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
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PLATO,
NATIONAL MUSEUM, NAPLES.

PLATO

II

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. N. FOWLER

AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
W. R. M. LAMB

Henry G. Richardson

I

EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY CRITO
PHAEDO PHAEDRUS



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PREFACE

THE Greek text in this volume is based upon that of Schanz, and all variations from his readings are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In some cases deviations from the reading of the manuscripts have been noted, even when adopted by Schanz. In the introductions to the separate dialogues no attempt has been made to discuss the philosophy of Plato or to do anything more than to supply such information as is needed for the intelligent reading of these particular dialogues. For further discussion and information the reader is referred to the General Introduction by Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, of Trinity College, Cambridge.

HAROLD N. FOWLER.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

PLATO was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of his master's

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thought ; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching : the suggestion came from the “ mimes ” of the Syracusan Sophron,—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the *Phaedo* he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is “ mind.” This was more promising : but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy ; this “ mind ” showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making *definitions* of “ beautiful,” “ good,” “ large ” and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher

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hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognised theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the *Republic*.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the *Phaedo* were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the *Clouds* (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to

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know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Laches* and *Lysis*, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the *Symposium*, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in

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a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the *Protagoras*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the Socratic discussions among the elect of the new

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generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the *Gorgias*. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the *Republic*, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The *Meno* and *Gorgias* set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the *Cratylus* and *Symposium*, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest

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powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organisation of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The

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Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The *Parmenides* corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all particulars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.

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Plato is here at work on his own great problem :— If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question : his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute “mean” which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato’s hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the *Laws*, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the *Republic*: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the *Timaeus* a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men

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have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealisable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. LAMB.

[NOTE.—*Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.*]

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EUTHYPHRO

VOL. I.

B

INTRODUCTION TO THE *EUTHYPHRO*

THE *Euthyphro* probably owes its place at the head of the list of dialogues to the fact that it is the first of four dialogues dealing with the trial and death of Socrates. It is probably one of the earliest in date of composition, though that fact is not likely to have affected its position in the series.

Socrates comes to the court of the king archon to attend to some preliminaries of his trial on the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Here he meets Euthyphro, who is bringing a charge of manslaughter against his father, on account of the death from exposure of a servant who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro says that he is bringing the charge in the interest of piety, and claims to know more than other men about the nature of piety, proper religious observances, and the will of the gods.¹ It is this claim which leads to the discussion of the nature of piety, or holiness, the chief theme of the dialogue.

The purpose of the dialogue is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. Euthyphro, when requested to give a definition of piety or holiness says (5 D) "I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or

¹ Of Euthyphro nothing further is known. He may be identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the *Cratylus* as a philologian addicted to fanciful etymologies.

INTRODUCTION TO THE *EUTHYPHRO*

steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else; and not prosecuting him is unholy." This reply leads at once to the proof that a particular example does not constitute a definition of a general concept. The second definition offered by Euthyphro is emended until it takes the form (9 ε) "What all the gods love is holy, and on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy." The question then arises whether a thing is holy because the gods love it, or the gods love it because it is holy. Cause and effect are discussed. In an attempt to arrive at a third definition, Euthyphro flounders hopelessly, whereupon Socrates shows how terms may be defined by referring a species to a genus.¹ Finally Euthyphro states (12 ε) that "the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness." Hereupon Socrates tries to get him to tell what attention the gods require, what end human service to the gods has in view. In this he does not succeed, and the dialogue ends with this question unanswered.

Instruction in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, however, may find it interesting, and in Plato's times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occupies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues. In the *Euthyphro* the correct method of thinking is illustrated and inculcated in the course of an attempt to define piety or holiness. The two definitions offered by Euthyphro are rejected; the third is left unchallenged, though a further limitation is demanded. It may therefore be regarded as

¹ See 11 c note.

INTRODUCTION TO THE *EUTHYPHRO*

a definition accepted by Plato, but not considered complete until the purpose of our service to the gods is determined. How Plato would determine it may be seen in the *Apology* (30 A), where Socrates says his life has been spent in the endeavour to persuade men to care chiefly for the perfection of their souls. The *Euthyphro* may perhaps be regarded as a sort of scientific justification of the position taken in the *Apology*. ✓

Special editions of the *Euthyphro* are numerous. Among them those of Schanz (1887), Christ (1890), Adam (1890), and Heidel (1902) may be chosen for especial mention. The last named contains an exhaustive bibliography.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΟΣΙΟΥ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

St. I.
p. 2

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

A 1. ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις οὕσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί φῆς; γραφήν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, B γέγραπται; οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σέ ἄλλος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνὸς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῦν ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον οἶον τετανότριχα καὶ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

This very remarkable little masterpiece . . . the
short complete work now in our possession
along with the scientific problem of religion.
Baillie - Interpretation of Religion - p. 14.

EUTHYPHRO

[OR ON HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

CHARACTERS

EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES

EUTHYPHRO. What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

SOCRATES. Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

EUTHYPHRO. What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don't accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

SOCRATES. Certainly not.

EUTHYPHRO. But someone else against you?

SOCRATES. Quite so.

EUTHYPHRO. Who is he?

SOCRATES. I don't know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ

C τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἦντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννή, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν· ἐκείνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς· καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὥς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλικιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὥς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ

D ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὁ τι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

2. ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Βουλοίμην ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τοῦναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὑφ' ἐστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καὶ μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νέους;

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὥς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὥς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεοὺς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. I don't remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

SOCRATES. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State, — at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.

EUTHYPHRO. I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

SOCRATES. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; it is because

τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίνεσθαι. ὥς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὥς διαβαλὼν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι,
 C ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὥς μαινομένου. καίτοι οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὦν προεῖπον, ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρή φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἵεναι.

3. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ τοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἶωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἶωνται
 D ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμούνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὥς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὃ τί περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς
 E παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

EUTHYPHRO

you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

SOCRATES. My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

EUTHYPHRO. I don't much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

SOCRATES. No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.

PLATO

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοὺν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

4. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστὶν δὲ δὴ σοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Διώκω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα;

4 ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ὀν διώκων αὐτὸ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὦν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστὶν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡράκλεις! ἢ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει.¹ οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ
B πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πόρρω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστὶν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ σου πατρός; ἢ δήλα δὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πού γε ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξῆμισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἶει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεὺς,

¹ Schanz, following Madvig, marks a lacuna here. For the meaning of the missing word or words he refers to 9 A and 15 D.

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

SOCRATES. What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

EUTHYPHRO. Prosecuting.

SOCRATES. Whom?

EUTHYPHRO. Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting¹ him.

SOCRATES. Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

EUTHYPHRO. No flying for him at his ripe old age.

SOCRATES. Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO. My father.

SOCRATES. Your father, my dear man?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

EUTHYPHRO. Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO. Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

SOCRATES. Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.

EUTHYPHRO. It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed

¹ The Greek word has much the same meaning as the Latin *prosequor*, from which the English 'prosecute' is derived, 'follow,' 'pursue,' and is at the same time the technical term for 'prosecute.'

- ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη
 ἐκτείνειν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη, εἰ
 εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, εἰάν περ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι
 C καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ᾗ. ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μῖασμα γίγνεται,
 εἰάν ξυνῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνειδώς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς
 σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνου τῇ δίκη ἐπεξιῶν, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε
 ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργού-
 μεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευν ἐκεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν. παρ-
 οινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινι τῶν
 ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν πατήρ συνδή-
 σας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν
 εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευσόμενον
 τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ, ὃ τι χρεῖη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ
 D χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς
 ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὄν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι·
 ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους
 καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνήσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον
 παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὲ οὖν
 καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ τε πατήρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι,
 ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου
 ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι,
 οὔτ' εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε
 ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ
 E τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ
 φόνου ἐπεξιέναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὧ Σώκρατες,
 τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὀσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ
 ἀνοσίου.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,
 οὕτως ἀκριβῶς οἶε ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων,

EUTHYPHRO

was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one's hearth and eat at one's table. For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.

SOCRATES. But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and

ὅπη ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὐτὸς σὺν ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ
5 Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

5. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ με ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἑξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητῆς δὴ γέγονα σός· καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὦ
B Μέλητε, φαίην ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείρουσι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκείνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι· καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθεται μηδ' ἀφή τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με
C ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὖροιμι' ἂν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὅπη σαθρός ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητῆς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδώς,

EUTHYPHRO

holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?

EUTHYPHRO. I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

SOCRATES. Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And "Meletus," I should say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father." And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

EUTHYPHRO. By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

SOCRATES. And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither

ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥαδίως κατείδεν, ὥστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι δισχυρίζου· ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ

D περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὄσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐτοῦ μὲν ὀσιῶν παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν¹ πᾶν, ὃ τί περ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε δή, τί φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὄσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξιέναι, εἴαν τε πατῆρ ὧν τυγχάνῃ

E εἴαν τε μήτηρ εἴαν τε ἄλλος ὅστισούν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον ἐπεὶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴῃ οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὅστισούν τυγχάνῃ ὧν αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι

6 τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιοτάτον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κακείνόν γε αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ

¹ After *ιδέαν* BD read *κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα*, which Schanz brackets.

EUTHYPHRO

this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic quality?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong-doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are

αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὐ ἔνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι' ἃ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσῃ τίς με ἔξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ
 B τῷ εὖ εἰδότει περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οἷ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἀλλὰ μοι εἰπέ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν
 C ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἂν περ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγῆσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰς αὐθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγῆσαι· νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἡρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν.
 D οὐ γάρ με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτήσαντα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅ τι ποτ' εἶη, ἀλλὰ μοι

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inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

SOCRATES. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

SOCRATES. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

SOCRATES. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy

εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὄν, δὲ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξίων τῷ πατρί.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῆς εἶναι ὅσια.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μέννησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, ἐν τῇ ἡ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὁσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μὴ ἰδέα τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, δὲ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾦ, ὡς ἂν ἡ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττη, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, δὲ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ-
7 φιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτησον ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές, τοῦτο οὐπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ὥς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἀλέγεις.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

8. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλὲς τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισῆς

EUTHYPHRO

which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, so they are.

SOCRATES. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don't you remember?

EUTHYPHRO. I remember.

SOCRATES. Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

EUTHYPHRO. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.

SOCRATES. I do wish it.

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

SOCRATES. Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the

ἀνοσιος· οὐ ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώ-
τατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι;

B ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.¹

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ
θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ
ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο
εἴρηται;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ
περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ᾧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἄρ'
ἂν εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ,
ὁπότερα πλείω, ἢ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροῦς
ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ
λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν

C ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ
ἐλάττονος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐλ-
θόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἐλθόντες,
ὥς ἐγῴμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου
διακριθεῖμεν ἂν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ
ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε
ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἴμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρό-

D χειρόν σοί ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ

¹ The manuscripts read Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· εἴρηται γάρ. Schanz brackets this and the preceding line. I follow

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exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, just this.

SOCRATES. And it seems to be correct ?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, we have said that.

SOCRATES. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger ? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic ?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course we should.

SOCRATES. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing ?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other ? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand ; but let

Hermann in omitting *εἰρηται γάρ*, which may have been once a marginal note or may have been copied by mistake from the next words of Euthyphro.

τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἄρα οὐ ταυτὰ ἐστίν, ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέρουσιν ἄν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Ε ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα¹ ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἢ γάρ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἔκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτὰ δέ γε, ὥς σὺ φής, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἃ καὶ 8 ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἄρα οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῇ τε καὶ θεοφιλῇ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔοικεν.

¹ καὶ ἄδικα inserted by Hirchig, followed by Schanz.

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me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

SOCRATES. And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

SOCRATES. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Κινδυνεύει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα δὲ ἡρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἡρώτων, δ¹ τυγχάνει ταῦτόν ὃν ὁσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· δὲ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾗ, καὶ θεομισὲς ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, δὲ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἥφαιστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν· καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκείνῳ, ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἤδη τινὸς ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὀτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἀδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμῶς οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

¹ Schanz reads ϕ for δ .

EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

EUTHYPHRO. I suppose so.

SOCRATES. Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

EUTHYPHRO. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

SOCRATES. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

SOCRATES. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Oh, no, they don't do that.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' D ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὥς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκείνó γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὥς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστίν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.¹

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκείνó γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε E ἀνθρώπων τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὥς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἕκαστόν γε οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί· πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπραχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἂρ' οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴθι νῦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, 9 δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστίν, ὥς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκείνον ἀδίκως τεθινάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδρο-

¹ οὐκ ἄρα . . . Ἀληθῇ λέγεις bracketed by Schanz following Schenkl.

EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty ; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong ; do they not ?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty ; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

EUTHYPHRO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not ? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

SOCRATES. But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so ?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed

φόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθείς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάση τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδῆσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί· ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὥς
 B παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν· κἄν μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξη, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδείξαι σοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὥς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν περ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσονται, ἐάν περ εὖ
 C δοκῇς λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὃ τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὥς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὁσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἂν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὠρισμένα τὸ ὁσιον καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὄν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη· ὥστε τούτου ἀφίημί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ
 D ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισούντων. ἄλλ' ἄρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,

EUTHYPHRO

a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

SOCRATES. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

SOCRATES. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: "If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and

ὥς δ' ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δ' ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὃ δ' ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα; ἄρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὠρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾶστά με διδάξεις ὃ ὑπέσχου.

Ε ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῷμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μόνον φῆ τίς τι ἔχειν οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

10 12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τάχ', ὦγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσό-
μεθα, ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε. ἄρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὀσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὀσιόν ἐστιν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὀρώμενον καὶ ὀρῶν. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ ἕτερα;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

EUTHYPHRO

say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. What is to hinder, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

SOCRATES. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

EUTHYPHRO. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

SOCRATES. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

EUTHYPHRO. I think I understand.

PLATO

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστὶν καὶ
τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον,
διότι φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστὶν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δή, διότι ἄγεται,
καὶ τὸ ὀρώμενον, διότι ὀράται;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενόν γέ ἐστὶν,
διὰ τοῦτο ὀράται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὀράται,
διὰ τοῦτο ὀρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστὶν,
διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο
ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ
διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἄρα κατάδηλον, ὦ

Γ Εὐθύφρων, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε,
ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενον
ἐστὶ, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον
ἐστὶν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι
πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ ξυγχωρεῖς οὕτω;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμε-
νόν τί ἐστὶν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ
τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀνάγκη.

EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for that reason.

SOCRATES. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

SOCRATES. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

EUTHYPHRO. Obviously.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου,
D ὦ Εὐθύφρον; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων,
ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστίν, ἢ
δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Διότι ἄρα ὁσίον ἐστίν, φιλεῖται,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁσίον ἐστίν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ
θεῶν, φιλοῦμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλές.¹

E ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὁσίον ἐστίν, ὦ
Εὐθύφρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις,
ἀλλ' ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ
τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὁσίον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι
φιλεῖται, ὅσιον εἶναι· ἢ γάρ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

13. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς
εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν, ὦ φίλε
Εὐθύφρον, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ
11 ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς
εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖ-
σθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ

¹ τὸ θεοφιλές added by Schanz following Bast.

EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for this reason.

SOCRATES. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so.

SOCRATES. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

EUTHYPHRO. How so, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

EUTHYPHRO. Very true.

SOCRATES. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because

ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὅσιον ᾗ· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχεται, ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἶον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ
 B ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὃ τι δὲ ὄν, οὐπω εἶπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὄν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ὀτιδὴ πάσχει· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως, τί ἐστὶν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὅπως σοι εἶπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν αἰὲν ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἰδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύ-
 C φρον, ἔοικεν εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δέ—σαι γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἄλλου δὴ τινος δεῖ σκώμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ

EUTHYPHRO

it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are entirely different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won't stay where we put it. { -

SOCRATES. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my ¹ ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won't stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they won't stay fixed, as you yourself see.

EUTHYPHRO. I think the jest does very well as it

¹ Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself educated to be a sculptor. This is doubtless the reason for his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.

PLATO

σκόμματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα.
D τὸ γὰρ περιέειναι τούτοις¹ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν
 τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, ἀλλὰ σύ μοι
 δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἔνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν
 ταῦτα οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἐκείνου
 τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην το-
 σούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνᾳ ἐποίει οὐ
 μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαντοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ
E τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό μοι τῆς τέχνης
 ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐβου-
 λόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως
 ἰδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ
 τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων
 μὲν ἄδην· ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός
 σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι,² ὅπως ἂν με διδάξης περὶ
 τοῦ ὀσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης. ἰδὲ γάρ, εἰ
 οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ
 ὅσιον.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον,
 12 ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πᾶν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν
 ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ
 ἄλλο;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐχ ἔπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς
 λεγομένοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἰ οὐκ
 ἐλάττονι ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς
 ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε,

¹ τούτοις is bracketed by Schanz following Stallbaum.

² ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δεῖξαι the manuscripts. Schanz follows Hermann in omitting δεῖξαι.

EUTHYPHRO

is ; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus ; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

SOCRATES. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will ; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

EUTHYPHRO. I do.

SOCRATES. But is everything that is right also holy ? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else ?

EUTHYPHRO. I can't follow you, Socrates.

SOCRATES. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser ; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert

PLATO

ξύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας·

Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θ' ἔρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ' ἐφύτευσεν,
B οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς.

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι ὅπη;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μὲν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα ἃ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ
C αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηταί τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος, οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλεον γάρ, οἶμαι, δέος αἰδοῦς· μῶριον γὰρ αἰδῶς δέους, ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵνα περ ἀριθμός, ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός. ἔπει γάρ που νῦν γε;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἡρώτων, ἅρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἵνα
D μὲν ὅσιον, ἔνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ

EUTHYPHRO

yourself, my friend ; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet¹ said, who wrote : " Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name ; for where fear is, there also is reverence." Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how ?

EUTHYPHRO. By all means.

SOCRATES. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence ; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don't you think so, too ?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear ; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness ?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, he does fear.

SOCRATES. Then it is not correct to say " where fear is, there also is reverence." On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear ; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence ; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now ?

EUTHYPHRO. Perfectly.

SOCRATES. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is,

¹ Stasinus, author of the "Cypria" (Fragm. 20, ed. Kinkel).

πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον.
οὕτω φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΤΕΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι
ὀρθῶς λέγειν.

14. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ
μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ
ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὖν σύ με ἡρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ,
οἶον ποῖον μέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς
ὦν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἂν, ὅτι ὁς ἂν
μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ, ἀλλ' ἰσοσκελὴς· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΕΥΤΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμοιγε.

Ε ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ οὕτω διδάξαι,
τὸ ποῖον μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὁσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ
Μελήτω λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσε-
βείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμα-
θηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥΤΕΦΡΩΝ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ
ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ
περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ
δικαίου μέρος.

15. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύ-
φρων, φαίνει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι
ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν οὐπω ξυνίημι
ἦντινα ὀνομάξεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἰαί περ
καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπείαι εἰσιν, τοιαύτην
καὶ περὶ θεούς. λέγομεν γάρ που—οἶον φαμέν,
ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ
ἵππικός· ἢ γάρ;

EUTHYPHRO

there also is the right ; but holiness is not everywhere where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent ?

EUTHYPHRO. No, I agree ; for I think the statement is correct.

SOCRATES. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, "that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two" ; or don't you agree ?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

SOCRATES. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.

EUTHYPHRO. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.

SOCRATES. I think you are correct, Euthyphro ; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by "attention." I don't suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not ?

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ γάρ που ἵππικὴ ἵππων θερα-
πεία.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θερα-
πεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν
θεραπεία.

B ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὀσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια
θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων; οὕτω λέγεις;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταῦτόν
διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι
καὶ ὠφελεία τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δὴ,
ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι
ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίνονται· ἢ οὐ δο-
κούσί σοι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμοιγε.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνη-
γετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ
τάλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἶει τοῦ
θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης θεραπεία οὐσα
θεῶν ὠφέλειά τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς

EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

EUTHYPHRO. That is so.

SOCRATES. Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the oxherd's art is that of attending to oxen?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I do.

SOCRATES. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the oxherd's and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES. But for its benefit?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and

ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσῃς ἄν, ὥς ἐπειδάν
 τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, οἶμαί σε
 τοῦτο λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ
 Δ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν
 τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τριαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ
 τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη
 ἂν ἡ ὀσιότης;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἥπιερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς
 δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετικὴ τις ἂν, ὥς
 ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

16. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἱατροῖς
 ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει
 οὐσα ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἶει;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς
 Ε τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἐστίν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπέ δὴ, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπη-
 ρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν
 εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα
 κάλλιστά γε φῆς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπέ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτέ ἐστιν

EUTHYPHRO

makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by "attention to the gods" just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

SOCRATES. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?

EUTHYPHRO. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

SOCRATES. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly.

SOCRATES. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

EUTHYPHRO. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

SOCRATES. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. And what I say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me,

ἐκείνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται
ἡμῖν ὑπηρεταῖς χρώμενοι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

14 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ’
ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥαδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι
νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὐ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πολλὰ δέ γ’, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ
γεωργοί· ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν
τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ δή; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ἃ
οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς
ἐργασίας;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ
B Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς πάντα
ταῦτα ὥς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω,
ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῖς θεοῖς
λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων,
ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σφάζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς
τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ’
ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ
ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

17. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ
Εὐθύφρων, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν
ἡρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἰ διδάξαι·
C δῆλος εἶ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἦσθα,
ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ
σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δέ—ἀνάγκη
γὰρ τὸν ἐρώντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν
ἐκείνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὐτὸ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ

EUTHYPHRO

what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

EUTHYPHRO. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.

SOCRATES. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or

τὴν ὁσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχέσθαι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ' εὐχέσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνήκας δ εἶπον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὃ τι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοὺς καὶ δίδοναι ἐκείνοις;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώ γε.

18. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη, ὧν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλὰ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ αὐτὸ δίδοναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκείνοις Ε τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὐτὸν ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμπορικὴ, εἰ οὕτως ἡδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἡδιον ἔμουγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὐσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρ'

EUTHYPHRO

holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.

EUTHYPHRO. You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO. What else?

SOCRATES. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

SOCRATES. I don't like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from

- 15 ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἂ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι, παντὶ δὴλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὃ τι ἂν μὴ ἐκείνοι δώσιν· ἂ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελούνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα τὰγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκείνοι δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ' οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἂ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἢ τιμὴ τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

- B ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τὸ ὅσιον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μάλιστα γέ.

19. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολὺ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιμόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν ἤκει; μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔμ-
C προσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτόν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῦ

EUTHYPHRO

the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?

EUTHYPHRO. Why you don't suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

SOCRATES. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

EUTHYPHRO. What else than honour and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

SOCRATES. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I think it is precious, above all things.

SOCRATES. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES. Then don't you see that now you say

θεοῖς φίλον φῆς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλές γίγνεται ἢ οὐ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογούμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἔοικεν.

20. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτόεν, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἐκὼν
D εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ με ἀτιμάσης, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νῦν ὃ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἰ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ᾔδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἀνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκᾶθαι φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδειςας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσεις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾗσχύνῃς. νῦν δέ
E εὐ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἶει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μὴ· εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὃ τι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Εἰς αὐθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καί μοι ὦρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἶα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἐταῖρε! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος
16 ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρ' Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

EUTHYPHRO

that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

SOCRATES. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

EUTHYPHRO. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

SOCRATES. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.

THE APOLOGY



INTRODUCTION TO THE *APOLOGY*

IN the spring of 399 B.C., when Socrates was seventy years old, he was accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth. The chief accuser was Meletus, who was seconded by Anytus and Lyco. In the *Euthyphro* Meletus is spoken of as an insignificant youth, and in the *Apology* he is said to have been incensed by Socrates' criticism of the poets. Nothing further is known of him, though he may be identical with the Meletus mentioned in the *Frogs* (1302) of Aristophanes as a poet of *Skolia*. The statement of Diodorus Siculus (XIV, 37), that the Athenians, overcome by repentance for their injustice to Socrates, put Meletus and Anytus to death, deserves no credence. Anytus, who is one of the characters in the *Meno*, was a man of substance, who had served as general of the Athenian armies and had recently been active in expelling the Thirty Tyrants. He was a bitter enemy of all the sophists, and, according to the author of the *Apology* attributed to Xenophon, he had been irritated by Socrates' criticism of his conduct in employing his son in his tannery, when the young man was fitted for higher things. Lyco was charged by the comic poet Eupolis with being of foreign descent, and the comic poet Cratinus refers to his poverty and effeminacy, though Aristophanes (*Wasps*, 1301) mentions him among

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aristocrats. He seems to have been a person of no great importance.

Cases involving religion came under the jurisdiction of the King Archon, to whom Meletus submitted his indictment of Socrates (see the beginning of the *Euthyphro*), and such cases, like others, were tried before the heliastic court, which consisted altogether of six thousand citizens chosen by lot, six hundred from each of the ten tribes. The court did not however, usually sit as a whole, but was divided, so that cases were tried before smaller bodies, consisting generally of five hundred jurymen or judges, though sometimes the number was less, as four hundred or two hundred, and sometimes more, as one thousand. One additional judge was added to these even numbers to avoid a tie. Socrates was tried before a court of 501 (*Apology*, 36 A). If the accuser did not receive a fifth part of the votes cast in a case of this kind, he was subject to a fine of 1000 drachmae (about £35 or \$175). No penalty was prescribed by law for the offence with which Socrates was charged. After Socrates was found guilty the penalty still remained to be determined. The rule was that the accused, after conviction, should propose a counter penalty, the court being obliged to choose one of the two penalties proposed (*Apology*, 36 B-38 B); no compromise was permitted.

The question has frequently been asked, whether the *Apology* is substantially the speech made by Socrates before the court or a product of Plato's imagination. In all probability it is essentially the speech delivered by Socrates, though it may well be that the actual speech was less finished and less charming than that which Plato has reported. The

INTRODUCTION TO THE *APOLOGY*

legal procedure is strictly followed, and the manner of speech is that which was, as we know from Plato and also from Xenophon, usual with Socrates. There is nothing inconsistent with what we know of Socrates, and no peculiarly Platonic doctrine is suggested. The purpose of the dialogue, or rather, of the speech, for it is hardly a dialogue, is to present Socrates in a true and favourable light to posterity, and that end could hardly be gained by publishing a fiction as the speech which many Athenians must have remembered at the time of publication, which was, in all probability, not long after the trial.

In form the *Apology*, if we disregard the two short addresses after the conviction and the condemnation, follows the rules in vogue for public speeches. A brief introduction is followed by the narrative and argument, after which the speech closes with a brief appeal to the judges and to God (36 D). It conforms to Plato's own rule (*Phaedrus* 264 c), that every discourse should, like a living being, have its middle parts and its members, all in proper agreement with each other and with the whole, which is, after all, the rule of common sense, followed for the most part even by those teachers of rhetoric whose elaborate subdivisions and high-sounding nomenclature Plato ridicules in the *Phaedrus* (266 E-267 D). The two shorter addresses after the case had been decided against Socrates cannot be expected to stand as independent and complete speeches; they are, and must be, treated as supplementary and subordinate to the speech delivered before the first adverse vote. Yet they are symmetrically arranged and their topics are skilfully presented. A peroration would hardly be appropriate before the last of

INTRODUCTION TO THE *APOLOGY*

these and the last itself needs no formal introduction; it serves as a fitting conclusion for the entire discourse. As such it is a brilliant example of oratorical composition.

The high moral character and genuine religious faith of Socrates are made abundantly clear throughout this whole discourse. It would seem almost incredible that the Athenian court voted for his condemnation, if we did not know the fact. His condemnation is to be explained by the general hostility to the sophists. Socrates was, to be sure, not a sophist, though Aristophanes in the *Clouds* selects him as the representative of that profession to be ridiculed. He did not teach for pay and did not promise any definite result from his instruction. He did not investigate natural phenomena or claim to ensure the political or financial success of his hearers; ~~his aim was to show the way to righteousness, to the perfection of the individual soul.~~ This seems harmless enough, but Socrates endeavoured to lead men to righteousness by making them think, and thinking, especially on matters of religion, is not welcomed by the slothful or the conservative. The mere fact that he was a leader of thought caused Socrates to be confounded with the sophists who were also leaders of thought, and were, chiefly, perhaps, for that reason, regarded with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, Socrates claimed to possess a *daimonion*, or spiritual monitor, which guided his actions. He did not, so far as we know, attribute a distinct personality to this inner voice, but his belief in it caused him to be accused of introducing "new spiritual beings" or divinities and of disbelieving in the gods of the state, although he was apparently punctilious in religious observances.

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His method had also, without doubt, aroused many personal antagonisms (*Apology* 21 c-23 a). Probably Meletus and the judges who voted for the condemnation of Socrates believed that they were acting in the interest of religion and piety, though their verdict has not been approved by later generations.

Editions of the *Apology* are very numerous. One of the best is that of Cron (*Apology* and *Crito*), upon which the excellent edition of Dyer is based (revised, 1908, by Seymour). Another good edition is that of J. Adam.

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

St. I
p. 17

[ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

- A 1. Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρή ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ
- B ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴν μηδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθῇ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ
- C τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως·

*An excellent comparison of Socrates as an orator
by Plato and Xenophon in Percy Fardell's
Ephesian Gospel - p. 101 ff.*

THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES AT HIS TRIAL

[ETHICAL]

How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know ; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk ; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth ; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator—not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true ; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just ; and let none of you expect anything else.

PLATO

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρεποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ
 ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μεираκίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς
 ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνν, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν
 διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου,
 δι' ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν
 τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι,
 D μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει
 γὰρ οὕτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον
 ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς
 οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν,
 εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγγανον ὦν, ξυνεγιγνώσκετε
 δήπου ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ
 18 τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ
 νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ,
 τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν· ἴσως μὲν γὰρ
 χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο
σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια
 λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος
 δὲ τάληθῇ λέγειν.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογή-
 σασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου
 ψευδῇ¹ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατη-
 γόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς
 B ὕστερους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι
 πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν
 ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς
 ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς·
 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς
 πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε

¹ Schanz brackets ψευδῇ, following Hirschig.



THE APOLOGY

For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old ; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not ; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true ; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous ; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got

- καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ¹ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὥς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
- C οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶν μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μεῖράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν
- D ὅτε αὐτῶν εἶδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδιοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν· ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντων ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς
- E κατήγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ

¹ After ἐμοῦ the MSS. read μᾶλλον "more" or "rather." Schanz reads μὰ τόν—, "by—," Hermann brackets μᾶλλον and also οὐδὲν ἀληθές, Wohlrab omits μᾶλλον.

THE APOLOGY

hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with

τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον. εἰεν· ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὃ
 19 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέ-
 σθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
 ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην
 μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον
 καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλεον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπο-
 λογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ
 πάννυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν
 ἵτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ
 ἀπολογητέον.

3. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία
 ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἥ δὴ καὶ
 B πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν
 ταύτην. εἰεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ δια-
 βάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντω-
 μοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ
 καὶ περιεργάζεται, ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ
 οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ
 C ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς
 ἐστίν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀρι-
 στοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-
 φερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην
 πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν
 οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν περὶ ἐπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὥς
 ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν. μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ
 Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι!¹ ἀλλὰ γὰρ
 ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.
 D μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρ-
 ἔχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ

¹ Schanz brackets μή πως . . . φύγοιμι.

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much greater force than these who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence; men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes' comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!),—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another

φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,¹ οὐδέ γ' εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ
- E ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν² ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἕξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσιν τὰς
- 20 ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἠσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε—
- ᾽Ω Καλλία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ υἱέῃ πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ
- B τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἣν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης

¹ Schanz brackets ἐστιν. ² Schanz brackets οἷός τ' ἐστὶν.

THE APOLOGY

and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me conversing—and there are many such among you—now tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also the other things that the multitude say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gentlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish among their own fellow citizens, to give up the association with those men and to associate with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him—for he has two sons—"Callias," said I, "if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind

ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπι-
στήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν
τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ;
Πάνν γε, ἢ ὁ ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός,
καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐῆνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐῆνον ἐμα-
C κάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ
οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς
ἐκαλλυγόμεν τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην
ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναῖοι.

5. Ὑπολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· Ἄλλ', ὦ
Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ δια-
βολαί σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε
οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου
ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ
τι ἔπραττες ἄλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί.¹ λέγε οὖν
D ἡμῖν, τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχέ-
διάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων,
κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν
τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν
διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν
ὑμῶν παίξειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν
ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι'
οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα
ἔσχηκα. ποῖαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ
ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ
κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν,
E οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον
σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω. οὐ γὰρ
δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ

¹ Schanz brackets εἰ μὴ τι . . . πολλοί.

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of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I, "and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." And I called Evenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin: "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case." The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom I was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to

ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ ὅλα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που.

21 οὗτος ἐμὸς τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ¹ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ, οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἔλθων ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὕτωσι μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος τετελεύτηκεν.

B 6. Σκέψασθε δέ, ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοῖδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, τί ποτε λέγει. ἔπειτα μόγις πάννυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

Ἦλθον ἐπὶ τίνα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἴ περπου, ἐδέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι οὕτωσι ἐμοῦ

¹ Schanz brackets ἐταῖρός τε καί.

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arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: "What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the

σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμέ εἴησθα. διασκοπῶν
οὖν τούτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖν λέγειν,
ἣν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν
τοιούτον τι ἔπαθον, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—καὶ
διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ,¹ ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ
δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς
ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ·
κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμενην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἷοιτο
D μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ
τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς
ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι τούτου
μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει
μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν καγαθὸν
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ
εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι·
ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ
σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι
εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἢ τῶν ἐκείνου
E δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα
ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κακείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθόμην.

7. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμε-
νος μὲν καὶ² λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθα-
νόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκο-
ποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς
τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὧς ἄνδρες
22 Ἀθηναῖοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθ' εἰ
λέγειν· ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιούτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα
εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ.

² Schanz brackets καὶ.

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oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest." So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience: those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient,

ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὸς πονοῦντος, ἵνα¹ μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἢ ἀ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων

B καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων οὐτα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτούς, τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὰληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν

C ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὲ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τὰλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἀ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ² οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.]

8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνους ἢ·
D ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῆδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ

¹ Schanz, following Stephanus, inserts *μη* after *ἵνα*.

² Schanz inserts *αὐτῶν* after *τῷ αὐτῷ*.

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as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen ; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles ; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say ; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men.

Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine

καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.¹ διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν

Ε ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἃ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

9. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες
- 23 Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθαιαί μοι γεγόνασιν καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεκρῆσθαι
- B δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.

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things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: "Human wisdom is of little or no value." And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: "This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

Therefore I am still even now going about and

καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἂν τινα οἶμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν

C πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος

D καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ, ὃ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὃ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν,¹ ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.] τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν.

E ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως² καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ

¹ Schanz reads ἀμφιγνοοῦσιν, "they are in doubt."

² Schanz reads ξυντεταμένως, "earnestly."

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searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise ; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others ; and, then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that " Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them " by doing or teaching what ? " they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, " the things in the air and the things beneath the earth " and " not to believe in the gods " and " to make the weaker argument the stronger." For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.

Μέλητός μοι επέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολι-
 24 τικῶν,¹ Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταύτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθ' ἢ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολή ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἐάν τε νῦν
 B ἐάν τε αὐθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουσιν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐτὴν τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα
 C δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι,

¹ Schanz follows Cobet in bracketing καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

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From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators ; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct ; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you ; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows : it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things

ὦν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πρόποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὥς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι. ¹

- D 12. Καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι
ἔσονται; Ἐγώ γε. Ἴθι δὴ νυν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς
αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθαι,
μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών,
ὥς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ¹ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν
δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα Ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον
αὐτοῖς, τίς ἐστιν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾶς καὶ
οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν σοι δοκεῖ
εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι
σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἄλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τίς
E αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο
ἔρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις
πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι
ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε;
οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἳ τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους
ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν
αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαντες. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἑρᾶν
λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί
25 δὲ δὴ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ;
Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί.
Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ
ἐκκλησιασταί,² διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ
κακῆνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κακῆνοι.
Πάντες ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς
ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω
λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ'

¹ Cobet's suggestion of εἰς τουτουσὶ for τουτοισὶ is adopted by Schanz.

² Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί.

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for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me : don't you consider it of great importance that the youth be as good as possible ? " I do." Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better ? For it is evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me ; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell ? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it ? But tell, my good man, who makes them better ? " The laws." But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws. " These men, Socrates, the judges." What are you saying, Meletus ? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better ? " Certainly." All, or some of them and others not ? " All." Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this ? Do these listeners make them better, or not ? " These also." And how about the senators ? " The senators also." But, Meletus, those in the assembly, the assembly-men, don't corrupt the youth, do they ? or do they also all make them better ? " They also." All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean ? " Very decidedly, that is

- ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι·
 ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν
 B βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι,
 εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοῦναντίον τούτου πάν
 εἷς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ
 ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ
 χρώνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει,
 ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάν-
 των ζώων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος
 οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία
 εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς
 διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ,
 C ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώ-
 ποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις
 τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν
 περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

13. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε,
 πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς
 ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τᾶν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδέν γάρ τοι
 χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι
 ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰὲ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ'
 ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι; Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις
 D βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον
 ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ
 νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται
 βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ
 εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὥς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους
 καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
 Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ
 ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἰ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε
 ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν
 E τι ἐργάζονται αἰὲ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν,

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what I mean." You have condemned me to great unhappiness ! But answer me ; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person ? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them ? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals ? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree ; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven's sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad ? My friend, answer ; for I am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good ? "Certainly." Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited ? Answer, my good man ; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured ? "Of course not." Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily ? "Voluntarily I say." What then, Meletus ? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some

οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, εἴαν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώ-
 26 πων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει.) εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων¹ ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδία λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

14. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελέτω τού-
 B των οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὁμῶς δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνν μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ
 C Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ ἀκουσίων.

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good ; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say ? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does ! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth ? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings ? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them ? " Very decidedly that is what I say." Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the

οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἡ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

D οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου¹ οἷε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἷε αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν

E ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιηταὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ² οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν. Ἀπιστός γ' εἰ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖτινι καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν

27 γὰρ ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης

¹ Schanz brackets Ἀναξαγόρου. ² Schanz brackets δοκῶ.

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state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. "That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? "No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth." Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? "And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? "No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least." You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: "Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?" For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, "Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does

θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

15. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἥ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ
- B Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. Ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ
- C τούτῳ γε ἀποκρίναι· ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὤνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι
- D θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι

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not believe in gods, but does believe in gods." And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits? "There is not." Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, or no? "Certainly." Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I

πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη, **E** ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ¹ οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς² τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ³ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε **28** ἥρωας,⁴ οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

16. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴπερ αἰρῇ, οὐ Μελήτος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἥρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ **B** καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύnei, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον

¹ Schanz brackets ταῦτα, which the MSS. give after σὺ.

² After ὡς the MSS., and Schanz, read οὐ. It was omitted by Stephanus.

³ Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

⁴ Schanz, following Prammer, brackets μήτε ἥρωας.

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believe in spirits ; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods ? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of ; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrong-doer according to Meletus's indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think will do so ; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say : "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result ?" But I should make to him a

PLATO

- ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ
- C λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτή-
κασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτείνειν, θεὸς οὔσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρή-
σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἑκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἑκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώ-
- D ρησε, πολὺ δὲ μάλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρού-
ρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κιν-
δύνου; οὔτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπο-
λογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ
- E ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔτατ-
τον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ

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just reply : " You do not speak well, Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, ' My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die ; " for straightway," ' she says, " after Hector, is death appointed unto thee" ' ;¹ he, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and ' Straightway,' said he, ' may I die,² after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.'³ Do you think he considered death and danger? "

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth ; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me,

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, xviii, 96.

² Homer, *Iliad*, xviii, 98.

³ Homer, *Iliad*, xviii, 104.

- ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντά με
- 29 δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τᾶν εἶη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὄν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν
- B κακῶν ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναί ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾿Αιδου οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναί· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ
- C με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρῆσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς

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like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach—if you should say

ταῦτα εἵποιτε· ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνὺτῳ οὐ
πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι,
ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν
μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλῳς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων,

D ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις
ἀφίοιτε, εἵποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες
Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ
μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ
οἶός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ
ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἶωθα, ὅτι, ὦ
ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης
καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρη-

E ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως
δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη
ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐὰν τις
ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς
ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν
καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ
κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ, ὅτι τὰ

30 πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ
φauλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ
πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ
καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυ-
τέρῳ ἔστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ
ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν
γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.
οὐδέν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ
πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους
μήτε σωματῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων

B πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς,

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to me in reply to this : "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die"; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, "Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way : "Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?" And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much ; and I tell

ὅπως ὡς ὑρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τις μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἂν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσουντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω

C πολλάκις τεθνάναι. }

18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμένετε μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν καὶ γάρ, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάβετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος·

D οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναίτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μέντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τις που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαντοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὕρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό-

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you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means. For know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not God's will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. (And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd

- τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει,¹ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων
- 31 καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὦν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ
- B πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μὲν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχεν² ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τὰλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπ-
- C αναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἱκανὸν

¹ The MSS. give ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, "by the god," after πόλει. Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets it.

² Schanz, with some inferior MS. authority, reads εἶχεν for εἶχον of the best MSS.

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figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his age and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. (Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think

γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις
- D ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται,¹ ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὐτ'
- E ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμavτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τὰληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῃ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδिका καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι,
- 32 ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμ' ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην.

¹ The MSS. read φωνή, "voice," after γίγνεται. Schanz, following others, omits it.

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I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood ; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing ; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth ; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more,—actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell

- έρω δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθὴ δέ.
 B ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν
 πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ
 ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς
 τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς
 ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν,
 παρανόμως ὥς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν
 ἔδοξε. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην
 ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους¹ καὶ ἐτοι-
 μων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥη-
 τῶρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ
 C τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ὥμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν
 διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια
 βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ
 ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως·
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ
 μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον
 προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Λέοντα τὸν
 Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις
 ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι
 ὥς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι
 D ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ
 θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν,
 οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργά-
 ζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ
 ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα, ὥστε
 ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου
 ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα
 καὶ ἡγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄχόμην ἀπὼν οἴκαδε.
 καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ

¹ Schanz, following Hermann, brackets καὶ ἐναντία ἐψη-
 φισάμην, "and I voted against it," which the MSS. give after

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you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. [That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been

νόμος. Xenophon, *Mem.* iv. 4. 2, states that Socrates, as presiding officer, refused to put the question to vote.

Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

21. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καί, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν
 33 ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμούς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθό-
 Β νησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

22. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσι
 C τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὗσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδὲς. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται

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put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one's teacher. If any one, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I

ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πραττεῖν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶν καὶ εὐλέγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς

D μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρὴν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτε τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι.¹ πάντως δὲ πάρεσιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοί, οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων

E οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου— καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεσθῇ—, καὶ Πάραλος ὃδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός. ὃδε δὲ 34 Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὐτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὃδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ

¹ After μεμνήσθαι the best MSS. give καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, "and punish." Schanz follows Bekker and some MSS. in omitting these words.

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have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk—ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see ; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present ; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here ; and also Antiphon of Cephissus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus ; Theages was his brother ; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here ; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech ; but if he forgot it then, let

δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τούναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασσι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

23. Εἶπεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῦ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παῖδιά τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῇ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκείοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία·

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him do so now ; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves corrupted might have some motive in aiding me ; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth ?

Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some one among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives ; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps some one with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, “not born of an oak or a rock,”¹ but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still

¹ Homer, *Odyssey*, xix. 163.

- ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος
 δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν
 τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι,
 Ε οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ
 ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μὴ, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ'
 οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ
 μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ
 τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν
 ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι
 35 τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.
 εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε
 ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἐσονται,
 αἰσχροὺν ἂν εἴη· οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά
 τινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι,
 θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους
 πείσεσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων
 ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ
 δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃν τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν
 τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες
 Β Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὗς αὐτοὶ ἐαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς
 ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν,
 οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς
 δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπιοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς
 ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδεί-
 κνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ
 ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέ-
 λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιούντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν
 ἄγοντος.
24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δί-
 C καιὸν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ
 δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.

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children ; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honour with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform

οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμῶμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκ οὐκ χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὖσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,
D ἄλλως τε μέντοι νή Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουῖ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγείσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῖην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὥς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

E 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
36 ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς¹ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ῥόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἂν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη

¹ Schanz brackets τὸ γεγονὸς.

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and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honourable nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had

Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κὰν
 B ὥφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον
 μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

26. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἰεν
 ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι; ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί
 ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ
 βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἤγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὥνπερ
 οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ
 στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν
 καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει
 γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιει-
 C κέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντα σφύζεσθαι,
 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε
 ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ
 ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν¹ εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐερ-
 γεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν
 ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν
 ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμε-
 ληθεῖν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος
 ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς
 πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν
 D τοιοῦτος ὢν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι·
 καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἂν πρέποι
 ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πέννητι εὐεργέτη,
 δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακε-
 λεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,
 πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ
 σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ

¹ Schanz brackets, ἰὼν.

THE APOLOGY

not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honourable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as I deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens, if I must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the

ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι,¹ ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι.
 E καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι.
 εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι,
 37 τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-
 πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου
 καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ
 οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε
 μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδι-
 κεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω·
 ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγεμθα· ἐπεί,
 ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις
 B ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον
 κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ
 ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπο-
 λύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν
 πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσῃν καὶ κατ'
 ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἀξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ
 καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας;
 ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται,
 ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακόν
 ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι
 κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦ τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;
 C καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ
 αἰεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ
 δεδέσθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταυτόν μοι
 ἐστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι
 χρήματα, ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμή-
 σωμαι; Ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε.
 πολλὰ μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως

¹ Schanz brackets εἶναι, following Hermann.

THE APOLOGY

Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality ; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado ; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one ; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced ; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I ? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil ? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil ? What penalty shall I propose ? Imprisonment ? And why should I live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority ? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid ? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty ? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be

ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε
D ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγήναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελευνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ
E μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

28. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἰός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαιί τινας ὑμῶν. ἐὰν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ·
38 ἐὰν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὅν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὃ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἥττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην
B ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ

THE APOLOGY

possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.

PLATO

ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα
 ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βού-
 λεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι
 ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι.
 Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων
 καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσίν
 με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγ-
 γυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ
 C ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν
 βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὥς Σωκράτης
 ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με
 σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μή εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν
 ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον,
 ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε
 γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ
 βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς
 D πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψη-
 φισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες,
 ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς
 ἔπεισα, εἰ ὥμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν,
 ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ'
 ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ
 τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν
 πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἡδιστα ᾗ ἀκούειν,
 θρηνηοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου· καὶ ἄλλα
 E ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ,
 ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων
 εἶναι. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ὥθήθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ

THE APOLOGY

But as it is—I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Aristobulus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time

- κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησάμενφ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ᾧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' 39 ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίνεται, ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλάί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εἴαν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ᾧ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ.
- B καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θᾶττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἔγωγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.
- C 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησ-μφοδῆσαι, ᾧ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησ-μφοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ᾧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλε-πωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον

THE APOLOGY

that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find

- ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς
D οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ
οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσφ
νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν
τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζήτε, οὐκ
ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγή
οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ
καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν,
ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς
βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφι-
E σαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλε-
χθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῖ πράγματος,
ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω
ἔρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι,
ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν
γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
40 ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι
ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ
γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς
καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν.
ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου¹ ἐν
μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰὲ
ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι
μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ
μοι, ἅπερ ὀράτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη
ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ
B οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἰκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ

¹ Schanz follows Schleiermacher in bracketing ἡ τοῦ δαι-
μονίου.

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the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than heretofore ; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not ; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at all nor honourable, but the easiest and most honourable escape is **not** by suppressing others, but by **making** yourselves as good as possible. So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends ; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened to me. For, judges—and in calling you judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not ; but now this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me ; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech,

ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, C ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

32. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε, ὥς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ¹ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε μηδεμίᾳ αἰσθησίς D ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὔτω κατέδαρθεν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν E βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν

¹ Schanz, following C and Hirschig, brackets τοῦ τόπου τοῦ.

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when I was going to say anything ; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech ; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason ? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me ; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things : either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if any one were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night,—I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I

τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω·
 καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται
 οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδη-
 μῆσαι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον,
 καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν
 ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου
 εἴη ἂν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος
 41 εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων
 δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς,
 οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ
 Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ (Τριπτόλεμος) καὶ
 ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ
 ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; / ἢ αὖ
 Ὅρφεϊ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ
 καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν;
 ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταύτ'
 ἐστιν ἀληθῆ· ἐπεὶ ἔμουγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν
 B εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλα-
 μῆδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος
 τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντι-
 παραβάλλοντι τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων,
 ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῆς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ
 μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα
 ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
 ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἐστιν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ
 δ' ἂν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι
 τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν
 C ἢ Ὀδυσσεά ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις
 εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέ-
 γεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν
 εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε
 ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα

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count it a gain ; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on the other hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, judges ? For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable ? Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer ? I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true ; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and compared my experience with theirs. I think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. What price would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention ? To converse and associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill people for it ; since, if what we are told is true,

εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἔστιν.

33. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο
- D** διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάννυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.
- E** τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες, ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλυποῦν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μὴδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἶονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῇτε, δίκαια
- 42 πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλην ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

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they are immortal for all future time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them : when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you ; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live ; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.

CRITO

INTRODUCTION TO THE *CRITO*

THIS dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his lifelong friend Crito, which takes place in the prison where Socrates is confined after his trial to await the day of his execution. Crito was a man of wealth and position, devotedly attached to Socrates, and greatly interested in philosophical speculation. Diogenes Laertius (II. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects attributed to him, but Plato represents him throughout as a man of kindly disposition and practical common sense, quite lacking in originality and with no gift for philosophical investigation.

There can be little doubt that Crito tried more than once to induce Socrates to escape from prison, but this dialogue can hardly be considered a mere report of a conversation which actually took place ; it is planned and carried out with the exquisite skill peculiar to Plato, and must be recognised as his work. It is difficult, often impossible, to distinguish between the doctrines and beliefs of the real Socrates and those which are put into his mouth by Plato ; but in view of the fact that Socrates did not escape from prison, his conduct must have been determined by some consideration of right. We may therefore believe that the doctrine that injustice is always

INTRODUCTION TO THE *CRITO*

wrong and that we must not requite injustice with injustice is really Socratic, and that the exalted patriotism and sublime serenity of mind portrayed by Plato in this dialogue were really exhibited in the last days, as in the previous life, of the master whom he delighted to honour.

For editions of the *Crito*, see the Introduction to the *Apology*.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΕΟΥΤ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Α 1. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων;

ἢ οὐ πρὸς ἔτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἐπεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἴτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθύς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθῃσαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἥγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα

CRITO

[OR ON DUTY ; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, CRITO

SOCRATES. Why have you come at this time, Crito ?
Or isn't it still early ?

CRITO. Yes, very early.

SOCRATES. About what time ?

CRITO. Just before dawn.

SOCRATES. I am surprised that the watchman of the prison was willing to let you in.

CRITO. He is used to me by this time, Socrates, because I come here so often, and besides I have done something for him.

SOCRATES. Have you just come, or some time ago ?

CRITO. Some little time ago.

SOCRATES. Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence ?

CRITO. No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless, and sorrowful. But I have been wondering at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you sleep ; and I purposely refrained from waking you, that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible. I have often thought through-

τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστώσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὥς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶως φέρεις.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς
C εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτον ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τύχῃ.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρῶ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται
— D ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὗτοι δὲ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκουτές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δηλονοῦν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων¹ ὅτι ἥξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

2. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ.
44 εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγώ σοι ἐρώ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

¹ Schanz brackets ἀγγέλων.

CRITO

out your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

CRITO. Other men as old, Socrates, become involved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

SOCRATES. That is true. But why have you come so early?

CRITO. To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and to few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

SOCRATES. What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

CRITO. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

CRITO. What is your reason for not thinking so?

SOCRATES. I will tell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἕκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγείραί με.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι B με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σώκρατες,

ἡματί κεν τρίτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναργές μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

3. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Λίαν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ¹ καὶ σώθητι· ὥς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἶον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ C-μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὥς οἷός τ' ὦν σε σφάζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχύων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα D-περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοί, ὥς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπράχθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.

D ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες,

¹ πιθοῦ Schanz, following Burges, πείθου BCDE.

CRITO

CRITO. So those say who have charge of these matters.

SOCRATES. Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

CRITO. What was the dream?

SOCRATES. I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, "Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia."¹

CRITO. A strange dream, Socrates.

SOCRATES. No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

CRITO. Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than that of considering one's money of more importance than one's friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

CRITO. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to

¹ Homer, *Iliad* ix, 363

καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ γὰρ ὥφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τ' ᾗσαν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσι.

Ε 4. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὥς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τούτοις
45 παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἕασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον καί, ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μήτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τὰργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαί σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὀρᾷς τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὥς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ
B δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει

CRITO

care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.

SOCRATES. I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

CRITO. That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this: you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either all our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

SOCRATES. I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

CRITO. Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don't you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you

δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι¹ ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλί-
σκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀρ-
γύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ
Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω,
μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι,
μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι
γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρῆο
σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν
ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετ-
ταλίαν ἵεναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται,
ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

5. Ἐτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς
ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σω-
θῆναι· καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέ-
σθαι, ἅπερ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ
ἔσπενυσάν σε διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς
προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαι-
δεῦσαι ρίχῃσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι
ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ
εἰκός, τοιούτων οἷάπερ εἶωθεν γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς
ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρή
ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέ-
φοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ
ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι· χρή δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι,
φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ὥς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ
ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ
ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ ἀνανδρία τινὲ τῇ

¹ After ξένοι the MSS. read οἱτοί, which Schanz brackets.

CRITO

ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebes also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right—betraying yourself when you might save yourself. And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has

ἡμετέρα πεπρᾶχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ
 > δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ
 αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ
 — τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὥσπερ κατάγελως τῆς
 πράξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρα
 46 διαπεφευγένοι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὔτινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώ-
 σαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ
 — τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ὄρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχυρᾷ ἢ σοί
 τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ
 βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία
 δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα
 δεῖ πεπρᾶχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον
 καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποίει.

B 6. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία
 σου πολλοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ
 ? δὲ μή, ὅσῳ μείζων, τοσοῦτ' αἰσχυρότερα. σκο-
 πείσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε
 ? μὴ· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος,
 οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ,
 ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. τοὺς
 δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύ-
 — ναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἤδε ἡ τύχη
 γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι,
 C καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὕσπερ καὶ
 πρότερον ὦν (ἐὰν μὴ) βελτίᾳ (ἔχωμεν λέγειν) ἐν τῷ
 παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοὶ ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ'
 — ἂν (πλείω) τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν
 δύναμιν ὥσπερ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται,
 > δεσμούς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων
 ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα

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been conducted with a sort of cowardice on our part—both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use whatever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; for all this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don't refuse.

SOCRATES. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honour the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are frightened with goblins, threatening us with imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now

αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλά-
βοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον

D δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν
ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ
κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου

ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς;
ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ

μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ
ᾧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πει-
σόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δέ πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐκά-
στοτε ᾧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν

E δοξάζουσιν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι,
τὰς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ
καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια,)

7. 47 ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὐριον, καὶ οὐκ
ἂν σε παρακροῦσι ἢ παρούσα ξυμφορά· σκόπει δὴ·
οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ
τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς
δ' οὐ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί
φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς
δὲ πονηρὰς μή;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων,
πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα
B ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων

CRITO

how could we examine the matter most reasonably? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God's name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

CRITO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

CRITO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his

— πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς (ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ) δόξῃ
τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν
τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους
καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς
ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλα δὴ.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ
γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ
ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ
ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

C ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ
ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους,¹
τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν
ἐπαίοντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

? ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ πρὶ
τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ
διολλύνει.

7 ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα,
ὦ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα δίτωμεν, καὶ δὴ
καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ
καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ
βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ
D δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεισθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ
ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστίν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι
καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους;
ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκείνο καὶ

¹ Schanz, following Burges, brackets καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους.

CRITO

business, does he pay attention to every man's praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

CRITO. To those of one man only.

SOCRATES. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

CRITO. Obviously.

SOCRATES. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

CRITO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

CRITO. Of course he will.

SOCRATES. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

CRITO. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

SOCRATES. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by

λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἡ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτο;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

8. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων δόξῃ, ἀρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν (διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ); ἐστὶ δέ που τοῦτο σῶμα· ἡ οὐχί;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἀδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν; ἡ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, 48 περὶ δ' ἣ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάννυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὃ τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. B ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύνναι.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν,¹ ὦ Σώκρατες.

¹ φαίη γὰρ ἂν bracketed by Schanz.

CRITO

the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this ?

CRITO. I think it is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined ? And that is the body, is it not ?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined ?

CRITO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right ? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body ?

CRITO. By no means.

SOCRATES. But more important ?

CRITO. Much more.

SOCRATES. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

CRITO. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.¹ ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὁμοιος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον² καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μένει.

9. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε C πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῷμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' αὖν, εἰ οἳοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῷ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελούντες D τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· καὶ φαινόμεθα ἄδिका αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὗτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

¹ Schanz gives ἀληθῇ λέγεις to Crito.

² The usual reading, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁμοιος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον was corrected by Schanz, who follows a quotation of the passage by Priscian.

CRITO

SOCRATES. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before ; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

CRITO. We do hold to it.

SOCRATES. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not ?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then, we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure anything else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅρα δέ, τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πῃ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ
 Ε σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρι-
 49 νεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἷη.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

10. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὲ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὲ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς. τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη;¹ ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα
 Β τηλικοῖδε² ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πᾶσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Φαμέν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

¹ The words *ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο*, "as has just been said, too," follow in the MSS. but are omitted by Schanz and others.

² *τηλικοῖδε γέροντες* MSS.

CRITO

CRITO. I think what you say is right, Socrates ; but think what we should do.

SOCRATES. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments ; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians ; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

CRITO. I will try.

SOCRATES. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others ? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong ? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children ? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not ? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer ? Do we believe this or not ?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

C ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δεῖ δῆ πού, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ γάρ πού κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη
D ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆς. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευματα. σκόπει δῆ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ
E κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

CRITO

CRITO. Why, no.

SOCRATES. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all. 5-

CRITO. Apparently not.

SOCRATES. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?

CRITO. Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?

CRITO. Not right, certainly.

SOCRATES. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.

CRITO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point. 1

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂ ἄν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ποιητέον.

11. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες
50 ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἡκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὐσιν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς δ' ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔροιντο· εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς
B τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς,
C ὅτι ἡδίκηκε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

CRITO

CRITO. I do hold to it and I agree with you ; so go on.

SOCRATES. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this : "ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?"

CRITO. He ought to do it.

SOCRATES. Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

CRITO. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

SOCRATES. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, "The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly"? Shall we say that, or what?

CRITO. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.

12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἥ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε
- D γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις¹ τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι, ὥς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἧ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἥ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι,² παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;
- E καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. εἰεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἥ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοὶ ὦν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν
- 51 οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους

¹ Schanz omits τοῖς νόμοις.

² Schanz omits νόμοι.

CRITO

SOCRATES. What then if the laws should say, "Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?" Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, "Don't be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?"

"I find no fault," I should say. "Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "You did," I should say. "Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and the like; and do you think that it will be proper for

- ἔσται¹ σοι, ὥστε, ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι, ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέληθέν σε, ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ
- B πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέικειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσιν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ πᾶσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ
- C καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἡττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν

¹ So Schanz, ἐξέσται BCE.

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you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue? Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?" What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

CRITO. I think they do.

SOCRATES. "Observe then, Socrates," perhaps the laws would say, "that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to

D οἱοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εἴαν τε τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ.

E ὅς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμέν τούτου ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσῃν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ
52 μὴ καλῶς τι ποιούμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφίεντων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

14. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,¹ ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἃ ἐπινόεις, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποισμι διὰ τί δῆ; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιτο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν
B ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήρια

¹ Schanz omits δ and brackets Σώκρατες.

CRITO

you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things."

... "We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others." If then I should say, "How so?" perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in

ἐστίν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἡρεσκεν, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες¹ οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ, καὶ ὠμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι· σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἡροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, D πρᾶττεῖς τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθὴ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὠμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῇ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

¹ The words *ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν*, "except once to the Isthmus," after *ἐξῆλθες* are omitted by Schanz and others as an early interpolation.

CRITO

it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they ; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us ; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and might have done with the state's consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught ; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us." What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true?

CRITO. We must, Socrates.

ΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαίεν, ἡ ξυνθήκας
 ὅς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις,
 πρὸ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς
 ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι,
 ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι
 ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι
 ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι· σὺ δὲ οὔτε
 Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκά-
 στοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν
 53 Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ
 ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ
 τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφε-
 ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἡρεσκεν ἢ πόλις τε
 καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίτι γὰρ ἂν πόλις
 ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; ¹ νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς
 ὁμολογημένοις; εἰ μὴν γε πείθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες·
 καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
 ἐξελθών.

15. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἑξαμαρ-
 τάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ
 Β τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
 κινδυνεύουσὶ γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ
 φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν
 ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
 μὲν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων ἔλθῃς,
 ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε—εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφό-
 τεραι—πολέμιος ἦξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων
 πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων,
 ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων,
 C καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε

¹ Schanz omits δῆλον ὅτι . . . νόμων, "evidently; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws?"

CRITO

SOCRATES. "Are you then," they would say, "not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? You will if you take our advice, Socrates; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

"For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property. And you yourself, if you go to Thebes or Megara—for both are well governed—will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the

δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστίν, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἐσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανείσθαι τὸ

D τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως σου ἀκούοιεν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς

E τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων·¹ τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ,² ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης

54 ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων

¹ Schanz omits δουλεύων, "being a slave."

² Schanz omits ἐν Θετταλίᾳ.

CRITO

judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilised men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant's leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and changing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But

ἔνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύῃς; τί δέ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψῃς τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδαιοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται¹ αὐτῶν. πότερον ἂν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἂν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἶπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἔστιν

B τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδεῖν εἶναι, οἷσθαί γε χρή.

16. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἔλθων ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκείσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικοημένος ἄπει, ἂν ἀπίης, οὐχ

C ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἂν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἡκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι

¹ Schanz omits ἐπιμελήσονται here and also the punctuation after αὐτῶν, making one long interrogative sentence.

CRITO

perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? How so? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

“Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defence. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades’ realm, will not receive you graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay,

τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν
 D ἃ λέγει μάλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

17. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων,¹ εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι
 ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν
 αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ
 τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι
 τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν
 ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, εἰάν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην
 ἐρεῖς· ὅμως μέντοι εἴ τι οἶει πλέον ποιήσῃν,
 λέγε.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

E ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράτ-
 τωμεν ταύτη, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

¹ Schanz follows Cobet and Naber in omitting Κρίτων.

CRITO

to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice."

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

CRITO. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES. Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.


PHAEDO

VOL. I.

O

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDO*

THE *Phaedo*, like the *Crito*, has for its scene the prison of Socrates, though the dialogue is here supposed to be reported by one who was present, not actually carried on in the presence of the reader. The immediate purpose of the dialogue seems to be to show that the philosopher will be glad to die ; and this purpose is never lost sight of, for it appears toward the end, as at the beginning. In order, however, to prove that willingness to die is rational, it is necessary to prove that the soul will continue to exist after the death of the body, and thus the original statement that the philosopher will be glad to die leads to the proof of a far more important truth. The commonly accepted statement that the real subject of the *Phaedo* is the immortality of the soul has certainly some justification. In order, however, to prove that the soul is immortal the theory is advanced that generation proceeds from opposite to opposite by alternation, that life proceeds from death as death from life, and that therefore the soul must exist after death as before birth. Again, all sensible objects are referable to certain types, of which they are likenesses. These types must be known to us before we can refer objects to them, and we have not seen or learned the types in this life ; we must therefore have seen them before this life began ; our knowledge is thus seen to be reminiscence of knowledge



INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDO*

gained before our birth. All this proves, however, only that the soul existed for a probably very long time before our birth and continues to exist for a probably very long time after our death, but not that it is immortal and indestructible. This objection leads to the discussion of causation and to the conclusion that "the ideas are the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge." The idea inherent in soul is life, and since ideas are so connected with particulars that no particular can admit an idea directly contrary to its own inherent idea, the soul cannot admit death. The proof of the immortality of the soul has been reached by proving the everlasting truth of the ideas. This last is the most important part of the *Phaedo*, so far as the development of Plato's system of philosophy is concerned, though it is introduced as a means for proving the immortality of the soul, just as the immortality of the soul is proved in order to show that the true philosopher will not fear, but welcome, death.¹

This dialogue, then, establishes the doctrine of the real existence of ideas as the sole objects of knowledge and also shows how that doctrine is necessary to human happiness, because it serves to prove that the soul is immortal. The ordinary human being is little interested in metaphysical speculation, but greatly interested in his own future; he will therefore pay attention to metaphysical theory if it is so presented as to seem to affect his happiness. The *Phaedo*, by applying the doctrine of ideas to prove

¹ This brief discussion of the contents and purpose of the *Phaedo* is for the most part derived from the introduction to R. D. Archer-Hind's excellent edition, to which the reader is referred for a more complete exposition.

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDO*

the immortality of the soul, tends to popularise the doctrine of ideas, and this may have been the ultimate purpose of Plato in writing the dialogue ; but that he was also fully in earnest in his belief in the immortality of the soul, and that the proof of immortality was an important part of his purpose in writing the dialogue, cannot be doubted.

In composition the *Phaedo* is elaborate without being complicated. The dramatic setting serves here, as in the *Crito*, as an appropriate introduction to a discourse on immortality and offers an opportunity to portray the gentle, genial nature, the kindly humour, and the calm, untroubled courage of Socrates ; it also marks the divisions between the various parts of the discussion, and offers relief to the mind of the reader who is wearied by close application to serious argument. Those who take part in the conversation are admirably characterised ; this is especially true of the two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who play the most important parts after Socrates himself. Both are eager searchers after truth, and both are evidently highly regarded by Socrates—were, in other words, at least respected by Plato ; but Simmias appears as a man of somewhat vague notions, inclined to mysticism, and somewhat lacking in keenness, while Cebes is clear-sighted, sharp, and keen, tenacious of his opinion, but quick to see when an opinion is no longer tenable. These distinguishing traits are drawn with few lines, but the few are masterly. The beautiful imaginative description of the life of souls in the other world is not merely a picturesque addition to the variety of the composition ; it teaches us how Plato believed that right and wrong actions were rewarded or

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDO*

punished. Quite different imagery is employed for the same end in the *Phaedrus*, but in both dialogues the justice of the treatment accorded the souls is made clear, and in both the importance of conduct in this life is emphasised, though this emphasis is stronger in the *Phaedo*, as is natural in view of the dramatic setting.

The number of persons mentioned in the *Phaedo* is considerable.

Echecrates of Phlius was one of the last of the Pythagoreans; we know of no particular reason why he is introduced into this dialogue, unless it be that, as a Pythagorean, he might naturally be in sympathy with the doctrine of ideas. Of his personal relations to Socrates nothing is known. Phaedo, of Elis, was taken prisoner in 401 B.C. and brought to Athens, where he was, according to Aulus Gellius (ii., 18), ransomed by Cebes. After the death of Socrates he returned to Elis and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which was afterwards moved to Eretria by Menedemus and known as the Eretrian school. Phaedo wrote several dialogues, but virtually nothing is known of his doctrines. He seems to have been highly esteemed by Socrates and his followers. Apollodorus of Phalerum is of no philosophical importance. He is mentioned several times by Plato and Xenophon as an ardent admirer and constant companion of Socrates, and a man of impulsive, unrestrained disposition. Simmias and Cebes were both Thebans, warm personal friends, and equally devoted to Socrates; both offered money to secure the release of Socrates from prison (*Crito*, 45 B). The composition preserved under the name of *Pinax* or *Tablet* of Cebes is certainly spurious. *Crito* appears

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here, as in the dialogue that bears his name, as the old and tried friend of Socrates. The others who are mentioned as companions of Socrates in his last hours are Critobulus, the son of Crito; Hermogenes, probably the son of Hipponicus and then identical with a speaker in the *Cratylus*; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aeschines, a well-known follower of Socrates, author of several dialogues; Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school; Ctesippus, a youth mentioned also in the *Euthydemus* and the *Lysis*; Menexenus, son of Demophon and an admirer of Ctesippus; his name is given to one of Plato's dialogues; Phaenodorus, a Theban; Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megarian school; and Terpsion, also a Megarian. Evenus, mentioned in 60 D, was a Parian sophist and poet.

The most important separate editions of the *Phaedo* are those of Geddes, W. Wagner, Wohlrab, Schanz, Hirschig, Burnet, and Archer-Hind. The introduction and commentary in the last-named edition are of special importance.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

Η ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ,
ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ

St. I
p. 57

A 1. ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτός, ὦ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἣ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδέως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ
B ἐκεῖθεν, ὅστις ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἷός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλήν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιὼν ἀποθάνοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε δν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἡγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα

PHAEDO

[OR ON THE SOUL; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

ECHECRATES, PHAEDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES,
SIMMIAS, CRITO, *the Servant of the Eleven.*

ECHECRATES. Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

PHAEDO. I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHECRATES. Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

PHAEDO. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

ECHECRATES. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the

ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, ὥς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις
B ἐπτὰ ἐκείνους ὥχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὖξαντο, ὥς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεῖεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἦν δὲ αἰὲ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίστε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι
C ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

2. ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

D ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρήσαν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὥς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι

PHAEDO

Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

ECHECRATES. What ship is this?

PHAEDO. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honour of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

ECHECRATES. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

PHAEDO. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

PHAEDO. I am not busy and I will try to tell

ὕμῃν διηγῆσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἡδιστον.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὥς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγενόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆει· εὐδαίμων γάρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδελῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστε μοι ἐκείνον παρίστασθαι μῆδ' εἰς Αἰδοῦ ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. 59 διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινὸν εἰσῆει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὥσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπόν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν 60 ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἐκείνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἶχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν

PHAEDO

you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

ECHECRATES. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do ; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend ; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning ; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy ;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping ; especially one of us, Apollodorus ; you know him and his character.

ECHECRATES. To be sure I do.

PHAEDO. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

ECHECRATES. Who were these, Phaedo ?

PHAEDO. Of native Athenians there was this

ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἡσθένει.

C ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Naί, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδωνίδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλέομβροτος¹ παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν δῆ; τίνες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

3. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσσομαι διηγῆσασθαι. αἰεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν
D ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθεῖν τὸ δεσμοτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεφύγετο γὰρ οὐ πρόφ' ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖν, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ²

¹ Schanz, after Cobet, inserts οὐ after Κλέομβροτος.

² After προτεραίᾳ the MSS. read ἡμέρᾳ, which Hermann, followed by Schanz and others, brackets.

PHAEDO

Apollódorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeonian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

ECHECRATES. Were any foreigners there?

PHAEDO. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaenonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

ECHECRATES. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHAEDO. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

ECHECRATES. Was anyone else there?

PHAEDO. I think these were about all.

ECHECRATES. Well then, what was the conversation?

PHAEDO. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison

- E** ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφικνόμενον εἶη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἡκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἡκομεν καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκεν καὶ
- 60 **ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην—γινώσκεις γάρ—ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὥς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὲ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σε προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα· ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν**
- B** **τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα· ὦς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰκὲ τί εἶναι τοῦτο, δὲ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὥς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ δὲ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὅσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δὺ ὄντε. καὶ**
- C** **μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὥς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ**

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in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. "For," he said, "the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day." So after a little delay he came and told us to go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: "Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them." And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, "Crito, let somebody take her home." And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, "What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think," he said, "if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when

διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπεὶδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνηψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

4. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών· Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας
D με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντέINAS τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤρουντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐῆνος πρῶην, ὃ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖς, ἐπεὶδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐῆνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὐθις ἐρωτᾷ, εὖ οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τί χρὴ λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθῇ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλούμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα
E ταῦτα· ἦδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥάδιον εἶη· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἅττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι
61 παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θεοῦσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης

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he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after."

Here Cebes interrupted and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say."

"Then tell him, Cebes," said he, "the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it.' And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the

μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τουτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημῶδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι

B πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὗ ἦν ἡ παρούσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἶπερ μέλλοι ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὓς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρῶτοις ἐνέτυχον.

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὥς

C τάχιστα. ἅπειμι δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας· Οἶον παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδὸν οὖν, ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἥσθημαι, οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἐκῶν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; ἡ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνος; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐήνος καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.

D καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο. ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· Πῶς τοῦτο

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greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. / For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was ; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day ; for that is the order of the Athenians."

And Simmias said, "What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus ! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it."

"Why so ?" said he. "Is not Evenus a philosopher ?"

"I think so," said Simmias.

"Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted." And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him : "What do you mean by

λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν
βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν
φιλόσοφον ἐπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ
ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ
Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ
αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοώς, φθόνος
οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει
Ε μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ
μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ,¹ ποίαν
τινὰ αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ
ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

6. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι
αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἤδη
γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου
ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων
τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ
? αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ
προθυμείσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ
ἀκούσαις. Ἰσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανέεται,
εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν
ἐστίν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ,
ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα,² ἐστίν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον
τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν· οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυ-
μαστόν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ
ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης
ἡρέμα ἐπιγελάσας· Ἴττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη τῇ αὐτοῦ
φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ

¹ Schanz brackets τῆς ἐκεῖ.

² Schanz, following Forster, puts a period after τᾶλλα and inserts ἀλλὰ.

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this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?"

"How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?"

"Nothing definite, Socrates."

"I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?"

"Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it."

"You must have courage," said he, "and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor."

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, "Gawd knows it doos," speaking in his own dialect.

"It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,"

- B Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; Ἔμοιγε,
- C φησὶν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαντοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἂν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.

7. Ἄλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ραδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, εἰκεν
- D τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ

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said Socrates, "but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me¹ to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "I do."

"Well then," said he, "if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me."

"That," said Cebes, "seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world,² are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run

- Ε δεσπότου,¹ καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ' ὃ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι, ὁ δὲ νῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν αἶε εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ δ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ' ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σω-
 63 κράτης ἡσθῆναί τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς· Ἀεὶ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερεινᾶ, καὶ οὐ πάννυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι, ὃ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας· Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς
 Β αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ
 C εὖ ἴστε, ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι

¹ Schanz brackets φευκτόν . . . δεσπότου.

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away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible ; and so he might thoughtlessly run away ; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural ; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice."

When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, "Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says."

And Simmias said, "Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them ? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers."

"You have a right to say that," he replied ; "for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court."

"Precisely," said Simmias.

"Well, then," said he, "I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe," said he, "that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively ; but I would

ἀγαθούς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δισχυρι-
 σαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνυ
 ἀγαθούς ἤξειν,¹ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο
 τῶν τοιούτων, δισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.
 ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ'
 εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καί,
 ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς
 ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,
 ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην
 D ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν
 γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν
 τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἀπολογία ἐστίν, ἐὰν ἄπερ
 λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη.
 πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστίν
 δ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι
 μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον,
 ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι;
 φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους,
 δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιούτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ.
 E εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς
 πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιούτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σω-
 κράτης· Ἐα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον
 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ² παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων,
 ἐὰν δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι
 ἤδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἄλλὰ μοι πάλαι³ πράγ-
 ματα παρέχει. Ἐα, αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν
 δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον
 ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ
 ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν

¹ Schanz brackets ἤξειν, following Hirschig.

² Schanz brackets τὸ ἑαυτοῦ.

³ Schanz brackets πάλαι.

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assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked."

"Well," said Simmias, "do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence."

"I will try," he replied. "But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time."

"Only, Socrates," said Crito, "that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times."

And Socrates said: "Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times."

"I was pretty sure that was what you would say," said Crito, "but he has been bothering me for a long time."

"Never mind him," said Socrates. "I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is

64 μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ· πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθῆναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἡκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν, δὲ πάλαι προεθυμούντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας· Νῆ τὸν Δία, B ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λεληθάσιν, ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθῆναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοί εἰσιν C θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι. εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν

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naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.

"Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practising."

And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it."

"And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then," said he, "speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?"

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

"We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists

- αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ¹
θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.
Σκέψαι δὴ, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ
D ἅπερ ἐμοί. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς
εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλο-
σόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σίτων τε καὶ
ποτῶν; "Ηκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμία.
Τί δέ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δέ;
τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι
ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφε-
ρόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν
E δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλή
ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἔφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως
δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία
οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὅσον δύναται
ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;
Ἔμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
δηλὸς ἐστὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὃ τι μάλιστα
65 τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας
διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται.
Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήπου, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀνθρώποις, ὧς μὴδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μὴδὲ
μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς
τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν
ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

¹ Schanz brackets η .

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alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?"

"No, it is this," said he.

"Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?"

"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.

"How about the pleasures of love?"

"Certainly not."

"Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?"

"I think the true philosopher would despise them," he replied.

"Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?"

"Yes."

"To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?"

"It is."

"Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn't deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead."

"That is very true."

10. Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ;
- B οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἣ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἴ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν· ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάννυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἄπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.
- C Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κατὰ δῆλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἐῷσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα
- D ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία. Καὶ

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"Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly I do," he replied.

"Then," said he, "when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it."

"True."

"In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?"

"Yes."

"But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality."

"That is true."

"In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?"

"Evidently."

"Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?"

"We certainly think there is."

- καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἦδη οὖν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς
- E οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὐ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γινῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάννυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃε καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην
- 66 αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὧτων καὶ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὥς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωνῇ, ἀρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Σιμμία, εἶπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὃ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὃ Σιμμίας, ὥς ἀληθῇ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.
- B 11. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρμένη

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"And absolute beauty and goodness."

"Of course."

"Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?"

"Certainly not," said he.

"Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?"

"Certainly."

"Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?"

"That is true as true can be, Socrates," said Simmias.

"Then," said he, "all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: 'There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the

ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπύμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα

D κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας περί διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτουν θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τὰληθές, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ

E ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ

167 ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὐ.

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soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall,

καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω
ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὁ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν
ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὁ τι μὴ
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου
φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν
ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ
ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης,
ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ
γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές·

B τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῶ
γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ.
τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς
ἀλλήλους. λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς
ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός
γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ
ἐταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι,
ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο
οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελ-
θόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι
C προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ
ἄλλῳ ἀνδρί, ὃς ἡγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν
διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν,
ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο
ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ
χωρίζειν ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν
καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ
σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ
οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι

D καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνῃν καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυομένην
ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάννυ μὲν

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I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.' Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree? "

"Most assuredly, Socrates."

"Then," said Socrates, "if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters? "

"Certainly," said he.

οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντά-
 πασί γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν,
 προθυμούνται αἰεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσο-
 φούντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν
 τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ
 σώματος, ἢ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ
 ἔλεγον, γέλοιον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ'

E τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἤκοντος αὐτῷ τού-
 του ἀγανακτεῖν.¹ οὐ γέλοιον; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῷ
 ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσο-
 φούντες ἀποθνήσκουν μετελῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι
 ἡκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ
 σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ
 σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν
 ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο
 καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ
 μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς

68 ἐστὶν οὐ διὰ βίου ἥρων τυχεῖν· ἥρων δὲ φρονήσεως·
 ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος
 αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν
 καὶ υἱέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες
 ἠθέλησαν εἰς "Αἰδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι
 τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύ-
 μουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι· φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις
 τῷ ὄντι ἐρών, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν
 ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ
 B ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν "Αἰδου, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀπο-
 θνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἰσὶν αὐτόσε; οἷεσθαι

¹ After ἀγανακτεῖν BT read οὐ γέλοιον; Schanz brackets these words. Burnet reads γέλοιον, giving it to Simmias,

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"Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?"

"Exactly so," said he.

"But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?"

"Obviously."

"Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?"

"Of course."

"In fact, then, Simmias," said he, "the true philosophers practise dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot

γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἦ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὰ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὰ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

13. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανὸν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς δὴν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὧν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέρω. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως, ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσιν;
- D τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶσθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἡγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλην οἱ

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think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher ; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death ?”

“ Very foolish, certainly,” said he.

“ Then is it not,” said Socrates, “ a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body ? And this same man is also a lover of money and of honour, one or both.”

“ Certainly,” said he, “ it is as you say.”

“ Then, Simmias,” he continued, “ is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers ? ”

“ By all means,” said he.

“ And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy ? ”

“ Necessarily,” said he.

“ For,” said Socrates, “ if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd.”

“ How so, Socrates ? ”

“ You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils ? ”

“ They certainly do.

“ And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils ? ”

“ That is true.”

“ Then all except philosophers are brave through

- φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία
 Ε ἀνδρείον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι
 αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασία
 τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον
 εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον
 τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην·
 φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ
 ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ'
 ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν
 69 τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει
 αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων¹
 ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιον ἐστὶν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο,
 τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσω-
 φρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία,
 μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή,
 ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ
 φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω
 πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνο
 μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα
 Β ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου
 μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ
 πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σω-
 φροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθῆς
 ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ
 ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ
 φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ
 σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι
 ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς
 ἔχῃ, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις

¹ Schanz brackets ἄλλων.

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fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice."

"Very true."

"And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence."

"So it seems."

"My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in

- C τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἤ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῶν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαί αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὃ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι.
- D οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν, ἐκείσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὥς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς
- E φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος ἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις.¹ εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη· ὦ Σώκратες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
70 ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἤ,

¹ After ἐταίροις, the MSS. read τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει, "but the many do not believe this." Ast, followed by Schanz and Burnet, omits.

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fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, 'the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few'; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well."

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: "Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the

ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρα διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολ-
 λύηται, ἣ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνήσκη· εὐθύς
 ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα
 ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχεται
 διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.¹ ἐπεί,
 εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ
 ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ
 B διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐλπίς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, ὡς ἀληθὴ ἔστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
 δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ
 πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.
 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης·
 ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει
 διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή;
 Ἐγώ γε οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι
 ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐκ οὐν γ' ἂν
 οἶμαι, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν
 C ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδιοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ
 καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμεαι.
 εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

15. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πη, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν
 "Αἰδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώ-
 πων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὐ
 μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ
 πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν
 τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνε-
 σθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ
 D εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πάλιν
 ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον
 τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερόν γίγνοιτο, ὅτι

¹ Schanz and Burnet bracket οἴχεται . . . ἦ.

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day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence."

"What you say, Cebes, is true," said Socrates. "Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?"

"I do," said Cebes. "I should like to hear what you think about it."

"Well," said Socrates, "I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

"Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the

οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων εἰδῶμεν, ἅρ' οὕτως γίγνεται

- Ε πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὃν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἅρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ
- 71 μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἐλαττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυρότερου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶπτον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον

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living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed."

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"Now," said he, "if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater."

"Yes."

"And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?"

"That is true," said he.

"And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?"

"Certainly."

"And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?"

"Of course."

"Then," said he, "we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?"

"Certainly."

"Now then, is there between all these pairs of

- μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν
 B ὄντοι δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον·
 μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ
 αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν
 αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
 καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι
 καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ
 χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν
 πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαι τε
 αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γενεσὶν τε εἶναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου¹
 εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς.
 C 16. Τί οὖν; ἔφη. τῷ ζῆν ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον,
 ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν
 οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ
 ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία
 ἐστίν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο
 δυοῖν ὄντοι; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν
 ἐτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη,
 Ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις·
 σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἐτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν,
 τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ
 ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ
 D καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν κατα-
 δαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκανῶς σοι,
 ἔφη, ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ

¹ Schanz brackets ἐξ ἑκατέρου.

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opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?"

"Yes," said he.

"And similarly analysing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"What?"

"Being dead," said he.

"Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?"

"Of course."

"Now," said Socrates, "I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?"

"Certainly."

σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; Ἐγωγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζώντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζώντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄιδου. Ἐοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γεγεσέοιεν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἑτέρα σαφῆς οὔσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφές δήπου, ἡ οὐ; Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνν γε. Ὅμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς

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"Now do you," said he, "tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?"

"I do."

"And that they are generated one from the other?"

"Yes."

"Now what is it which is generated from the living?"

"The dead," said he.

"And what," said Socrates, "from the dead?"

"I can say only one thing—the living."

"From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?"

"Evidently," said he.

"Then," said Socrates, "our souls exist in the other world."

"So it seems."

"And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?"

"Certainly we must," said he.

"What is this process?"

"Coming to life again."

"Then," said Socrates, "if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?"

"Certainly."

"So by this method also we reach the conclusion

ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἤττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

17. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ
 B μὴ αἰεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις γιγνώμενα ὥσπερ εἰ κύκλῳ περιμόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ τις εἴη ἢ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἴσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίῃ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνώμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ γιγνώμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος,
 C οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ' ἂν λήρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταῦτόν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. καὶ εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγρονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. ὥσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεώτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα
 D τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκοι, τίς

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that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living ; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.

“I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions.”

“Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all.”

“What do you mean ?” said he.

“It is not at all hard,” said Socrates, “to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense ; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, ‘all things are chaos,’ would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive ? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is

μηχανὴ μὴ οὐ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατῶμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι.”¹

18. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνόν γε τὸν λόγον ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἰώθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἢ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη πού ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν
73 πού ἡμῖν ἢ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴ τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβὼν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτῶμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἣ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνούσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἴοι τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα
B ἀγῇ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ

¹ After εἶναι the MSS. read καὶ ταῖς μὲν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἀμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον, “and that the good fare better and the bad worse.” Bracketed by Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, Burnet, and others.

there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?"

"I see none, Socrates," said Cebes. "What you say seems to be perfectly true."

"I think, Cebes," said he, "it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist."

"And besides," Cebes rejoined, "if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal."

"But, Cebes," said Simmias, "what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now."

"Briefly," said Cebes, "a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort."

"And if you are not convinced in that way,

- ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἂν τῇδέ πῃ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξη. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δῆ, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μὲντ' ἂν ἡττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν,
- C πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδ' ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δέ τινα τρόπον τόνδε· εἴαν τίς τι¹ ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι
- D ἀνεμνήσθῃ, οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἶον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἰμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἶωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθῃ, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ'
- E ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα

¹ After τι BCD read πρότερον, which Schanz brackets. T reads τι ἕτερόν τι, Burnet τι ἕτερον.

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Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?"

"I am not incredulous," said Simmias, "but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say."

"It was this," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?"

"What do you mean?"

"Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre."

"Of course."

"Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples."

"To be sure you could," said Simmias.

"Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of

μέντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἡ δ' ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ

74 Σιμμίον ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

19. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθῃ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;

B Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἡ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο

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recollection? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?"

"Surely."

"And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?"

"Yes," said he.

"All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?"

"Yes."

"And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?"

"Inevitably," he replied.

"Now see," said he, "if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?"

"We shall say that there is," said Simmias, "most decidedly."

"And do we know what it is?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood

- ἐνεννόησαμεν, ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτ' ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἢ
- C ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταυτόν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκας τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς
- D ὁψεως ἄλλο ἐννόησης, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· ἢ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννόηση, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ
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or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?"

"Certainly."

"Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?"

"No, Socrates, never."

"Then," said he, "those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract."

"Not at all, I should say, Socrates."

"But from those equals," said he, "which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?"

"Very true," he replied.

"And it is either like them or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"It makes no difference," said he. "Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection."

"Surely."

"Now then," said he, "do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?"

"They fall very far short of it," said he.

"Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being

- νῦν ἐγὼ ὀρώ, εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεί
Ε δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ'
 ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον που τὸν τοῦτο
 ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ
 προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρας δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀν-
 άγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς,
 ἢ οὐ, περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντά-
 πασί γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ
 75 ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον
 ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν
 πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐν-
 δεεστέρας. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε
 ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ
 δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ
 ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτόν
 δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτόν γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ
 Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.
 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι,
Β ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέ-
 γεται τοῦ ὃ ἐστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά
 ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα
 ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα
 αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην
 αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὃ τι ἐστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν
 αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται
 μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ
 φαυλότερα.¹ Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ᾧ
 Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθύς ἐωρῶμέν τε

¹ Schanz brackets ὅτι προθυμεῖται . . . φαυλότερα.

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like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,' he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?"

"We must."

"Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?"

"It certainly is."

"Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'"

"That is true."

"And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike."

"Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument."

"Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?"

"Yes."

"Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it."

"That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates."

καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν;

C Πάνυ γε. Ἐδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἐοικεν.

20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθύς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου, καί, ὅπερ λέγω,

D περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ δ' ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότας αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστίν, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέκεναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάν-

E τως δήπου, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἅς ποτε

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"And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?"

"Certainly."

"But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?"

"Yes."

"Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born."

"It does."

"Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of 'absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth."

"That is true."

"And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?"

"Certainly, Socrates," said he.

"But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process

καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμνησέσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε 76 γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι, ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ὃ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὢν ἢ ὁμοιον ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὓς φάμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμνησκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

21. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ, ὦ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμέ-
B νους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμνησέσθαι ὕστερον ὢν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δέ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μέντ' ἂν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβούμεναι, μὴ αὔριον
C τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς.

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which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?"

"Assuredly."

"For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection."

"That is certainly true, Socrates."

"Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?"

"I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates."

"How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?"

"Certainly he can, Socrates."

"And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?"

"I wish they might," said Simmias; "but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly."

"Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?"

"By no means."

Ἄναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε ἔμαθον; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ
D λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶπεν, ὦ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὥς ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών.

22. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεὶ, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέ-
E ρομεν, ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; Ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ

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"Then they recollect the things they once learned?"

"Necessarily."

"When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings."

"Certainly not."

"Then previously."

"Yes."

"Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence."

"Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains."

"Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?"

"None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense."

"Then, Simmias," said he, "is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?"

τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν
77 τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν σὺ λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὢν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἱκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις· ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν
B γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδοδεῖχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν, ὃ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαννῦται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἄλλοθεν ποθεν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθεῖρεσθαι;
C Εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡμισυ ἀποδοδεῖχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔχειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης,

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"Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient."

"But how about Cebes?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be convinced, too."

"He is fully convinced, I think," said Simmias; "and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?"

"You are right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect."

"It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already," said Socrates, "if you will combine this conclusion

καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὠμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένη μῆδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὐθις αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.

24. "Ομως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία, ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας· Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν· μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται· τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσῃτε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' ὧδὸν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ᾗ ἔνευσί που ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπ' ὧδὸν, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι ἂν ἀναγκαιότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως

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with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather."

And Cebes laughed and said, "Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin."

"Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear."

"Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"

"Hellas, Cebes," he replied, "is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for

γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυνα-
 μένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ἔφη,
 ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανέλ-
 B θωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ-ἐστίν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἡδο-
 μένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

25. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἧ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης,
 δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα
 προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάν-
 νυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ
 πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο
 αὐ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἢ ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ
 τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας
 ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν
 C συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει
 τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτῃ ἥπερ συνε-
 τέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξύνθετον, τούτῳ μόνῳ
 προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;
 Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν
 ἅπερ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα
 μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθετα, ἃ δὲ ἄλλοτ'
 ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ
 εἶναι τὰ σύνθετα; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωμεν
 δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν
 D λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τὸ εἶναι
 καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύ-
 τως αἰεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ
 τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστίν,
 τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται;
 ἧ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστι, μονοειδὲς ὄν αὐτὸ

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perhaps you would hardly find others better able to do this than you."

"That," said Cebes, "shall be done. But let us return to the point where we left off, if you are willing."

"Oh, I am willing, of course."

"Good," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "must we not ask ourselves some such question as this? What kind of thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind of thing might we naturally fear it, and again what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after this must we not inquire to which class the soul belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon the answers to these questions?"

"You are quite right," he replied.

"Now is not that which is compounded and composite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same way in which it was compounded? And if anything is uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally unlikely to be decomposed?"

"I think," said Cebes, "that is true."

"Then it is most probable that things which are always the same and unchanging are the uncompounded things and the things that are changing and never the same are the composite things?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Let us then," said he, "turn to what we were discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we in our dialectic process of question and answer call true being, always the same or is it liable to change? Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute existence, true being—do they ever admit of any change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence,

καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὅσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὄντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; Ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτά; Οὕτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

79 Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄψαιο κἂν ἰδοῖς κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἰσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἂν ἄλλ' ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀειδῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

26. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδές ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν.

B Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἶδει φαῖμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀειδές; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες,

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since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?"

"It must," said Cebes, "necessarily remain the same, Socrates."

"But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?"

"The latter," said Cebes; "they are never the same."

"And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?"

"Certainly," said he, "that is true."

"Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?"

"Let us assume them," said Cebes.

"And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?"

"Let us assume that also," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?"

"Yes," he replied.

"Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?"

"To the visible," said he; "that is clear to everyone."

"And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates."

ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει;
Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν;
ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὁρατόν. Ἀειδὲς
ἄρα; Ναί. Ὅμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχῇ σώματός ἐστιν
C τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ
Σώκρατες.

27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ
ψυχὴ, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ
σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι'
ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ διὰ
τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—,
τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε
κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ
ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε
τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε
D αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ
καθαρόν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως
ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου
τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται
καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ
περὶ ἐκείνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε
τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα
φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς
καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐ
σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ

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"But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?"

"Yes, we do."

"Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?"

"It cannot be seen."

"Then it is invisible?"

"Yes."

"Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible."

"Necessarily, Socrates."

"Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?"

"Certainly."

"But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?"

"Socrates," said he, "what you say is perfectly right and true."

"And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which

Ε τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ
 ξυγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἄν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, συγ-
 χωρήσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου,
 καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλη καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιό-
 τερόν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῷ αἰὲ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον
 ἢ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

28. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ
 86 αὐτῷ ὧσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ
 ἄρχεσθαι ἢ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ
 δεσπόζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ
 ὁμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ
 δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμο-
 νεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ
 δουλεύειν; Ἐμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔοικεν;
 Δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ,
 τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ
 Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν
 Β ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ
 καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰὲ ὡσαύτως
 κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυ-
 χήν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ
 καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔ-
 χοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὐ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν
 τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ οὐχ
 οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ
 σώματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ
 αὐ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τού-

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class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?"

"I think, Socrates," said he, "that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not."

"And the body?"

"Is more like the other."

"Consider, then, the matter in another way. When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"

"Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal."

"Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?"

"No, we cannot."

"Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?"

- C του; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὁρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, ἔαν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον.¹ ἔνια
- D δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῇ, ὅστ' αὖτε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν· ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον γεννναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἱ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσεται καὶ ἀπόλῳεν, ὥς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι;
- E πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ᾧ ἔχει· ἔαν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη² αὕτη εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα αἰεὶ τοῦτο—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ
- 81 ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα.³ ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

¹ Schanz brackets συμπεσὼν . . . χρόνον.

² συνηθροισμένη αὕτη εἰς ἑαυτήν T Stobaeus. Schanz brackets καὶ συνηθροισμένη. B and Schanz omit αὕτη εἰς ἑαυτήν.

³ The MSS. read μελετῶσα ῥαδίως. Schanz brackets ῥαδίως.

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"Of course."

"Observe," he went on, "that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favourable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?"

"Yes."

"But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this:—if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practised being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?"

μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὦ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως;

30. Οὕτω νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε,
- B οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι αἰεὶ ξυνούσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὐ τις ἂν ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἶει
- C ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῇ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένην γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον; Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρή εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ Ἰδου,
- D ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὥφθη ἅττα

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"By all means."

"Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?"

"Assuredly," said Cebes.

"But, I think, if when it departs from the body it is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?"

"By no means," said he.

"But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?"

"Certainly."

"And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been

ψυχῶν σκιοειδῇ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἰδῶλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου

E πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα. 31. Ἐνδύνονται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἥθη ὅποι' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκῶσι τύχωσιν ἐν τῇ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποῖα δὲ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους, εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων

82 εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Πάνν μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἵεναι; Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὲ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἢ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὲ, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν

B καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγонуῖαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ

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seen, figures of those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of the visible; and this is why they are seen."

"That is likely, Socrates."

"It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about until through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are likely to be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former life."

"What natures do you mean, Socrates?"

"I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly that is very likely."

"And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they go?"

"Beyond a doubt," said Cebes, "they pass into such creatures."

"Then," said he, "it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "of course."

"Then," said he, "the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice?"

νοῦ; Πῇ δὲ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; "Οτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταυτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους· Εἰκός.

32. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπionτι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔνεκα, ὦ ἐταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ αὖν πρόποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι
C
D
μὰ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι, οἷς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι λατρεύοντες¹ ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπη ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῷ ταύτη τρέπονται ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι, ἢ ἐκείνη ὑψηλεῖται.

33. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς

¹ λατρεύοντες is an emendation proposed by Schanz for πλάττοντες of the MSS.

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"How are these happiest?"

"Don't you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?"

"Yes."

"And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonour or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honour and power, that they refrain from them."

"No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates," said Cebes.

"Most assuredly not," said he. "And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads."

"How do they do this, Socrates?"

"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of knowledge," said he, "perceive that when philo-

- Ε διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἴργμου διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἴργμου τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὥς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος
- 83 ξυλλήπτωρ εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, γινώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβούσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὠτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλ'
- Β ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὃ τι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὃ τι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὄν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὁρατὸν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητὸν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ ἢ λυπηθῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὢν ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἶον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας
- Γ διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ

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sophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think—for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts—but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account.”

“What is this evil, Socrates?” said Cebes.

Κέβης. "Οτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὁρατά· ἢ οὐ;

- D Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δῆ; "Οτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἦλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσιν αὐτὰ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἶμαι ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς "Αἶδου καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ αἰετὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίεναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ
- E ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἅμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

34. Τούτων τοίνυν ἔνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὧν ᾗ
 84 πολλοὶ ἔνεκα· ἢ σὺ οἶε; Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης

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"The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true ; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not ?"

"Certainly."

"And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body ?"

"How so ?"

"Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body ; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute."

"What you say, Socrates, is very true," said Cebes.

"This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave ; not the world's reason. Or do you disagree ?"

"Certainly not."

"No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his

τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένην, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου

B τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ,¹ ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾗ.

35. Σιγῇ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ
- C Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγέσθην· καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῷ ἤρετο· Τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ
- D εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη· Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάλῃθ' ἔσσι μοι ἔρω. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἑτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν

¹ After φοβηθῇ the MSS. read ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτηδεύουσα. Ast bracketed this and is followed by Schanz and Burnet.

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soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere."

When Socrates had said this there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said: "Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company."

And Simmias said: "Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer,

μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὁκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι
 ἀηδὲς ἢ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφορὰν. καὶ ὃς
 ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησιν, Βαβαί,
 Εὖ Σιμμία· ἢ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώ-
 πους πείσαιμι, ὥς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν
 παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μὴδ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι
 πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν
 διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καί, ὥς ἔοικε,
 τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν
 μαντικὴν, οἳ ἐπειδὴν αἰσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς
 ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ,
 85 τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγηθότες
 ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι, οὐπὲρ εἰσι
 θεράποντες. οἳ δ' ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος
 τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί
 φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης
 ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογιζονται, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνειον ἄδει,
 ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγοῖ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῇται,
 οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ
 δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε
 ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἳ
 Β κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες
 μαντικοί τε εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἀίδου
 ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν
 διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ
 καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός γε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων
 καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρον' ἐκείνων
 τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ
 δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
 ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρή καὶ ἐρωτᾶν
 ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐώσιν ἄνδρες

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but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune."

And when he heard this, he laughed gently and said : " Ah, Simmias ! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble ; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans ; but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask whatever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit."

- ἔνδεκα.¹ Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ
- C ἔγωγέ σοι ἐρῶ δ' ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὁδε, ἥ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων
- D λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοῦμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνηθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ, ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἃ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.
- E 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὥς ἡ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ
- 86 θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα

¹ Schanz brackets ἔως . . . ἔνδεκα.

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"Good," said Simmias. "I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. [For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely.] And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem quite satisfactory."

And Socrates replied: "Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory."

"In this," said he, "that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies,

καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῇ καὶ
 ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγ-
 γενῇ. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἡ
 διατέμη¹ καὶ διαρρήξη τὰς χορδὰς, εἴ τις δισχυρί-
 ζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι
 εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι·
 οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι
 εἶναι διερρωγιῶν τῶν χορδῶν² καὶ τὰς χορδὰς
 θνητοειδεῖς οὕσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι
 B τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῇ τε καὶ
 ξυγγενῇ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ
 φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν,
 καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπή-
 σεσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν, — καὶ γὰρ οὖν,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο
 ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμ-
 βάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ
 σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ
 ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν,
 C κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν
 ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως
 κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ
 οὕσα ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ
 σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ
 ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθύς
 ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὕσαν θειοτάτην,
 ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἷ τ' ἐν τοῖς
 φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις
 πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν

¹ Schanz brackets διατέμη.

² Schanz brackets διερρωγιῶν τῶν χορδῶν.

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and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a

D χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῇ ἡ κατασαπῇ. ὄρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, εἰάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρῶτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι

E χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί αὐτῷ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα, τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εἰάν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, εἰάν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐτῷ θρᾶπτον. Λέγω δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταῦτον
87 ἔγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως, καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι. ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὥς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἂν φαίῃ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε
B ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὅτι σῶζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκειναι, εἴ τι

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long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?"

Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: "Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebes finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defence of our reasoning. Come, Cebes," said he, "tell us what it was that troubled you."

"Well, I will tell you," said Cebes. "The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before. For I do not deny that it has been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias' objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I think it is far superior in all such respects. 'Why then,' the argument might say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?' Now see if my

- λέγω· εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἔστι που σῶς,¹ τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἡμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος, ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοίῃ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶν
- C πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεῖα τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δέ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἂν λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν
- D ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φανλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώῃ· εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζώντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
- E ἀλλ' ἢ ψυχὴ αἰεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι,

¹ σῶς Schanz, after Forster ; ἴσως BCDE.

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reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

“But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feebler or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then

ἀναγκαῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ
 ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν
 ἔχουσιν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
 ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς
 ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν
 διοίχοιτο. ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐπω ἄξιον
 πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν,
 88 ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον
 ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἂ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς
 αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς
 χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν
 καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ
 ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖ-
 σθαι αὐθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι,
 ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς
 δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν
 αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν
 γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι.
 B τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν
 τοῦ σώματος, ἡ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, μηδένα
 φαίη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτφοῦν αἰσθάνε-
 σθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσή-
 κει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν,
 ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντά-
 πασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή,
 ἀνάγκην εἶναι αἰετὸν τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι
 δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ
 σώματος διαζεύξῃ παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.

38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν
 C ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα
 πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ

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when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay. And so we are not yet justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, that our souls will still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths. But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.”

Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and

εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρη-
μένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα
ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ
τὰ πράγματα ἀπιστα ἦ.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώ-
μην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκού-
σαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν
D ἐπέρχεται· τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς
γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε
λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμασ-
τῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ
νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχὴν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ
αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι
πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με
πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει
ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης
E μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κακείνος, ὥσπερ
ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ,
ἀλλὰ πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς
ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν διέλθε ὡς δύνα-
σαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις
θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην
89 ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὃ τι
λέγοι ἐκείνος, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε
μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς
ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων
τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως
ῥηθετο ὁ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς
εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ

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distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

ECHECRATES. By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathise with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself: "What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit." For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven's sake, tell how Socrates continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men's criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and

ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς δῆ;

- ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ
 Β καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός,
 ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας
 οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ
 αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν
 μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὐριον δῆ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ
 Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἐοικεν, ἦν
 δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ.
 Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμερον, ἔφη, καὶ γὰρ τὰς
 ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος
 τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.
 C καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος,
 ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρό-
 τερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος
 τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷός τε
 εἶναι. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρα-
 κάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν,
 ἔφη, οὐχ ὥς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὥς Ἰόλεως. Οὐδὲν
 διοίσει, ἔφη.

39. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ
 πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώ-
 D μεθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρω-
 ποι γιγνόμενοι· ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἂν τις
 μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας.
 γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ
 μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται
 ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ

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defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

ECHECRATES. How did he do it?

PHAEDO. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, “To-morrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair.”

“I suppose so, Socrates,” said I.

“Not if you take my advice.”

“What shall I do then?” I asked.

“You will cut it off to-day, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again. If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes.”

“But,” I replied, “they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.”

“Well,” said he, “call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.”

“I call you to help, then,” said I, “not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.”

“That is all one,” said he. “But first let us guard against a danger.”

“Of what sort?” I asked.

“The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument,” said he, “as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without

ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί τε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ
καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον
εὔρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἄπιστον καὶ αὐθις
ἕτερον· καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ
ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὗς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο οἰκειοτά-
Ε τους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ
προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς
οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι σὺ
τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν,
ἢ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρὸν,¹ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης
τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο,
ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς
90 καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἑκατέρους, τοὺς
δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ.
"Ὡσπερ, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ
μεγάλων· οἶε τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα
μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κῖνα
ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν
ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι
ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν
ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα
καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἶε,
B ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγῶν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλί-
γους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκὸς
γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταύτη

¹ Schanz brackets αἰσχρὸν.

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sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?"

"Certainly," said I.

"Well," he went on, "is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?"

"To be sure," said I.

"And don't you think," said he, "that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?"

"Very likely," I replied.

"Yes, very likely," he said. "But it is not in that

- μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμεν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, καὶ πειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὖθις ἑτεροῦ καὶ ἑτεροῦ· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντι-
C λογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα
D διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιουτοῖσι λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λαιδωρῶν διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖη. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

40. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβη-
E θῶμεν καὶ μὴ παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς

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respect that arguments are like men ; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this : when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again ; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time."

"Certainly," I said, "that is very true."

"Then, Phaedo," he said, "if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality."

"Yes, by Zeus," I said, "it would be sad."

"First, then," said he, "let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others

- 91 ἔνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμηθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅ τι
- B μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταίρε· θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἂ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἢ δὲ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείπεται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἐρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον· ὑμεῖς
- C μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἂν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχῆσομαι.

41. Ἄλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἂ ἐλέγετε, ἂν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἢ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ

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for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So," he said, "Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

"But we must get to work," he said. "First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the

- D κάλλιον ὃν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει οὔσα· Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιπούσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἀρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
- E συνωμολογεῖτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν
- 92 εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὥς ἐπείσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὥς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάννυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαίε, ἄλλα δοξάσαι, ἐάνπερ μείνη ἡδε ἢ οἴησις, τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκει-
- B σθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ὥς πρότερον ἦν ἀρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν

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body, may perish first, being of the nature of a harmony. And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no one could know that the soul, after wearing out many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving the body; and that this was death—the destruction of the soul, since the body is continually being destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes, which we must consider?”

They both agreed that these were the points.

“Now,” said he, “do you reject all of our previous arguments, or only some of them?”

“Only some of them,” they replied.

“What do you think,” he asked, “about the argument in which we said that learning is recollection and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in the body?”

“I,” said Cebes, “was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than any other argument.”

“And I too,” said Simmias, “feel just as he does, and I should be much surprised if I should ever think differently on this point.”

And Socrates said: “You must, my Theban friend, think differently, if you persist in your opinion that a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a harmony made up of the elements that are strung like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will not accept your own statement that a composite harmony existed before those things from which it had to be composed, will you?”

“Certainly not, Socrates.”

“Then do you see,” said he, “that this is just

- φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδος γε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὃ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ
- C φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνωδός· ἀλλ' ὅρα, πότερον αἰρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνου, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὁδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς
- D καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ
- E ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἰκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστιν ἁρμονία.

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what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?"

"I cannot at all," said Simmias.

"And yet," said Socrates, "there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others."

"Yes, there ought," said Simmias.

"Well," said he, "there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?"

"The former, decidedly, Socrates," he replied. "For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists. Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony."

42. Τί δέ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι
 ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως
 93 πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ, ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγ-
 κέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς
 ἐγὼμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ
 ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε
 προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων, ἐξ ὧν ἂν συντεθῇ,
 ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ
 ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι
 ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ
 μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὕτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν
 εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἀρμοσθῇ; Οὐ
 μαυθάνω, ἔφη. Οὐχί, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον
 B ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο
 γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἀρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων,
 εἰ δ' ἡττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἡττόν τε καὶ
 ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ
 ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον ἐτέραν
 ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ'
 ἔλαττον καὶ ἡττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν;
 Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός·
 λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν
 καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχ-

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"Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias," said he. "Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?"

"Certainly not."

"And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?"

He agreed.

"Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them."

He assented.

"A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts."

"Quite unable," said he.

"Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonised?"

"I do not understand," said Simmias.

"Would it not," said Socrates, "be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonised more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonised and to a less extent?"

"Certainly."

"Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?"

"Not in the least," said he.

"Well now," said he, "one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to

- θηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακή; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς
 C λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμένων
 ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσῃ ταῦτα ὄντα
 εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
 κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὐτὴν τινα ἄλλην καὶ
 ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν,
 καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἀρμονίᾳ οὔση ἄλλην ἀρμονίαν,
 τὴν δὲ ἀναρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν
 αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας,
 εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ
 ἐκείνῳ ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη,
 D μὴδὲν μᾶλλον μὴδ' ἥττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυ-
 χὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα,
 μὴδὲν μᾶλλον μὴδ' ἐπὶ πλεόν μὴδ' ἥττον μὴδ'
 ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν εἶναι. ἢ
 γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μὴδὲν μᾶλλον μὴδὲ
 ἥττον ἀρμονίαν οὔσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον
 ἡρμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε
 μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον ἡρμωσμένη· ἔστιν ὃ τι πλεόν
 ἢ ἔλαττον ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον.
 Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἥττον
 E ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ
 μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἥττον ἡρμωσται; Οὕτω. Τοῦτο δέ
 γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλεόν ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ
 ἀρμονίας μετέχει ἂν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ'
 αὐτὴ πεπονθυῖα ἂν τι πλεόν κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς
 μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρ-
 μοστία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλεόν.
 Μᾶλλον δέ γε πού, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν
 94 λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἀρ-

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possess folly and wickedness and to be bad ; and is this true ? ” “ Yes, it is true.”

“ Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are ? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it ? ”

“ I cannot tell,” replied Simmias, “ but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort.”

“ But we agreed,” said Socrates, “ that one soul is no more or less a soul than another ; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not ? ” “ Certainly.”

“ And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonised. Is that so ? ” “ Yes.”

“ But has that which is no more and no less harmonised any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount ? ” “ An equal amount.”

“ Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonised.”

“ That is so.”

“ And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony ? ” “ No.”

“ And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony ? ” “ It cannot.”

“ Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony ;

μονία ἐστίν· ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔσα ἁρμονία ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ' ἂν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδέ γε δήπου ψυχῇ, οὔσα παντελῶς ψυχῇ, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῶων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

B Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οὔτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

43. Τί δέ; ἡ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὃ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν¹ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ² ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἶον³ καύματος ἐνόητος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν

C τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἡ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὔν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ'

¹ Schanz brackets συγχωροῦσαν.

² Schanz omits ἢ καί.

³ οἶον Stobæus. ὥσει CDE, bracketed by Schanz.

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for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord."

"Certainly not."

"Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness."

"How could it, if what we have said is right?"

"According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good."

"So it seems, Socrates," said he.

"And," said Socrates, "do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?"

"Not in the least," he replied.

"Well," said Socrates, "of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?"

"No, I do not."

"Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?"

"Certainly."

"Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?"

ἀν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιούμενη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὐσα ἄλλῃ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεά·

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ'
ἔτλης.

Ε ἄρ' οἶει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺν θειότερου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαν; Νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς
95 ἔοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχειν οὕτως ἔφη.

44. Εἶπεν δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἱλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ

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"Yes," he replied, "we did, of course."

"Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannising over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the *Odyssey*¹ when he says of Odysseus :

He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart :

'Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this' ?

Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony? "

"By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think."

"Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That is true," said he.

"Very well," said Socrates, "Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately

¹ *Odyssey* xx, 17, 18. Bryant's translation.

- Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὥς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίῳ γὰρ λέγοντος ὃ τι ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον, εἴ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι
- B τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθύς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτά δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὡς γὰρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι.¹ ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιόις ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον
- C τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὔσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλον ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βίους ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστίν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἅττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον
- D ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος· καὶ τάλαιπωρομένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ

¹ Schanz, following Hermann, brackets ἔσεσθαι.

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gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?"

"I think," said Cebes, "you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

"My friend," said Socrates, "do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, 'charge the foe' and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that, but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally

ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρειν¹ δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδέν, εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκειν² γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαύτ' ἅττα
 Ε ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθήῃς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. καὶ ὁ Κέβης· Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα, ἃ λέγω.

45. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγ-
 96 ματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίδειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼν περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί
 Β ἐστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἑμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε, ἅρ' ἐπειδὴν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν³ σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς

¹ Schanz reads διαφέρει.

² Schanz reads προσήκει.

³ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν Eb Stobaeus. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν BD, Schanz brackets ψυχρὸν.

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perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a body once or many times, so far as the fear each of us feels is concerned ; for anyone, unless he is a fool, must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. That, Cebes, is, I think, about what you mean. And I restate it purposely that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you wish, add or take away anything."

And Cebes said, "I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning."

Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said : "It is no small thing that you seek ; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish ; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty."

"Certainly," said Cebes, "I wish to hear your experiences."

"Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists ; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these : Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organisation of animals, as some people say ? Is

- τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα συντρέφεται· καὶ
 πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ὃ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀῆρ ἢ τὸ
 πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ' ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ
 ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ
 δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν
 κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὖ τούτων
 C τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ
 τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς
 ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι, ὥς οὐδὲν χρήμα.
 τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ καὶ
 πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως
 οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἂ
 πρὸ τοῦ ᾧμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ
 διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ᾧμην πρὸ
 τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ
 D πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ
 σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστέοις ὀστᾶ, καὶ
 οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ
 αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν
 ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολλὴν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ
 οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν·
 οὕτως τότε ᾧμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἐμοιγε,
 ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾧμην
 γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρω-
 πος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ
 E κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων
 ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα
 εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ
 τοῦ πηχυαίου μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ
 ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι

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it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn't that seem to you reasonable?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other, and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length."

"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"

δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω πόν, ἔφη, νῆ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἶεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὥς, ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσθῇ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ 97 ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γάρ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὥς, ἐάν τις ἐν διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὥς αὕτη αὐ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται B ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδέ γε, δι' ὃ τι ἐν γίγνεται ὥς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὃ τι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρῳ, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.

46. Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὥς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ C λέγοντος ὥς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτία ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἷτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν¹ καὶ ἕκα-

¹ Schanz brackets κοσμεῖν.

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"By Zeus," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from another. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

"Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes

- στον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὔρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὔρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πᾶσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ
- D λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ¹ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὲ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὕρηκεναι ὥμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν, πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ
- E φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀπο-
- 98 φαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμεν ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν, ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν ἢ πᾶσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὥμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει·
- B ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ

¹ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου BCDE. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ. Wohlrab omits ἐκείνον and reads αὐτοῦ. Burnet brackets ἐκείνου.

each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same.' As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the centre, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the centre; and I had made up my mind that if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause. And I had determined that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are. So I thought when he assigned the cause

κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστω βέλτιστον ᾧμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἦ ἀνεγίνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὥχόμεν φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖὼν καὶ ¹ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ
C τινὰς αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, καῖπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἔστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα
D οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος,
E ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ.

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of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

“My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me, and therefore I have decided

- αὐτὸ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον
 παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν·
- 99 ἐπεὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ
 - νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὅσῃ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς
 ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ
 δικαιότερον ὧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ
 φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει
 δίκην ἥντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἷτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα
 καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὅσῃ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
 ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι,
 ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ
- B καὶ ταῦτα νῶ πρᾶττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου
 αἰρέσει, πολλὴ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ
 λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶόν τ' εἶναι ὅτι
 ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ
 ἐκείνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἷτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἷτιον· ὃ
 δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ
 ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς
 αἷτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις
 δύνῃν περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ
 ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατεία
 βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε
- C βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι,
 ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἶονται δαιμονίαν
 ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἂν
 ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἀπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν
 οἶονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅπῃ
 ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητῆς ὅπου οὖν ἡδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην·
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὗτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν

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that it was best for me to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that

D οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν
 δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ
 πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπιδείξιν
 ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη,
 ὡς βούλομαι.

48. Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἡ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα,
 ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβη-
 θῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα
 θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ
 που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι
 E τοιούτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιούτόν
 τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενόηθην, καὶ ἔδμεσα, μὴ παντάπασι
 τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγ-
 ματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων
 ἐπιχειρῶν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι
 εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν
 τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὧς εἰκάζω
 100 τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συγχωρῶ
 τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι
 μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ
 ταύτῃ γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον
 ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι
 δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθηναι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα,
 καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων
 τῶν ὄντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μή, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι
 δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω· οἶμαι γὰρ σε
 νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,
 οὐ σφόδρα.

B 49. Ἄλλ', ἡ δ' ὅς, ὧςδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινόν,
 ἀλλ' ἅπερ αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι
 λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ
 ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ

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was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes," said he, "to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?"

"I wish it with all my heart," he replied.

"After this, then," said he, "since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the last that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now."

"Not very well, certainly," said Cebes.

"Well," said Socrates, "this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying,

- πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὑγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἂ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὥς
- C ἀθάνατον ἢ ψυχὴν. Ἄλλα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὥς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, ἐάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιαύτῃ αἰτία συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ," ἔφη. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγῃ, δι' ὃ τι καλόν ἐστιν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ
- D χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐγώ, ταράττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλόν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἐτι τοῦτο δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά· τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέςτατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου
- E ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτῳ οὖν ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ

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and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal."

"You may assume," said Cebes, "that I grant it, and go on."

"Then," said he, "see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?"

"I do," said he.

"Now I do not yet, understand," he went on, "nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?"

"I do."

"And great things are great and greater things

- μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρό-
τητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀπο-
δέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἑτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ
μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ
101 ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἄν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν
ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου
οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον
οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος
οἶμαι, μή τίς σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν
τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῇ εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω,
πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι καὶ
τὸ ἔλαττον ἔλαττον, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ
B οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας
εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν
φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας· Ἐγωγε,
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτῶ δυοῖν
πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερ-
βάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ
διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου
ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ
που φόβος. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς
προσθεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο
C γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλα-
βοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶνς ὅτι οὐκ
οἴσθα ἄλλως πῶς ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν
τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐκ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν
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greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?"

"Yes."

"And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head, but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same thing, and secondly, that the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

And Cebes laughed and said, "Yes, I should."

"Then," he continued, "you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two-cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear."

"Certainly," said he.

"Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it

τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν, παρείς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιώς

D ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλούς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν; εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔφοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἣτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως

E ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν. ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλώντες ὁμῶς δύνασθαι¹ αὐτοὶ

102 αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ' εἴπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε· θαυμαστώως γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

¹ Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing δύνασθαι.

PHAEDO

participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the saying goes, of your own shadow ; so you would cling to that safe principle of ours and would reply as I have said. And if anyone attacked the principle, you would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until you had examined the consequences to see whether they agreed with one another or not ; and when you had to give an explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any of the realities ; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about these things. They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix everything up ; but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I have said."

"That is true," said Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHECRATES. By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those matters astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

PHAEDO. Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too,

PLATO

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

50. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι
- B ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα· Εἰ δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἂρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφοτέρω, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἐγώ γε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν
- C τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει δ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρὸς τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὦν ἀμφοτέρων,
- D τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας· Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐν ἔχει γέ που, ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα,

PHAEDO

ECHECRATES. And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said after that?

PHAEDO. As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then Socrates asked: "Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?"

"Yes."

"But," said Socrates, "you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than Socrates by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness."

"True."

"And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias's smallness."

"That is true."

"Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two, surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness." And he laughed and said, "I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say."

Simmias agreed.

"I am speaking so because I want you to agree

βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἐθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ

E προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομείναν δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὦν ὅσπερ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμι· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ тетόλμηκεν μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ' αὖτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν ἅμα τοῦναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι

103 ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

51. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅστις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι· Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἄνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο,

PHAEDO

with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change."

"That," said Cebes, "seems to me quite evident."

Then one of those present—I don't just remember who it was—said: "In Heaven's name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen."

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened.

"You have spoken up like a man," he said, "but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become

οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμία, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ
 C φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν· Ἄρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὁδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' Οὐκ¹ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,² οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὥς οὐ πολλά με ταραττει. Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἡ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

52. Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἐγωγε. Ἄρ' ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;
 D Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', οἶμαι, δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα³ οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν,⁴ ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ⁵ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξίεναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτέ

¹ δ δ' αὖ BT. δ δ' οὐκ αὖ, Hermann, Schanz.

² Schanz brackets δ Κέβης.

³ Schanz inserts χιόνα before χιόνα.

⁴ Schanz brackets καὶ θερμόν.

⁵ αὐτό BCE; bracketed by Schanz. αὐτῷ c, Wohlrab, Burnet.

PHAEDO

its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other."

At the same time he looked at Cebes and said: "And you—are you troubled by any of our friends' objections?"

"No," said Cebes, "not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me."

"Well, we are quite agreed," said Socrates, "upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite."

"Entirely agreed," said Cebes.

"Now," said he, "see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?"

"Yes."

"Are they the same as snow and fire?"

"No, not at all."

"But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?"

"Yes."

"Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist."

"Certainly."

"And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in

- τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι
 E ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.¹ Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη,
 λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἣ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἓνια τῶν
 τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου
 μορφήν αἰὲ ὅτανπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως
 ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰ-
 που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν
 λέγομεν. ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρα μόνον τῶν
 ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἣ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι
 104 μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ
 τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰὲ διὰ τὸ
 οὕτω πεφυκέναι, ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε
 ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς
 πέποιθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς
 τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι
 αἰὲ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ,
 ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως
 πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς
 τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν
 B αἰὲ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός· καὶ αὐτὰ δύο
 καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὐτοῦ στίχος τοῦ
 ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἕκαστος
 αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰὲ· συγχωρεῖς ἦ οὐ; Πῶς
 γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δη-
 λῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ
 μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰὲ
 τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν

¹ Schanz brackets καὶ ψυχρόν.

PHAEDO

admitting cold and being still fire, as it was before, and also cold."

"That is true," said he.

"The fact is," said he, "in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?"

"Certainly."

"But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?"

"Of course," he replied.

"Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites;

ιδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὔσῃ ἐναντία ἦ, ἀλλ'
 C ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχω-
 ροῦντα· ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι
 πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπο-
 μεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν
 οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίου
 γέ ἐστι δυὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα
 μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα
 ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ
 ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

53. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τ' ὦμεν,
 ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταῦτά ἐστιν; Πάνυ γε.
 D Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδε εἴη ἄν, ἂ ὅ τι ἂν
 κατάσχη, μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν
 αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου ἀεί τινος;¹ Πῶς
 λέγεις; Ὡσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δή-
 που, ὅτι ἂ ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη
 αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.
 Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναν-
 τία ιδέα ἐκείνῃ τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργά-
 ζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γάρ. Εἰργάζετο

¹ αὐτῷ ἀεί τινος BCDE. Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, brackets αὐτῷ.

these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"But the number two is not the opposite of the number three."

"No."

"Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites."

"Very true," he said.

"Shall we then," said Socrates, "determine if we can, what these are?"

"Certainly."

"Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?"

"What do you mean?"

"Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd."

"Certainly."

"Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result."

"No, it cannot."

δέ γε ἡ περιττή; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτῃ ἡ
 Ε τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ
 ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἥξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα
 δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία. Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος
 ἄρα ἡ τριάς. Ναί. Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσα-
 σθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ
 δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον,¹ οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ
 ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
 δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ
 105 ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα
 πάμπολλα—ἀλλ' ὅρα δῆ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον
 τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν
 αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου
 ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀνα-
 μιμνήσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ
 πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέχεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν
 τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ
 αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ
 Β οὐ δέχεται· οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ
 τοιαῦτα,² τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ

¹ Schanz, following Bekker, brackets τὸ ἐναντίον.

² After τοιαῦτα the MSS. read τὸ ἡμισυ, "half," which Schanz brackets.

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"But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?"

"Yes."

"And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?"

"Yes."

"Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three."

"No."

"Then three has no part in the even."

"No, it has none."

"Then the number three is uneven."

"Yes."

"Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple frac-

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με, ᾧ ἂν τί¹ ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν C ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὃ τι βούλομαι. Ἄλλα πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡς ἂν ψυχῇ, ἔφη. Οὐκ D οὖν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατὰσχη, ἀεὶ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκείνο φέρουσα ζωὴν; Ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχῇ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε

¹ After τί the MSS. read ἐν τῷ σώματι, "in the body," which Schanz brackets.

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tions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go with me and agree to this ?”

“ Yes, I agree entirely,” he said, “ and am with you.”

“ Then,” said Socrates, “ please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire ; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever ; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently what I mean ?”

“ Quite sufficiently,” he replied.

“ Now answer,” said he. “ What causes the body in which it is to be alive ?”

“ The soul,” he replied.

“ Is this always the case ?”

“ Yes,” said he, “ of course.”

“ Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it ?”

“ Certainly,” he said.

“ Is there anything that is the opposite of life ?”

“ Yes,” said he.

“ What ?”

“ Death.”

“ Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will

δέξεται, ὥς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέαυ τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν Ε μὴ δέχεται; Ἀμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἰεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ. Ἀθάνατον. Εἰεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶμεν· ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο 106 τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὡσαύτως, οἶμαι, καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπῆρει, οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἀπεςβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν ᾤχετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Β Οὐκοῦν καὶ ᾧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου

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never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it."

"Decidedly not," said Cebes.

"Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?"

"Uneven," said he.

"And those which do not admit justice and music?"

"Unjust," he replied, "and unmusical."

"Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?"

"Deathless or immortal," he said.

"And the soul does not admit death?"

"No."

"Then the soul is immortal."

"Yes."

"Very well," said he. "Shall we say then that this is proved?"

"Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates."

"Well then, Cebes," said he, "if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?"

"Of course."

"And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat."

"That is very true," he replied.

"In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed."

"Necessarily," he said.

"And must not the same be said of that which is

- εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ
- C αὐτ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενῆσθαι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἡ οὖν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ
- D ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἴ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὄν φθορὰν δέξεται.
56. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατο
- E καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη;
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immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about five and heat and the rest, could we not?"

"Certainly."

"And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed."

"But," he said, "it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable."

"All, I think," said Socrates, "would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish."

"All men would, certainly," said he, "and still more, I fancy, the Gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?"

Πολλή ἀναγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σὼν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπὶόν, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, 107 ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἄιδου. Οὐκ οὐν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι· ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἄλλὰ μὲν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶν, B καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμᾶντῳ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ¹ καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κὰν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

57. Ἀλλὰ τότε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον C διανοηθῆναι ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ

¹ After ἀλλὰ the MSS. read ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις; bracketed by Ast, Schanz, and others.

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"Necessarily."

"Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death."

"So it seems."

"Then, Cebes," said he, "it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world."

"I," said Cebes, "have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters."

"But," said Simmias, "I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said."

"Not only that, Simmias," said Socrates, "but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyse them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther."

"That is true," he said.

"But my friends," he said, "we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life,

ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῇ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὐσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὕτῃ

D ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἄιδου ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἄιδου πορεύεσθαι

E μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μέιναντας ὅν χρῆ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει·

108 ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὔτε ἀπλὴ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾷς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. ἢ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνο πολὺν χρόνον

but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be saved in any other way than by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to the other world nothing but its education and nurture, and these are said to benefit or injure the departed greatly from the very beginning of his journey thither. And so it is said that after death, the tutelary genius of each person, to whom he had been allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead are gathered together; then they are judged and depart to the other world with the guide whose task it is to conduct thither those who come from this world; and when they have there received their due and remained through the time appointed, another guide brings them back after many long periods of time. And the journey is not as Telephus says in the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path leads to the lower world, but I think the path is neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way to any place if there were only one road. But really there seem to be many forks of the road and many windings; this I infer from the rites and ceremonies practised here on earth. Now the orderly and wise soul follows its guide and understands its circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the visible world for a long time, and after much resist-

- B ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὄθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἣ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία, ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν· ἣ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὥκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὥς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι.
- D 58. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας· Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οἶν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγῆσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν· ὥς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μὲντοι ιδέα ν τῆς γῆς, οἷαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν,

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ance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone's authority."

And Simmias said, "What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it."

"Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it."

"Well," said Simmias, "that will be enough."

"I am convinced, then, said he, that in the first

- 109 ἡ δ' ὅς, ἐγώ, ὥς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὐσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἡττον οὐδαμῶσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. πρῶτον μὲν, ἡ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἑρακλείων
- B στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινι μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκούντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνερρηκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν αἶρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧπέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα
- C ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι, καὶ ξυρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκούντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι, καὶ οἶεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἴοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὀρῶν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἡγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ
- D ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακὼς εἶη, ἐκδύς καὶ ἀνακύψας

place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place ; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the centre of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced."

"And rightly," said Simmias.

"Secondly," said he, "I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together ; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether ; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the

ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ
καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ
σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοὺς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος.
ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκούντας
γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἶεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς
οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὥς διὰ τούτου
οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι
E ταῦτόν,¹ ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἷους
τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα·
ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς
γενόμενος ἀνάπτοιτο, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύνφαντα,
ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύν-
πτοντες ὀρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ
ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἢ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἶη ἀνέχεσθαι
θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς
110 οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὥς ἀληθῶς γῆ.
ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ
ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα,
ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε
φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε
τέλειον, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ
καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροί
εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ᾗ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν
κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἄξια· ἐκεῖνα δὲ
αὐτῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανεῖν
B διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν, ἄξιον
ἀκούσαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς
γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ
Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ
μύθου ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

59. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πρῶτον

¹ Schanz, following Rückert, brackets εἶναι ταῦτόν.

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sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us ; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface ; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air ; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world ; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognise that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth. For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours. If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing."

"By all means, Socrates," said Simmias ; "we should be glad to hear this story."

"Well then, my friend," said he, "to begin with, .

- μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν
 θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη,
 χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι
 χρώματα ὥσπερ δέγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς
 C καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων
 εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρω-
 τέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῇ εἶναι καὶ
 θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῇ, τὴν δὲ
 ὄσῃ λευκῇ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ
 τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ
 ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωρά-
 καμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς
 ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔκπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι
 D εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων
 χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος
 συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐσῇ
 τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα
 τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄρη
 ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
 λόγον τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ
 τὰ χρώματα καλλίῳ· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια
 εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε
 E καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ
 τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ
 ἔτι τούτων καλλίῳ. τὸ δ' αἷτιον τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι
 ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδεδεσμένοι
 οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος
 καὶ ἄλμης¹ ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνερρυηκότων, ἀ καὶ
 λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς
 αἷσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν
 • κεκοσμηῆσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασιν καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ καὶ

¹ Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης.

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the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather ; it is divided into patches of various colours, of which the colours which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use. But there the whole earth is of such colours, and they are much brighter and purer than ours ; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colours likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance of colour as they glisten amid the variety of the other colours, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful ; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in colour than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and jaspers, and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapours and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants. And the earth there is adorned with all these jewels and also with gold and silver and every-

- 111 ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἅερα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς περιρρεῖν τὸν ἅερα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὕσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι
- B πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἅερα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτῆς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἥπερ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἕρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι
- C αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὀρᾶσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγχοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου,

D ἔστι δ' οὗς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντα ὑπὸ

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thing of the sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places, so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions, and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

“Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these

γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἣ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ εἰς κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου
 Ε καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιρροὴ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἡ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει
 112 ὃν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὅπερ Ὁμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτό

τῆλε μάλ', ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·

ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσιν τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν· γίνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦτοι, δι' οἷας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. ἡ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν
 Β πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀῆρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταῦτόν ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ

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are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows: One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth;¹

and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here is that this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and

¹ Homer, *Iliad* 8, 14, Lord Derby's translation.

- ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων αἰεὶ ἐκπνεῖ
 τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ
 ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας
 ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὼν καὶ
 C ἐξιὼν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν
 τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα
 τὰ ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν
 ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ
 αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ῥεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ
 διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνού-
 μενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε
 καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμούς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ·
 ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν
 D μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ
 δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν
 Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ
 ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω
 εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἔνια μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ
 ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι
 δὲ ἅ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ
 καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ
 οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν
 E ἐμβάλλει. δυνατόν δὲ ἔστιν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ
 μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἀναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέ-
 ροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα
 καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα
 ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἅττα ρεύματα,
 ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ῥέον κύκλῳ ὁ
 καλούμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ
 καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε

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just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out. And when the water retires to the region which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth, some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm. Now it is possible to go down from each side to the centre, but not beyond, for there the slope rises upward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

“Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through

- 113 τόπων ῥεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ῥέων εἰς τὴν
 / λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οἱ αἱ τῶν
 τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται
 καὶ τινες εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μέινασαι, αἱ μὲν
 μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμ-
 πονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῳῶν γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ
 ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς
 τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ
 πολλῷ καιόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ'
 ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσιν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ.
 B ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης,
 περιελιττόμενος δὲ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ'
 ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνύ-
 μενος τῷ ὕδατι· περιελιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ
 γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου· οὗτος δ'
 ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὐ καὶ
 οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν ὅπη ἂν
 τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὐτὸ καταντικρὺ ὁ
 τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον¹ δεινόν τε καὶ
 ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρώμα δ' ἔχοντα ὅλον οἶον ὁ
 C κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν
 λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγα· ὁ
 δ' ἐμπεσὼν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν
 τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος
 χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν
 τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδέ τὸ
 τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος
 κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον
 ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ
 ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

- D 62. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴν ἀφί-

¹ Schanz brackets πρῶτον.

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various desert places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud. Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyriphlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli. This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyriphlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. And the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

“Such is the nature of these things. Now when

κωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ
δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο
οἷ τε καλῶς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ
οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες
ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχή-
ματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην,
καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε
ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τις τι

E ἡδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ
τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως
ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἡ ἱερο-
συλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ
παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι, ἡ ἄλλα ὅσα
τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα
μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαί-
νουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν
ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ
μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μετα-

114 μέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνου
τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ
ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας
δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει
τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν,
τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν
Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται
κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα
βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖς ἀπέκτειναν,
οἱ δὲ οὖς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύουσι καὶ
B δέονται εἶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ
δέξασθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε
καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις
εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποτα-

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the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings, and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrong-doings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge. Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyriphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on

- μούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἠδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμω-
- C τηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνούνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥάδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρή ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη.
- D 63. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα δισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελέλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νουν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρή περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ ἄνδρα, ὅστις ἐν
- E τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄντας, καὶ πλεόν θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ

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until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged ; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons ; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

“ But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

“ Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe ; for the venture is well worth while ; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and

115 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περι-
 μένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος
 ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ
 Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαυθις ἔν
 τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἤδη
 καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ
 σχεδόν τί μοι ὥρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν·
 δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ
 φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν
 νεκρὸν λούειν.

64. Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων· Εἶεν,
 B ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπι-
 στέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του,
 ὃ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα
 ποιοῖμεν; Ἄπερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν
 καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς
 καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι
 ποιήσετε ἅττ' ἂν ποιήτε, καὶ μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε·
 εἰ δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε καὶ μὴ θέλητε
 ὥσπερ κατ' ἔχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ
 C ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδὲ εἰς πολλὰ
 ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν
 πλεον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυ-
 μηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ
 σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἔφη, βούλησθε,
 εἰάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.
 γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας
 εἶπεν· Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ
 εἰμι οὗτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενος καὶ
 διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται με
 D καὶ ἔρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι

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courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest," he said, "will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse."

When he had finished speaking, Crito said: "Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else—anything we can do to serve you?"

"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing, no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at present."

"We will certainly try hard to do as you say," he replied. "But how shall we bury you?"

"However you please," he replied, "if you can catch me and I do not get away from you." And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And though I have been saying at

πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὥς, ἐπειδὴν πῶ το
 φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ, ἀλλ' οἰχήσομαι
 ἀπὼν εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινος εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά
 μοι¹ δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος
 ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν
 με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην
 ἢ ἢν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἡγγυᾶτο. οὗτος
 μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ
 παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ
 Ε οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπιόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾶον φέρῃ, καὶ
 μὴ ὀρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυττό-
 μενον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὥς δεινὰ πάσχοντος,
 μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὥς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτης
 ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὅς,
 ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον
 εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι
 ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ
 φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως
 116 ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγῇ νόμιμον
 εἶναι.

65. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά
 τι ὥς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ,
 ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς
 ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγυῖα εἴη,
 ἀτεχνῶς ἡγούμενοι ὥσπερ πατρὸς στερηθέντες
 διάξιν ὀρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλού-
 Β σατο καὶ ἡνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ
 αὐτῷ υἱεῖς μικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ

¹ Schanz, following Madvig, brackets μοι.

PHAEDO

great length that after I drink the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage you and myself. So," he said, "give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial ; for he gave security that I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die, but shall go away, so that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. No, you must be of good courage, and say that you bury my body,—and bury it as you think best and as seems to you most fitting."

When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe ; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and

- οἰκείαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον¹ τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἄττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παῖδιά ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν
- C ἔνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν· Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουνσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γινώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἂ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα
- D φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσῆει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῆστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύνει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων,
- E Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἡλίου εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσιν καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι.

¹ ἐναντίον ἐκείναις. Elmsl. ἐναντίον ἐκείναις. BD. Schanz brackets ἐκείναις. ἐκείναις ἐναντίον Heermann. Wohlrab.

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the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not much was said, and the servant of the eleven came and stood beside him and said: "Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are to blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must as easily as you can." And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said: "Fare you well, too; I will do as you say." And then he said to us: "How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it." And Crito said: "But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and



καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνν ὄψῃ πίνοντας,
ἐπειδὴν παραγγεληῇ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ
πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίοις ὧν
ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου·
ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως
γε, ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν,
οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἷονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιή-
σαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως¹ οὐ ποιήσω·
117 οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδανεῖν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὼν
ἄλλο γε ἢ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλιχό-
μενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενός ἔτι ἐνόντος.
ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

66. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ
πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συγχρὸν
χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι
τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον·
ιδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ
βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ
ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιέειναι,
B ἕως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα
κατακεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. καὶ ἅμα
ᾤρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει· καὶ ὃς λαβὼν
καὶ μάλα ἴλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ
διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώ-
που, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας
πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τούδε
τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι; ἔξεστιν
ἢ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν,
ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ
C δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαί γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί
τε καὶ χρὴ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε

¹ Schanz brackets εἰκότως, following Hirschig.

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I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry ; for there is still time."

And Socrates said: "Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it ; and I shall be right in not doing as they do ; for I think I should gain nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and spared it, when there is no more profit in it. Come," he said, "do as I ask and do not refuse."

Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said: "Well, my good man, you know about these things ; what must I do?" "Nothing," he replied, "except drink the poison and walk about till your legs feel heavy ; then lie down, and the poison will take effect of itself."

At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing colour or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: "What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?" "Socrates," said he, "we prepare only as much as we think is enough." "I understand," said Socrates ; "but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one ; so I

εὐτυχῇ γενέσθαι· ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γέ-
νοιτο ταύτη. καὶ ἅμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ
μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπιεν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ
πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν
τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὥς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ
πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ
ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος
ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε, ἀλλὰ

D τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἷου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερη-
μένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ,
ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα,
ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπρο-

σθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ
τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ¹ ἀγανακτῶν
οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν
γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη,
ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα
τούτου ἔνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ
τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν

E εὐφημία χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε
καὶ καρτερεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσυχύνθη-
μέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελ-
θὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατε-
κλίθη ὑπτίος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος·
καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ
φάρμακον,² διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπέσκόπει τοὺς πόδας
καὶ τὰ σκέλη, καῖπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν
πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη· καὶ μετὰ

118 τοῦτο αὐθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιὼν οὕτως ἡμῖν

¹ Schanz brackets κλαίων καί.

² Schanz follows Upton and others in bracketing οὗτος . . .
φάρμακον.

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offer this prayer, and may it be granted." With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave." Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his hands and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said "No"; then after that, his thighs; and passing upwards in

ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐθις¹ ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἤδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο· ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὃς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

67. Ἦδε ἡ τελευταίη, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως² φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

¹ αὐθις, Forster. αὐτὸς, BCDF. αὐ, Schanz.

² Schanz brackets ἄλλως.

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this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words—“Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it.” “That,” said Crito, “shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say.” To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.

PHAEDRUS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDRUS*

THE *Phaedrus* is pre-eminent among the dialogues of Plato for the variety of its contents and style, the richness of its imaginative description, and the sportive humour of its conversation. The chief theme of the dialogue is rhetoric, the art of speaking, a subject which formed an important part of the oral and written instruction of the sophists. Plato, and herein he agrees with the sophists, assumes that the result aimed at by rhetoric is persuasiveness, ability to lead the minds of the hearers to a particular belief or action. For the attainment of this result, the sophists claimed that knowledge of the truth concerning the subject under discussion is not essential; all that is necessary is ability to make one's conclusions seem probable. Plato shows that only the man who knows the truth can know what will seem probable; and he must also know the minds or souls to be persuaded. This he cannot do without a knowledge of the nature of the soul. Now knowledge of the truth concerning the various subjects of discourse and knowledge of all the different classes of human souls must be supplemented by knowledge of the different kinds of argument and of the various niceties of speech taught by the sophists. Only he who has acquired all this knowledge is a perfect orator, so far as perfection is attainable by man; but the acquisition

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of this knowledge is a great task, which no one would undertake merely for the purpose of persuading his fellows ; a higher purpose, the perfection of his soul and the desire to serve the gods, must animate the spirit of the student of the real art of rhetoric.

But if rhetoric is the chief theme of the dialogue, it is not by any means the only theme. The rationalistic (Euhemeristic) explanation of myths is briefly discussed and rejected, the higher and lower forms of love are analysed, the nature of the soul is described in the beautiful figure of the charioteer and his two horses, and here, as in the *Phaedo*, the doctrine of ideas and its derivative, the doctrine of reminiscence, are intimately connected with the description of the life of the soul. Yet, formally, at any rate, the other subjects of the dialogue are subordinate to the discussion of rhetoric. The processes of collection and division, by which a number of particulars may be brought together under one head and a general concept may be divided, are clearly stated. The latter is of such importance in the dialectic method, which for Plato was the only correct method of reasoning, that we may well believe the discussion of rhetoric to have been undertaken in part for the purpose of giving a concise and clear statement of this principle.

In this dialogue, as in the *Phaedo*, we find the soul justly rewarded or punished for conduct in this life ; but the soul is here described as made up of a charioteer and two horses, whereas in the *Phaedo* it is one and indivisible ; but the description of the soul in the *Phaedrus* is confessedly and obviously figurative, and the simple, uniform nature of the soul

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is arrived at in the *Phaedo* by serious argument. It is therefore evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer is reason. It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the *Phaedrus* is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato's conception of the soul. Since the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* were probably written about the same time, no real disagreement between them is to be assumed.

The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to the famous orator, Lysias, son of Cephalus, and the question has been much discussed whether it is really a work of Lysias which Plato has inserted here. All the extant speeches of Lysias were composed to be spoken in court or at least on public occasions. We have no specimen of a discourse written by him purely as an example of his skill or for the delectation of his audience, nor do we know that he ever wrote such discourses. The discourse on love is certainly in the style of Lysias, that is to say, it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in a court of law; but Plato was a consummate literary artist, and there is surely every reason to believe that he could imitate the style of Lysias if he chose. Similarity to the style of Lysias is therefore no sufficient reason for the belief that

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the discourse is not Plato's composition, especially as the introduction of a genuine discourse by Lysias would impair the unity, and, to a certain extent, the dignity of the dialogue.

Toward the end of the *Phaedrus*, Plato inserts a remarkable discussion of the relative value of the spoken and the written word. It is somewhat startling to find so voluminous a writer maintaining that the written word is only a plaything, or, at best, a reminder; yet this must, apparently, be accepted as his deliberate judgment. In the Academy he laid great stress upon oral instruction, and this passage seems to indicate that he considered that instruction more important than his writings. It is interesting to find this judgment of the written word in a dialogue in which the playful element is so strong.

Of *Phaedrus*, the only interlocutor and the sole audience of Socrates in this dialogue, little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato. He was the son of Pythocles, of the Attic deme of Myrrhinus. He appears in several dialogues of Plato as a follower of Socrates, but no writings of his are extant, if any ever existed. Diogenes Laertius (iii., 29, 31), speaks of him as Plato's favourite. Some of the persons mentioned in the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary. Such are the great orator Lysias, the sophist and rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini, the philosopher Zeno of Elea (who masquerades under the name of Palamedes, 261 D), the distinguished sophist Protagoras of Abdera, Hippocrates, the "father of medicine," and the rhetorician, orator, and sage Isocrates. Acumenus and his son, Eryximachus, were Athenian physicians,

INTRODUCTION TO THE *PHAEDRUS*

Herodicus was a physician of Megara, Morychus was an Athenian of some means, whose house had apparently been bought by Epicrates, who is described by a scholiast as an orator and demagogue. The other persons mentioned, Tisias of Sicily, Thrasy-machus of Chalcedon, Theodorus of Byzantium, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus of Agrigentum, and his teacher, Licymnius, were all sophists and rhetoricians, whose inventive-ness in the matter of rhetorical nomenclature is ridiculed.

Separate editions of the *Phaedrus* are few. The only one which appears to demand special mention is that of W. H. Thompson (1868).

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΛΟΥ· ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

St.
III.
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ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

A 1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου· πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους. συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθήμενος ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ· τῷ δὲ σῷ καὶ ἐμῷ ἐταίρῳ πειθόμενος Ἀκουμενῷ κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιούμεαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι

B τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐν ἄστει.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί, παρ' Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μορυχίᾳ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν δὴ ἦν ἡ διατριβή; ἡ δὴλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πεύσει, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προΐοντι ἀκούειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἶε με κατὰ Πίν-

PHAEDRUS

[OR ON THE BEAUTIFUL, ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

SOCRATES, PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from?

PHAEDRUS. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, at Epicrates' house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympieum.

SOCRATES. What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches.

PHAEDRUS. You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

SOCRATES. What? Don't you believe that I

δαρον καὶ ἀσχολιας ὑπερτερον πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκούσαι;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρόαγε δὴ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ ὃν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικός. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρώμενόν τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ' ἐραστοῦ δέ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμψευται· λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὦ γενναῖος, εἴθε γράψειεν ὡς χρὴ πένητι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουσίῳ, καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἢ νεωτέρῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡμῶν ἢ γὰρ ἂν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημοφελεῖς εἶεν οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμῃκα ἀκούσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίης, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκρατες; 228 οἶμαι μὲν, ἂ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα ιδιώτην ὄντα ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκείνου;

¹ Pindar *Isthm.* i. 1. Μᾶτερ ἐμά, τὸ τεόν, χρύσασι θήβα, πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀσχολιας ὑπέρτερον θήσομαι. "My mother, Thebes of the golden shield, I will consider thy interest greater even than business."

² Herodicus, Sch.: ἱατρὸς ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἔξω τείχους ἐποιεῖτο, ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ τίνος διαστήματος οὐ μακροῦ ἀλλὰ συμμέτρου, ἄχρι τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων. "He was a physician and exercised outside the wall, beginning at some distance, not great but moderate, going as far as the wall and turning back."

PHAEDRUS

consider hearing your conversation with Lysias "a greater thing even than business," as Pindar says?¹

PHAEDRUS. Lead on, then.

SOCRATES. Speak.

PHAEDRUS. Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For the discourse about which we conversed, was in a way, a love-speech. For Lysias has represented one of the beauties being tempted, but not by a lover; this is just the clever thing about it; for he says that favours should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.

SOCRATES. O noble Lysias! I wish he would write that they should be granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and most of us have; for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility. I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.²

PHAEDRUS. What are you saying, my dear Socrates? Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?

πολλοῦ γε δέω· καί τοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαῖδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλυσμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέτερά ἐστι τούτων· εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Δυσίου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκείνος οὐ μόνον ἅπαξ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευεν οἱ λέγειν· ὁ δὲ B ἐπείθετο προθύμως. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἦν ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ἃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει, καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν, ἐξ ἐωθινοῦ καθήμενος, ἀπειπὼν εἰς περίπατον ἦει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις¹ ἦν μακρός. ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους, ἵνα μελετῶῃ. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι C συγκορυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε· δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἐραστοῦ, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευτῶν δὲ ἔμελλε, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις ἐκὼν ἀκούοι, βία ἐρεῖν. σὺ οὖν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήθητι, ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσῃ, νῦν ἤδη ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστόν ἐστιν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν. ὥς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὐδαμῶς με ἀφήσεις, πρὶν ἂν εἴπω ἀμῶς γέ πως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνυ γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.
D 3. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτωςι τοίνυν ποιήσω. τῷ ὄντι γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, παντὸς μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἀπάντων, οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρώντος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μὴ, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἐφεξῆς δίλειμι, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

¹ τις B.T: τι Schanz.

PHAEDRUS

Far from it ; and yet I would rather have that ability than a good sum of money.

SOCRATES. O Phaedrus ! If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself. But since neither of these things is true, I know very well that when listening to Lysias he did not hear once only, but often urged him to repeat ; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this, sitting from early morning, when he grew tired, went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. And he was going outside the wall to practise it. And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his revel, and told him to lead on. But when the lover of discourse asked him to speak, he feigned coyness, as if he did not yearn to speak ; at last, however, even if no one would listen willingly, he was bound to speak whether or no. So, Phaedrus, ask him to do now what he will presently do anyway.

PHAEDRUS. Truly it is best for me to speak as I may ; since it is clear that you will not let me go until I speak somehow or other.

SOCRATES. You have a very correct idea about me.

PHAEDRUS. Then this is what I will do. Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart ; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, the points in which he said the lover was superior to the non-lover, giving them in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὦ φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἱματίῳ. τοπάζω γάρ σε ἔχειν τὸν λόγον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστιν, Ε οὕτωςι διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ σε πάννυ μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος δὲ Λυσίου ἐμαυτὸν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάννυ δέδοκται. ἀλλ' ἴθι, δείκνυε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκας με ἐλπίδος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἣν εἶχον ἐν σοὶ ὡς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ δὴ βούλει καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώμεν;

229 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῦρ' ἐκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισσὸν ἴωμεν, εἴτα ὅπου ἂν δόξῃ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζήσόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰς καιρόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὢν ἔτυχον· σὺ μὲν γὰρ δὴ αἰεὶ. ῥᾶστον οὖν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσιν τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀηδές, ἄλλως τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὥραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρόαγε δὴ, καὶ σκόπει ἄμα ὅπου καθιζήσόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μήν;

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ' ἐστὶ καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον, καὶ πόα καθίξεσθαι ἢ ἂν βουλώμεθα κατακλιθῆναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Προάγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὀρεῖθυιαν ἀρπάσαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ

PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Yes, my dear, when you have first shown me what you have in your left hand, under your cloak. For I suspect you have the actual discourse. And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practise on. Come now, show it.

PHAEDRUS. Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practising on you. But where shall we sit and read?

SOCRATES. Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please.

PHAEDRUS. I am fortunate, it seems, in being bare-foot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day.

SOCRATES. Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit.

PHAEDRUS. Do you see that very tall plane tree?

SOCRATES. What of it?

PHAEDRUS. There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on.

SOCRATES. Lead the way.

PHAEDRUS. Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia?

SOCRATES. Yes, that is the story.

PHAEDRUS. Well, is it from here? The streamlet

καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῇ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ' αὐτά.

- C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ κάτωθεν ὅσον δύ' ἢ τρία στάδια, ἥ πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαίνομεν· καὶ πού τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες· σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

4. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἶην· εἴτα σοφίζόμενος φαίην ἂν αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσιν ὥσαι, καὶ
- D οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀναρπαστὸν γεγονέναι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρός, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αἰθίς τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων
- E ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή· τὸ δὲ αἷτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε· οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γινῶναι ἑμαυτόν· γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται,

PHAEDRUS

looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by.

SOCRATES. No, the place is about two or three furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the precinct of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas somewhere thereabouts.

PHAEDRUS. I have never noticed it. But, for Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this tale is true?

SOCRATES. If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off the neighbouring rocks as she was playing with Pharmacea, and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been carried off by Boreas.¹ But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very pretty in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable man, for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then that of the Chimæra, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasus and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet

¹ The MSS. insert here ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου λέγεται γὰρ αὐτὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἐκείθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη, "or from the Areopagus, for this story is also told, that she was carried off from there and not from here." Schanz follows Bast and many editors in rejecting this as a gloss.

230 τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὁθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἔσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλὰ ἑραυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίου τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἂρ' οὐ τόδε ἦν τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς;

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό.

5. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῆ τὴν Ἡραν, καλὴ γε ἡ καταγωγὴ. ἥ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὕτη μάλ' ἀμφιλαφὴς τε καὶ ὑψηλὴ, τοῦ τε ἄγνου τὸ ὕψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχοι τὸν τόπον· ἥ τε αὖ πηγὴ χαριεστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ῥεῖ μάλα ψυχροῦ ὕδατος, ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι. Νυμφῶν τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελώου ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν
C κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὐπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ· θερινόν τε καὶ λιγυρὸν ὑπηχεῖ τῷ τῶν τεττίγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τὸ τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἡρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σὺ δέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις φαίνεται. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ, ὃ λέγεις, ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ
D καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὐτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξίεναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα

PHAEDRUS

know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, this is it.

SOCRATES. By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! and it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

PHAEDRUS. You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don't go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don't go outside the walls at all.

SOCRATES. Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and

οὐδέν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει
 ἄνθρωποι. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐξόδου τὸ
 φάρμακον εὐρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινῶντα
 θρέμματα θαλλὸν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσείοντες
 ἄγουσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βι-
 E βλίοις τὴν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνει περιιάζειν ἅπασαν
 καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ. νῦν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρ-
 όντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος ἐγὼ μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακεί-
 σεσθαι, σὺ δ' ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἶει ῥᾶστα ἀνα-
 γνῶσεσθαι, τοῦθ' ἐλόμενος ἀναγίνωσκε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄκουε δὴ·

- 231 . 6. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι,
 καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων
 ἀκήκοας· ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν
 δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ὢν σου τυγχάνω. ὡς
 ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν,
 ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ οὐκ
 ἔστι χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ μεταγνῶναι προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ
 ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἄλλ' ἐκόντες, ὡς ἂν ἄριστα περὶ τῶν
 οἰκείων βουλευσαιντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν
 αὐτῶν εὖ ποιούσιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρῶντες σκο-
 ποῦσιν ἅ τε κακῶς διέθεντο τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν
 ἔρωτα καὶ ἅ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ἂν εἶχον πόνον
 B προστιθέντες ἡγοῦνται πάλαι τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδεδω-
 κέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν
 οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἔστι
 προφασίζεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς παρεληλυθότας πόνους
 ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας
 διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι· ὥστε περιηρημένων τοσού-
 των κακῶν οὐδέν ὑπολείπεται ἄλλ' ἢ ποιεῖν
 C χαριεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τοὺς

PHAEDRUS

the trees won't teach me anything, and the people in the city do. But you seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please. So now that I have come here, I intend to lie down, and do you choose the position in which you think you can read most easily, and read.

PHAEDRUS. Hear then.

You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases; but there is no time when non-lovers naturally repent. For they do kindnesses to the best of their ability, not under compulsion, but of their free will, according to their view of their own best interest. And besides, lovers consider the injury they have done to their own concerns on account of their love, and the benefits they have conferred, and they add the trouble they have had, and so they think they have long ago made sufficient return to the beloved; but non-lovers cannot aver neglect of their own affairs because of their condition, nor can they take account of the pains they have been at in the past, nor lay any blame for quarrels with their relatives; and so, since all these evils are removed, there is nothing left for them but to do eagerly what they think will please the beloved. And besides, if lovers ought to be highly esteemed

ἐρώντας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὅτι τούτους
 μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐρώσιν καὶ ἔτοιμοί
 εἰσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἀπεχθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρί-
 ζεσθαι, ῥάδιον γνῶναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ὅτι
 ὅσων ἂν ὕστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ
 πλείονος ποιήσονται, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐκείνοις
 δοκῇ, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσουσι. καὶ τοι πῶς
 εἰκός ἐστι τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα προέσθαι τοιαύτην

D ἔχοντι συμφοράν, ἣν οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειεν οὐδεὶς
 ἔμπειρος ὧν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολο-
 γοῦσιν νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι
 κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν·
 ὥστε πῶς ἂν εὖ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν
 ἡγήσαιντο περὶ ὧν οὕτω διακείμενοι βεβούλευνται;
 καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρώντων τὸν βέλτιστον
 αἰροῖο, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοὶ ἢ ἐκλεξῖς εἶη· εἰ δ' ἐκ τῶν
 ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐκ πολλῶν·

E ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα
 τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.

7. Εἰ τοίνυν τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα
 δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄνειδός σοι
 232 γένηται, εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας, οὕτως ἂν
 οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὥσπερ
 αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν, ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ ἔχειν καὶ
 φιλοτιμουμένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ὅτι
 οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνηται· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρών-
 τας, κρείττους αὐτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ
 τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἰρεῖσθαι.
 ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρώντας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι



PHAEDRUS


because they say they have the greatest love for the objects of their passion, since both by word and deed they are ready to make themselves hated by others to please the beloved, it is easy to see that, if what they say is true, whenever they fall in love afterwards, they will care for the new love more than for the old and will certainly injure the old love, if that pleases the new. And how can one reasonably entrust matters of such importance to one who is afflicted with a disease such that no one of any experience would even try to cure it? For they themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind, and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves; and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? And if you were to choose the best from among your lovers, your choice would be limited to a few; whereas it would be made from a great number, if you chose the most congenial from non-lovers, so that you would have a better chance, in choosing among many, of finding the one most worthy of your affection.

Now if you are afraid of public opinion, and fear that if people find out your love affair you will be disgraced, consider that lovers, believing that others would be as envious of them as they are of others, are likely to be excited by possession and in their pride to show everybody that they have not toiled in vain; but the non-lovers, since they have control of their feelings, are likely to choose what is really best, rather than to court the opinion of mankind. Moreover, many are sure to notice and see the lovers going about with their beloved ones and making

- καὶ ἰδεῖν, ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς ἐρωμένοις καὶ ἔργον
 B τοῦτο ποιουμένους, ὥστε ὅταν ὀφθῶσι διαλεγόμενοι
 ἀλλήλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἶονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ
 μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι· τοὺς
 δὲ μὴ ἐρώντας οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν
 ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἢ διὰ
 φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δι' ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονήν.
 καὶ μὲν δὴ εἴ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένῳ
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι φιλίαν συμμένειν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν
 τρόπῳ διαφορᾷ γενομένης κοινὴν ἂν¹ ἀμφοτέροις
 καταστήναι τὴν συμφορὰν, προεμένου δέ σου ἂ
 C περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ μεγάλην δὴ² σοι βλάβην ἂν
 γενέσθαι, εἰκότως δὴ τοὺς ἐρώντας μᾶλλον ἂν
 φοβοῖο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστὶ τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ
 πάντ' ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβῃ νομίζουσι γίγνεσθαι.
 διόπερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἐρωμένων
 συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβούμενοι τοὺς μὲν
 οὐσίαν κεκτημένους, μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερ-
 βάλονται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους, μὴ συνέσει
 κρείττους γένωνται· τῶν δ' ἄλλο τι κεκτημένων
 D ἀγαθὸν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου φυλάττονται. πεί-
 σαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπέχθεσθαί σε τούτοις εἰς ἐρημίαν
 φίλων καθιστᾶσιν, ἂν δὲ τὸ σεαυτοῦ σκοπῶν
 ἄμεινον ἐκείνων φρονῆς, ἥξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφορὰν·
 ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἐρώντες ἔτυχον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν
 ἔπραξαν ὧν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνουσίᾳ φθονοῖεν,
 ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῖεν, ἡγούμενοι σ' ὑπ'
 ἐκείνων μὲν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ

¹ ἂν inserted by Hirschig and Schanz.

² δὴ here and after εἰκότως is inserted by Schanz for ἂν of BT.



PHAEDRUS

that their chief business, and so, when they are seen talking with each other, people think they are met in connexion with some love-matter either past or future ; but no one ever thinks of finding fault with non-lovers because they meet, since everyone knows that one must converse with somebody, either because of friendship or because it is pleasant for some other reason. And then, too, if you are frightened by the thought that it is hard for friendship to last, and that under other circumstances any quarrel would be an equal misfortune to both, but that when you have surrendered what you prize most highly you would be the chief sufferer, it would be reasonable for you to be more afraid of the lovers ; for they are pained by many things and they think everything that happens is done for the sake of hurting them. Therefore they prevent their loves from associating with other men, for they fear the wealthy, lest their money give them an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove superior in intellect ; and they are on their guard against the influence of everyone who possesses any other good thing. If now they persuade you to incur the dislike of all these, they involve you in a dearth of friends, and if you consider your own interest and are more sensible than they, you will have to quarrel with them. But those who are not in love, but who have gained the satisfaction of their desires because of their merit, would not be jealous of those who associated with you, but would hate those who did not wish to do so, thinking that you are slighted by these last and benefited by the former, so that there is much more

Ε ὠφελείσθαι, ὥστε πολὺ πλείων ἐλπίς φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ ἔχθραν γενήσεσθαι.

8. Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐρώντων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἢ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἔμπειροι ἐγένοντο, ὥστε ἄδηλον εἰ ἔτι βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι, 233 ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν, οἳ καὶ πρότερον ἀλλήλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἂν εὖ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκός ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεῖα καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτίονί σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἢ ἐραστῇ. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ B ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γιγνώσκοντες, τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδείκνυται· δυστυχοῦντας μὲν, ἃ μὴ λύπην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀνιὰρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν· εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἄξια παρ' ἐκείνων ἐπαινοῦ ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν· ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἢ ζηλοῦν αὐτοὺς προσήκει. ἐὰν δ' ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παρούσαν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύων συνέσομαί σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν C μέλλουσαν ὠφελίαν ἔσεσθαι, οὐχ ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἡττώμενος, ἀλλ' ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἰσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος, ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιούμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίῳ συγγνώμην ἔχων, τὰ δὲ ἐκούσια πειρώμενος ἀποτρέπειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δ' ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρέστηκεν, ὥς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἰσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι,

PHAEDRUS

likelihood that they will gain friendship than enmity from their love-affair with you.

And then, too, many lovers are moved by physical passion before they know the character or have become acquainted with the connexions of the beloved, so that it is uncertain whether they will wish to be your friends after their passion has ceased. But in the case of those who are not in love, who were your friends before entering into the closer relation, the favours received are not likely to make the friendship less, but will remain as pledges of future joys. And then, too, it will be better for your character to yield to me than to a lover. For lovers praise your words and acts beyond due measure, partly through fear of incurring your displeasure, and partly because their own judgment is obscured by their passion. For such are the exhibitions of the power of Love : he makes the unsuccessful lovers think that things are grievous which cause no pain to others, and he compels the successful to praise what ought not to give pleasure ; therefore those whom they love are more to be pitied than envied. But if you yield to me, I shall consort with you, not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future advantage also, not being overcome by passion but in full control of myself, and not taking up violent enmity because of small matters, but slowly gathering little anger when the transgressions are great, forgiving involuntary wrongs and trying to prevent intentional ones ; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will endure for a long time. But if you have a notion that friendship cannot be firm

D ἔὰν μή τις ἐρῶν τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμῆσθαι χρή, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς υἱεῖς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμεθα οὐτ' ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὐτ' ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἐκεκήμεθα, οἳ οὐκ ἔξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγόνασιν ἀλλ' ἔξ ἐτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

9. Ἐτι δὲ εἰ χρή τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν·

E μέγιστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην χάριν αὐτοῖς εἷσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησμονῆς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἤξουσιν καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἷσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὕξονται. ἀλλ' ἴσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς προσαιτοῦσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς

234 ὥρας ἀπολαύουσιν, ἀλλ' οἳ τινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδώσουσιν· οὐδὲ οἳ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμήσονται, ἀλλ' οἳ τινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἅπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὐδὲ τοῖς ὀλίγον χρόνον σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἳ τινες παυόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλ'

B οἳ παυσαμένοις τῆς ὥρας τότε τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται. σὺ οὖν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο, καὶ ἐκείνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἐρῶντας οἳ φίλοι νοουθετοῦσιν ὡς ὄντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος,

PHAEDRUS

unless one is in love, you should bear in mind that in that case we should not have great affection for sons or for fathers and mothers, nor should we possess faithful friends who have been gained not through passion but through associations of a different kind.

Besides, if you ought to grant favours to those who ask for them most eagerly, you ought in other matters also to confer benefits, not on the best, but on the most needy ; for they will be most grateful, since they are relieved of the greatest ills. And then, too, at private entertainments you ought not to invite your friends, but beggars and those who need a meal ; for they will love you and attend you and come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful, and will call down many blessings upon your head. Perhaps, however, you ought not to grant favours to those who beg for them, but to those who are most able to repay you ; and not to those who ask merely, but to the most deserving ; and not to those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but to those who will share their good things with you when you are older ; and not to those who, when they have succeeded, will boast to others of their success, but to those who will modestly keep it a secret from all ; and not to those who will be enamoured for a little while, but to those who will be your friends for life ; and not to those who will seek a pretext for a quarrel when their passion has died out, but to those who will show their own merit when your youth is passed. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and bear this also in mind, that lovers are admonished by their friends, who think

τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὥς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένοις περὶ ἐαυτῶν.

Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἂν ἔροίό με, εἰ ἅπασιν σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἐρώσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν ἐρῶντα πρὸς ἅπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρῶντας
C ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ¹ λαμβάνοντι χάριτος ἴσης ἄξιον, οὔτε σοὶ βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λανθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατόν· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὠφελίαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἱκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα. εἰ δέ τι² σὺ ποθεῖς, ἡγούμενος παραλελείφθαι, ἐρώτα.

10. Τί σοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ
D ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρήσθαι;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὥστε με ἐκπλαγῆναι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, πρὸς σέ ἀποβλέπων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάνυσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγιγνώσκων. ἡγούμενος γὰρ σέ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμέ ἐπαθεῖν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοὶ εἰπόμεν, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἴεν· οὕτω δὴ δοκεῖ³ παίζειν;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκῶ γάρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

E ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς εἶπε πρὸς Διὸς φίλιον, οἶει ἂν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

¹ λόγῳ B. Omitted by Schanz.

² δέ τι BT. δ' ἔτι τι Schanz, following Heindorf.

³ δὴ δοκεῖ T. δὴ B. δεῖ, Schanz.

PHAEDRUS

their way of life is bad, but no relative ever blamed a non-lover for bad management of his own interests on account of that condition.

Perhaps you may ask me if I advise you to grant favours to all non-lovers. But I think the lover would not urge you to be so disposed toward all lovers either ; for the favour, if scattered broadcast, is not so highly prized by the rational recipient, nor can you, if you wish, keep your relations with one hidden from the rest. But from love no harm ought to come, but benefit to both parties. Now I think I have said enough. But if you feel any lack, or think anything has been omitted, ask questions.

What do you think of the discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful, especially in diction?

SOCRATES. More than that, it is miraculous, my friend ; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.

PHAEDRUS. Indeed ! So you see fit to make fun of it?

SOCRATES. Do I seem to you to be joking and not to be in earnest?

PHAEDRUS. Do not jest, Socrates, but, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, tell me truly, do you think any other of the Greeks could speak better or more copiously than this on the same subject?

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτη δεῖ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὥς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνη μόνον, ὅτι σαφὴ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σὴν, ἐπεὶ ἐμέ γε ἔλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας. τῷ γὰρ ῥητορικῷ αὐτοῦ μόνῳ τὸν νοῦν προσεῖχον, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν ὥμην Λυσίαν οἶεσθαι ἱκανὸν εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δις καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὥς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ὥς οἷός τε ὦν ταῦτ' ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνόντων ἀξίως¹ ῥηθῆναι ἐν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὥστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκείνῳ εἰρημένα μηδὲν ἂν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἄλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο ἐγὼ σοι οὐκέτι οἷός τε ἔσομαι πιθέσθαι. παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσί με, εἴαν σοι χαριζόμενος συγχωρῶ.

Γ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἣ που Σαπφούς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὲ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλήρ' ἔστι πῶς, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθά-

¹ ἀξίως BT. ἀξίων Madvig, followed by Schanz.

PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. What? Are you and I to praise the discourse because the author has said what he ought, and not merely because all the expressions are clear and well rounded and finely turned? For if that is expected, I must grant it for your sake, since, because of my stupidity, I did not notice it. I was attending only to the rhetorical manner, and I thought even Lysias himself would not think that satisfactory. It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

PHAEDRUS. Nonsense, Socrates! Why that is the especial merit of the discourse. He has omitted none of the points that belong to the subject, so that nobody could ever speak about it more exhaustively or worthily than he has done.

SOCRATES. There I must cease to agree with you; for the wise men and women of old, who have spoken and written about these matters, will rise up to confute me, if, to please you, I assent.

PHAEDRUS. Who are they? and where have you heard anything better than this?

SOCRATES. I cannot say, just at this moment; but I certainly must have heard something, either from the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps from some prose writers. What ground have I for saying so? Why, my dear friend, I feel that my own

νομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χεῖρω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἑμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννεό-
 D ἡκα, εὖ οἶδα, συνειδώς ἑμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν· λείπεται
 δὴ, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτριῶν ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς
 ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου· ὑπὸ δὲ
 νωθείας αὐ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέλθωμαι, ὅπως τε
 καὶ ὧν τινων ἤκουσα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄλλ', ὦ γενναϊότατε, κάλλιστα εἶρη-
 κας. σὺ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ὧν τινων μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἤκουσας,
 μῆδ' ἂν κελεύω εἶπης, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ δ λέγεις
 ποιήσον· τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ
 ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπόσχεσι¹ εἰπεῖν, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος.
 καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπισχνού-
 μαι χρυσὴν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθή-
 E σειν, οὐ μόνον ἑμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σὴν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φίλτατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς,
 ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἴ με οἶει λέγειν ὡς Λυσίας τοῦ παντός
 ἡμάρτηκε, καὶ οἶόν τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἄλλα
 εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο δὲ οἶμαι οὐδ' ἂν τὸν φαυλότατον
 παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τίνα
 οἶει λέγοντα ὡς χρὴ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶντι
 236 χαρίζεσθαι, παρέντα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκω-
 μιάζειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαῖα γοῦν
 ὄντα, εἴτ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἔξω λένειν; ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ
 μὲν τοιαῦτα ἑατέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντι· καὶ
 τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθε-
 σιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλε-
 πῶν εὐρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὕρεσιν.

12. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συγχωρῶ δ λέγεις· μετρίως γάρ
 μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέυαι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ οὕτω·

¹ ὑποσχέσει BT, ἐπιχείρει Schanz. The reading in the text
 was first suggested by Wex.



PHAEDRUS

bosom is full, and that I could make another speech, different from this and quite as good. Now I am conscious of my own ignorance, and I know very well that I have never invented these things myself, so the only alternative is that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the well springs of another ; but, again because of my stupidity, I have forgotten how and from whom I heard it.

PHAEDRUS. Most noble Socrates, that is splendid ! Don't tell, even if I beg you, how or from whom you heard it ; only do as you say ; promise to make another speech better than that in the book and no shorter and quite different. Then I promise, like the nine archons, to set up at Delphi a statue as large as life, not only of myself, but of you also.

SOCRATES. You are a darling and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing that he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst writer. For example, to take the subject of his speech, who do you suppose, in arguing that the non-lover ought to be more favoured than the lover, could omit praise of the non-lover's calm sense and blame of the lover's unreason, which are inevitable arguments, and then say something else instead ? No, such arguments, I think, must be allowed and excused ; and in these the arrangement, not the invention, is to be praised ; but in the case of arguments which are not inevitable and are hard to discover, the invention deserves praise as well as the arrangement.

PHAEDRUS. I concede your point, for I think what you say is reasonable. So I will make this concession :

B τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρώντα τοῦ μὴ ἐρώντος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δώσω σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἕτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια εἰπὼν τῶν Λυσίου, παρὰ τὸ Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ στάθῃτι.¹

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐσπούδακας, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμεν ἑρεσχηλῶν σε, καὶ οἶει δὴ με ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἕτερόν τι ποικιλώτερον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τὰς **C** ὁμοίας λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας. ῥητέον μὲν γάρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅπως οἶός τε εἶ, ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῶδων φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις, εὐλαβήθητι² καὶ μὴ βούλου με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἰ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἑμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλυσμαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δὲ ἀλλὰ διανοήθητι ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἄπιμεν, πρὶν ἂν σὺ εἴπῃς ἃ ἔφησθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἔσμεν δὲ **D** μόνῳ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγώ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δ' ἀπάντων τούτων ξύνες ὃ σοι λέγω, καὶ μηδαμῶς πρὸς βίας βουλευθῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκὼν λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ', ὦ μακάριε Φαῖδρε, γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οἶσθ' ὡς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρὸς με καλῶπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπῃς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὁ δέ μοι

¹ στάθῃτι BT, ἔσταθι Schanz following Cobet.

² Schanz, following Cobet, omits εὐλαβήθητι.

PHAEDRUS

I will allow you to begin with the premise that the lover is more distraught than the non-lover; and if you speak on the remaining points more copiously and better than Lysias, without saying the same things, your statue of beaten metal shall stand at Olympia beside the offering of the Cypselids.

SOCRATES. Have you taken my jest in earnest, Phaedrus, because, to tease you, I laid hands on your beloved, and do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the rhetoric of Lysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?

PHAEDRUS. Now, my friend, you have given me a fair hold; for you certainly must speak as best you can, lest we be compelled to resort to the comic "you're another"; be careful and do not force me to say "O Socrates, if I don't know Socrates, I have forgotten myself," and "he yearned to speak, but feigned coyness." Just make up your mind that we are not going away from here until you speak out what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger and younger than you; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and speak voluntarily, rather than under compulsion.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art.

PHAEDRUS. Now listen to me. Stop trying to fool me; for I can say something which will force you to speak.

SOCRATES. Then pray don't say it.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, but I will. And my saying shall

λόγος ὄρκος ἔσται· ὁμνυμι γάρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι,
 Ε τίνα θεῶν; ἡ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; ἡ
 μὴν, ἐάν μοι μὴ εἴπῃς τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
 ταύτης, μηδέποτε σοι ἕτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς
 ἐπιδείξειν μηδ' ἐξαγγελεῖν.

13. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βαβαί, ὦ μιარέ, ὡς εὖ ἀνεῦρες
 τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν κελεύῃς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σύ γε ταῦτα
 ὁμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ' εἶην τοιαύτης
 θοίνης ἀπέχεσθαι;

237 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δῆ.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἐρῶ, ἵν' ὃ τι τάχι-
 στα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον, καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σέ
 ὑπ' αἰσχύνῃς διαπορῶμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅπως βούλει
 ποίει.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄγετε δῆ, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δι' ᾧδῆς
 εἶδος λῖγαιαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων
 ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε
 τοῦ μύθου, ὃν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὐτοσὶ
 Β λέγειν, ἵν' ὁ ἐταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν
 τούτῳ σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξη.

Ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μεираκίσκος, μάλα
 καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί. εἰς
 δέ τις αὐτῶν αἰμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἡττον ἐρῶν
 ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς οὐκ ἐρῶν· καί ποτε αὐτὸν

PHAEDRUS

be an oath. I swear to you by—by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

SOCRATES. Oh! Oh! You wretch! How well you found out how to make a lover of discourse do your will!

PHAEDRUS. Then why do you try to get out of it?

SOCRATES. I won't any more, since you have taken this oath; for how could I give up such pleasures?

PHAEDRUS. Speak then.

SOCRATES. Do you know what I'm going to do?

PHAEDRUS. About what?

SOCRATES. I'm going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk, that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed.

PHAEDRUS. Only speak, and in other matters suit yourself.

SOCRATES. Come then, O tuneful Muses, whether ye receive this name from the quality of your song or from the musical race of the Ligyans, grant me your aid in the tale this most excellent man compels me to relate, that his friend whom he has hitherto considered wise, may seem to him wiser still.

Now there was once upon a time a boy, or rather a stripling, of great beauty: and he had many lovers. And among these was one of peculiar craftiness, who was as much in love with the boy as anyone, but had made him believe that he was not in love; and once in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that favours ought to be granted rather

αἰτῶν ἔπειθε τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὥς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ᾧδε·

14. **C** Περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλευέσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἦ ἡ βουλή, ἣ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἐκάστου. ὥς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται, ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος, οἷόν τ' ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν,
- D** ὁμολογία θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τούτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιῶμεθα, εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως, ἅπαντι δῆλον· ὅτι δ' αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν. τῷ δὴ τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; δεῖ δὴ νοῆσαι, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἐπόμεθα ἢ ἂν ἄγητον, ἢ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὔσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπὶ κτήτος δόξα,
- E** ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου. τούτῳ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμονοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἐτέρα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἐτέρα κρατεῖ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ
- 238 **κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα· ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἐλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυνύμῳ· πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές. καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπῆς ἢ ἂν τύχη γενομένη, τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται,**

PHAEDRUS

to the non-lover than to the lover ; and his words were as follows :—

There is only one way, dear boy, for those to begin who are to take counsel wisely about anything. One must know what the counsel is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile, but most people are ignorant of the fact that they do not know the nature of things. So, supposing that they do know it, they come to no agreement in the beginning of their enquiry, and as they go on they reach the natural result,—they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Now you and I must not fall into the error which we condemn in others, but, since we are to discuss the question, whether the lover or the non-lover is to be preferred let us first agree on a definition of love, its nature and its power, and then, keeping this definition in view and making constant reference to it, let us enquire whether love brings advantage or harm. Now everyone sees that love is a desire ; and we know too that non-lovers also desire the beautiful. How then are we to distinguish the lover from the non-lover ? We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead ; one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife ; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms ; and whichever of these forms is most marked

- οὔτε τινὰ καλὴν οὔτε ἐπαξίαν κεκτηῖσθαι.¹ περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου
- B** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταῦτόν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται· περὶ δ' αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος· καὶ τὰλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς αἰεὶ δυναστευούσης ἢ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ἥς δ' ἔνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πᾶν πως σαφέστερον· ἢ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ
- C** ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἐαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωματίων κύλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγή, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

15. Ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὖροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν.

- ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Σιγῇ τοίνυν μου ἄκουε· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ
- D** θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι· ὥστε εἰάν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσης· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος· ἀλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπίον.

¹ Schanz reads ἐκτῆσθαι here and the corresponding forms elsewhere.

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gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honourable, to him who possesses it. For example, if the desire for food prevails over the higher reason and the other desires, it is called gluttony, and he who possesses it will be called by the corresponding name of glutton, and again, if the desire for drink becomes the tyrant and leads him who possesses it toward drink, we know what he is called; and it is quite clear what fitting names of the same sort will be given when any desire akin to these acquires the rule. The reason for what I have said hitherto is pretty clear by this time, but everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken; so I say that the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force, and is called love.¹

Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency.

SOCRATES. Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambics.

PHAEDRUS. That is very true.

SOCRATES. You are responsible for that; but hear what follows; for perhaps the attack may be averted.

¹ This somewhat fanciful statement is based on a supposed etymological connexion between *ἔρως* and *ῥώμη, ἔρρωμένος, ῥωσθεῖσα*.

ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἰτέον.

Εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε· ὃ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὃν περὶ οὗ βουλευτέον, εἴρηταί τε καὶ ὄρισταί, βλέποντες δὲ
 Ε δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν, τίς ὠφελία ἢ βλάβη ἀπὸ τε ἐρώντος καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ ἐξ εἰκότος συμβήσεται.

Τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντί τε ἡδονῇ ἀνάγκῃ πον τὸν ἐρώμενον ὡς ἡδιστον ἑαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν· νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτεῖνον, κρείττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν. οὔτε
 239 δὴ κρείττω οὔτε ἰσούμενον ἐκὼν ἐραστῆς παιδικὰ ἀνέξεται, ἥττω δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον αἰεὶ ἀπεργάζεται· ἥττων δὲ ἀμαθὴς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρείου, ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου. τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκῃ γιγνομένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνόντων, τῶν μὲν ἡδεσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἢ στέρεσθαι τοῦ παραυτίκα ἡδέος.
 Β φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων, ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστ' ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἰτίου εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη. τοῦτο δὲ ἡ θεία φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὃν, ἧς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκῃ πόρρωθεν εἶργειν, περίφοβον ὄντα τοῦ καταφρονηθῆναι· τὰ τε ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἂν ἡ πάντα ἀγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἀποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἐραστήν, οἷος ὢν τῷ μὲν
 C ἡδιστος, ἑαυτῷ¹ δὲ βλαβερώτατος ἂν εἴη. τὰ μὲν

¹ ἑαυτῷ T Stobaeus : τῷ ἑαυτῷ B Schanz.

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That, however, is in the hands of God; we must return to our boy.

Well then, my dearest, what the subject is, about which we are to take counsel, has been said and defined, and now let us continue, keeping our attention fixed upon that definition, and tell what advantage or harm will naturally come from the lover or the non-lover to him who grants them his favours.

He who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will inevitably desire to make his beloved as pleasing to himself as possible. Now to one who is of unsound mind everything is pleasant which does not oppose him, but everything that is better or equal is hateful. So the lover will not, if he can help it, endure a beloved who is better than himself or his equal, but always makes him weaker and inferior; but the ignorant is inferior to the wise, the coward to the brave, the poor speaker to the eloquent, the slow of wit to the clever. Such mental defects, and still greater than these, in the beloved will necessarily please the lover, if they are implanted by Nature, and if they are not, he must implant them or be deprived of his immediate enjoyment. And he is of necessity jealous and will do him great harm by keeping him from many advantageous associations, which would most tend to make a man of him, especially from that which would do most to make him wise. This is divine philosophy, and from it the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised; and he will contrive to keep him ignorant of everything else and make him look to his lover for everything, so that he will be most agreeable to him and most harmful to himself. In respect to

οὖν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπός τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελὴς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

16. Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἔξιν τε καὶ θεραπείαν οἶαν τε καὶ ὡς θεραπεύσει οὐ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὃς ἡδὺν πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἠνάγκασται διώκειν, δεῖ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὀφθῆσεται δὲ¹ μαλθακὸν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεὸν διώκων, οὐδ' ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένον ἀλλ' ὑπὸ συμμιγεί σκιᾷ, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἰδρώτων ξηρῶν ἄπειρον, ἔμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ
D ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ἃ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀρίσασμένους ἐπ' ἄλλο ἰέναι· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σῶμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρεῖαις ὅσαι μεγάλαι οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ θαρροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἔρασταὶ φοβούνται.

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὡς δῆλον ἔατέον, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς
E ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν ἢ τοῦ ἐρώντος ὀμιλία τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφὲς δὴ τοῦτό γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὀρφανὸν πρὸ παντὸς εὖξαιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν ἐρώμενον· πατρός γάρ καὶ μητρός καὶ ξυγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρε-
240 σθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακωλυτὰς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν ὀμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐσίαν γ' ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης κτήσεως οὐτ' εὐάλωτον ὁμοίως οὔτε ἀλόντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται· ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐρα-
στήν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν οὐσίαν κεκτημένοις,

¹ δὲ BT, δὲ Schanz following Hirschig.

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the intellect, then, a man in love is by no means a profitable guardian or associate.

We must next consider how he who is forced to follow pleasure and not good will keep the body of him whose master he is, and what care he will give to it. He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worth while to describe further. We can sum it all up briefly and pass on. A person with such a body, in war and in all important crises, gives courage to his enemies, and fills his friends, and even his lovers themselves, with fear.

This may be passed over as self-evident, but the next question, what advantage or harm the intercourse and guardianship of the lover will bring to his beloved in the matter of his property, must be discussed. Now it is clear to everyone, and especially to the lover, that he would desire above all things to have his beloved bereft of the dearest and kindest and holiest possessions; for he would wish him to be deprived of father, mother, relatives and friends, thinking that they would hinder and censure his most sweet intercourse with him. But he will also think that one who has property in money or other possessions will be less easy to catch and when caught will be less manageable; wherefore the lover must necessarily begrudge his beloved the possession of

ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τοίνυν ἄγαμον, ἄπαιδα, ἄοικον ὃ τι πλείστον χρόνον παιδικὰ ἔραστής εὖξαιτ' ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλείστον χρόνον καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

17. Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἀλλὰ τις
- B** δαίμων ἔμιξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ἡδονήν, οἷον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμιξεν ἢ φύσις ἡδονήν τινα οὐκ ἄμουσον, καὶ τις ἐταίραν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἂν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων θρεμμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων, οἷς τό γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδίστοισιν εἶναι ὑπάρχει· παιδικοῖς δὲ ἔραστής πρὸς
- C** τῷ βλαβερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεῖν πάντων ἀηδέστατον. ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα· ἢ γάρ, οἶμαι, χρόνου ἰσότης ἐπ' ἴσας ἡδονὰς ἄγουσα δι' ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν παρέχεται· ἀλλ' ὅμως κόρον γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνουσία ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ βαρὺ παντὶ περὶ πᾶν λέγεται· ὃ δὴ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστα ἔραστής πρὸς παιδικὰ ἔχει. νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνὼν οὐθ' ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἐκὼν
- D** ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἴστρου ἐλαύνεται, ὃς ἐκείνῳ μὲν ἡδονὰς αἰεὶ διδούς ἄγει ὀρώντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀπτομένῳ, καὶ πᾶσαν αἰσθησιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὥστε μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀραρότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν· τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποῖον παραμυθιον ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς διδούς ποιήσῃ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ' ἔσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀηδίας; ὀρώντι μὲν ὄψιν πρεσβυτέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὥρᾳ, ἐπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτῃ, ἃ καὶ
- E** λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτερπές, μὴ ὅτι δὴ ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι· φυλα-

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property and rejoice at its loss. Moreover the lover would wish his beloved to be as long as possible unmarried, childless, and homeless, since he wishes to enjoy as long as possible what is pleasant to himself.

Now there are also other evils, but God has mingled with most of them some temporary pleasure ; so, for instance, a flatterer is a horrid creature and does great harm, yet Nature has combined with him a kind of pleasure that is not without charm, and one might find fault with a courtesan as an injurious thing, and there are many other such creatures and practices which are yet for the time being very pleasant ; but a lover is not only harmful to his beloved but extremely disagreeable to live with as well. The old proverb says, "birds of a feather flock together" ; that is, I suppose, equality of age leads them to similar pleasures and through similarity begets friendship ; and yet even they grow tired of each other's society. Now compulsion of every kind is said to be oppressive to every one, and the lover not only is unlike his beloved, but he exercises the strongest compulsion. For he is old while his love is young, and he does not leave him day or night, if he can help it, but is driven by the sting of necessity, which urges him on, always giving him pleasure in seeing, hearing, touching, and by all his senses perceiving his beloved, so that he is glad to serve him constantly. But what consolation or what pleasure can he give the beloved ? Must not this protracted intercourse bring him to the uttermost disgust, as he looks at the old, unlovely face, and other things to match, which it is not pleasant even to hear about, to say nothing of being constantly compelled to come into contact with them ? And he

κάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένῳ διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἐπαίνους καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντας ἀκούοντι, ὥς δ' αὖτως ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτούς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἰόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς¹ παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη χρωμένου.

18. Καὶ ἐρῶν μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄπιστος, εἰς ὃν πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὀρκῶν τε καὶ δεήσεων
- 241 ὑπισχνούμενος μόγις κατεῖχε τὴν ἐν τῷ τότε ξυνουσίαν ἐπίπονον φέρειν δι' ἐλπίδα ἀγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην αὐτ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγωνὺς λέληθεν τὰ παιδικά. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν χάριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ὑπομιμνήσκων τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ λεχθέντα, ὥς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾷ ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, οὔθ' ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοήτου ἀρχῆς ὀρκωμόσιά τε καὶ
- B ὑποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσει ἔχει, νοῦν ἤδη ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονηκὼς, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταῦτα τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμοίος τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγὰς δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπεστερηκὼς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής, ὁστράκου μεταπεσόντος, ἵεται φυγῇ μεταβαλὼν· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων, ἡγνοηκὼς τὸ ἅπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἔδει ποτὲ ἐρῶντι καὶ ὑπ'
- C ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτῳ χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον

¹ ἐπαισχεῖς Schanz following Heindorf, ἐπ' αἰσχει BT.

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is suspiciously guarded in all ways against everybody, and has to listen to untimely and exaggerated praises and to reproaches which are unendurable when the man is sober, and when he is in his cups and indulges in wearisome and unrestrained freedom of speech become not only unendurable but disgusting.

And while he is in love he is harmful and disagreeable, but when his love has ceased he is thereafter false to him whom he formerly hardly induced to endure his wearisome companionship through the hope of future benefits by making promises with many prayers and oaths. But now that the time of payment has come he has a new ruler and governor within him, sense and reason in place of love and madness, and has become a different person ; but of this his beloved knows nothing. He asks of him a return for former favours, reminding him of past sayings and doings, as if he were speaking to the same man ; but the lover is ashamed to say that he has changed, and yet he cannot keep the oaths and promises he made when he was ruled by his former folly, now that he has regained his reason and come to his senses, lest by doing what he formerly did he become again what he was. He runs away from these things, and the former lover is compelled to become a defaulter. The shell has fallen with the other side up ;¹ and he changes his part and runs away ; and the other is forced to run after him in anger and with imprecations, he who did not know at the start that he ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reason-

¹ This refers to a game played with oyster shells, in which the players ran away or pursued as the shell fell with one or the other side uppermost.

μὴ ἐρῶντι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναγκαῖον εἶη ἐνδοῦναι αὐτὸν ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλῳ, φθονερῷ,¹ ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παιδευσιν, ἥς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμιώτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. ταῦτά τε οὖν χρή, ὦ παῖ, ξυννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονῆς,

D ὥς λύκοι ἄρ' ἀγαπῶσ', ὧς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

19. Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Φαῖδρε. οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσῃς ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἤδη σοι τέλος ἔχέτω ὁ λόγος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καίτοι ᾧμην γε μεσοῦν αὐτόν, καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἴσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος, ὥς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων² ὅσ' αὐ ἔχει ἀγαθὰ· νῦν δὲ δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἀποπαύει;

E ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἦσθον, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἤδη ἔπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι διθυράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἕτερον ἄρξωμαι, τί με οἶει ποιήσῃς; ἄρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἷς με σὺ προὔβαλες ἐκ προνοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάσω; λέγω οὖν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἕτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὰναντία τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσσεστι. καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. καὶ οὕτω δῆ ὁ μῦθος, ὅ τι πάσχειν
242 προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται· καὶ γὰρ τὸν ποταμὸν

¹ δυσκόλῳ φθονερῷ omitted by Schanz, following Spengel.

² λέγων BT, λέγονθ' Schanz.

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able non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harmful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher importance in truth either in heaven or on earth. These things, dear boy, you must bear in mind, and you must know that the fondness of the lover is not a matter of goodwill, but of appetite which he wishes to satisfy :

Just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover adores his beloved.

There it is, Phaedrus! Do not listen to me any longer; let my speech end here.

PHAEDRUS. But I thought you were in the middle of it, and would say as much about the non-lover as you have said about the lover, to set forth all his good points and show that he ought to be favoured. So now, Socrates, why do you stop?

SOCRATES. Did you not notice, my friend, that I am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithyrambics, even though I am finding fault with the lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you purposely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the advantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover. Why make a long speech? I have said enough about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as

τούτον διαβὰς ἀπέρχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μείζον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μήπω γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ· ἢ οὐχ ὀρᾷς ὥς σχεδὸν ἤδη μεσημβρία ἴσταται;¹ ἀλλὰ περιμέναντες, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἴμεν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θεῖός γ' εἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ
B τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σέ πεποιηκέναι γεγενῆσθαι ἤτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἐνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Σιμμίαν Θηβαῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς· καὶ νῦν αὖ δοκεῖς αἰτίος μοι γεγενῆσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθῆναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις· ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

20. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ηνίκ' ἔμελλον, ὦ 'γαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς
C σημείον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν²—καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἑμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἤδη μαθάνω τὸ ἀμάρτημα. ὥς δὴ τοι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μὲν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καὶ πῶς ἐδυσωπούμην κατ'

¹ After ἴσταται BT have ἤδη (ἢ δὴ t, Stobaeus) καλουμένη σταθερά, "which is called noontide," which Schanz brackets.

² Schanz follows Heindorf in bracketing ἀεὶ . . . πράττειν.

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it may ; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me.

PHAEDRUS. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don't you see that it is already almost noon ? Let us stay and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

SOCRATES. Phaedrus, you are simply a superhuman wonder as regards discourses ! I believe no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban ; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me.

PHAEDRUS. That is not exactly a declaration of war ! But how is this, and what is the discourse ?

SOCRATES. My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came—it always holds me back from something I am about to do—and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes ; so now I understand my error. How prophetic the soul is, my friend ! For all along, while I was speaking my discourse, something troubled

Δ Ἴβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοῖς ἀμβλακὼν τιμὰν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείψω· νῦν δ' ἥσθημαι τὸ ἀμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δεινὸν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας ἐμέ τε ἡνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εὐήθη καὶ ὑπό τι ἀσεβῆ· οὐ τίς ἂν εἴη δεινότερος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδεῖς, εἴ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἑρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεὸν τίνα ἡγεῖ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγεται γε δῆ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τι ὑπό γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ὃς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφάρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον ὃ Ἑρως, οὐδὲν ἂν κακὸν εἶη· τὸ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὥς τοιούτου ὄντος. ταύτη τε οὖν ἡμαρτανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἑρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνυ ἀστεία, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθὲς

243 σεμνύνεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετεν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκη· ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίαν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὃν Ὅμηρος μὲν οὐκ ἥσθετο, Στῆσίχορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ ὁμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἡγνόησεν ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος, ἀλλ'

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me, and "I was distressed," as Ibycus says, "lest I be buying honour among men by sinning against the gods."¹ But now I have seen my error.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that?

PHAEDRUS. Nothing, if you are right about it.

SOCRATES. Well, do you not believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite and is a god?

PHAEDRUS. So it is said.

SOCRATES. Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched. If Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil. So then they sinned against Love; but their foolishness was really very funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honour among them. Now I, my friend, must purify myself; and for those who have sinned in matters of mythology there is an ancient purification, unknown to Homer, but known to Stesichorus. For when he was stricken with blindness for speaking ill of Helen, he was not, like Homer, ignorant of the reason, but

¹ Fragment 24, Bergk.

ἄτε μουσικὸς ὢν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ποιεῖ
εὐθὺς

οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος οὗτος,
οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλμοις, οὐδ' ἵκεο

B Πέργαμα Τροίας·

καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην παλινωδίαν
παραχρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφώτερος
ἐκείνων γενήσομαι κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο· πρὶν γάρ
τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἔρωτος κακηγορίαν πειρά-
σομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινωδίαν, γυμνῇ τῇ
κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης
ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τουτωνί, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄττ'
ἂν ἐμοὶ εἶπες ἡδίω.

21. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄγαθὲ Φαῖδρε, ἐννοεῖς
C ὡς ἀναιδῶς εἴρησθον τὸν λόγον, οὗτός τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ
τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς. εἰ γὰρ ἀκούων τις τύχοι
ἡμῶν γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶος τὸ ἦθος, ἐτέρου δὲ
τοιούτου ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερόν ποτε ἐρασθεὶς,
λεγόντων ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ
ἐρασταὶ ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ
φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν
ἡγεῖσθαι ἀκούειν ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ
οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἐωρακότων, πολλοῦ δ' ἂν
D δεῖν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἃ ψέγομεν τὸν Ἔρωτα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἴσως νῆ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτόν γε τοίνυν ἔγωγε αἰσχυνό-
μενος, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἔρωτα δεδιώς, ἐπιθυμῶ
ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἶον ἁλμυρὰν ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι·
συμβουλευῶ δὲ καὶ Λυσία ὃ τι τάχιστα γράψαι,

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since he was educated, he knew it and straightway he writes the poem:

“That saying is not true; thou didst not go within the well-oared ships, nor didst thou come to the walls of Troy”;¹

and when he had written all the poem, which is called the recantation, he saw again at once. Now I will be wiser than they in just this point: before suffering any punishment for speaking ill of Love, I will try to atone by my recantation, with my head bare this time, not, as before, covered through shame.

PHAEDRUS. This indeed, Socrates, is the most delightful thing you could say.

SOCRATES. Just consider, my good Phaedrus, how shameless the two speeches were, both this of mine and the one you read out of the book. For if any man of noble and gentle nature, one who was himself in love with another of the same sort, or who had ever been loved by such a one, had happened to hear us saying that lovers take up violent enmity because of small matters and are jealously disposed and harmful to the beloved, don't you think he would imagine he was listening to people brought up among low sailors, who had never seen a generous love? Would he not refuse utterly to assent to our censure of Love?

PHAEDRUS. I declare, Socrates, perhaps he would.

SOCRATES. I therefore, because I am ashamed at the thought of this man and am afraid of Love himself, wish to wash out the brine from my ears with the water of a sweet discourse. And I advise Lysias

¹ Fragment 32, Bergk.

ὥς χρὴ ἐραστῇ μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐρῶντι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἔξει τοῦθ' οὕτω·
 σου γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ἔπαινον, πᾶσα
 Ε ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι
 αὐτὸν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾗς
 ὅς εἴ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πού δή μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς δὴν ἔλεγον;
 ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὢν φθάσῃ
 χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὗτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον αἰεὶ
 πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

22. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕτωςι τοίνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ,
 244 ἐννόησον, ὥς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου
 τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός· δὴν δὲ
 μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἰμε-
 ραίου. λεκτέος δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λόγος,
 ὅς ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρῶντι μᾶλλον φῇ
 δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ
 σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν
 εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θεία μέντοι
 δόσει διδομένης. ἥ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προ-
 Β φῆτις αἵ τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἰέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ
 δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδία τε καὶ δημοσία τὴν Ἑλλάδα
 εἰργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν· καὶ
 ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι

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also to write as soon as he can, that other things being equal, the lover should be favoured rather than the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS. Be assured that he will do so : for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same subject.

SOCRATES. I believe you, so long as you are what you are.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then without fear.

SOCRATES. Where is the youth to whom I was speaking ? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him.

PHAEDRUS. Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him.

SOCRATES. Understand then, fair youth, that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhtown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favoured, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true ; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds ; and if we should speak of the Sibyl and all the others who by pro-

μαντικῇ χρώμενοι ἐνθέφ πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προ-
λέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὄρθωσαν, μηκύνοιμεν ἂν
δῆλα παντὶ λέγοντες· τόδε μὴν ἄξιον ἐπιμαρτύ-
ρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα
τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦντο οὐδὲ ὄνειδος μανίαν.

- C οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἣ τὸ μέλλον κρίνε-
ται, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικὴν
ἐκάλεσαν· ἀλλ' ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ
γίγηται, οὕτω νομίσαντες ἔθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν
ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικὴν
ἐκάλεσαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τήν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν
τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρνίθων ποιουμένων¹ καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων σημείων, ἅτ' ἐκ διανοίας ποριζομένων ἀνθρω-
D πίνῃ οἰήσῃ νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοϊστικὴν
ἐπωνόμασαν, ἣν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ᾧ σεμνύνοντες
οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν· ὅσῳ δὲ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐν-
τιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς, τό τε ὄνομα τοῦ
ὀνόματος ἔργον τ' ἔργου, τόσῳ κάλλιον μαρτυ-
ροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ
τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γιγνομένης. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσω
γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ
μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τισι τῶν γενῶν, ἣ μανία
E ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν
εὔρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ
λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν
τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἔχοντα πρὸς

¹ Schanz brackets ποιουμένων.

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phetic inspiration have foretold many things to many persons and thereby made them fortunate afterwards, anyone can see that we should speak a long time. And it is worth while to adduce also the fact that those men of old who invented names thought that madness was neither shameful nor disgraceful ; otherwise they would not have connected the very word mania with the noblest of arts, that which foretells the future, by calling it the manic art. No, they gave this name thinking that mania, when it comes by gift of the gods, is a noble thing, but nowadays people call prophecy the mantic art, tastelessly inserting a T in the word. So also, when they gave a name to the investigation of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds and by other signs, since they furnish mind (nous) and information (historia) to human thought (oiesis) from the intellect (dianoia) they called it the oionostic (oionoistike) art, which modern folk now call oiōnistic, making it more high-sounding by introducing the long O. The ancients, then testify that in proportion as prophecy (mantike) is superior to augury, both in name and in fact, in the same proportion madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin. Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of

245 τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὐρομένη. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχή τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχὴν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ τε ὠδὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιῶν ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγιγνομένους παιδεύει· ὃς δ' ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἱκανὸς ποιητὴς ἐσόμενος, ἀτελεὶς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μαινομένων ἢ τοῦ σωφρονούντος ἠφανίσθη.

B 23. Τοσαῦτα μέντοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἔχω μανίας γιγνομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα· ὥστε τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβώμεθα, μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖτω δεδιττόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον· ἀλλὰ τότε πρὸς ἐκείνῳ δείξας φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἐρῶντι καὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπέμπεται. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὐτοῦναντίον, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ C τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀπόδειξις ἔσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως περὶ θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τάληθες νοῆσαι· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἦδε.

24. Ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον· τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς· μόνον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἐαυτό, οὐ ποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις D ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο πηγὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ

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madness a release from present ills is found. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.

All these noble results of inspired madness I can mention, and many more. Therefore let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy. Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory. We, on our part, must prove that such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows:

Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the

γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μὴδ' ἐξ ἑνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχῇ γίγνοιτο,¹ οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἐστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτε ἔκ του οὔτε ἄλλο ἐξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, εἴπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὕτω δὲ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν,

Ε ἡ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενήσεται. ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτόν τις λέγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ὃ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ὃ δὲ ἔνδοθεν αὐτῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὥς ταύτης οὔσης φύσεως ψυχῆς· εἰ δ' ἐστιν τοῦτο οὕτως
246 ἔχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν ἂν εἴη.

25. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τῆς ιδέας αὐτῆς ὧδε λεκτέον· οἶον μὲν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ὃ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττονος· ταύτῃ οὖν λέγωμεν. εἰκέτω δὴ ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνιόχοι πάντες αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
B ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμικται· καὶ πρῶτον

¹ Schanz adds τοῦτο before οὐκ.

beginning is ungenerated. For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not generated from anything ; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be generated from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also indestructible ; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, since all things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that which moves itself must be the beginning of motion. And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin. But since that which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says that this self-motion is the essence and the very idea of the soul, will not be disgraced. For every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul ; but if this is true,—that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal.

Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough ; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure ; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and of good descent, but those of other races are mixed ; and first

- μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἄρχων ξυνωρίδος ἡνιοχεῖ, εἴτα τῶν ἵππων ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡνιοχίαις. πῇ δὴ οὖν θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῶον ἐκλήθη, πειρατέον εἰπεῖν. πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀψύχου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περιπολεῖ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἶδεσι γιγνομένη· τελέα
- C μὲν οὖν οὕσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διοικεῖ· ἡ δὲ πτερορρυήσασα φέρεται, ἕως ἂν στερεοῦ τινὸς ἀντιλάβηται, οὐ κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γήϊνον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῶον τὸ ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα παγέν, θνητὸν τ' ἔσχεν ἐπωνυμίαν· ἀθάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἑνὸς λόγου λελογισμένου, ἀλλὰ πλάττομεν οὔτε ἰδόντες
- D οὔτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν, ἀθάνατόν τι ζῶον, ἔχον μὲν ψυχὴν, ἔχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν αἰὲ δὲ χρόνον ταῦτα ξυμπεφυκότα. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἐχέτω τε καὶ λεγέσθω· τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἣν ψυχῆς ἀπορρεῖ, λάβωμεν. ἔστι δέ τις τοιάδε.

26. Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα, ἣ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ· κεκοινώνηκε δὲ πῇ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ
- E σῶμα τοῦ θεοῦ.¹ τὸ δὲ θεῖον καλόν, σοφόν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ τι τοιοῦτον· τούτοις δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, αἰσχυρῷ δὲ καὶ κακῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις²

¹ The word ψυχὴ, given in the MSS. after θεοῦ, is omitted by Plutarch and most modern editors, including Schanz.

² Schanz omits καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

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the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. Now we must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal. Soul, considered collectively, has the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in one form and sometimes in another ; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world ; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it ; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal. It is not immortal by any reasonable supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. Let that, however, and our words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God ; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses its wings. It is something like this.

The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods. More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities ; by these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as vileness and

φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν
 ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνὸν ἄρμα, πρῶτος
 πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος·
 247 τῷ δ' ἔπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, κατὰ
 ἔνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη· μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν
 θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνη· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν
 δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἡγούνται
 κατὰ τάξιν ἣν ἕκαστος ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν
 καὶ μακάριαι θεαὶ τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ,
 ἃς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων¹ ἐπιστρέφεται, πράττων
 ἕκαστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἔπεται δὲ ὁ αἶε ἐθέλων
 τε καὶ δυνάμενος· φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ
 ἴσταται· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαῖτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην
 B ἴωσιν, ἄκραν ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα πορεύον-
 ται² πρὸς ἄναντες· ἥ δὴ³ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα
 ἰσορρόπως εὐήνια ὄντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ
 ἄλλα μόγις· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κᾶκης ἵππος
 μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων, ὃ μὴ
 καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων· ἔνθα δὴ πόνος
 τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος ψυχῇ πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν
 γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλούμεναι, ἡνίκ' ἂν πρὸς ἄκρῳ
 C γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ
 οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περι-
 φορά, αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

27. Τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ
 πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητῆς οὔτε ποτὲ ὕμνήσει κατ'
 ἀξίαν, ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε
 ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας
 λέγοντα. ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος

¹ Schanz reads εὐδαιμόνως.

² Schanz brackets πορεύονται.

³ ἥ δὴ Proclus, followed by Burnet. ἥδη BT Schanz et al.

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evil, they are wasted away and destroyed. Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things. He is followed by an army of gods and spirits, arrayed in eleven squadrons; Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. Of the rest, those who are included among the twelve great gods and are accounted leaders, are assigned each to his place in the army. There are many blessed sights and many ways hither and thither within the heaven, along which the blessed gods go to and fro attending each to his own duties; and whoever wishes, and is able, follows, for jealousy is excluded from the celestial band. But when they go to a feast and a banquet, they proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven, where the chariots of the gods, whose well matched horses obey the rein, advance easily, but the others with difficulty; for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the top, pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven.

But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly

καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα ψυχῆς¹ κυβερνήτη
μόνῳ θεατῇ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς
D ἐπιστήμης γένος τοῦτον ἔχει τὴν τόπον. ἄτ'² οὖν
θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφο-
μένη καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, ὅση ἂν μέλλῃ τὸ προσ-
ῆκον δέξεσθαι,³ ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὄν ἀγαπᾷ
τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τὰληθῇ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ,
ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἢ περιφορᾷ εἰς ταῦτον περιενέγκῃ.
ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην,
καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ
ἢ γένεσις προσεστί, οὐδ' ἢ ἐστίν που ἑτέρα ἐν
E ἑτέρῳ οὐσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ
τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστίν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὐσαν· καὶ
τὰλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένα καὶ
ἐστιαθείσα, δῦσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ,
οἴκαδε ἦλθεν, ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς
τὴν φάτιν τοὺς ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμ-
βροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

248 28. Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυ-
χαί, ἢ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη
ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡνιόχου
κεφαλὴν, καὶ συμπεριηνέχθη τὴν περιφορᾷ, θορυ-
βουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα τὰ
ὄντα· ἢ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἦρε, τοτὲ δ' ἔδω, βιαζομένων
δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἶδεν, τὰ δ' οὐ· αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι
γλιχόμεναι μὲν ἅπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἔπονται, ἀδυ-
νατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχιαι ξυμπεριφέρονται, πα-
B τοῦσαι ἀλλήλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἑτέρα πρὸ τῆς

¹ ψυχῇ οὐσα B οὐσα ψυχῆς T. οὐσα Madvig, Schanz.

² ἄτ' BT ἢ τ' Heindorf, Schanz.

³ καὶ ἀπάσης . . . δέξεσθαι bracketed by Schanz, following Suckow.

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existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place. In the revolution it beholds absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge, not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute; and in the same way it beholds and feeds upon the other eternal verities, after which, passing down again within the heaven, it goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others. The other souls follow after, all yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, and are carried round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each

- ἐτέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἄμιλλα καὶ ἰδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται, οὐ δὴ κακία ἡνιόχων· πολλὰ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλὰ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύονται· πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρῶνται. οὐ δ' ἔνεχ' ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐ¹ ἔστιν, ἣ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἣ τε τοῦ
- C πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται· θεσμός τε Ἀδρασθείας ὅδε, ἥτις ἂν ψυχὴ θεῷ ξυνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατὶδῇ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἐτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, καὶ αἰεὶ τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, αἰεὶ ἀβλαβῇ εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπένθῃ μὴ ἰδῇ, καὶ τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη λήθῃς τε καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρησῇ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ, τότε νόμος ταύτην μὴ
- D φυτεῦσαι εἰς μηδεμίαν θήρειον φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδοῦσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννόμου ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἢ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοπόνου γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σώματος ἱασίν τινος ἔσομένου, πέμπτην
- E μαντικὸν βίον ἢ τινα τελεστικὸν ἔξουσιν· ἕκτη ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησιν τις ἄλλος ἀρμόσει, ἑβδόμη δημιουργικὸς ἢ γεωργικὸς, ὀγδόη σοφιστικὸς ἢ δημοτικὸς, ἐννάτη τυραννικὸς.

¹ οὐ is omitted by Schanz, following Madvig.

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striving to pass its neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed, and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers; and after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion. But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul shall never pass into any beast at its first birth, but the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature, and the second soul into that of a lawful king or a warlike ruler, and the third into that of a politician or a man of business or a financier, the fourth into that of a hard-working gymnast or one who will be concerned with the cure of the body, and the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or someone who conducts mystic rites; to the sixth, a poet or some other imitative artist will be united, to the seventh, a craftsman or a husbandman, to the eighth, a sophist or a demagogue, to the ninth, a tyrant.

29. Ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἅπασιν ὃς μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ, ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, ὃς δ' ἂν ἀδίκως, χείρονος. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄθεν ἦκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσούτου χρόνου, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας· αὗται δὲ τρίτῃ περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεί, ἔαν ἔλωνται τρις ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὕτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιοστῷ ἔτει ἀπέρχονται· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον, κριθεῖσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιοτήρια ἐλθοῦσαι δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δ' εἰς τοῦραν οὐ τινὰ τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεῖσαι διάγουσιν ἀξίως οὐ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει ἐβίωσαν βίου. τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφοτέραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἰροῦνται ὃν ἂν ἐθέλῃ ἐκάστη· ἔνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίον ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου, ὃς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἦ γε μὴ ποτε ἰδοῦσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἥξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ' ¹ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον· ² τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φάμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἀεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς

¹ Schanz inserts τὸ after κατ'.

² Schanz, following Heindorf, reads ξυναιρουμένων.

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Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things

οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεϊὸς ἐστίν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους αἰετελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται·

D ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς.

30. Ἔστιν δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνησκόμενος, πτερῶται τε καὶ¹ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς

E διακείμενος· ὡς ἄρα αὕτη πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστὴς καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθέεται τὰ ὄντα, ἣ οὐκ ἂν

250 ἦλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ζῶον, ἀναμιμνήσκεισθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκεῖνα οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπάσῃ, οὔτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τὰ κεῖ, οὔτε αἱ δεῦρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὥστε ὑπὸ τινων ὁμιλιῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὢν τότε εἶδον ἱερῶν ἔχειν. ὀλίγαι δὲ λείπονται, αἷς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν· αὗται δέ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἴδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ' αὐτῶν γίγνου-

¹ Schanz omits τε καί.

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the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.

All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover. For, as has been said, every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, otherwise it would not have entered into a human being, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not

- ται, ὃ δ' ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς
 B δισαισθάνεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφρο-
 σύνης, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἔνεστι
 φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι'
 ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ τὰς
 εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος·
 κάλλος δὲ τότε ἦν ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐ-
 δαίμονι χορῶ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι
 μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου θεῶν,
 εἰδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις
 C λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, ἣν ὠργιάζομεν ὁλόκληροι
 μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἀπαθείς κακῶν, ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν
 ὑστέρω χρόνῳ ὑπέμενευ, ὁλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἀπλᾶ
 καὶ ἀτρεμῇ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μνουμένοι τε
 καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ ὄντες
 καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες
 ὀνομάζομεν, ὁστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

31. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω, δι' ἣν
 πόθῳ τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ
 D κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπευ
 ὄν, δευρό τ' ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς
 ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον
 ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ
 σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἥ φρόνησις οὐχ
 ὁράται—δεινὸν γὰρ ἂν παρείχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι
 τοιοῦτον ἐαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἰδωλον παρείχετο· εἰς
 ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος
 μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ' ἐκφανέστατον
 E εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον. ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελής ἡ



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understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. . Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company—we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other god—they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.

So much, then, in honour of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.

- διεφθαρμένος οὐκ ὀξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φέρεται
 πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῆδε
 ἐπωνυμίαν, ὥστ' οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ' ἡδονῇ
 παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ
 251 παιδοσπορεῖν, καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν
 οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν διώκων· ὁ δὲ
 ἄρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδὲς
 πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον ἢ τινα
 σώματος ἰδέαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξεν καὶ τι τῶν
 τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς
 θεὸν σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔδεδίδει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα
 μανίας δόξαν, θύοι ἂν ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς
 παιδικοῖς. ἰδόντα δ' αὐτὸν οἶον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης
 μεταβολή τε καὶ ἰδρῶς καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης
 B. λαμβάνει· δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν
 ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάνθη, ἥ ἢ τοῦ
 πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται,¹ θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη
 τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος
 συμμεμυκῶτα εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης
 δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ὥδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ
 τῆς ρίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς
 ψυχῆς εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή.
 32. Ζεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ
 C ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυούντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς
 ὀδόντας γίνεταί, ὅταν ἄρτι φύωσιν, κυήσις τε καὶ
 ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταῦτόν δὴ πέπονθεν ἢ
 τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχῇ· ζεῖ τε καὶ
 ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά.
 ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς

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Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, does not quickly rise from this world to that other world and to absolute beauty when he sees its namesake here, and so he does not revere it when he looks upon it, but gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting; he makes licence his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue pleasure in violation of nature. But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a god-like face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat; for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.

Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpitates, and as in those who are cutting teeth there is an irritation and discomfort in the gums, when the teeth begin to grow, just so the soul suffers when the growth of the feathers begins; it is feverish and is uncomfortable and itches when they begin to grow. Then when it gazes upon the beauty of the boy and

- κάλλος ἐκείθεν μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ῥέοντ', ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἥμερος καλεῖται, δεχομένη¹ ἄρδεται τε καὶ
- D θερμαίνεται, λωφᾷ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμῆση, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἣ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρμᾷ, συναυαίνόμενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήει τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ, ἣ δ' ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἡμέρου ἀποκεκλημένη, πηδῶσα οἶον τὰ σφύζοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ ἐγγχρίει ἐκάστη τῇ καθ' αὐτήν, ὥστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλῳ ἣ ψυχὴ οἷστρά καὶ ὀδυνᾶται· μνήμην δ' αὐτὴ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν. ἐκ δ' ἀμφοτέρων μεμιγμένων
- E ἀδημονεῖ τε τῇ ἀτοπία τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυττᾷ, καὶ ἐμμανῆς οὔσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἡμέραν οὐδ' ἂν ἥ μένειν, θεὸς δὲ ποθοῦσα, ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος· ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχετευσαμένη ἥμερον ἔλυσεν μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, ἡδονὴν δ'
- 252 αὐτὴν ταύτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται. ὅθεν δὴ ἐκούσα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται, οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἐταίρων πάντων λέλησται, καὶ οὐσίας δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὐδὲν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οἷς πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἔῃ τις ἐγγυτάτῳ τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος
- B ἔχοντα ἱατρὸν ἠῦρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων.

¹ After δεχομένη the best MSS. read τὸν ἥμερον. Schanz follows Stallbaum in omitting it.

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receives the particles which flow thence to it (for which reason they are called yearning),¹ it is moistened and warmed, ceases from its pain and is filled with joy ; but when it is alone and grows dry, the mouths of the passages in which the feathers begin to grow become dry and close up, shutting in the sprouting feathers, and the sprouts within, shut in with the yearning, throb like pulsing arteries, and each sprout pricks the passage in which it is, so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain ; and then again, remembering the beautiful one, it rejoices. So, because of these two mingled sensations, it is greatly troubled by its strange condition ; it is perplexed and maddened, and in its madness it cannot sleep at night or stay in any one place by day, but it is filled with longing and hastens wherever it hopes to see the beautiful one. And when it sees him and is bathed with the waters of yearning, the passages that were sealed are opened, the soul has respite from the stings and is eased of its pain, and this pleasure which it enjoys is the sweetest of pleasures at the time. Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for him mother and brothers and all friends, neglects property and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the beloved ; for it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but finds in him the only healer of its greatest woes. Now this

¹ The play on the words μέρη and ἡμερος cannot be rendered accurately in English. Jowett approaches a rendering by the use of the words motion and emotion, but emotion is too weak a word for ἡμερος.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν Ἐρωτα ὀνομάζουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δέ, οἶμαι, τινὲς Ὀμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπῶν δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἐρωτα, ὧν τὸ ἕτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἔμμετρον· ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὧδε·

- C τὸν δ' ἦτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἐρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν, ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτορ' ἀνάγκην.

τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μή· ὅμως δὲ ἡ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώντων τοῦτο ἐκείνο τυγχάνει ὄν.

33. Τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὀπαδῶν ὁ ληφθεὶς ἐμβριθέστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερονύμου ἄχθος. ὅσοι δὲ Ἀρεῶς τε θεραπευταὶ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ' Ἐρωτος ἀλῶσιν καί τι οἰθῶσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φονικοὶ καὶ ἔτοιμοι καθιερεύειν αὐτούς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά·

- D καὶ οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον θεόν, οὗ ἕκαστος ἦν χορευτής, ἐκείνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ζῆ, ἕως ἂν ἡ ἀδιάφθορος, καὶ τὴν τῇδε πρώτην γένεσιν βιοτεύῃ, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. τὸν τε οὖν ἔρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπου ἐκλέγεται ἕκαστος, καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνον ὄντα ἑαυτῷ οἶον ἄγαλμα τεκταίνεται τε

- E καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργιάσων. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δῖόν τινα εἶναι ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον· σκοποῦσιν οὖν, εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὐρόντες ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως

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condition, fair boy, about which I am speaking, is called Love by men, but when you hear what the gods call it, perhaps because of your youth you will laugh. But some of the Homeridae, I believe, repeat two verses on Love from the spurious poems of Homer, one of which is very outrageous and not perfectly metrical. They sing them as follows :

“Mortals call him winged Love, but the immortals call him The Winged One, because he must needs grow wings.”

You may believe this, or not ; but the condition of lovers and the cause of it are just as I have said.

Now he who is a follower of Zeus, when seized by Love can bear a heavier burden of the winged god ; but those who are servants of Ares and followed in his train, when they have been seized by Love and think they have been wronged in any way by the beloved, become murderous and are ready to sacrifice themselves and the beloved. And so it is with the follower of each of the other gods ; he lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god, so long as he is uncorrupted, and is living his first life on earth, and in that way he behaves and conducts himself toward his beloved and toward all others. Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honour and worship him. The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus ; so they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they find him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.

- τοιοῦτος ἔσται. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῶσι
 τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μαυθάνουσί
 τε ὅθεν ἂν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται,
 253 ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ
 σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως
 ἡναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτό-
 μενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιῶντες ἐξ ἐκείνου
 λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ'
 ὅσον δυνατόν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν· καὶ
 τούτων δὴ τὸν ἐρώμενον αἰτιώμενοι ἔτι τε μᾶλλον
 ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ¹ ἐκ Διὸς ἀρύττωσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ
 βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου ψυχὴν ἐπαντλοῦντες
 ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατόν ὁμοιότατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.
 Β ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἡρας εἶποντο, βασιλικὸν ζητοῦσι,
 καὶ εὐρόντες περὶ τοῦτον πάντα δρῶσιν τὰ αὐτά.
 οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν θεῶν οὕτω
 κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἰόντες ζητοῦσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα
 πεφυκέναι, καὶ ὅταν κτήσωνται, μιμούμενοι αὐτοί
 τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθοντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς
 τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἄγουσιν, ὅση
 ἐκάστῳ δύναμις, οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνελευθέρῳ δυσμε-
 νεῖα χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοιότητα
 C αὐτοῖς τῷ θεῷ, ὃν ἂν τιμῶσι, πᾶσαν πάντως ὃ τι
 μάλιστα πειρώμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία
 μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐρώντων καὶ τελετή, ἐάν
 γε διαπράξωνται ὃ προθυμοῦνται ἢ λέγω, οὕτω
 καλὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δι' ἔρωτα

¹ Schanz, following Madvig, reads χᾶν.

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If they have not previously had experience, they learn then from all who can teach them anything; they seek after information themselves, and when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god. And those who followed after Hera seek a kingly nature, and when they have found such an one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects; and likewise the followers of Apollo, and of each of the gods, go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honour. Thus the desire of the true lovers, and the initiation into the mysteries of love, which they teach, if they accomplish what they desire in the way I describe, is beautiful and brings happiness from the inspired lover to the loved one, if he be captured; and the

μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίνεται, ἐὰν αἰρεθῇ· ἀλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἰρεθείς¹ τοιῷδε τρόπῳ.

34. Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦδε τοῦ μύθου τριχῇ διειλόμην ψυχὴν ἐκάστην, ἵππομόρφῳ μὲν δύο
D τινὲ εἶδη, ἡνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἡμῖν ταῦτα μενέτω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ἵππων ὁ μὲν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίονι στάσει ὦν τό τε εἶδος ὀρθὸς καὶ διηρθρωμένος, ὑψαύχην, ἐπίγρυπος, λευκὸς ἰδεῖν, μελανόματος, τιμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, ἀπληκτος, κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἡνιοχεῖται·
E ὁ δ' αὖ σκολιός, πολὺς, εἰκῇ συμπεφορημένος, κρατεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόματος, ὕφαιμος, ὕβρεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, περὶ ὧτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάλιστα μετὰ κέντρων μόγις ὑπέικων. ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἡνίοχος ἰδὼν τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πᾶσαν αἰσθήσει διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχὴν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ
254 πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ, ὁ μὲν εὐπειθὴς τῷ ἡνιόχῳ τῶν ἵππων, αἰεὶ τε καὶ τότε αἰδοῖ βιαζόμενος, ἑαυτὸν κατέχει μὴ ἐπιπηδᾶν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ· ὁ δὲ οὔτε κέντρων ἡνιοχικῶν οὔτε μάλιστα ἔτι ἐντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βία φέρεται, καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τῷ σύζυγί τε καὶ ἡνιόχῳ ἀναγκάζει ἵεναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνηῖαν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τὼ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον ἀγανακτοῦντε, ὡς
B δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἀναγκαζομένῳ· τελευτῶντες δέ, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ πέρας κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον

¹ Schanz brackets ὁ αἰρεθείς, following Badham.

fair one who is captured is caught in the following manner :—

In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad ; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs ; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in colour, and has dark eyes ; he is a friend of honour joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory ; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his colour dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot ; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs. Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved ; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and forcing them to approach the beloved and propose the joys of love. And they at first pull back indignantly and will not be forced to do terrible and unlawful deeds ; but finally, as the trouble has no

ἀγομένω, εἵξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσῃν τὸ κελευόμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ' ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὄψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν.

35. Ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἠνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβῶσαν· ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, καὶ ἅμα ἠναγκάσθη εἰς τοῦπίσω ἐλκύσαι τὰς
- C ἡνίας οὕτω σφόδρα, ὥστ' ἐπὶ τὰ ἰσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τὸ ἵππῳ, τὸν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν μάλ' ἄκουτα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπ' αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἰδρῶτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχὴν, ὁ δὲ λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης, ἣν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχευ καὶ τοῦ πτώματος, μόγις ἐξαναπνεύσας ἐλοιδόρησεν ὀργῇ, πολλὰ κακίζων τὸν τε ἡνιόχον καὶ
- D τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δειλία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία λιπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν· καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσιέναι ἀναγκάζων μόγις συνεχώρησε δεομένων εἰσαυθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιουμένῳ ἀναμιμνήσκων, βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, ἔλκων ἠνάγκασεν αὐτὸν προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐγκύψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον, ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν,
- E μετ' ἀναιδείας ἔλκει· ὁ δ' ἡνιόχος ἔτι μᾶλλον ταῦτόν πάθος παθὼν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ ὑσπληγος ἀναπесών, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὑβριστοῦ ἵππου ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βία ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν, τὴν τε κακῆγορον γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθήμαξεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἰσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν

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end, they go forward with him, yielding and agreeing to do his bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face.

And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a pedestal of chastity, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches, the one quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unruly beast very unwilling. And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other, as soon as he is recovered from the pain of the bit and the fall, before he has fairly taken breath, breaks forth into angry reproaches, bitterly reviling his mate and the charioteer for their cowardice and lack of manhood in deserting their post and breaking their agreement; and again, in spite of their unwillingness, he urges them forward and hardly yields to their prayer that he postpone the matter to another time. Then when the time comes which they have agreed upon, they pretend that they have forgotten it, but he reminds them; struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly. The effect upon the charioteer is the same as before, but more pronounced; he falls back like a racer from the starting-rope, pulls the bit backward even more violently than before from the teeth of the unruly horse, covers his scurrilous tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches

ἐρείσας ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν. ὅταν δὲ ταῦτόν πολλαίς
 πάσχω· ὁ πονηρὸς τῆς ὑβρεως λήξῃ, ταπεινωθεὶς
 ἔπεται ἤδη τῇ τοῦ ἡνιόχου προνοίᾳ, καὶ ὅταν ἴδῃ
 τὸν καλόν, φόβῳ διόλλυται· ὥστε ξυμβαίνει τότε
 ἤδη τὴν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ψυχὴν τοῖς παιδικοῖς αἰδου-
 μένῃν τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν ἔπεσθαι.

- 255 36. Ἄτε οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἰσόθεος
 θεραπευόμενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ
 ἐρώντος, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεπονθότος, καὶ
 αὐτὸς ὢν φύσει φίλος τῷ θεραπεύοντι, ἐὰν ἄρα
 καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ξυμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινων
 ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ᾖ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν
 ἐρῶντι πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθῇ τὸν
 ἐρῶντα· προϊόντος δὲ ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἢ τε ἡλικίας
 B καὶ τὸ χρεὼν ἡγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν εἰς
 ὁμίλιαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε εἴμαρται κακὸν κακῷ
 φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. προσε-
 μένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὁμίλιαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν
 ἢ εὖνοια γιγνομένη τοῦ ἐρώντος ἐκπλήττει τὸν
 ἐρώμενον διαισθανόμενον, ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ ξύμπαντες
 ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκείοι μοῖραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν
 παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἔνθεον φίλον. ὅταν δὲ
 χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ
 ἄπτεσθαι ἐν τε γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις
 C ὁμίλιας, τότε ἤδη ἢ τοῦ ρεύματος ἐκείνου πηγῇ,
 ὃν ἱμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἐρῶν ὠνόμασεν, πολλή
 φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστήν, ἢ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδω,
 ἢ δ' ἀπομεστούμενου ἔξω ἀπορρεῖ· καὶ οἶον πνεῦμα
 ἢ τις ἡχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἀλλομένη

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to the ground, causing him much pain. Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear ; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.

Now the beloved, since he receives all service from his lover, as if he were a god, and since the lover is not feigning, but is really in love, and since the beloved himself is by nature friendly to him who serves him, although he may at some earlier time have been prejudiced by his schoolfellows or others, who said that it was a disgrace to yield to a lover, and may for that reason have repulsed his lover, yet, as time goes on, his youth and destiny cause him to admit him to his society. For it is the law of fate that evil can never be a friend to evil and that good must always be friend to good. And when the lover is thus admitted, and the privilege of conversation and intimacy has been granted him, his good will, as it shows itself in close intimacy, astonishes the beloved, who discovers that the friendship of all his other friends and relatives is as nothing when compared with that of his inspired lover. And as this intimacy continues and the lover comes near and touches the beloved in the gymnasium and in their general intercourse, then the fountain of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, called "desire" flows copiously upon the lover ; and some of it flows into him, and some, when he is filled, overflows outside ; and just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and

πάλιν ὅθεν ὥρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους
 ρεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἰόν,
 ἧ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον, καὶ

D ἀναπτερώσαν τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν, ἄρδει τε
 καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου
 αὐ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἐρᾷ μὲν οὖν, ὅτου
 δέ, ἀπορεῖ· καὶ οὐδ' ὅ τι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει
 φράσαι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπ' ἄλλου ὀφθαλμίας ἀπολε-
 λαυκῶς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ δ' ἐν
 κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθεν. καὶ
 ὅταν μὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῇ, λήγει κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐκείνῳ
 τῆς ὀδύνης· ὅταν δὲ ἀπῇ, κατὰ ταῦτ' αὐ ποθεῖ
 καὶ ποθεῖται, εἰδῶλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων·

E καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἶεται οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν
 εἶναι. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκείνῳ παραπλησίως μὲν,
 ἀσθενεστερώς δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατα-
 κεῖσθαι· καὶ δὴ, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο
 ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν
 ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅ τι λέγει πρὸς
 τὸν ἡνίοχον, καὶ ἀξιοῖ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ
 256 ἀπολαῦσαι· ὁ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν
 εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπορῶν περιβάλλει τὸν
 ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὥς σφόδρ' εὖνουν ἀσπαζόμενος·
 ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, οἷός ἐστι μὴ ἀπαρνη-
 θῆναι τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἐρῶντι, εἰ
 δεσθεῖη τυχεῖν· ὁ δὲ ὁμόζυξ αὐ μετὰ τοῦ ἡνίοχου
 πρὸς ταῦτα μετ' αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει.

37. Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν
 καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νικήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας

B ἀγαγόντα, μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὁμοιοσητικὸν τὸν
 ἐνθάδε βίον διάγουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ
 κόσμιοι ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ᾧ κακία ψυχῆς

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returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes, the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the passages of the feathers, waters them and makes the feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved one with love. So he is in love, but he knows not with whom ; he does not understand his own condition and cannot explain it ; like one who has caught a disease of the eyes from another, he can give no reason for it ; he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror, but is not conscious of the fact. And in the lover's presence, like him he ceases from his pain, and in his absence, like him he is filled with yearning such as he inspires, and love's image, requited love, dwells within him ; but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love, but friendship. Like the lover, though less strongly, he desires to see his friend, to touch him, kiss him, and lie down by him ; and naturally these things are soon brought about. Now as they lie together, the unruly horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in return for his many troubles ; and the unruly horse of the beloved says nothing, but teeming with passion and confused emotions he embraces and kisses his lover, caressing him as his best friend ; and when they lie together, he would not refuse his lover any favour, if he asked it ; but the other horse and the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and reason.

If now the better elements of the mind, which lead to a well ordered life and to philosophy, prevail, they live a life of happiness and harmony here on earth, self controlled and orderly, holding in subjection that which causes evil in the soul and giving

- ἐνεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ᾧ ἀρετῇ· τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἐν νενικήκασιν, οὐ μείζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη φορτικωτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρήσωνται, τάχ' ἂν που ἐν μέθαις ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ ἀμελείᾳ τὸ ἀκολάστῳ αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίῳ λαβόντε τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, ξυναγαγόντε εἰς ταυτόν, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαριστὴν αἴρεσιν εἰλέσθην τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπραξαμένῳ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρώνται μὲν αὐτῇ, σπανία δέ, ἅτε οὐ πάσῃ δεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράττοντες. φίλῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτῳ, ἡττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἀλλήλοιν διὰ τε
- D τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένῳ διάγουσι, πίστει τὰς μεγίστας ἡγουμένῳ ἀλλήλοιν δεδωκέναι τε καὶ δεδέχθαι, ἃς οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἔχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἄπτεροι μὲν, ὠρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὥστε οὐ σμικρὸν ἄθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἔτι ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργημένοις ἤδη τῆς ἐπουρανίου πορείας, ἀλλὰ φανὸν βίον διάγοντας εὐδαιμονεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, ὅταν γένωνται, γενέσθαι.
- E 38. Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὦ παῖ, καὶ θεία οὕτω σοι δωρήσεται ἢ παρ' ἐραστοῦ φιλία· ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης, σωφροσύνη θνητῇ κεκραμένη, θνητά τε καὶ φειδωλὰ οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς

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freedom to that which makes for virtue; and when this life is ended they are light and winged, for they have conquered in one of the three truly Olympic contests. Neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can confer upon man any greater blessing than this. If however they live a life less noble and without philosophy, but yet ruled by the love of honour, probably, when they have been drinking, or in some other moment of carelessness, the two unruly horses, taking the souls off their guard, will bring them together and seize upon and accomplish that which is by the many accounted blissful; and when this has once been done, they continue the practice, but infrequently, since what they are doing is not approved by the whole mind. So these two pass through life as friends, though not such friends as the others, both at the time of their love and afterwards, believing that they have exchanged the most binding pledges of love, and that they can never break them and fall into enmity. And at last, when they depart from the body, they are not winged, to be sure, but their wings have begun to grow, so that the madness of love brings them no small reward; for it is the law that those who have once begun their upward progress shall never again pass into darkness and the journey under the earth, but shall live a happy life in the light as they journey together, and because of their love shall be alike in their plumage when they receive their wings.

These blessings, so great and so divine, the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, dear boy; but the affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and follows mortal and parsimonious rules of conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the

257 ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνουν παρέξει. αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρωσ, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὃ τι καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοται τε καὶ ἐκτέτιστα παλινφθία, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἠναγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρῆσθαι. ἀλλὰ τῶν προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἴλεως τὴν ἐρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην, ἣν ἔδωκας, μήτε ἀφέλῃ μήτε πηρώσης δι' ὀργήν, δίδου δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιον B εἶναι. τῷ πρόσθεν δ' εἴ τι λόγῳ σοι ἀπηνὲς εἵπομεν Φαῖδρός τε καὶ ἐγώ, Λυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αἰτιώμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δέ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψον, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁδε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πρὸς Ἔρωτα μετὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων τὸν βίον ποιῇται.

39. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συνεύχομαί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, C εἵπερ ἄμεινον ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δέ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὅσῳ καλλίῳ τοῦ προτέρου ἀπειργάσω· ὥστε ὁκνῶ μή μοι ὁ Λυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῇ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἐβελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατείνειν. καὶ γάρ τις αὐτόν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἔναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λοιδορῶν ὠνείδιζε, καὶ διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον· τάχ' οὖν ἂν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἐπίσχοι ἡμῖν ἂν τοῦ γράφειν.

D ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γελοῖόν γ', ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἐταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἡγεῖ τινὰ ψοφοδεᾶ. ἴσως δὲ καὶ

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narrowness which the common folk praise as virtue ; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last. There, dear Love, thou hast my recantation, which I have offered and paid as beautifully and as well as I could, especially in the poetical expressions which I was forced to employ on account of Phaedrus. Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept these words with favour ; be kind and gracious to me ; do not in anger take from me the art of love which thou didst give me, and deprive me not of sight, but grant unto me to be even more than now esteemed by the beautiful. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses.

PHAEDRUS. I join in your prayer, Socrates, and pray that this may come to pass, if this is best for us. But all along I have been wondering at your discourse, you made it so much more beautiful than the first ; so that I am afraid Lysias will make a poor showing, if he consents to compete with it. Indeed, lately one of the politicians was abusing him for this very thing, and through all his abusive speech kept calling him a speech-writer ; so perhaps out of pride he may refrain from writing.

SOCRATES. That is an absurd idea, young man, and you are greatly mistaken in your friend if you think he is so much afraid of noise. Perhaps, too, you think

τὸν λοιδορούμενον αὐτῷ οἷοι νομίζοντα λέγειν ἂ ἔλεγεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐφαίνετο γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγραμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γλυκὺς ἀγκῶν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, λέληθέν σε¹ καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀγκῶνι λανθάνει σε, ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον φρονούντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἐρῶσι λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγραμμάτων, οἳ γε καὶ ἐπειδὴν τινα γράφωσι λόγον, οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὥστε προσπαργάφουσι πρώτους, οἳ ἂν ἐκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτούς.

258 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ² ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος ὁ ἐπαινέτης γέγραπται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδοξέν πού φησι τῇ βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ ὃς εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεύς, ἔπειτα λέγει δὴ³ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν

¹ After λέληθέν σε the MSS. read ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ ἀγκῶνος τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλον ἐκλήθη. Schanz and Burnet bracket these words, following Heindorf.

² Schanz, following Madvig, brackets ἀρχῇ. Burnet brackets συγγράμματι below.

³ Schanz, following Krische, inserts τὸ after δὴ.

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the man who abused him believed what he was saying.

PHAEDRUS. He seemed to believe, Socrates; and you know yourself that the most influential and important men in our cities are ashamed to write speeches and leave writings behind them, through fear of being called sophists by posterity.

SOCRATES. You seem to be unacquainted with the "sweet elbow,"¹ Phaedrus, and besides the elbow, you seem not to know that the proudest of the statesmen are most fond of writing and of leaving writings behind them, since they care so much for praise that when they write a speech they add at the beginning the names of those who praise them in each instance.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean? I don't understand.

SOCRATES. You don't understand that the name of the approver is written first in the writings of statesmen.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. The writer says, "It was voted by the senate (or the people, or both), and so-and-so moved," mentioning his own name with great dignity and praise, then after that he goes on, displaying his own wisdom to his approvers, and sometimes making a very long document. Does it seem to you that a

¹ This is a proverbial expression, similar in meaning to our "sour grapes." The explanation given in the MSS., that the sweet elbow gets its name from the long bend, or elbow, in the Nile may be an addition by some commentator; at any rate, it hardly fits our passage.

B ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα· ἢ σοι ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὲν οὗτος ἐμμένῃ, γεγηθῶς ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλιφῇ καὶ ἄμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀξίος εἶναι συγγράφειν, πενθεῖ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλόν γε ὅτι οὐχ ὥς ὑπερφρονούντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ' ὥς τεθαυμακότες.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

C **ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Τί δέ; ὅταν ἱκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεὺς ὥστε λαβὼν τὴν Λυκούργου ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἂρ' οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτός τε αὐτὸν ἔτι ζῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γιγνόμενοι ταῦτα ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἶει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστις καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν δύσνους Λυσία, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὀνειδίζοι.

D **40. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.** Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, ἀλλ' αἰσχροῦς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον δῆ.

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thing of that sort is anything else than a written speech?

PHAEDRUS. No, certainly not.

SOCRATES. Then if this speech is approved, the writer leaves the theatre in great delight; but if it is not recorded and he is not granted the privilege of speech-writing and is not considered worthy to be an author, he is grieved, and his friends with him.

PHAEDRUS. Decidedly.

SOCRATES. Evidently not because they despise the profession, but because they admire it.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Well then, when an orator or a king is able to rival the greatness of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and attain immortality as a writer in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Do you think, then, that any of the statesmen, no matter how ill-disposed toward Lysias, reproaches him for being a writer?

PHAEDRUS. It is not likely, according to what you say; for he would be casting reproach upon that which he himself desires to be.

SOCRATES. Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace.

PHAEDRUS. How can it be?

SOCRATES. But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly.

PHAEDRUS. Evidently.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθ' αὖτις, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις πῶποτέ τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψῃ, εἴτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἴτε ἰδιωτικόν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητής, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης;

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτᾷς εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνας μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ζῶν, ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἔνεκα; οὐ γάρ που ἐκείνων γε ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, ὃ δὴ ὀλίγου πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἔχουσι· διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδῶδεις κέκληνται.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε καὶ ἅμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῷ πνίγει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττιγες ἄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενοι καθορᾶν. εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν καὶ νῶ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρία μὴ διαλεγόμενους, ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὑφ' αὐτῶν δι' ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελῶν, ἡγούμενοι ἀνδράποδα ἅττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὥσπερ προβάτια μεσημβριάζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὔδειν· ἐὰν δὲ ὀρώσι διαλεγόμενους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὥσπερ Σειρήνας ἀκηλή-
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B τους, ὃ γέρας παρὰ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ἀνθρώποις διδόναι, τάχ' ἂν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.

41. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; ἀνήκοος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τυγχάνω ὢν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκοον εἶναι· λέγεται δ' ὡς ποτ' ἦσαν οὗτοι ἄνθρωποι τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγενέσθαι, γενομένων δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείσης ὧδῆς οὕτως ἄρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν ὑφ'

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SOCRATES. What, then, is the method of writing well or badly? Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who ever has written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in verse or in prose, be he poet or ordinary man?

PHAEDRUS. You ask if we want to question them? What else should one live for, so to speak, but for such pleasures? Certainly not for those which cannot be enjoyed without previous pain, which is the case with nearly all bodily pleasures and causes them to be justly called slavish.

SOCRATES. We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

PHAEDRUS. What is this gift? I don't seem to have heard of it.

SOCRATES. It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so

- C ἡδονῆς, ὥστε ἄδοντες ἡμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτήσαντες αὐτούς· ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκείνο φύεται, γέρας τοῦτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον,¹ ἀλλ' ἄσιτόν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθύς ἄδειν, ἕως ἂν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὼν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν, τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾷ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσ-
- D φιλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἑρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτω, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανίᾳ τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἱ δὲ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὔσαι θεῖους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἰᾶσι καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὲ οὖν ἔνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λεκτέον γὰρ οὖν.

- E 42. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προϋθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μή, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὐγε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διανοίαν εἰδυῖαν τ' ἀληθὲς ὧν ἂν ἐρεῖν πέρι μέλλῃ;

- ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτωςι περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε
- 260 Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια μαθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ' ἂν πλήθει, οἷπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ, ἀλλ' ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ

¹ Schanz, following Badham, puts γενόμενον after εὐθύς.

PHAEDRUS

overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honours each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honoured her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favour of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honouring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, we ought to talk.

SOCRATES. We should, then, as we were proposing just now, discuss the theory of good (or bad) speaking and writing.

PHAEDRUS. Clearly.

SOCRATES. If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?

PHAEDRUS. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so;

τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δ' ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι.¹ καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ σε πείθοιμι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμύνειν κτησάμενον ἵππον, ἄμφω δὲ ἵππον ἀγνοοῖμεν, τοσόνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὅτι Φαῖδρος ἵππον ἡγείται τὸ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῶων μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γελοῖόν γ' ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐπω γε· ἀλλ' ὅτε σπουδῇ σε πείθοιμι, συντιθεῖς λόγον ἔπαινον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάζων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἴκοι τε κεκτῆσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ προσενεγκεῖν δυνα-

C τὸν σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὠφέλιμον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγγέλοιόν γ' ἂν ἤδη εἶη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κρεῖττον γελοῖον ἢ δεινόν τε καὶ ἐχθρόν εἶναι;²

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθῃ, μὴ περὶ ὄνου σκιᾶς³ ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἔπαινον ποιούμενος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ

¹ Schanz, following Schaefer, reads λέγουσι.

² εἶναι ἢ φίλον BT. Schanz follows Bekker in omitting ἢ φίλον.

³ Schanz follows Spalding in omitting σκιᾶς.

PHAEDRUS

for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.

SOCRATES. "The word," Phaedrus, which the wise "speak must not be rejected,"¹ but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.

PHAEDRUS. You are right.

SOCRATES. Let us then examine it in this way.

PHAEDRUS. How?

SOCRATES. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—

PHAEDRUS. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.

SOCRATES. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—

PHAEDRUS. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.

SOCRATES. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the "shadow of an ass"² under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them

¹ Homer, *Iliad* ii. 361. ² A proverbial expression.

πλήθους μεμελετηκὼς πείσῃ κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τινα οἶει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν

D καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνν γε ἐπιεικῇ.

43. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ ἡγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἢ δ' ἴσως ἂν εἴποι· τί ποτ', ὦ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν' ἀγνοοῦντα τάληθές ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγειν, ἀλλ', εἴ τις ἐμῇ ξυμβουλή,¹ κτησάμενος ἐκείνο οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνει· τόδε δ' οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὥς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τὰ ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνη.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἐρεῖ, λέγουσα ταῦτα;

E ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φημί, ἐὰν οἷ γε ἐπιόντες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ' ἄτεχνος τριβή· τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων, ἔτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἡφθαι οὐτ' ἔστιν οὔτε μή ποτε ὕστερον γένηται.²

261 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δεῦρο αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταξε, τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάριτε δὴ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλί- παιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε, ὥς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὐδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαῖδρος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτᾶτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ

¹ εἴ τις ἐμῇ ξυμβουλή χρῆται Schanz, following Stephanus. εἴ τι ἐμῇ ξυμβουλή B. εἴ τις ἐμῇ ξυμβουλή T.

² Schanz brackets τοῦ . . . γένηται.

PHAEDRUS

to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown ?

PHAEDRUS. No very good harvest.

SOCRATES. Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly ? Perhaps she might say : " Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men ? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion."

PHAEDRUS. And will she be right in saying this ?

SOCRATES. Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.

PHAEDRUS. We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.

SOCRATES. Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.

PHAEDRUS. Ask your questions.

SOCRATES. Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an

ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον
 ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι,
 B ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἢ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων
 πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τό γε ὀρθὸν περὶ
 σπουδαῖα ἢ περὶ φαῦλα γιγνόμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ
 ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως,
 ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν πῶς περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε
 καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημη-
 γορίας· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως
 τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ
 C σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμῆδους
 ἀνήκοος γέγονας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε τῶν Νέστορος,
 εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ
 τινα Θρασύμαχόν τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὀδυσσέα.

44. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐῷμεν
 σὺ δ' εἶπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν;
 οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι, ἢ τί φήσομεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦτ' αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει
 D φανῆναι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν
 δὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν
 τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ, τοτὲ δ' αὖ τὰναντία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν οὖν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμῆδην

PHAEDRUS

art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?

PHAEDRUS. No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in law-suits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.

SOCRATES. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?

PHAEDRUS. Nor of Nestor's either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.

SOCRATES. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?

PHAEDRUS. Exactly that.

SOCRATES. About the just and the unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

PHAEDRUS. Just so.

SOCRATES. Do we not know that the Eleatic

λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὐ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήριά τέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἂν εἴη, ἥ τις οἷός τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῇδε δοκῶ ζητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὀλίγον;

262 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσῃν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὖν οἷός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν ἐκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικρὰν
B τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν

PHAEDRUS

Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

PHAEDRUS. When there is little.

SOCRATES. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, he must.

SOCRATES. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognise in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

PHAEDRUS. It is impossible.

SOCRATES. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are

καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τοῦτο δι' ὁμοιοτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρή. C

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστὶν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιοτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὃ μὴ ἐγνωρικῶς ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μὴ ποτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δοξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει.

45. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλει οὖν ἐν τῷ Λυσίου λόγῳ, ὃν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἶπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὧν φαμέν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς D ἔοικεν, ἐρρηθήτην τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντέ τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἂν ὁ εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεοὺς· ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφήται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾧδοι ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐστω ὡς λέγεις· μόνον δήλωσον ὃ φής.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ Λυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

E ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπί-

PHAEDRUS

deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

PHAEDRUS. It does happen in that way.

SOCRATES. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

PHAEDRUS. Never in the world.

SOCRATES. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

PHAEDRUS. Probably.

SOCRATES. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

PHAEDRUS. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

SOCRATES. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps, too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS. So be it; only make your meaning clear.

SOCRATES. Read me the beginning of Lysias' discourse.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and

στασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχῆσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής ὧν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—

263 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἀμαρτάνει καὶ ἄτεχνον ποιεῖ, λεκτέον. ἦ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

46. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τό γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἓνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἓνια στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἔτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅταν τις ὄνομα εἶπη σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἄρ' οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενόηθημεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητότεροί ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μείζον δύναται;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνην ῥητορικὴν μετιέναι πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα ὁδῷ διηρῆσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἶδους, ἐν ᾧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ᾧ μή.

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἶη κατανενοηκῶς ὁ τοῦτο λαβών.

PHAEDRUS

you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—

SOCRATES. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

PHAEDRUS. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

SOCRATES. When one says "iron" or "silver," we all understand the same thing, do we not?

PHAEDRUS. Surely.

SOCRATES. What if he says "justice" or "goodness"? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

PHAEDRUS. True.

SOCRATES. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

PHAEDRUS. Evidently in the class of doubtful things.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.

PHAEDRUS. He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἐκάστῳ γιγνόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι, περὶ οὗ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐρεῖν, ποτέρου ὄν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἐρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μή;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δὴ πον· ἢ οἶει ἂν σοι συγχωρῆσαι εἰπεῖν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἶπες περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὥς βλάβη τέ ἐστι τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι,
D καὶ αὐθις ὥς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀριστα λέγεις· ἀλλ' εἶπέ καὶ τόδε —ἐγὼ γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάννυ μέμνημαι—εἰ ὠρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Νῆ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὥς σφόδρα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελώου καὶ Πᾶνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Λυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἐρωτα ἐν τι τῶν
E ὄντων, ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἤδη συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὑστερον λόγον διεπεράνατο; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγνῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ σοί γε δοκεῖ· ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ ἔστ' αὐτόθι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε, ἵνα ἀκούσω αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου.

47. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὥς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων
264 γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι ὧν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστὴς ὢν σοῦ

PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?

PHAEDRUS. To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?

SOCRATES. Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.

SOCRATES. Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?

PHAEDRUS. If you like; but what you seek is not in it.

SOCRATES. Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your

τυγχάνω. ὥς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὧν ἂν εὖ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε γε ὃ ζητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἀφ' ὧν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἤδη ὁ ἐραστής λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδὲν εἶπον, Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλὴ;

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἔστιν γέ τοι δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τελευτῇ, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ τᾶλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλήσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθῆναι, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὥς μηδὲν εἰδότε, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπιὸν εἰρῆσθαι τῷ γράφοντι· σὺ δ' ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικὴν, ἢ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἀλληλα ἔθηκεν;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Χρηστὸς εἶ, ὅτι με ἡγεῖ ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνου οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διιδεῖν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἂν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῶον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν τὸν τοῦ ἐταίρου σου λόγον, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει· καὶ εὐρήσεις D τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδα τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ποῖον τοῦτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός;

PHAEDRUS

lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases.

SOCRATES. He certainly does not at all seem to do what we demand, for he does not even begin at the beginning, but undertakes to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end, and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved. Am I not right, Phaedrus my dear?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly that of which he speaks is an ending.

SOCRATES. And how about the rest? Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?

PHAEDRUS. You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.

SOCRATES. But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organised, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. See then whether this is the case with your friend's discourse, or not. You will find that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

PHAEDRUS. What sort of inscription is that, and what is the matter with it?

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο τόδε·

χαλκῇ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δ' ἐπὶ σήματι
κείμει.

ὄφρ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ
τεθήλῃ,

αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ
τύμβου,

ἀγγελέω παριούσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαιπται.

Ε ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὕστατόν τι
λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς πού, ὡς ἐγώ μαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὦ Σώ-
κρατες.

48. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ
ἄχθῃ, ἐάσωμεν· καὶ τοι συχνά γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ
παραδείγματα, πρὸς ἃ τις βλέπων ὀνύναιτ' ἂν,
μιμείσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνυ τι· εἰς δὲ τοὺς
ἐτέρους λόγους ἴωμεν. ἦν γάρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς
265 δοκῶ, προσῆκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων
σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναντίω πού ἦσθην· ὁ μὲν γάρ,
ὡς τῷ ἐρώντι, ὁ δ' ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι,
ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀνδρικῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡμην σε τᾷληθές εἶρεῖν, ὅτι μανι-
κῶς· ὃ μέντοι ἐξήτουν, ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν
γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανίας δέ γε εἶδη δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ
νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλ-
λαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην.

PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. This is it :

A bronze maiden am I ; and I am placed upon
the tomb of Midas.

So long as water runs and tall trees put forth
leaves,

Remaining in this very spot upon a much
lamented tomb,

I shall declare to passers by that Midas is
buried here ;

and you perceive, I fancy, that it makes no difference
whether any line of it is put first or last.

PHAEDRUS. You are making fun of our discourse,
Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, to spare your feelings, let us say
no more of this discourse—and yet I think there
were many things in it which would be useful
examples to consider, though not exactly to imitate—
and let us turn to the other discourses ; for there
was in them, I think, something which those who
wish to investigate rhetoric might well examine.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean ?

SOCRATES. The two discourses were opposites ; for
one maintained that the lover, and the other that the
non-lover, should be favoured.

PHAEDRUS. And they did it right manfully.

SOCRATES. I thought you were going to speak the
truth and say “madly” ; however, that is just what
I had in mind. We said that love was a kind of
madness, did we not ?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And that there are two kinds of mad-
ness, one arising from human diseases, and the other
from a divine release from the customary habits.

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν¹ τέτταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικὴν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικὴν, Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικὴν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος ἐρωτικὴν μανίαν ἐφήσαμεν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἴσως μὲν ἀληθοῦς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ

C παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικὸν τινα ὕμνον προσεπαίσαμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμεως τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἔρωτα, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι.

49. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τόδε τοίνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὥς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

D ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνων δὴ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰς μίαν τε ιδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵν' ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ νυνδὴ περὶ Ἔρωτος δ' ἔστιν ὀρισθέν, εἴτ' εὖ εἴτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη. τὸ γοῦν σαφές καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὁμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτ' ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος.

¹ Schanz brackets τεττάρων θεῶν.

PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and perhaps being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we chanted a sportive and mythic hymn in meet and pious strain to the honour of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear.

SOCRATES. Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to praise.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.

PHAEDRUS. What principles?

SOCRATES. That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον δὴ εἶδος τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Ε ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα, ἣ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ χεῖρὲν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείου τρόπῳ χρώμενον· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄρτι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, 266 ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἠγησαμένῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανήκεν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μάλ' ἐν δίκῃ, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν Β ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ' αὖ τιν' ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινόμενος ἐπήνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἵτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

50. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἠγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ' ὄραν, τοῦτον διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἵχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδεν, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς. τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν· ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνόν ἐστιν ἢ λόγων τέχνη, ἢ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ

PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. And what is the other principle, Socrates?

SOCRATES. That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god."¹ And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. But tell me now what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have

¹ Homer, *Odyssey* v, 193. ὃ δ' ἔπειτα μετ' ἰχθῦα βαῖνε θεοῖο
(and he walked in the footsteps of the god).

μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἱ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε ὦν ἐρωτᾷς. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν D καλῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθ' ἡμᾶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς φῆς; καλὸν πού τι ἂν εἴη, δ τούτων ἀπολειφθὲν ὅμως τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως δ' οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γ' ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

51. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ· ταῦτα λέγεις—ἦ γάρ; τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

E ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τὸν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

267 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μῆν; καὶ ἐλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογία. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐνὸν εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσιν τε πρῶτος εὔρε καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν· σοφὸς γὰρ ἄνῃρ. Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὔδειν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν

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become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?

PHAEDRUS. They are royal men, but not trained in the matters about which you ask. I think you give this method the right name when you call it dialectic; but it seems to me that rhetoric still escapes us.

SOCRATES. What do you mean? Can there be anything of importance, which is not included in these processes and yet comes under the head of art? Certainly you and I must not neglect it, but must say what it is that remains of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. A great many things remain, Socrates, the things that are written in the books on rhetoric.

SOCRATES. Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not?—the niceties of the art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the worthy Theodorus?

SOCRATES. Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defence. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who invented covert allusion and indirect praises? And some say that he also wrote indirect censures, composing them in verse as an aid to memory; for he is a clever man. And shall we leave Gorgias and

ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὥς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινὰ τε ἀρχαίως
 B τὰ τ' ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων; ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς ἡύρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμψηφον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἥλειον ξένον γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δ' οὐ;

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν¹ αὐ μουσεῖα λόγων, ὥς² διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, ὀνομάτων τε Δικυμνείων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο³ πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας;⁴

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόνων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν,
 D καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὥς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὅθενδὴ κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικεν συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινὲς μὲν ἐπ' ἀνόδον, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.

¹ πῶς φράσωμεν B. πῶς φράσομεν T. πῶς οὐ φράσομεν Schanz. ² ὥς B. ὅς T, Schanz.

³ Schanz, following Ast, brackets ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο.

⁴ Schanz reads προσεποίησεν εὐεπείαν (προσεποίησεν after Cornerius).

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Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length.

PHAEDRUS. O Prodicus! How clever!

SOCRATES. And shall we not mention Hippias, our friend from Elis? I think he would agree with him.

PHAEDRUS. Oh yes.

SOCRATES. And what shall we say of Polus and his shrines of learned speech, such as duplication and sententiousness and figurativeness, and what of the names with which Licymnius presented him to effect beautiful diction? •

PHAEDRUS. Were there not some similar inventions of Protagoras, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνήσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἴ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

268 ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐώμεν δὴ τά γε σμικρά· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπ' αὐγὰς μᾶλλον ἴδωμεν, τίνα καὶ πότ' ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένην, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδοις.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔχει γάρ· ἄλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἰδὲ καὶ σύ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἡτρίον ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

• 52. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι· εἴ τις προσελθὼν τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου Ἐρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἀκουμενῷ εἴποι ὅτι Ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα
B σώμασι προσφέρειν, ὥστε θερμαίνειν τ' ἐὰν βούλωμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ μοι, ἐμεῖν ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ' αὖ, κάτω διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἀξιῶ ἱατρικὸς εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν, ᾧ ἂν τὴν τούτων ἐπιστήμην παραδῶ· τί ἂν οἶε ἀκούσαντας εἰπεῖν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἐρέσθαι, εἰ προσεπίσταται καὶ οὕστινας δεῖ καὶ ὅποτε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὀπόσου;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ οὖν εἴποι ὅτι οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλ' ἀξιῶ τὸν ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶόν τ' εἶναι ποιεῖν ἢ ἐρωτᾷς;

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PHAEDRUS. You mean making a summary of the points of the speech at the end of it, so as to remind the hearers of what has been said?

SOCRATES. These are the things I mean, these and anything else you can mention concerned with the art of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. There are only little things, not worth mentioning.

SOCRATES. Never mind the little things; let us bring these other things more under the light and see what force of art they have and when.

PHAEDRUS. They have a very powerful force, at least in large assemblies.

SOCRATES. They have; but my friend, see if you agree with me in thinking that their warp has gaps in it.

PHAEDRUS. Go on and show them.

SOCRATES. Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say "I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vomit, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things"; what do you think they would say?

PHAEDRUS. They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much.

SOCRATES. If then he should say: "No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about?"

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἵποιεν ἄν, οἶμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχὼν φαρμακίοις ἰατρὸς οἴεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαῖων τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὐ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἰκτράς, καὶ τούναντίον αὐ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς, ὅσα
D τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγωδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδιδόναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὗτοι ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι, καταγελῶεν, εἴ τις οἴεται τραγωδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ συνισταμένην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροίκως γε, οἶμαι, λοιδορήσειαν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχὼν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ ἀρμονικῶ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυγχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶόν τε ὀξύτατην καὶ βαρυτάτην
E χορδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἀγρίως εἴποι ἄν' ὦ μοχθηρέ, μελαγχολᾶς, ἀλλ' ἅτε μουσικὸς ὢν πραότερον ὅτι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀρμονικὸν ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀρμονίας ἐπατεῖν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἀρμονικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὅρθότατά γε.

269 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸν σφίσιν ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγωδίας ἂν φαίη ἄλλ' οὐ

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PHAEDRUS. They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really had no knowledge of the art.

SOCRATES. And what if someone should go to Sophocles or Euripides and should say that he knew how to make very long speeches about a small matter, and very short ones about a great affair, and pitiful utterances, if he wished, and again terrible and threatening ones, and all that sort of thing, and that he thought by imparting those things he could teach the art of writing tragedies?

PHAEDRUS. They also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition.

SOCRATES. But they would not, I suppose, rebuke him harshly, but they would behave as a musician would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes. He would not say roughly, "You wretch, you are mad," but being a musician, he would say in gentler tones, "My friend, he who is to be a harmonist must know these things you mention, but nothing prevents one who is at your stage of knowledge from being quite ignorant of harmony. You know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself."

PHAEDRUS. Quite correct.

SOCRATES. So Sophocles would say that the man exhibited the preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy

τὰ τραγικά, καὶ ὁ Ἀκουμένος τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς
ἄλλ' οὐ τὰ ἰατρικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

53. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; τὸν μελίγηρυν Ἀδραστον
οἰόμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν ὧν νῦν δὴ
ἡμεῖς διῆμεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων, βραχυ-
λογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογιῶν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
διελθόντες ὑπ' αὐγὰς ἔφαμεν εἶναι σκεπτέα,
B πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ
σύ, ὑπ' ἀγροικίας ῥῆμά τι εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς
τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς
ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἣ ἅτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους
κἂν νῦν ἐπιπλήξαι εἰπόντας· ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε καὶ
Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἀλλὰ συγγιγνώ-
σκειν, εἴ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι
ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὀρίσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν
ῥητορικὴ, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς
τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν
C ᾤθησαν ἡύρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες
ἄλλους ἡγοῦνται σφίσιν τελέως ῥητορικὴν δεδι-
δάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἕκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε
καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτοὺς δεῖν
παρ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς σφῶν πορίζεσθαι ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις.

- ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει
τοιούτῳ τι εἶναι τὸ τῆς τέχνης, ἣν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες
ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσιν τε καὶ γράφουσιν· καὶ
D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ

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itself, and Acumenus that he knew the preliminaries of medicine, not medicine itself.

PHAEDRUS. Exactly so.

SOCRATES. Well then, if the mellifluous Adrastus¹ or Pericles heard of the excellent accomplishments which we just enumerated, brachylogies and figurative speech and all the other things we said we must bring to the light and examine, do we suppose they would, like you and me, be so illbred as to speak discourteously of those who have written and taught these things as the art of rhetoric? Would they not, since they are wiser than we, censure us also and say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, we ought not to be angry, but lenient, if certain persons who are ignorant of dialectics have been unable to define the nature of rhetoric and on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they had discovered rhetoric, and believe that by teaching these preliminaries to others they have taught them rhetoric completely, and that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches."

PHAEDRUS. Well, Socrates, it does seem as if that which those men teach and write about as the art of rhetoric were such as you describe. I think you are

¹ Tyrtaeus, ed. Bergk, first ed. frg. 9, 7, οὐδ' εἰ Τανταλίδεω Πέλοπος βασιλεύτερος εἴη γλῶσσαν δ' Ἀδρήστου μελιχόγηρυν ἔχοι, "not even if he were more kingly than Pelops and had the mellifluous tongue of Adrastus." Perhaps the orator Antiphon is referred to under the name of Adrastus, cf. chapter xliii. above.

τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἂν τις δύναίτο πορίσασθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὥσπερ τᾶλλα. εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῶ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην· ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσει. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἧ Λυσίας τε καὶ Θρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ πῇ δὴ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δὴ;

54. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως περί· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόνοον τοῦτο καὶ πάντῃ
270 τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὁ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτέησατο· προσπεσὼν γάρ, οἶμαι, τοιούτῳ ὄντι Ἀναξαγόρα, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὦν δὴ περί τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐντεῦθεν εἴλκυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ αὐτός που τρόπος τέχνης ἱατρικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, εἰ

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right. But how and from whom is the truly rhetorical and persuasive art to be acquired?

SOCRATES. Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus.

PHAEDRUS. Where then?

SOCRATES. I suppose, my friend, Pericles is the most perfect orator in existence.

PHAEDRUS. Well?

SOCRATES. All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. In both cases you must analyse a nature, in one that of the body and in the other that of the

μέλλεις μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τέχνη, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ὑγίειαν καὶ ῥώμην ἐμποιήσῃ, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἣν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

C ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἶε δυνατόν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ μὲν Ἱπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, λέγει· χρὴ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἱπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν, εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Φημί.

D 55. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί ποτε λέγει Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθὴς λόγος. ἄρ' οὐχ ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅτου οὖν φύσεως· πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἢ πολυειδές ἐστιν, οὐ πέρι βουλευσόμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν, ἔπειτα δέ, ἂν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ᾖ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, εἰ δὲ πλείω εἶδη ἔχῃ, ταῦτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνός, τοῦτ' ἰδεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

E ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ γοῦν ἄνευ τούτων μέθοδος εἰκοίαι ἂν ὥσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείᾳ· ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν ἀπεικαστέον τὸν γε τέχνη μετιόντα ὅτι οὖν τυφλῷ οὐδὲ κωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὥς, ἂν τῷ τις τέχνη λόγους

PHAEDRUS

soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.

PHAEDRUS. That, Socrates, is probably true.

SOCRATES. Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?

PHAEDRUS. If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend; however, we ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to see also if our reason agrees with him on examination.

PHAEDRUS. I assent.

SOCRATES. Then see what Hippocrates and true reason say about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by what?

PHAEDRUS. Very likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES. At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues any study scientifically ought not to be comparable to a blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical teaching

διδῶ, τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως
τούτου, πρὸς δ' τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει· ἔσται δέ
που ψυχὴ τοῦτο.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

271 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἄμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς
τοῦτο πᾶσα· πειθὼ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ.
ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχος τε καὶ
ὁς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῶ,
πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσῃ
ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ
κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γὰρ φάμεν
φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὅτῳ τί ποιεῖν ἢ
παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων
τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα
δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἐκάστῳ
καὶ διδάσκων, οἷα οὖσα ὑφ' οἷων λόγων δι' ἣν
αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἂν, ὥς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικ-
νύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ
γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο· ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν
γράφοντες, ὧν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων
πανοῦργοί εἰσι καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς
πὲρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἂν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς
τέχνη γράφειν.

PHAEDRUS

is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that to which his words are to be addressed, and that is the soul, is it not ?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then this is the goal of all his effort ; he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not that so ?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric, will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect ; for this is what we call explaining its nature.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And secondly he will say what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Thirdly, he will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not.

PHAEDRUS. That would, I think, be excellent.

SOCRATES. By no other method of exposition or speech will this, or anything else, ever be written or spoken with real art. But those whom you have heard, who write treatises on the art of speech nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of the soul, though they know it very well. Until they write and speak by this method we cannot believe that they write by the rules of art.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτου;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπετές· ὥς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δῆ.

56. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγ-
D χάνει ψυχαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν
ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴν ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει.
ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα·
ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοῖδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοῖδε γίνονται· τούτων
δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν
εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῖδε ὑπὸ τῶν
τοιῶνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα
εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῖδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· δεῖ
E αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα,
ὁξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ
μηδὲν εἶναί πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὢν τότε ἤκουεν λόγων
ξυνών. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἱκανῶς ἔχη, οἷος ὑφ'
οἷων πείθεται, παραγιγνόμενόν τε δυνατός ἢ δι-
272 αισθανόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν
καὶ αὕτη ἢ φύσις, περὶ ἧς τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι,
νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ἢ προσαιστέον τούσδε ὧδε
τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶνδε πειθῶ, ταῦτα δ' ἤδη
πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ· πότε
λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ
ἐλεεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως ἐκάστων τε ὅσ' ἂν

PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. What is this method ?

SOCRATES. It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used ; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then.

SOCRATES. Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds : these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded - by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life ; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes

εἶδη μάθη λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαιρίαν διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἢ
 B τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὐ· ἀλλ' ὅ τι
 ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείπη λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γρά-
 φων, φῆ δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὃ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ.
 τί δὴ οὖν; φήσει ἴσως ὁ συγγραφεὺς, ὦ Φαῖδρέ τε
 καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὕτως; ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀπο-
 δεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀδύνατόν που, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως·
 καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἔνεκα
 C χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετα-
 στρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴ τίς πη ῥάων καὶ βραχυ-
 τέρα φαίνεται ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὁδός, ἵνα μὴ μάτην
 πολλὴν ἴη καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν.
 ἀλλ' εἴ τινά πη βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκοὺς Δυσίου
 ἢ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν,¹ ἀλλ'
 οὔτι νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλει οὖν ἐγὼ τιν' εἶπω λόγον, ὃν
 τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἀκήκοα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

D ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ σύ γε οὕτω ποιεῖ.

57. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα
 δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περι-
 βαλλομένους· παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς
 εἶπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας
 μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων,

¹ Schanz reads λέγοιμ' ἄν.

PHAEDRUS

of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the better man. "Now then," perhaps the writer of our treatise will say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, do you agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be described in some other way?"

PHAEDRUS. No other way is possible, Socrates. But it seems a great task to attain to it.

SOCRATES. Very true. Therefore you must examine all that has been said from every point of view, to see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears, that one may not take a long and rough road, when there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help us, try to remember it and tell it.

PHAEDRUS. If it depended on trying, I might, but just now I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES. Then shall I tell something that I have heard some of those say who make these matters their business?

PHAEDRUS. Pray do.

SOCRATES. Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus, has a right to an advocate, as they say.

PHAEDRUS. Do you be his advocate.

SOCRATES. Very well. They say that there is no need of treating these matters with such gravity and carrying them back so far to first principles with many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth

ἡ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἡ τροφῇ,
 τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι. τὸ
 παράπαν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων
 E ἀληθείας μέλειν οὐδενί, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τοῦτο
 δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ᾧ δεῖν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα
 τέχνη ἐρεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πραχθέντα δεῖν
 λέγειν ἐνίοτε, εἰ μὴ εἰκότως ἢ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ
 τὰ εἰκότα, ἐν τε κατηγορία καὶ ἀπολογία· καὶ
 πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκός διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλά
 273 εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεῖ· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς
 τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἅπασαν τέχνην πορί-
 ζειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελέλυθας
 ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσ-
 ποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ
 πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ
 δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν
 πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω τοῖνυν καὶ τόδε ἡμῖν
 B ὁ Τισίας, μή τι ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ τῷ
 πλήθει δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν εὐρών
 ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν, ὡς εἰάν τις ἀσθενὴς
 καὶ ἀνδρικός ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον
 ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγεται,
 δεῖ δὴ τάληθές μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν
 δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγ-
 κεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω
 C ἦσθην, ἐκείνῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ πῶς δ' ἂν
 ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα; ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ

PHAEDRUS

in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

PHAEDRUS. You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before,¹ but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

SOCRATES. Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

PHAEDRUS. That is just what he says.

SOCRATES. Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, "How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?" The coward will

¹ See 259 E.

τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν τάχ' ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίῃ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τὰλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐστὶν τὰ τέχνη λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποτ' ὦν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος.

D ἀτάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, τούτῳ ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῖον;

58. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅτι, ὦ Τισία, πάλοι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο τὸ εἶκός τοῖς πολλοῖς δι' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγιγνόμενον· τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὐρίσκειν. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἂν· εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νυνδὴ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μή τις τῶν τε ἀκουσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθ-

E μήσεται, καὶ κατ' εἶδη τε διαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ δυνατὸς ἢ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον περιλαμβάνειν, οὐ ποτ' ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσεται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας· ἦν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πρᾶττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σῶφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν
274 τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γάρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τισία, φασὶν οἱ σοφώτεροι ἡμῶν, ὁμοδούλοις δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὃ τι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν· ὥστ'

PHAEDRUS

not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his opponent a chance to confute him. And in other cases there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so, Phaedrus?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud to call his own! But, my friend, shall we say in reply to this, or shall we not—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. "Tisias, some time ago, before you came along, we were saying that this probability of yours was accepted by the people because of its likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who knows the truth is always best able to discover likenesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not, we will put our trust in what we said just now, that unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech. But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing to the gods. For those who are wiser than we, Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practise to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary consideration, but his good and noble masters. Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished;

εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσης· μεγάλων γὰρ ἔνεκα περιτέον, οὐχ ὥς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἔσται μὲν, ὥς ὁ λόγος φησὶν, εἴαν τις ἐθέλη, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλως ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, -εἴπερ οἷός τέ τις εἴη.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς Β καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πᾶσχειν ὃ τι ἂν τῷ ξυμβῇ παθεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὲν;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν. ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

59. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῶν χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δέ;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο εὖροιμεν αὐτοί, ἄρά γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γελοῖον ἦρου· ἀλλ' ἂ φῆς ἀκηκοέναι, λέγε.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἦκουσα τοίνυν περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῆς Αἰγύπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὐ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερόν, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσιν ἰβιν· αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ. τοῦτον δὲ D πρῶτον ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν εὐρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἔτι δὲ πεττείας τε

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for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires."

PHAEDRUS. I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

SOCRATES. But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

PHAEDRUS. Assuredly.

SOCRATES. But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

PHAEDRUS. Not at all; do you?

SOCRATES. I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

PHAEDRUS. A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

SOCRATES. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most

καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα· βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἄνω τόπου, ἣν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμωνα, παρὰ τοῦτον ἔλθων ὁ Θεὺς τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἰγυπτίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο, ἥντινα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὠφελίαν, διεξιόντος δέ, ὃ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς δοκοῖ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν

Ε ἔψευγε, τὸ δ' ἐπῆναι. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεῷ λέγεται ἀποφῆνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, τοῦτο δέ, ὧ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἔφη ὁ Θεὺς, σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει. μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ἡνρέθη. ὁ δ' εἶπεν· ὧ τεχνικώτατε Θεὺς, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρίναι, τίς ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι

275 χρῆσθαι· καὶ νῦν σύ, πατήρ ὢν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐνοίαν τοῦναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους· οὐκ οὖν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ἡῦρες. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις· πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες

Β εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες

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important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, "This invention, O king," said Theuth, "will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered." But Thamus replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant

καὶ χαλεποὶ ξυνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὀποδαπούς ἂν ἐθέλῃς λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἱ δέ γ', ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἱερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἔφησαν μαντικούς πρῶτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε, ἅτε οὐκ οὔσι σοφοῖς ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκούειν ὑπ' εὐηθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν· σοὶ δ' ἴσως διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδαπός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὅρθως ἐπέπληξας, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ἥπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

60. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς παραδεχόμενος ὥς τι σαφές καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας γέμοι καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὴν Ἀμμωνος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνησαι περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς ἢ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινὸν γάρ πον, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὥς ζῶντα, εἰάν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰάν δὲ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν αἰεῖ. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαίουσιν, ὥς δ' αὕτως παρ'

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and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise."

PHAEDRUS. Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

SOCRATES. They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth ; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

PHAEDRUS. Your rebuke is just ; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

SOCRATES. He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting ; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words ; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who

οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς
δεῖ γε καὶ μὴ· πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη
λοιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς αἰεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς
γὰρ οὐτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ταυτὰ σοι ὀρθότατα εἴρηται.

276 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ'; ἄλλον ὀρώμεν λόγον τούτου
ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅσῳ
ἀμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτου καὶ πῶς λέγεις γιγνώ-
μενον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ
τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμύναι ἑαυτῷ,
ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα
καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἰδῶλον ἂν τι
λέγοιτο δικαίως.

B 61. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τότε δὴ μοι
εἶπέ· ὁ νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, ὦν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο
καὶ ἔγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῇ
ἂν θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαίροι
θεωρῶν καλοὺς ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὀκτῶ γιγνομένους, ἢ
ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παιδιᾷς τε καὶ ἐορτῆς χάριν δρῶν ἄν,
ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ· ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακε, τῇ γεωργικῇ
χρῶμενος ἂν τέχνῃ, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον,
ἀγαπῶν ἂν ἐν ὀγδόῳ μηνὶ ὅσα ἔσπειρεν τέλος
λαβόντα;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτω που, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν
σπουδῇ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρως ἄν, ἢ λέγεις, ποιοῖ.

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have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak ; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it ; for it has no power to protect or help itself.]

PHAEDRUS. You are quite right about that, too.

SOCRATES. Now tell me ; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature ?

PHAEDRUS. What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say ?

SOCRATES. The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

SOCRATES. Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement ? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month ?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἡττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τάληθῇ διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκουν δὴ τό γ' εἰκός.

D ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιᾶς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράφει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἑαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας εἰς ἵκηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταῦτόν ἔχνος μετιόντι, ἡσθήσεται τε αὐτοὺς θεωρῶν φυομένους ἀπαλούς· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιαῖς ἄλλαις χρώνται, συμποσίοις τε ἄρδοντες αὐτοὺς ἐτέροις τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τότε ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς¹ λέγω παίζων διάξει.

E ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλῃν λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔστι γάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω· πολὺ δ', οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδῇ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε 277 φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἤθεσι

¹ οἷς BT. οἷ Schanz.

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SOCRATES. And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman?

PHAEDRUS. By no means.

SOCRATES. Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

PHAEDRUS. No, at least, probably not.

SOCRATES. No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

PHAEDRUS. A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

SOCRATES. Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable

φυόμενοι τοῦτ' αἰὲ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἱκανοί, καὶ¹ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιούντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πολὺ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

62. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἤδη, ὦ Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὁμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡν δὴ πέρι βουλευθέντες ἰδεῖν
B ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Λυσίου τε ὄνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οἳ τέχνη καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης γράφονται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλωῆσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐδοξέ γε δὴ· πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρὶν ἂν τις τό τε ἀληθὲς ἐκάστων εἰδῇ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ' αὐτό τε πᾶν ὀρίζεσθαι δυνατός γένηται, ὀρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ·
C προσαρμόττον ἐκάστη φύσει εἶδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῇ τὸν λόγον, ποικίλῃ μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ καὶ παναρμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἀπλοὺς δὲ ἀπλῇ· οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι καθ' ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθῆναι τὸ λόγων γένος, οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι, ὥς ὁ ἔμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

¹ Schanz omits καί.

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of continuing the process for ever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, that is far nobler.

SOCRATES. And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

PHAEDRUS. What others?

SOCRATES. Those which brought us to this point through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speech-writer,¹ and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said.

SOCRATES. A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

¹ See 257 c.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὕτω πως ἐφάνη.

63. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὺν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν,
D καὶ ὅπῃ γιγνόμενον ἐν δίκη λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄνειδος ἢ μή, ἄρα οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν —

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡς εἶτε Λυσίας ἢ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ γράφει ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ νόμους τιθεῖς,¹
σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινα ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνεια, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἶτε τίς φησιν εἶτε μή· τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύγει
E τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἐκάστου παιδιᾶν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι, οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι ὥς οἱ ῥαψωδούμενοι ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέ-
278 χθησαν,² ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδόντων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνοις τό τε ἐναργές εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς· δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους

¹ Schanz, following Schleiermacher, brackets νόμους τιθεῖς.

² Schanz brackets οὐδὲ . . . ἐλέχθησαν.

PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Yes, certainly, that is just about our result.

SOCRATES. How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it.

PHAEDRUS. That is true.

SOCRATES. But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in metre or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people's minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered

λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον υἱεῖς γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰς εὐρεθεῖς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα
 B εἴ τινας τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἁλλαισιν ἁλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν· τοὺς δὲ ἁλλους χαίρειν ἔων — οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει, ὦ Φαῖδρε, εἶναι οἷον ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εὐξαίμεθ' ἂν σέ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαι τε καὶ ἔρχομαι ἃ λέγεις.

64. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σύ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε Λυσία, ὅτι νῦν καταβάντε εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν νᾶμά τε
 C καὶ μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγων, οἱ ἐπέστελλον λέγειν Λυσία τε καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι λόγους, καὶ Ὀμήρῳ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος αὐτοῖς ποιήσιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾧδῇ συντέθεικε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγγράμματα ἔγραψεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχει συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν εἰς ἔλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φαῦλα ἀποδείξαι, οὐ τι τῶνδε ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ'
 D οἷς ἐσπούδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῷ νέμεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν σοφόν, ὦ Φαῖδρε, καλεῖν ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρόπειν· τὸ δὲ ἢ φιλόσοφον ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι μᾶλλον τε ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέως ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιώτερα ὧν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἄνω κάτω στρέφον ἐν

PHAEDRUS

the speaker's own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words,—that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become.

PHAEDRUS. By all means that is what I wish and pray for.

SOCRATES. We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs, and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws :— If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.

PHAEDRUS. What titles do you grant them then ?

SOCRATES. I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great and befits God alone ; but the name "philosopher," that is, "lover of wisdom," or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

PHAEDRUS. And quite appropriate.

SOCRATES. On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or

Ε χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, ἐὶ δίκη που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερεῖς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ ἐταίρῳ φράζε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δέ; σὺ πῶς ποιήσεις; οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν σὸν ἐταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα τοῦτον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἴσοκράτη τὸν καλόν· ᾧ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τί ν' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νέος ἔτι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, Ἴσοκράτης· ὁ 279 μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτι τε ἤθει γεννικωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαι· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προοιούσης τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτοὺς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέον ἢ παίδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώποτε ἀψαμένων λόγων, ἔτι τε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω τις αὐτὸν

Β ἄγοι ὁρμὴν θειοτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὦ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὲ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶνδε τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοῖς παιδικοῖς Ἴσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ' ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσία.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ταῦτα ἔσται· ἀλλὰ ἴωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνίγος ἡπιώτερον γέγονεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένῳ πρέπει τοῖσδε πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ¹ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τᾶνδοθεν· ἔξωθεν

¹ Schanz reads δοίτέ.

PHAEDRUS

written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Tell this then to your friend.

PHAEDRUS. But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by.

SOCRATES. What friend?

PHAEDRUS. The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is?

SOCRATES. Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him.

PHAEDRUS. What is it?

SOCRATES. I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favourite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favourite.

PHAEDRUS. It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.

SOCRATES. Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful

δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον
 C δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἴη
 μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ
 σώφρων.—Ἐπ' ἄλλου του δεόμεθα, ὦ Φαῖδρε;
 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἡῦκται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεύχου· κοινὰ γὰρ
 τὰ τῶν φίλων.

ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰωμεν.

PHAEDRUS

in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich ; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.—Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.

PHAEDRUS. Let me also share in this prayer ; for friends have all things in common.

SOCRATES. Let us go.

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
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II

PLATO

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

H. N. FOWLER

OF WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

II

THEAETETUS

SOPHIST



LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN

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MCMXXI



PREFACE

THE Greek text in this volume is based upon the Codex Clarkianus and the Codex Venetus. Deviations from the readings of these manuscripts are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In most instances disagreement between these two manuscripts, and occasionally readings found in inferior manuscripts or in ancient quotations, as well as emendations offered by modern scholars, are noted, even when they have not affected the text chosen. The following abbreviations are employed :

B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written A.D. 895.

T = Codex Venetus, Append. class. 4, cod. 1 ; twelfth century.

W = Codex Vindobonensis 54; Suppl. graec. 7.

D = Codex Venetus 185.

G = Codex Venetus, Append. class 4, cod. 54.

b t w = later hands of B T W.

The brief introductions aim merely at supplying such information as may aid the reader to appreciate these particular dialogues.

HAROLD N. FOWLER.

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THEAETETUS

INTRODUCTION TO THE *THEAETETUS*

In the *Theaetetus* Euclides the Megarian repeats to his friend Terpsion a conversation between Socrates, the mathematician Theodorus, and the youth Theaetetus, who was himself a mathematician of note. The subject is the nature of knowledge, and the discussion is interrupted and furthered by two digressions, one concerning midwives, in which Socrates likens his method of investigation to the activities of the midwife, the other contrasting the lawyer and the philosopher.

The definition of knowledge is hard to attain, and is, in fact, not attained in this dialogue. The confusion between knowledge and various kinds or applications of knowledge is first cleared up, and then the discussion centres upon three definitions:

- ✓ (1) Knowledge is sensible perception; (2) Knowledge is true opinion; (3) Knowledge is true opinion with reasoned explanation.

The discussion of the first definition contains as one of its most important parts the refutation of the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things"; but it includes also a discussion of the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things are always in

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motion. Here Plato distinguishes two kinds of motion—movement in space and change of quality—and asserts that constant motion of the first kind must be accompanied by change, because otherwise the same things would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This obvious fallacy Plato appears to ascribe to Heracleitus and his school. The result of this discussion is that if nothing is at rest, every answer on whatever subject is equally correct.

The possibility of false opinion is discussed in connexion with the second definition. This part of the dialogue contains many subtle distinctions and interesting comparisons. The errors of memory are illustrated by the wax tablets which, on account of their imperfections, fail to receive and preserve clear impressions from sensible objects, and the confusion of our recollections by the aviary, the possessor of which takes in his hand one bird when he wishes to take another, though all the birds have previously been caught and imprisoned by him.

The third definition is explained in various ways, none of which is found to be satisfactory, and the dialogue closes with its avowed purpose—the complete definition of knowledge—unaccomplished. Nevertheless the rejection of the definitions proposed is a gain in itself, and the dialogue may be said to prepare the way for the acceptance of the theory of ideas. It serves also as an example of the importance of the dialectic method, and shows Plato's interest in combating the theories of other philosophers.

The *Theaetetus* contains many interesting similes and comparisons, and is, like the *Sophist* and the

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Statesman, pervaded by a subtle and at the same time ponderous kind of humour which is rather irritating to some, at least, among modern readers. The reasoning is careful and accurate, but the exposition is somewhat too prolix for modern taste.

The date of the *Theaetetus* is uncertain, but it cannot be one of the early dialogues. The mention of the Athenian army at Corinth makes any date much earlier than 390 impossible. At the very end the reader is prepared for a continuation of the conversation, and this takes place in the *Sophist*, but that dialogue and the *Statesman* may very well have been written some years later than the *Theaetetus*, from which they differ considerably in style.

There are separate editions of the *Theaetetus* by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1861 and 1883) and B. H. Kennedy (Cambridge, 1881 and 1894), both with translation and notes.

ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

St. I
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ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

- A I. ΕΥ. Ἄρτι, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἄγρου;
ΤΕΡ. Ἐπεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ εὐρεῖν.
ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.
ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;
ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε.
ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;
B ΕΥ. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.
ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντηρία;
ΕΥ. Ναί.
ΤΕΡ. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.
ΕΥ. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι

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[OR ON KNOWLEDGE, TENTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

EUCLEIDES, TERPSION, SOCRATES, THEODORUS, THEAETETUS

EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city.

TERP. Where then?

EU. As I was going down to the harbour I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

TERP. Alive or dead?

EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERP. You mean the dysentery?

EU. Yes.

TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger!

EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I

καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ θαυμαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ
C αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ κατέλυν;

ΕΤ. Ἡπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελεν. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σωκράτους, ὥς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τούτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ μεираκίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὓς
D διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγῆσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξιούς ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε, ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἶη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γέ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγῆσασθαι;

ΕΤ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ οὐτω γέ ἀπὸ στό-
143 ματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην τότε εὐθύς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμνημήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηγορβοῦμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ· ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι αἰεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὥς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἦκων.

B ΕΤ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινοῦ

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heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

TERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara?

EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

TERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk. Could you relate it?

EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

TERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as

PLATO

Θεαίτητον προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην. ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΤ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτωςι τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτῃ διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν C ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγῇσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οἶον, καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφην ἢ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι συνέφη ἢ οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τούτων ἔνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδῃ.

ΕΤ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

D 2. ΣΘ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν ἡρώτων, εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δὲ ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τοῦσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὀρώ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· E ἄξιός γάρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ

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Erineum,¹ so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us.

TERP. Very well.

EU. Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as "and I said" or "and I remarked," whenever Socrates spoke, or "he agreed" or "he did not agree," in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

TERP. That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

EU. Come, boy, take the book and read.

SOC. If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other

¹ Erineum was between Eleusis and Athens, near the Cephissus. Apparently Eucleides had walked some thirty miles.

δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἷω ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· νῦν δέ—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἦττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' 144 ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὦν δὴ πῶποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην οὕτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὥς ἄλλω χαλεπόν, πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὄντινούν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὗτ' ἂν ὥόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον¹. ἀλλ' οἱ τε ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὥς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι εἰσι, καὶ ἄττοντες φέρονται B ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἱ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστεροι νωθροὶ πῶς ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστως καὶ ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ρεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ ρέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικούτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΟ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ. C ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ

¹ γιγνόμενον T ut videtur, Burnet; γιγνομένους B, Berol.

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reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

THEO. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

SOC. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

THEO. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is

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μέσω. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο
ἐταῖροί τέ τινες οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι
δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἵεναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει,
εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Γινώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου
ἐστίν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ
τοῦτον διηγεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι
καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ' ὄνομα
οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μεираκίου.

Δ ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα·
τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες
διεφθαρκεῖναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν
χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε
αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ
Σωκράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα καὶ γὰρ ἐμαυ-
τὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποιὸν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον.

Ε φησὶν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ
εἰ νῦν ἐχόντοιν ἐκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι
ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκε-
ψάμεθ' ἂν, εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ'
ἂν, ἄμουσον δέ, ἡπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ', οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν
145 προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον, εἰ γραφικὸς ὢν
λέγει ἢ οὔ.

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the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course,¹ and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

soc. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth's name I do not know.

theo. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

soc. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

theo. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

soc. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

theaet. We should inquire.

soc. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

theaet. Yes.

soc. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

¹ The scene is evidently laid in a gymnasium; the young men have been exercising.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδεΐας ἔχεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματος τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὔ.

Β ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκούσαντι προθυμῆσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

3. ΣΩ. Ὡρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὥς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπῆνεσεν ὥς σέ νῦν δή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ C παίζων ἔλεγεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι· μανθάνεις πού παρα Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἅττα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. I think we must.

SOC. Well, is Theodorus a painter?

THEAET. Not so far as I know.

SOC. Nor a geometrician, either?

THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.

SOC. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?

THEAET. I think so.

SOC. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.

THEAET. Perhaps not.

SOC. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.

SOC. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.

THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.

SOC. That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.

THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.

SOC. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?

THEAET. Yes.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρά γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν οἶωμαι τι τούτων ἐπατεῖν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Σοφία δέ γ', οἶμαι, σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μὴν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαντῶ, ἐπιστήμη ὃ τί
146 ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. ἄρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὃ δὲ ἁμαρτῶν, καὶ ὃς ἂν αἰεὶ ἁμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος· ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὃ τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. τί σιγᾶτε; οὔ τί πον, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς¹ ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοισι γίγνεσθαι;

¹ ἡμᾶς] ὑμᾶς T.

THEAETETUS

soc. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?

THEAET. I try hard to do so.

soc. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And does this differ at all from knowledge?

THEAET. Does what differ?

soc. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.

B **ΘΕΟ.** Ἦκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν εἷη ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεираκίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω· τοῖσδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλεον ἐπιδιδοίεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, **C** ὦ ἀπειθεῖν,¹ ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.

4. ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἰοί τε ὦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἄς νῦν δὴ σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ **D** αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδῶρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἰτηθεῖς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἁπλοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράξεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

E **ΣΩ.** Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

¹ ἀπειθεῖν W; ἀπιστεῖν BT; ἀπελθεῖν al.

THEAETETUS

THEO. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

soc. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

soc. Certainly, if we can.

THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

soc. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say "cobblery" you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

THEAET. Nothing else.

soc. And when you say "carpentry"? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΗ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὀρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΗ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἐρωτηθέν,¹ ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινές· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτάς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ἡ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

147 ΣΗ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρώων καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἱπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ΣΗ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες Β εἴτε ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἡ, οἶει, τίς τι συνίησιν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΗ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὃ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΗ. Σκυτικήν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΣΗ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς

¹ τὸ δέ γ' ἐρωτηθέν Burnet; τὸ δέ γε ἐρωτηθέν W, Berol.; τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν BT.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.

soc. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.

soc. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?

THEAET. Perhaps.

soc. Yes; in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say "clay," no matter whether we add "the image-makers'" or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

THEAET. By no means.

soc. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

THEAET. No.

soc. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblery or any other art.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question "what is knowledge?" when we give the name of

C ὄνομα. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῇ ὑγρῷ φυραθείσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἔαν χαίρειν.

5. ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἶον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγόμενοις, ἐμοί D τε καὶ τῷ σῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὁδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων¹ ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλήθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι συλλαβεῖν E εἰς ἓν, ὅτῳ πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

¹ ἀποφαίνων om. T; Burnet brackets.

¹ A simple form of the first statement would be: The square roots of 3, 5, etc., are irrational numbers or surds. The word δύναμις has not the meaning which we give in English to "power," namely the result of multiplication of a number by itself, but that which we give to "root," i.e. the number which, when multiplied by itself, produces a given result. Here Theaetetus is speaking of square roots only; and when he speaks of numbers and of equal factors

THEAETETUS

some art ; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round ; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say "clay is earth mixed with moisture" without regard to whose clay it is.

THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it ; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

soc. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus ?

THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet ; and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.¹

he evidently thinks of rational whole numbers only, not of irrational numbers or fractions. He is not giving an exhaustive presentation of his investigation, but merely a brief sketch of it to illustrate his understanding of the purpose of Socrates. Toward the end of this sketch the word *δύναμις* is limited to the square roots of "oblong" numbers, i.e. to surds. The modern reader may be somewhat confused because Theaetetus seems to speak of arithmetical facts in geometrical terms. (Cf. Gow, *Short History of Greek Mathematics*, p. 85.)

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἡῦρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκοῦμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκεις γίνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσό- πλευρον προσείπομεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὦν καὶ τὰ
148 τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκεις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκεις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκεις γίννεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἰὲ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐτὸ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μήκος ὠρισάμεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει
B μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἀδύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσσεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σύ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὐ φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

THEAETETUS

soc. And did you find such a name?

THEAET. I think we did. But see if you agree.

soc. Speak on.

THEAET. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

soc. Well done!

THEAET. The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

soc. Very good; and what next?

THEAET. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.¹

soc. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

THEAET. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

¹ That is, cubes and cube roots.

ϸ. ζη. Τί δέ; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ οὕτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἴτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἡττόν τι ἂν οἶει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ζη. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἶει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκροτάτων.

ζη. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαντῶ καὶ τὶ οἶον
D Θεόδωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκα, ὦ Σώκρατες, φανεύεται.

δ. ζη. Ἴθι δὴ—καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω—πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἐνὶ εἵδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἑμαντόν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.¹

ζη. Ὡδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

¹ μέλειν B, Berol. et γρ. W (and Burnet); μέλλειν T; εὐρεῖν W.

THEAETETUS

soc. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

THEAET. Why, no.

soc. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

soc. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

soc. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

soc. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labour, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.

149 ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαιναρέτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἦ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὼ οὖν σοι τὸ αἷτιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾶον μαθήσει ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἡδὴ ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε. στερί-
C φαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὦν ἂν ἡ ἀπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον,

THEAETETUS

soc. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

soc. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

soc. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Shall I tell you the reason then?

THEAET. Oh yes, do.

soc. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

soc. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honouring them for their likeness to herself.

THEAET. Very likely.

soc. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary,

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τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεισθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν
μαιῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια
D καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ
μαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν
τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὄν¹ δόξη
ἀμβλίσκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἦσθησαι, ὅτι
καὶ προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὥς πάσσοφοι
οὔσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρή ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ
συνοῦσαν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζον φρονοῦσιν
E ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς
ἢ ἄλλης οἶει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκο-
μιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς
ποίαν γῆν ποῖον φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναιῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἶει τοῦ
τοιούτου, ἄλλην δέ συγκομιδῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκουν εἰκός γε.

150 ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀδικόν τε καὶ
ἄτεχνον συναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἣ δὴ
προαγωγία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν
ἄτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς
ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ

¹ νέον ὄν of the mss. is impossible; Schanz suggests νόμιμον "lawful," Adam νηδὺν "the womb." Possibly Plato wrote ἀνετέον "permissible."

THEAETETUS

that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labour and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skilful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

THEAET. I do not know that at all.

soc. But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

THEAET. To the same art.

soc. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

THEAET. It is not likely.

soc. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid match-making, through fear of falling under the charge of pander-

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ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν
B ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰδῶλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῇν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μὴ· ἧ οὐκ οἶει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

7. ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
C τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἰδῶλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνειδίσαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθές ὠνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἷτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός,
D οὐδέ τί μοι ἔστιν εὖρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϋούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θανμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς

THEAETETUS

ing. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

THEAET. It seems so.

soc. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

soc. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labour, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only

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αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο
 ἐναργές ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδέν πώποτε μαθόντες,
 ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες
 τε καὶ τεκόντες.¹ τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός
 τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὦδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη
 Ε τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ
 δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέν-
 τες ἀπῆλθον πρωαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες
 δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν
 καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες
 ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῇ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησά-
 μενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ
 τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὦν εἰς γέγονεν
 151 Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί·
 οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσι δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συν-
 ουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγ-
 νόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις
 δὲ ἑᾶ, καὶ πάλιν οὗτοι² ἐπιδιδόασιν. πάσχουσι δὲ
 δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταῖς
 τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμ-
 πλανται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ
 ἐκεῖναι³. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ
 ἀποπαύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν
 Β δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις⁴ δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἱ ἄν μοι μὴ
 δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνούς ὅτι οὐδέν
 ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι καί, σὺν

¹ καὶ τεκόντες W, Berol.; κατέχοντες BT.

² οὗτοι T; αὐτοὶ B.

³ ἐκεῖναι B; κείναι T.

⁴ ἐνίοις Berol., Burnet; ἐνίοτε BT; ἐνιοι W.

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in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill

θεῶ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συ-
γενόμενοι ὄναιτο· ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα
Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσ-
πεσίοις ἀνδράσι.

Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα,
ὑποπτεύων¹ σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει, ὠδίνειν τι
κνοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς με ὡς πρὸς
C μαίας ὑὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ
προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ' εἴ οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι·
καὶ ἔαν ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς ἡγήσω-
μαι εἰδῶλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἴτα ὑπεξαιρώμαι καὶ
ἀποβάλλω,² μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι
περὶ τὰ παῖδια. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε,
πρὸς με οὕτω διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν
ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπειδὴν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφ-
αιρώμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶονταί με εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν,
D πόρρῳ ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσνους
ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δρῶ,
ἀλλὰ μοι ψεῦδός τε συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀληθές
ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ
λέγειν· ὡς δ' οὐχ οἷός τ' εἴ, μηδέποτ' εἵπῃς.
ἔαν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ' ἔσει.

8. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε
οὕτω παρακελευομένου αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ
E τρόπῳ προθυμεῖσθαι ὃ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ
οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὁ
ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί
ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις.

¹ ὑποπτεύων B; ὑποπτεύω al.

² ἀποβάλλω T; ὑποβάλλω B; ἀποβάλλω W.

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as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men.

Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

THEAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἴσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἶρη-
152 κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἶα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἶα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε καὶ γώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γάρ οὖν οὕτω.

Β ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥίγοι, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ¹ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅμοιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἐκατέρω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

¹ ἑαυτοῦ W, Berol.; ἑαυτὸ BT.

THEAETETUS

soc. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is "the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not." You have read that, I suppose?

THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.

soc. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being "man"?

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold; or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

soc. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

THEAET. Yes.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν γάρ.

C ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταυτόν ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἕκάστω καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶν καὶ ἀψευδὲς ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὡς ἄρα ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὁποιοῦν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανέται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρὺ, κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνός μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε' οὐδέν, αἰεὶ

E δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων,¹ Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμωδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος, ὃς² εἰπὼν

Ὡκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν

¹ συμφερέσθων B (ut videtur), Burnet; συμφέροντα TW, Berol., Eus.; συμφέροντα Stobaeus.

² ὃς add. Heindorf.

THEAETETUS

soc. But "seems" denotes perceiving?

THEAET. It does.

soc. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth¹ in secret to his pupils.

THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

soc. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say "are"—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line

Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother²

¹ An allusion to the title of Protagoras's book, *Truth*.

² Homer, *Iliad*, xiv. 201, 302.

πάντα εἶρηκεν ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἣ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

9. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον
153 στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο
ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ¹ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ
λόγῳ σημεία ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ
γίγνεσθαι κινήσεις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ
ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ,
ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶ-
ται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτῳ² δὲ κινήσει.
ἣ οὐχ αὐται γενέσεις πυρός;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐται μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυ-
χίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ
καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ³ σῶζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως
μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων,⁴ κτᾶται τε
μαθήματα καὶ σῶζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ
δ' ἡσυχίας, ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης,
C οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἅ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

¹ μὴ οὐ W, Eus., Stobaeus; μὴ BT.

² τούτῳ B²W, Berol.; τοῦτο BT, Stobaeus.

³ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ B, Stobaeus; ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ T (ὡς above the line); ἐπὶ πολὺ Burnet.

⁴ κινήσεων οὐσῶν Stobaeus; κινήσειον ὄντων Buttmann.

THEAETETUS

has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion ; or don't you think he means that ?

THEAET. I think he does.

soc. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous ?

THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

soc. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction ; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire ?

THEAET. Yes, they are.

soc. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions ?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And what of the habit of the soul ? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned ?

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων,¹ τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, D καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταίῃ τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις.

ΙΟ. ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοῖνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτως· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασι· μὴδέ τιν' αὐτῷ E χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε δήπου² ἐν τάξει καὶ μένον³ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

¹ ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων TW, Berol.; ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων B, Stobaeus; προσβιβάζω (omitting ἀναγκάζω) Cobet, followed by Burnet. Possibly ἀναγράφω προσβιβάζων.

² δήπου Schanz; ἂν που BT.

³ καὶ μένον Stobaeus; κείμενοι pr. B (corr. καὶ μένοι); κείμενον T.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by "the golden chain"¹ refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

soc. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the colour that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

THEAET. But what do you mean?

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, viii. 18 ff., especially 26. In this passage Zeus declares that all the gods and goddesses together could not, with a golden chain, drag him from on high, but that if he pulled, he would drag them, with earth and sea, would then bind the chain round the summit of Olympus, and all the rest would hang aloft. This "crowning argument" is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the habit of using texts from Homer in support of all kinds of doctrine.

ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὃν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὁμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί
 154 φάμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ δισχυρίσαιο ἂν ὥς, οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτῳοῦν ζῳῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ¹ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὐ
 Β ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλω προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγγέγονει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ᾧ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὥς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

¹ ᾧ MSS. ; δ Cornarius.

THEAETETUS

soc. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other colour whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call colour will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each colour appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

soc. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

soc. Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

Σ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ᾧ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος· ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλεόν γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

Σ. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμβήσεται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται, ἢ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξήτακότες, ἥδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, Ε. συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί ποτ' ἔστιν ᾧ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωσιοῦν.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. What do you mean? What statements?

soc. Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you admit any other?

THEAET. Not I.

soc. Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, "Theaetetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased?" what reply will you make?

THEAET. If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to the present question, I should say "no," but if I consider the earlier question, I should say "yes," for fear of contradicting myself.

soc. Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer "yes" it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.¹

THEAET. True.

soc. Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of the fulness of our wisdom, rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat, battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.

¹ Eurip. *Hippol.* 612, ἡ γλῶσσ' δμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος, "my tongue has sworn, but my mind is unsworn."

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.

II. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, 155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγώ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἑλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ὦ μήτε προστιθεῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, αἰεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

B ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ὕστερον ἀλλὰ¹ τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δῆ, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος C ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγιγνόμεν ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δῆ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα

¹ ὕστερον ἀλλὰ BT (schol. ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει, i.e. ἀλλὰ is transposed to the second place); ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Stephanus et al.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly that is what I should like.

soc. And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves, consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

THEAET. Yes, I agree.

soc. These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow

παραδεξόμεθα. ἔπει¹ γάρ που, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ.

D ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἰριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὃ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμέν λέγειν, ἢ οὐπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐπω μοι δοκῶ.

E ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν;

I2. ΣΩ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶν δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὐ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληροὺς γε 156 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶν γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι· ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς² καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἥρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο

¹ ἔπει Heindorf; εἰπέ BT.

² ἐξ ἧς W²b; ἐξῆς BTW.

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me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

THEAET. By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

soc. Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumás¹ made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

THEAET. Not yet, I think.

soc. And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

THEAET. Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

soc. Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible. X

THEAET. Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse mortals.

soc. So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this,

¹ Hes. *Theog.* 780. Iris is the messenger of heaven, and Plato interprets the name of her father as "Wonder" (θαύμα).

εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρύψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν
 Β αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησίς, αἰὲ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιαύδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὅψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὁσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμέναι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητόν γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὅψει μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως
 C φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ συγγενῇ γιγνόμενα. τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄθρει, ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐνὶ τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ
 D γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττω ἐστίν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξύ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὅψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλ-

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but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colours are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

THEAET. Not quite, Socrates.

SOC. Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and white-

Ε μὴν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος
 τὸ χρῶμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως
 ἐγένετο καὶ ὄρα δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄψις
 ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὄρων, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννήσαν τὸ χρῶμα
 λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ
 ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὄτουον ¹
 ξυνέβη χρῶμα ² χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι.
 καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα,
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ
 157 μὴδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ
 πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα
 ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναί τι καὶ
 τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ
 εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν
 τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ
 ποιοῦντι· τό τέ τινα συνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλω
 αὖ προσπεσὼν πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων
 τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ
 καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινα αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι
 Β πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ
 ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημο-
 σύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὥς ὁ τῶν
 σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὐτ'
 ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὐτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα
 ὃ τι ἂν ἰστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα
 καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα·
 ὥς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐλέγκτος ὁ τοῦτο

¹ ὄτουον Schanz; ὄτου οὖν BT; ὄτωον Campbell; ὄτιον
 vulg., Burnet.

² χρῶμα BT; χρῆμα Heindorf, Burnet; σχῆμα Schanz.

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ness from that which helps to produce the colour are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the colour is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so coloured. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and “being” should be altogether abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of “something” or “somebody’s” or “mine” or “this” or “that” or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as “becoming” and “being made” and “being destroyed” and “changing”; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things

ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὥς δὴ ἀθροίσματι
C ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶον
τε καὶ εἶδος. ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἡδέα
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γένοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσ-
κόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκράτης· καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά
σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ'
οἶδα οὔτε ποιῶμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ'
εἰμι αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα
ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθην ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-
D γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυν-
εξαγάγω· ἐξαχθέντος δὲ τότ' ἤδη σκέβομαι εἴτ'
ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ
θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου
ἂ ἂν φαίνεται σοι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δὴ.

I3. ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει
τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
καλὸν¹ καὶ πάντα ἂ ἄρτι διήμην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω
διεξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον
καὶ ὑποληπτέον ἥπερ διελήλυθας.

E ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον
αὐτοῦ. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων,
τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν
ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

¹ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν MSS.; secl. Ast.

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stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are "mankind" and "stone" and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

THEAET. I don't know, Socrates; besides, I can't tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.

SOC. You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

THEAET. Very well; ask them.

SOC. Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming—good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

THEAET. Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.

SOC. Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connexion with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course

οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως
ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι διήμην λόγον, ὥς παντὸς
158 μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας,
καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ¹ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν
αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα
ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὧ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι
οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι
B αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισ-
βητῆσαι ὥς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ
ψευδῇ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται
εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὥς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ
διανοῶνται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐν-
νοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ
ὑπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων,
τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο
νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ
πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν
C τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορόν γε ὅτῳ
χρῇ² ἐπιδείξαι τεκμηρίῳ· πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ
ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἃ τε γὰρ νυνὶ
διειλέγμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν

¹ δεῖ MSS.; δεῖν Heindorf, followed by Schanz and Wohlrab.

² χρῇ TW; χρόνῳ χρῇ B; χρεὼν Hultsch.

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you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

THEAET. What you say is very true, Socrates.

soc. What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

THEAET. I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

soc. Don't you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

THEAET. What dispute?

soc. One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each other in a waking condition.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don't see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and anti-strophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we

ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγείσθαι, ἄτοπος ἢ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβη-
D τεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ὧ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις δισχυρίζομεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθῆσεται;

E ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἶη πολλαχῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

14. ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ αἰεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες· “ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ παντά-
πασιν, μὴ πῇ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον.”

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν
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are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

soc. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.

soc. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

THEAET. I do not think I can.

soc. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: "Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other."

THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in

*criterion,
not
meaning*

X

159 δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῶουν, ὅταν ᾗ κομιδῇ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοίον τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτόν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὥς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτ' ἄλλ' ἕτερα γεννῆσει;

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ καὶ τᾶλλα ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτῃ ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτῃ αὖ ἀσθενούντα. πότερον ὁμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενούντα Σωκράτῃ, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνόμοιον δήπου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ᾧ νῦν δὴ¹ C διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;

¹ νῦν δὴ Heindorf; νῦν BT.

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anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

soc. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

THEAET. It seems so to me.

soc. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

THEAET. We must.

soc. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

THEAET. When you say “Socrates in illness” do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

soc. You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

THEAET. Unlike, I imagine.

soc. And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states we enumerated just now?

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἐκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγὼ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκείνο τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων
D τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἰσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὕσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγαινούσῃ γλῶττι ἐποίησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὠμολόγητο.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσήλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

E ΣΩ. Ἔτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον

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THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?

THEAET. How can it help it?

soc. And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive element, shall each produce a different object?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet to me?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a while ago, the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness, which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health. X

THEAET. Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.

soc. But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really doesn't get hold of the same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly unlike.

THEAET. True.

soc. Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitter-

γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἰσθῆσιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὐν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθησις,
160 καὶ ἄλλοιον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὗτ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλω συνελθὼν ταῦτόν γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό
B τέ τι γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνώμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ περ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι· ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ,

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ness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive. ?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is. >

THEAET. No.

soc. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

soc. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything "is," he must say it is to or of or in relation to something,

Internal relations

εἴτε γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὄν ἢ
C γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος
ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὄν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστίν
καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος
δ' οὔ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθὲς ἄρα ἐμοί ἢ ἐμῇ αἰσθησί· τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστίν· καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν
Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν
μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

Δ 15. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδὲς ὦν καὶ μὴ
πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ
ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἶην ὥνπερ αἰσθητῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη
οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστίν ἢ αἰσθησίς, καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν συμ-
πέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ
πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον
πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ

Ε δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων· αἰσθησιν
ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι. ἢ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν
τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν
δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεν-

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and similarly if he says it "becomes"; but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates.

soc. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

soc. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.

soc. Well, we have at last managed to bring this

PLATO

νήσαμεν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν
τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ
περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάβῃ
ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ
161 ἀνεμιαῖόν τε καὶ ψεῦδος. ἥ σὺ οἶει πάντως δεῖν
τό γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἥ καὶ ἀνέξει
ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς,
εἰάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδα-
μῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἥ αὖ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλόλογός γ' εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ
Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἶει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ
ῥαδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα.
B τὸ δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν
λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοῖ
προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον
πλὴν βραχείος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἑτέρου σοφοῦ
λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο
παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσσομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ
ποίει οὕτως.

ΙΒ. ΣΩ. Οἷσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω
τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;

C ΘΕΟ. Τὸ ποῖον;

¹ The rite called *amphidromia* took place a few days after the birth of a child. After some ceremonies of purification the nurse, in the presence of the family, carried the

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forth, whatever it turns out to be ; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle¹—the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away ; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born ?

THEO. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all ?

SOC. You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong ; but you do not understand what is going on : none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

THEO. That is the better way, Socrates ; do as you say.

SOC. Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras ?

THEO. What is it ?

infant rapidly about the family hearth, thereby introducing him, as it were, to the family and the family deities. At this time the father decided whether to bring up the child or to expose it. Sometimes, perhaps, the child was named on this occasion. In the evening relatives assembled for a feast at which shell-fish were eaten.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς
 τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ ἔστιν· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν
 τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος
 τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν
 ὁ δὲ ἡ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν
 ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ
 καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος
 ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ
 σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγγανεν ὧν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν
 Δ βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του
 ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν,¹ ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ
 δὴ ἐκάστω ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὁ ἂν δι' αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ,
 καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιον διακρινεῖ,²
 μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται ἐπισκέψασθαι
 ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ' ὁ πολλάκις
 εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος δοξάσει,
 ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, ὦ
 ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
 Ε διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μι-
 σθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν
 ἦν παρ' ἐκεῖνον, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστω τῆς
 αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον
 λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ
 τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον
 γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ
 τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν
 καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν³ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας
 τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὐσας, οὐ μακρὰ

¹ λέγωμεν BT; λέγομεν vulg.

² διακρινεῖ most editors; διακρίνη B (emendation) T.

³ ἐπιχειρεῖν TW; om. B.

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soc. In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don't see why he does not say in the beginning of his *Truth*¹ that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honouring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another's condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another's opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was "playing to the gallery" in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another's fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each man's must be

¹ *Truth* was apparently the title, or part of the title, of Protagoras's book.

162 μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγγατο;

* ΘΕΟ. ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνὴρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογούντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοὶ ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καὶ εἰς Λακεδαιμόνα ἐλθὼν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαιστράς ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνοὺς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυνόμενος;

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἔαν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

17. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέον. λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαυμάζεις¹ εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτοουὺν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἡττόν τι οἶει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε· καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάννυ θαυμάζω. ἥνίκα γὰρ διήμμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάννυ μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοῦναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

¹ συνθαυμάζεις BT; σὺ θαυμάζεις W.

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right, be tedious and blatant folly, if the *Truth* of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

THEO. Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

soc. If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

THEO. Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

soc. Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's "measure" applies any less to gods than to men?

THEAET. By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγο-
ρίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα
ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· ὦ
γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε
συγκαθεζόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες,
οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ
Ε αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ
πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα,
ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν
ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὅτουοῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ
καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντιοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι
χρησθε, ὥς εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεω-
μετρῶν χρώμενος· γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς
μόνου¹ ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος,
εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ
163 τηλικούτων² λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ
οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλη δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς
καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη
τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταυτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό
που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ
πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Β ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθα-
νόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστα-
σθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν
πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ

¹ μόνου] Adam, *Class. Rev.* iv. p. 103, suggests νόμου, "a
coin, a copper."

² τηλικούτων T; τούτων B.

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soc. You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, "Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in such important matters.

THEAET. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

soc. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

THEAET. Yes, certainly in a different way.

soc. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

THEAET. Most assuredly.

soc. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak, ✕

ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν δι-
ισχυριούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν,
ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν·
τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ
C ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα
ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἱ τε γραμματι-
σταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε
αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

18. ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ
ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ.
ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ
αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο, “ ἄρα δυνατόν,
ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα
D μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε
μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται ;”
μακρολογῶ δέ, ὥς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ
μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη
ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ
ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθῆσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν
E ὃ εἶδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;

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or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and colour, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

soc. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.

THEAET. What is it?

soc. It is like this: If anyone should ask, "Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?" I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

soc. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?

THEAET. I do.

soc. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?

*cf
Berkeley*

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δήπου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾗσθητο, τοιούτωνί τινων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηται που ἐνίοτε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ΣΩ. *Ἡ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

164 ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσομεν¹ τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δέ μή, οἷχεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πῇ.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὐπὲρ ὁρῶν· ὅψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτόν ὠμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὃ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐδέωρα, εἰ μύσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

B ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο,

¹ σώσομεν Dissen; σώσοιμεν BT.

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THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Memory of nothing or of something?

THEAET. Of something, surely.

soc. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?

THEAET. He does.

soc. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?

THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.

soc. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.

THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you. Tell me how it is.

soc. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But "does not see" is the same as "does not know," if it is true that seeing is knowing.

THEAET. True.

soc. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers

ἔτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὄρᾳ· ὁ τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνει φαίνεται, εἴαν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθῶσιν ταῦτόν φῃ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα ἑκάτερον φατέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

C ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἷη ἐπιστήμη; πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥς ἔοικεν, λεκτέον. καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθ' αἰσθῶσιν ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἰκότα πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγεγόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτ' ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσιν ποιοῦντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δῆ, εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον ὀρώντα δὲ οὐκ ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότες ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

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it, he does not know it, since he does not see it ; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same. X

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then we must say they are different.

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

THEAET. About what?

soc. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock ; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

THEAET. How so?

soc. We seem to be acting like professional debaters ; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

soc. Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers ; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception. X

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ¹ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν, βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὡν Θεόδωρος εἰς² ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
165 Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς δέ πως θάπτον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέγιστοι σοὶ³ ἔξομεν, ἂν αὐτῶ βοηθῇς.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειεν μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ;

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ
Β νεώτερος· σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

ΙΘ. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα· ἔστι δέ, οἶμαι, τοιόνδε τι· ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδῶτα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινόμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί

¹ πολλά om. T.

² εἰς om. T.

³ σοὶ om. B.

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THEAET. Evidently.

soc. It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

THEO. Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

soc. Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

THEO. To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

soc. Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

THEO. Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAET. It is impossible, I should think.

soc. Not if you make seeing and knowing identical.

PLATO

γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτω ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος,¹ ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνὴρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν,
C εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι ἐτέρῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταυτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ' ἠρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὁ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὠμολογηκῶς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου, τί σοι συμβαίνει.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντία οἷς ὑπεθέμην.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ γ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἴ τις σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν² ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἥνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταυτὸν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις,

E ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδήσας ἤδη ἂν

¹ συνεχόμενος B; συσχόμενος B²T.

² ἐλλοχῶν bt; ἐνλοχῶν BT.

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For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

THEAET. I shall say, I think, "Not with that eye, but with the other."

soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

THEAET. After a fashion.

soc. "That," he will reply, "is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is."

THEAET. Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

soc. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would

τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοί γε κακείνῳ
ἐδόκει. τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως,
λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πει-
ρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

20. ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπα-
166 μύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, χωρή-
σεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων. “οὗτος δὴ
ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι
ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ
μεμνήσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν
διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥαθυμότατε
Σώκρατες, τῇδ' ἔχει. ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτή-
σεως σκοπῆς, ἔαν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἴαπερ ἂν ἐγὼ
ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλῃται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγ-
Β χομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοῖα, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. αὐτίκα
γὰρ δοκεῖς τινὰ σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην
παρεῖναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος
οἶον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε
δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἶόν τ' εἶναι
εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἔάνπερ
τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν
ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον
δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους
γιννομένους ἀπείρους, ἔάνπερ ἀνομοιώσις γίγνηται,
C εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι

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at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

THEAET. By all means.

SOC. He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, "Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of becoming

ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε," φήσει, " γενναιοτέ-
 ρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον
 ὥς οὐχὶ ἰδίαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστω ἡμῶν γίνονται,
 ἢ ὥς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ
 φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ
 ὀνομάζειν, εἴη ὥπερ φαίνεται· ὅς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνο-
 κεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὕηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά

Δ μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι
 μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὥς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ
 ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίον
 μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι
 τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα.
 καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ
 φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν,
 ὃς ἂν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μετα-
 βάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι.

Ε τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίδωκε, ἀλλ'
 ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν
 τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν
 ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ
 δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τᾶναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτε-
 ρον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ
 167 γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὥς ὃ μὲν κάμνων
 ἀμαθὴς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὃ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς
 ὅτι ἄλλοῖα· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων

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different continues? But, my dear fellow," he will say, "attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say 'be,' would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to

γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ
 ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον· ἀλλ'
 ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς
 λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῇ δοξάζοντά τις τινα
 ὕστερον ἀληθῇ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ
 μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν
 πάσχη· ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῇ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, πονηρᾷ¹
 B ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα² συγγενῇ ἑαυτῆς³ χρηστῇ
 ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ
 φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῇ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ
 δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα
 δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες,
 πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν
 ,σώματα ἱατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς.
 φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν
 αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ
 C ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς⁴ ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς
 δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι
 τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι
 ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἶά γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ
 καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ
 νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς
 ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ
 δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομέ-
 νους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ
 D ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν· καὶ
 οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ οὐδεῖς

¹ πονηρᾷ Aldina ; πονηρὰς BT.

² δοξάζοντα Tb ; δοξάζοντας B.

³ ἑαυτῆς BT ; αὐτῆς some mss. and editors.

⁴ ἀληθεῖς BT ; ἀληθείας Schleiermacher.

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the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition ; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels ; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts ; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles ; when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen ; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so ; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honourable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are wiser than others, and that

ψευδῇ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐάν τε βούλῃ ἐάν τε μή,
 ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρω· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ
 λόγος οὗτος. ὧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισ-
 βητεῖν, ἀμφισβῆται λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθών· εἰ δέ
 δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον
 τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἀδίκει
 Ε ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾷν· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς
 φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα
 ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ,
 ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς
 διατριβὰς ποιῇται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν
 μὲν τῷ παίξῃ τε καὶ σφάλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνῃται,
 ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ
 τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνῃ αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύ-
 μενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ
 168 τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο· ἂν μὲν
 γὰρ οὕτω ποιῇς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδια-
 τρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας,
 ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σέ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν,
 αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς
 φιλοσοφίαν, ἣν ἄλλοι γενομένοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν
 οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τὰναντία τούτων δρᾷς
 ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὰναντία ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ
 τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο
 Β τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτεροι γένων-
 ται· ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθῃ,
 οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ' ἔλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ
 συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψῃ τί ποτε λέγομεν,
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no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair in your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real argument. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and his previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you; they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy when they grow older. If, therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me and inquire what we really mean

κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα, τό τε δοκοῦν
 ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ
 ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψαι, εἴτε ταῦτόν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ
 C συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ
 ὅπη ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντο-
 दाπὰς παρέχουσι." ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ
 σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν,
 σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειό-
 τερον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

21. ΘΕΟ. Παίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ
 νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἐταῖρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόη-
 σάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδί-
 D ζοντος ἡμῖν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιού-
 μενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα¹ εἰς τὰ
 ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμ-
 νύων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς
 διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία
 ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμέ καὶ σέ

¹ ἀγωνιζόμεθα B; ἀγωνιζοίμεθα T.

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when we declare that all things are in motion and that whatever seems is to each individual, whether man or state. And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of perplexity in one another." Such, Theodorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion more magnificent.

THEO. You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man's assistance with all the valour of youth.

SOC. Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras reproached us for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boy's timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of "the measure of all things," and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

THEO. Of course I observed it, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, shall we do as he says?

THEO. By all means.

SOC. Now you see that all those present, except you and myself, are boys. So if we are to do as

Ε δεῖ ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοι τοῦτό γε¹ ἔχη ἐγκαλεῖν, ὥς παίζοντες πρὸς μεῖράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐτοῦ τὸν² λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ'; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἷου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι
169 δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακε-
Β δαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν³ ἀναγκάσης ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπή-
κασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι

¹ τοι τοῦτό γε B; τοι τόγε T; τοῦτό γε W.

² αὐτοῦ τὸν apogr. Coislinianum 155; αὐ τοῦ τὸν B; αὐ τοῦτον τὸν T.

³ πρὶν ἂν Heindorf; πρὶν BT.

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the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

THEO. Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

soc. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

THEO. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron.¹ For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the rôle of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

soc. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more

¹ Sciron was a mighty man who attacked all who came near him and threw them from a cliff. He was overcome by Theseus. Antaeus, a terrible giant, forced all passers-by to wrestle with him. He was invincible until Heracles crushed him in his arms.

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γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες¹
καρτεροὶ² πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν,
ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις
C ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας.
μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσης προσανατριψάμενος
σαυτὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπη θέλεις·
πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην ἦν ἂν³ σὺ
ἐπικλώσης δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι
περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρα-
σχεῖν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.

ΣΟ. Ἄλλ' ἄρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι
πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μὴ που παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν
D εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῖν
αὐτὸ ὀνειδίση.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύ-
νωμαι.

22. ΣΟ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλα-
βώμεθα οὐπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὀρθῶς ἢ
οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ
ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει· καὶ
ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ
ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ
εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὠμολόγει, ἀλλὰ
E μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν,
οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι·
νῦν δὲ τάχ' ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ
ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέ-

¹ ἐντυχόντες T; ἐντυγχάνοντες B.

² καρτεροὶ B; κρατεροὶ T.

³ ἦν ἂν W; ἦν BT.

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stubborn combatant than they ; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belaboured me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me ; it will be good for both of us.

THEO. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

soc. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

THEO. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

soc. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not ?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him ; therefore it is better to make the

στερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΞΗ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου
170 λόγου ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς;

ΞΗ. Οὕτωςί· τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ
εἶναι φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;

ΘΕΟ. Φησί γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΗ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώ-
που, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν,
καὶ φαμέν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι
τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ
ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις
ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς
θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας
B σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλω τῷ διαφέροντας
ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα
ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων
τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι.
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν
εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΞΗ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν
ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

C ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΞΗ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;

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agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

THEO. That is true.

soc. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.

THEO. How?

soc. In this way: He says, does he not? "that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears."

THEO. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviours, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

THEO. Yes, we must.

soc. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

THEO. Of course.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do

πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκοπεῖ γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὥς οὐδεὶς ἡγείται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλ' ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

D ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστιν κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ αἰεὶ σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι ἐκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι;

E ΘΕΟ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἳ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὥς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδεὶν δὲ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν; εἰ

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about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus; would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself, care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.

SOC. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

THEO. How so?

SOC. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?

THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer¹ says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

SOC. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

SOC. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the "truth" which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought

¹ Homer, *Odyssey*, xvi. 121, xvii. 432, xix. 78.

171 δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἷσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσω πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἶπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΟ. Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἶσιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Β ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῇ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΟ. Οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΟ. Ὁ δέ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ᾧν γέγραφε.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΟ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τὰναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας

Γ αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἢ Πρωταγόρου "ἀλήθεια" ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

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it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

soc. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

THEO. Certainly.

soc. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

THEO. Necessarily.

soc. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

THEO. No, they do not.

soc. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

THEO. Evidently.

soc. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Then since the “truth” of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.

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ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον
 Δ ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐν-
 τεύθην ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ
 τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολο-
 γοῦντα, καταδύς ἂν οἰχοίτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν
 ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοί τινές
 ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα
 καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε
 ὄντινούν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι
 δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

23. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι
 τὸν λόγον, ἥ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες
 Ε Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἥ δοκεῖ, ταύτη καὶ
 ἔστιν ἐκάστω, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα
 τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι συγχωρήσεται
 διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη
 ἐβελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον,
 καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον
 ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου
 διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

172 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ
 αἰσχυρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδिका καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα
 ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὐτῇ,
 ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις
 μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε
 πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ

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THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

SOC. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

THEO. Yes, I think at least we must.

SOC. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

THEO. Yes, I think that is correct.

SOC. And likewise in affairs of state, the honourable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advan-

ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἶπερ που, αὐ
 ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν
 καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν,
 Β καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε φῆσαι, ἂ ἂν θῆται
 πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον
 ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς
 δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις¹ καὶ ὀσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις,
 ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν
 οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν
 τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθές τότε ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν
 δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ² μὴ παντάπασι
 τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν,³ ὥδέ πως τὴν
 σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ
 C λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος καταλαμβάνει.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΟ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὦ
 δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὥς
 εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον
 διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι
 φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;

ΣΟ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς
 τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν
 D φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους
 ὥς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.⁴

ΘΕΟ. Πῇ δὴ;

ΣΟ. Ἦι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι,
 σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῇς
 ποιοῦνται· ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον

¹ καὶ ἀδίκους W; om. BT.

² δὴ BT; ἂν Schanz.

³ λέγουσιν Naber, with inferior mss.; λέγωνσιν BT.

⁴ τεθράφθαι W; τετράφθαι BT.

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tageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.

THEO. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

SOC. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

THEO. What do you mean?

SOC. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

THEO. In what way is this the case?

SOC. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up

ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω καὶ κεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε αἰεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον

Ε —καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην, ὣν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον· ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν.¹ οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος·

173 ὥστ' ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι,² σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον³ ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ

¹ ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν mss.; om. Abresch et al.
² χαρίσασθαι BT; ὑπελθεῖν Cobet from Themistius.
³ τὸ ἐλεύθερον BT; τὸ ἐλευθέριον Themistius. §

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argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if, as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit);¹ and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant's life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favour by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become

¹ In Athenian legal procedure each party to a suit presented a written statement—the charge and the reply—at a preliminary hearing. These statements were subsequently confirmed by oath, and the sworn statement was called *διδυμοσία* or *ἀντιδυμοσία*, which is rendered above by “affidavit” as the nearest English equivalent.

Β συγκλῶνται, ὥσθ' ὑγιές οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ μεираκίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοί γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

Γ πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι ἡμέτεροι ¹ ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικαστῆς οὔτε θεατῆς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

24. ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν Δ ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τις ² γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τω κακὸν ἔστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης Ε λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ

¹ ἡμέτεροι W ; οἱ ἡμέτεροι BT.

² τις W, Iambl., Clem. ; τι BT.

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greatly bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

THEO. By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

soc. Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not

PLATO

οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδο-
κιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ
πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια,
ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμά-
σασα πανταχῇ φέρεται¹ κατὰ Πίνδαρον, “ τᾶς²
τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε ” καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα,
“ οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπὲρ ” ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν
174 πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου
ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ καὶ Θαλὴν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεό-
δωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θραῦττά
τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι
λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι,
τὰ δ’ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι
αὐτόν. ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι
B ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον
ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὃ τι
πράττει, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι
ἄλλο θρέμμα· τί δέ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί
τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων
ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχει
διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε.
ἦ οὐ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ

¹ φέρεται BT; πέτεται B²W, Iambl., Clem., Euseb.
² τᾶς Campbell from Clement; τᾶ C; τὰ T.

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know ; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city ; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar¹ says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

THEO. What do you mean by this, Socrates ?

SOC. Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbour ; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature ; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not ?

THEO. Yes, I do ; you are right.

SOC. Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in

¹ This may refer to *Nem.* x. 87 f.—

ἡμῖν μὲν κε πνέουσιν γαλας ὑπένερθεν ἑών,
ἡμῖν δ' οὐρανοῦ ἐν χρυσεῖσιν δόμοισιν,

"Thou (Polydeuces) shalt live being half the time under the earth and half the time in the golden dwellings of heaven," but it may be a quotation from one of the lost poems of Pindar.

- τοιοῦτος ἐκάστω καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος
 C ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκα-
 σθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς
 διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν
 ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη
 δεινὴ, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη· ἐν τε γὰρ
 ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν,
 αὐτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
 μεμελετηκέναι. ἀπορῶν οὖν γελοῖος φαίνεται. ἐν
 D τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις,
 οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἐνδηλος
 γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννόν τε
 γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἓνα τῶν νομέων,
 οἷον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἢ τινα βουκόλον, ἡγεῖται
 ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσ-
 κολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον
 ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς, ἄγροικον
 δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν
 E νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκὸν
 ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν
 μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα
 κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα
 δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν.
 τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούντων, ὥς γενναῖός τις ἐπτά
 πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν
 ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὀρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν
 175 ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ

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private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them; because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed

πάν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστω γεγόνασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυριοὶ γεγόνασιν ὁπωῦν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμννομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι B δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷα συνέβαινε αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχων, ὥς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν. ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25. ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, C ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ “τί ἐγὼ σέ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ;” εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ “εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων,” “κεκτημένος τ' αὖ πολὺ¹ χρυσίον,” βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποίῳ τέ τινε ἔστων καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι² αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων D ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ

¹ πολὺ Euseb., Iamb.; om. BT.

² κτήσασθαι B², Iamb., Euseb.; κτήσεσθαι BT.

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upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

THEO. That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

SOC. But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of "What wrong have I done you or you me?" to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of "Is a king happy?" or, on the other hand, "Has he great wealth?" to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other—when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these

ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· ἱλιγγίων τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ
 κρεμασθεῖς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ
 ἀηθείας ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βατταρίζων¹
 γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ' ἄλλω ἀπαι-
 ψεύτῳ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίως
 ἢ ὥς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν.² οὗτος δὲ
 ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν
 Εὐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὲ
 φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ
 οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουρικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα,
 οἷον στρωματοδέσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευά-
 σασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ'³
 αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τὸρῶς τε καὶ
 ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου
 ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως⁴ οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων
 176 λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν
 εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.⁵

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὃ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις
 ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνῃ καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω
 κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὃ
 Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι
 ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ
 βνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ

¹ βατταρίζων Themistius; βαρβαρίζων BT.

² τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν B; τραφεῖσι πᾶσιν T, Iamb., Euseb.

³ ὁ δ' t, Iamb.; οὐ δ' BT.

⁴ ἐλευθέρως BT; ἐλευθερίως Athenaeus.

⁵ ἀληθῆ om. Athenaeus.

THEAETETUS

things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped,¹ still less to acquire the true harmony of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.

SOC. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore

¹ The Athenians regarded the proper draping of the cloak as a sign of good breeding. The well-bred Athenian first threw his cloak over the left shoulder, then passed it round the back to the right side, then either above or below the right arm, and finally over the left arm or shoulder. See Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1567 f., with Blaydes's notes.

ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρή ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε
 B φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγή δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῶ
 κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον
 μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε,
 οὐ πάντ¹ ῥᾶδιον πείσαι ὥς ἄρα οὐχ ὦν ἔνεκα οἱ
 πολλοὶ φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ
 διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ,
 ἵνα μὴ² κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα
 γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕβλος, ὥς ἐμοὶ
 C φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθές ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς
 οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὥς οἷόν τε δικαιο-
 τατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς
 ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιοτάτος. περὶ τοῦτο³
 καὶ ἡ ὥς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε
 καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνώσις σοφία καὶ
 ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία
 ἐναργής· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ
 σοφαί ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι
 φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάνανσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδι-
 D κούντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ
 ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας
 εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνειδεῖ καὶ οἷονται
 ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ'
 ἄνδρες οἷους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους.
 λεκτέον οὖν τ' ἀληθές, ὅτι τοσοῦτ' ἂν μᾶλλον εἰσιν
 οἷοι οὐκ οἷονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἷονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ
 ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ

¹ πάντ B; πάντ τι T.

² ἵνα μὴ B; ἵνα δὴ μὴ T.

³ τοῦτο Euseb., Iamb., Stob.; τούτου BT.

THEAETETUS

we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can ; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible ; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be practised and the other not ; that, I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the saying is. Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice ; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness ; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man and the man whose words or deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery ; for such men glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, "useless burdens upon the earth,"¹ but such as men should be who are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them the truth—that just because they do not think they are such as they are, they are so all the more truly ; for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For

¹ Homer, *Iliad*, xviii. 104 ; *Odyssey*, xx. 379.

PLATO

ἐστὶν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίστε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον Εἰ ἐκφυγεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

177 ΣΩ. Παραδειγμαμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι
τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὐ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται· ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Β ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἐταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν· ὅταν¹ ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐβελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν,² τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πῶς ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν—εἰ δὲ
C μὴ, πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν

¹ ὅτ' ἂν W, Iamb.; ὅτι ἂν BT.

² φυγεῖν W; φεύγειν BT, Iamb.

THEAETETUS

it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.

THEO. What penalty do you mean?

soc. Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their "cleverness," the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

THEO. Very true, Socrates.

soc. Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like

ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾶω γὰρ τηλικῶδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

26. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν δισχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἂ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τὰγαθοῦ¹ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἂ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

Ε ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω.²

ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάξῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὥς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἐαυτῇ τίθεται· ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

¹ τὰγαθοῦ BW²; τὰγαθὰ TW.

² τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω W; ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται B; λεγέτω . . . μὴ γάρ om. T.

THEAETETUS

an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

THEO. To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument ; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

soc. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force ; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name “advantageous”¹; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

THEO. Certainly.

soc. Yes ; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

THEO. True.

soc. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability ; or has it in making laws anything else in view ?

¹ The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be.

178 ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΟ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει αἰεὶ, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη¹;

ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν.

ΣΟ. Ἐπι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειεν ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν· ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὥς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον² ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.

Β ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΟ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὥς φατέ, ᾧ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων· ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἶα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτω.

ΣΟ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ᾧ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἶα
C ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἶον θερμά, ἀρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἱατρῷ οὐ

¹ ἐκάστη W; ἐκάστη BT.

² μέλλον W; μᾶλλον BT.

THEAETETUS

THEO. Certainly not.

soc. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?

THEO. I should say they do often miss it!

soc. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

THEO. Certainly.

soc. Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion

PLATO

θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέραι·

ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἶη.

ΣΟ. Ἄλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἶνου γλυκύτητος καὶ
 Δ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ
 δόξα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.

ΘΕΟ. Τί μήν;

ΣΟ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρ-
 μόστου ἔσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειεν
 μουσικοῦ, ὃ¹ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει
 εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσασθαι μὴ
 μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα
 ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἔσομένης
 Ε ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος ἐκάστω
 ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώ-
 μεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστω καὶ δόξειν
 καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής,
 ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε² περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν
 ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον
 ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὅστισοῦν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε
 σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

ΣΟ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε· ἢ οὐδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-
 179 λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺν ἀργύριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας
 ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν

¹ ὁ om. T.

² τό γε W; τότε BT.

THEAETETUS

of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

THEO. No, that would be ridiculous.

soc. But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

THEO. Of course.

soc. And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

THEO. Certainly not.

soc. Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one; but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

THEO. Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

soc. Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge

PLATO

οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτός.¹

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΗ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΞΗ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλίσκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἥ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.

ΞΗ. Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίῃ μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταυτὸν

D θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ

¹ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ MSS.; αὐτῷ om. Schleiermacher.

THEAETETUS

better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

THEO. Very true.

soc. Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

THEO. Assuredly.

soc. Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

X

THEO. In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

soc. In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical. So we must, as the argument in behalf of

T

PLATO

Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταπτε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα,¹ εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται· μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

27. ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

ΞΘ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον
Ε καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων ἢ, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, Ὀμηρείων καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι εἶναι,² οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρώσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ' ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίῳ ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι
180 καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἦττον αὐτοῖς ἐνὶ ἡ τὸ μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίας. ἀλλ' ἂν τινά τι ἔρῃ, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, καὶ τούτου ζητῆς λόγον λαβεῖν τί εἶρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει καὶ νῦν μετ-
ωνομασμένῳ. περὶ αὖτε οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλή-
B λους, ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδέν βέβαιον

¹ διακρούοντα TW ; ἀκούοντα B.

² ἔμπειροι εἶναι Vindob. 21 ; ἔμπειροι BT, Euseb.

THEAETETUS

Protagoras¹ enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

THEO. Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heraclitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

SOC. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the beginning as they themselves present it.

THEO. Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heraclitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words “nothing at all” fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either

*of
Protagoras*

¹ See 168 B.

PLATO

ἐὰν εἶναι μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγοούμενοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στασίμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.

ΞΘ. Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσιν δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἐταῖροί εἰσιν· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γί-
C γνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὃ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτ' ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ΞΘ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ
D ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὥς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὡκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς ῥεύματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων ἅτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμεν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὐτὰναντία τούτοις ἀπεφάναντο,

THEAETETUS

in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

THEO. What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

soc. Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honour their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this,

PLATO

E οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθειν¹ ὡς πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι,

καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις δισχυρίζονται, ὥς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λεληθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ
 181 ἂν μὴ πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες ἔλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὔσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν²
B τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφοτέροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδοδοκιμακότες. ὦρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι κίνδυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκεψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

¹ τελέθειν Stallbaum; τελέθει BT.

² παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν Schleiermacher; παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν W; ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς B; τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν T.

THEAETETUS

So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All,¹ and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these ; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend ? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions.² I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others ; but if we find that the partisans of "the whole" seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

THEO. Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

¹ Parmenides, line 98 (ed. Mullach). In its context the infinitive is necessary ; but Plato may have quoted carelessly and may have used the indicative.

² In the game referred to (called *διελευστίνδα* by Pollux, ix. 112) the players were divided into two parties, each of which tried to drag its opponents over a line drawn across the palaestra.

28. ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυ-
μουμένου. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως
C κινήσεως περί, ποῖόν τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντές φασι
τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε·
πότερον ἐν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ
φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω,
ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἂν
τι καὶ δέῃ. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς,
ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ
D ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ
ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην
ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος
φάναι κινήσεως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.¹

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν.² δύο δὲ λέγω τούτῳ
εἶδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.³

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθῳς γε λέγων.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα
ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσιν κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἔρω-
τῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι,
E φερόμενόν τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι ἀμφο-
τέρως, τὸ δ' ἑτέρως;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν·
οἶμαι δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε αὐτοῖς⁴

¹ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ om. Stobaeus.

² ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν given to Theodorus by B.

³ φοράν W; περιφοράν BT, Stobaeus.

⁴ αὐτοῖς W; ἑαυτοῖς BT.

THEAETETUS

soc. Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this: Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

THEO. I think so.

soc. Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion: "alteration," and "motion in space." X

THEO. And you are right.

soc. Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, "Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?"

THEO. By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

soc. Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will

καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἔξει
εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἔστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ
μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι¹ μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν
182 κίνησιν ἀεὶ κινεῖται.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος
ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὅτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέ-
γομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα
αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος,
καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν² ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν³
γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα;
ἴσως οὖν ἢ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται
ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ
B μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης
οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ
τᾶλλα οὕτω· μέμνησαι γάρ που καὶ ἐν τοῖς
πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ'
αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ. τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ'
ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς
αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν
ποιὰ⁴ ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε
C ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὐ δ' ἐνεκα λέγομεν,
τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· κινεῖται
καὶ ρεῖ, ὥς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

¹ ἐνεῖναι W; ἐν εἶναι BT.

² αἰσθητικὸν Burnet; αἰσθητὸν BT; αἰσθητὴν Buttmann;
αἰσθανόμενον Heindorf.

³ αἰσθησιν W; αἰσθησιν ἐτι BT.

⁴ ποιὰ bt; ποι BT.

THEAETETUS

be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEO. What you say is very true.

SOC. Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself unvaryingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

THEO. I remember, of course.

SOC. Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, "Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux?" Is that so?

PLATO

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἄς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἵπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινῆσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ μή, εἵχομεν ἄν που εἰπεῖν οἷα ἅττα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν¹;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

Δ ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ρεῖν τὸ ρέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χροάν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ ταύτη μένον, ἄρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἵπερ αἰεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε δὴ ρέον;

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὁράν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῷ ὁράν ἢ ἀκούειν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκ οὐν δεῖ γε, εἵπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὁράν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὁράν, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μή, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἴσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὥς ἔφαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

¹ λέγωμεν Β; λέγομεν Τ.

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THEO. Yes.

soc. Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration? X

THEO. Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.

soc. Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?

THEO. That is right.

soc. But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of colour, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a colour, and yet to speak accurately?

THEO. How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux? 158

soc. But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of seeing or hearing?

THEO. It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.

soc. Then we must not speak of seeing more than not-seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion. X

THEO. No, we must not.

soc. And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said. X

THEO. Yes, you did say that.

183 **ΣΩ.** Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτῶμενοι ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.
ΘΕΟ. Ἐοίκατε.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀποκρίσις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς εἰκεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀποκρίσις, περὶ οὗτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι “οὕτω” τε εἶπον καὶ “οὐχ οὕτω.” δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο “οὕτω”
Β λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο “οὕτω”. οὐδ' αὖ “μὴ οὕτω”. οὐδὲ γὰρ “τοῦτο” κινήσις· ἀλλὰ τι¹ ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ “οὐδ' ὅπως.”¹ μάλιστα δ' οὕτως² ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον.

ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕτω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ
Γ φρόνιμός τις ἦ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, εἰ μὴ³ τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι

¹ ὅπως BT; οὕτως W.

² δ' οὕτως om. W.

³ εἰ μὴ W; ἢ εἰ μὴ BT.

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soc. Then when we were asked "what is knowledge?" we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

theo. So it seems.

soc. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, "becomes thus," to avoid giving them fixity by using the word "is."

theo. You are right.

soc. Except, Theodorus, that I said "thus," and "not thus"; but we ought not even to say "thus"; for "thus" would no longer be in motion; nor, again, "not thus." For there is no motion in "this" either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word "nohow." That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

theo. At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

soc. So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

theo. An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty

ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

29. ΘΕΑΙ. Μῆ, πρὶν γ' ἂν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθῃτε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προύθεσθε.

ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὢν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μέντ' ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἳ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρμενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, "αἰδοῖός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἅμα "δαινός τε." συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτης, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασιν γενναῖον.

184 φοβουῖμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλεόν λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος ὠρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν

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of answering your questions according to our agreement, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

THEAET. No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates have discussed those who say all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.

THEO. A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of the argument.

THEAET. I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

THEO. Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain.¹ Just ask him a question and you shall hear.

SOC. Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theaetetus.

THEO. Why will you not comply with it?

SOC. Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homer's words, "one to be venerated" and also "awful."² For I met him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of

¹ A proverbial expression. An open plain is just what cavalry desires.

² *Iliad*, iii. 172; *Odyssey*, viii. 22; xiv. 234.

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ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανιεῖ· δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὦν
B κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΟ. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῶη· “ τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὄρᾳ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει; ” εἴποις ἂν, οἶμαι, “ ὁμμασί τε καὶ ὤσιν.”

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

C ΣΟ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ὧ ὀρώμεν, τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὐ ὀρώμεν, καὶ ὧ ἀκούομεν, ὠτα, ἢ δι' οὐ ἀκούομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

D ΣΟ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις
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arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

THEO. Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

soc. Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. If, then, anyone should ask you, "By what does a man see white and black colours and by what does he hear high and low tones?" you would, I fancy, say, "By his eyes and ears."

THEAET. Yes, I should.

soc. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

soc. Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if

ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὃ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἥ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τιτι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν
 Ε ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν, καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν. ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκεὰ δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι' ἐτέρας
 185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὕν.

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροᾶς πρῶτον μὲν

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we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not all unite in one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.

THEAET. I think what you suggest is more likely than the other way.

soc. Now the reason why I am so precise about the matter is this: I want to know whether there is some one and the same power within ourselves by which we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again other qualities through the other organs, and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better that you make the statement in answer to a question than that I should take all the trouble for you. So tell me: do you not think that all the organs through which you perceive hot and hard and light and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts of something else?

THEAET. Of nothing else.

soc. And will you also be ready to agree that it is impossible to perceive through one sense what you perceive through another; for instance, to perceive through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what you perceive through sight?

THEAET. Of course I shall.

soc. Then if you have any thought about both of these together, you would not have perception about both together either through one organ or through the other.

THEAET. No.

soc. Now in regard to sound and colour, you have,

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αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω
ἔστόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΞΝ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν
ἕτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταυτόν;

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΝ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΝ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλή-
λοι, δυνατός ἐστι ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΞΝ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν δια-
νοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ
κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τότε
τεκμήριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν εἴη
ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἄρ' ἔστόν ἀλμυρὸν ἢ οὔ,
οἶσθ' ὅτι ἕξεις εἰπεῖν ὥς ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε
C ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοή φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης
δύναμις.

ΞΝ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις
τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι,
ὥς τὸ “ἔστιν” ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ “οὐκ ἔστι,”
καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι
ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιό-

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in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist? X

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. And that both together are two and each separately is one?

THEAET. Yes, that also.

soc. And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

THEAET. May be.

soc. Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and colour, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else. X

THEAET. Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.

soc. Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?

THEAET. You mean being and not-being, and like-

• τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ
D ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ
αὐτῶν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν
ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος
ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρει, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν
ἃ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ
ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν
οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον
ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ
E κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὥς
ἐλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσchrός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων
καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς
με μάλα συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι
τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ
διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν
ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ
δόξαι.

186 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

30. ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο
γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν
ἐπορέγεται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὁμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ
ταῦτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσchrόν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογι-

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ness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

soc. Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.

soc. Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favour by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

THEAET. Well, I do think so.

soc. To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

THEAET. I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

soc. And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

THEAET. I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly

ζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα
B πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ· ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν
σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ
μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὃ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν
ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς
ἐναντιότητος αὐτῇ ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλ-
λουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι
C φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα
διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει·
τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν
καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγισ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγ-
μάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ
παραγίγνηται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὧς μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου
ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπι-
στήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ·
οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε,
δυνατὸν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταῦτόν ἐκείνό τε καὶ τοῦτο ¹ καλεῖς,
τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;

¹ τοῦτο] ταὐτὸ T; ταῦτόν B.

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views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.

soc. Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. Is it, then, possible for one to attain "truth" who cannot even get as far as "being"?

THEAET. No.

soc. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

THEAET. How can he, Socrates?

soc. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὦτι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας αἴψα σθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὃν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

187 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἢ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῳς γὰρ οἶει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν Β πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

31. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώ-

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THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.

soc. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?

THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?

soc. Collectively you call it, then, perception?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.

THEAET. No; certainly not.

soc. Nor knowledge either, then.

THEAET. No.

soc. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.

THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.

soc. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.

THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.

soc. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.

THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is

End
1st
Section

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κρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα·
κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καί
μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προ-
ϊούσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύ-
μως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὥς τὸ πρῶτον ὤκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτω δρώμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν
C ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἥττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ
ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοῖν ὄντοι εἰδέοιν
δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου,
τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν
πάλιν—;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-
D λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ
πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ'
ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον
ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῇ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ
νῦν ἐτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκε-
ψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὀπη-
τιοῦν¹ φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ

¹ ὀπητιοῦν Burnet ; ὀπηγοῦν B ; ὀπη γοῦν W ; ὀπηοῦν T.

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impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion ; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I'll try to give another, just as I have given this.

soc. That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen : either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all ; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now ? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion ?

THEAET. Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

soc. Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?

THEAET. What point do you refer to ?

soc. Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

THEAET. What experience ?

soc. That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

THEAET. Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it ? For just now, in talking about

καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς περί, ὡς οὐδέν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατεπείγει.

Ε ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ που σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῇ φαμεν ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῇ, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῇ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ δῆ.

188 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἔστιν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδέν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ
B εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζων, ἂ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἶεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφοτέρω;

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leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

soc. You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

THEAET. Yes, we do.

soc. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

soc. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴδρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδοῖσι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὥς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

C ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεται πού ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδῇ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν πού δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ περ πάντ' ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατόν ψευδῇ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ

D τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ οὗτου οὖν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς οὐ ψευδῇ δοξάσει, κἂν ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνη· “δυνατόν δὲ ὅπως οὖν ὃ λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό”; καὶ ἡμεῖς

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THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.

soc. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

THEAET. That is impossible.

soc. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.

soc. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for false opinion.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

THEAET. What do you mean?

soc. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.

soc. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, "Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them?" We, I fancy, shall

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Ε δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· “ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος·” ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἶει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὅ ἄρα ἐν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

189 ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνός γέ του ἄπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἐνός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι ¹ δοξάζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δ' ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Ὅ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.

¹ ἐν τι BT; ἐν γέ τι W.

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reply, "Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true," shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

soc. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

THEAET. How can he?

soc. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think "one" is among the things that are not?

THEAET. No, I do not.

soc. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

THEAET. That is clear.

soc. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

THEAET. That also is true.

soc. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

THEAET. He must do so.

soc. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

THEAET. That is plain, apparently.

X

B ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὥς ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδῆς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.

32. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῇ φάμεν εἶναι
C δόξαν, ὅταν τις τι ¹ τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαζάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῇ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροὺν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὥς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῇ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύ-
D δους ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου

¹ τι om. BT.

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soc. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them. X

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

soc. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

THEAET. After what manner?

soc. We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

THEAET. Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

soc. Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

THEAET. Why in the world do you say that?

soc. You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your "truly false" by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that

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γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὥς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὥς ἐκείνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ Ε ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἥτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν· ἥτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει.

ΣΩ. Κάλ्लιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα
190 καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐγῶγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν· σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καγώ.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησὶν, ὡς εἰκε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

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of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

THEAET. I am.

soc. It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

THEAET. Yes, it is.

soc. Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

THEAET. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

soc. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

THEAET. How do you define it?

soc. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

THEAET. In the same way.

soc. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

THEAET. Certainly.

ΣΩ. Ἀναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον, σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὥς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τὸνναντίον οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὥς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστὶν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

C ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶε ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν ἀναπειθόντα αὐτόν, ὥς ἀνάγκη τὸν βούν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ¹ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὥς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ² περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὥς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ
D ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὼ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὥς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τό γε ³ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ

¹ καὶ om. T.

² After ῥῆμα B adds ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτόν ἐστιν, applied to things in succession, since the word "one" is, as a word, the same as "other" (i.e. the Greek uses ἕτερον for "one" and "other").

³ τό γε Heindorf; τότε B; τό ** T.

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soc. Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. You are right.

soc. Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I do not.

soc. Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression “one and other.” This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

soc. You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other. X

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. But surely he who holds an opinion of one

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δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

ΣΩ. Οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀμφοτέρω οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι
Ε ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῇ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὐτ' ἄρα ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσα δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

33. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δῆ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔρῳ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀπορούμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ'
191 εἰ ἐὰν εὕρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶτες· εἰ δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὃ τι ἂν βούληται. ἦ οὖν ἔτι πόρον τινὰ εὐρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ
B οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλὰ πῃ δυνατόν.

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only, and not of the other at all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

soc. Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to admit many absurdities.

THEAET. What absurdities?

soc. I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest, and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

THEAET. Do speak.

soc. I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows, and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὁ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἥνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίος¹ ἐγὼ γινώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γινώσκω, ὥσθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἶον λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἂ ἴσμεν ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθώμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἴσως C πῇ ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. ἄρα ἔστιν μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἔνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μείζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ D ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἂν βουλευθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν¹ ἢ ἀκούσωμεν² ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὁ μὲν

¹ εἰδῶμεν B.

² ἀκούωμεν BT.

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THEAET. Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

soc. But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know? }

THEAET. Certainly we did.

soc. Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

THEAET. To be sure he can.

soc. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper quality.

THEAET. I assume all that.

soc. Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings;

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ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἰδῶλον αὐτοῦ· ὁ δ' ἂν¹ ἐξαιλειφθῇ ἢ Ε μὴ οἷον τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλελῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῇ ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δὴ τινι;

ΣΩ. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἃ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ἃ μὴ. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὠμολογήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

- 192 ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδεν σχῶν² αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ, τοῦτο³ οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μὴ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ Β αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται.⁴ καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν

¹ ὁ δ' ἂν B²W; ὅταν B; ὅταν δὲ T.

² σχῶν BT; ἔχων W. ³ τοῦτο B; om. al.

⁴ καὶ . . . ὧν αἰσθάνεται om. B.

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and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

THEAET. Let us assume that.

SOC. Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

THEAET. In what manner?

SOC. By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

THEAET. What do you say about it now?

SOC. We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords

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αἰσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔστι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ ¹ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὁ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων ² κατὰ ταυτά, ὁ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται ³. πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῇ τινα δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δὴ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ' ἅττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὐτὸ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

34. ΣΩ. Ὡς δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταυτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὀρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἄπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν,

¹ After καὶ the mss. read δ, expunged by Bonitz.

² τὸ μνημεῖον . . . ἔχων om. BT; add. B²T in marg.

³ ὁ μὴ οἶδε . . . μὴ αἰσθάνεται om. B.

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with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

THEAET. What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

soc. The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives. X

THEAET. Now I am even more out of the running than before.

soc. Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not,

τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ' αἰσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑμαντῷ;

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μάθε ὦν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι¹ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἴδὲ δὴ εἴαν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκρά-
193 τῆς εἰς γιγνώσκει² Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μὴδέτερον, μὴδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητός ἐστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τί ἢ οὐδέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὦν ἔλεγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μὴδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸ οἰηθείην ὃν οἶδα εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μὴδέτερον γιγνώσκων μὴδὲ
B αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην ὃν μὴ οἶδα ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι ὦν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἐξῆς νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτε³

¹ ἔστι . . . μὴδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι below om. B.

² εἰ γιγνώσκει W ; ἐπιγιγνώσκει BT.

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sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

THEAET. That too is possible.

soc. See if you follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

THEAET. You are right.

soc. Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

soc. The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

THEAET. Right.

soc. And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I

PLATO

ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάσω, οὔτε γινώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γινώσκων· καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταῦτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπομαι.

ΞΗ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, ὅταν γινώσκων σέ· καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν
C ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίνῳ ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφοιν τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὀρών ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημείον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἵχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημείον, ἢ καὶ οἶα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης,
D ταὐτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὥς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΞΗ. Ἐτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γινώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γινώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καί μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

THEAETETUS

could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say "perceive" instead of "know." Do you follow me?

THEAET. I follow you.

soc. Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition;¹ but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

THEAET. I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvellously well.

soc. There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

¹ Aeschylus, *Choeph.* 197 ff., makes Electra recognize the presence of her brother Orestes by the likeness of his footprints to her own.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γινώσκων τὸν
 Ε ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ
 τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι
 αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὃν γινώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται
 καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν
 αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον,
 ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμεν τὴν ψευδῇ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω
 γινώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην
 194 αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἄμφοῖν τῷ σημείῳ¹ μὴ κατὰ
 τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον
 τοξότην φαῦλον ἰέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ
 καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμαστα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΞΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἴσθησις τῶν
 σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως
 τῇ παρούσῃ προσαρμύσῃ, πάντῃ ταύτῃ ψεύδεται
 ἢ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις
 Β μηδὲ ᾗσθητο² πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥς ἔοικεν,
 οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι οὔτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς
 ὑγιᾶς λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανό-
 μεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται
 ἢ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ
 μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία συνάγουσα ἀπο-
 τυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ
 σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

¹ τῷ σημείῳ al. Heusde; τῷ σημείῳ TW²; τὸ σημείον BW.

² μηδὲ ᾗσθητο TW; μηδὲ ἐπέσθητο ἐπῆσθητο B; μηδ' ἐπῆσθητο B².

THEAETETUS

THEAET. No, I did not.

soc. This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not ?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

soc. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one ?

C ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθές δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λείος καὶ μετρίως ὠργασμένος¹ ᾗ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις
D καθαρὰ τὰ σημεία ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίνεταί καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἴτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεία ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφύως μὲν οὖν.

E ΣΩ. Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ² κέαρ ᾗ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμ-

¹ ὠργασμένος Suidas, Timaeus; ἐργασμένος BT.

² του τὸ] τοῦτο τὸ B.

THEAETETUS

soc. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax¹—; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed

¹ The similarity is in the Greek words *κῆρ* or *κῆρ*, heart, and *κνῆς*, wax. The shaggy heart is mentioned in the *Iliad*, ii. 851; xvi. 554. The citation of Homer, here and below, is probably sarcastic—in reference to the practice of some of the sophists who used and perverted his words in support of their doctrines.

μιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα
 ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος
 γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ
 195 τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ
 πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ᾗ
 ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριον,
 ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνον-
 ται οἱ τοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι ὀρώσιν ἢ
 ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα¹ ἀπονέμειν ταχὺ
 ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι καὶ ἄλλο-
 τριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ
 παρανοοῦσι πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ οὗτοι
 ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρα-
 τες.

ΣΟ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΟ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ΣΟ. Ἦδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὠμολογήσθαι ὅτι
 παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρω τούτῳ τῷ δόξᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

35. ΣΟ. Δεινὸν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς ἀληθῶς
 κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολεσχής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;

C ΣΟ. Τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ
 ὥς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο
 ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις ὑπὸ
 νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἢ δυσπαλά-
 λακτος ἀφ' ἐκάστου λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

¹ ἕκαστα] ἕκαστοι ΒΤ.

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in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds. So also do those whose wax is hard ; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred ; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

THEAET. You are right as right could be, Socrates.

soc. Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us ?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. And true opinions, no doubt ?

THEAET. And true ones also.

soc. Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist ?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Truly, Theatetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature !

THEAET. Eh ? What makes you say that ?

soc. Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them ?

THEAET. But you, why are you vexed ?

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα, ὅ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηταί με· “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡϋρηκας δὴ ψευδῇ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ’ ἐν ταῖς διανοοίαις, D ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν;” φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι ἡϋρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. “Οὐκοῦν,” φήσκει, “λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ’ οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὐτὸ οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ;” ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.

E ΣΩ. “Τί οὖν,” φήσκει,¹ “τὰ ἔνδεκα, ἃ μὴδὲν ἄλλο ἢ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὐτὸ διανοεῖται;” ἴθι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ’ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ
196 πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μὴδ’ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, ἃ φάμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη

¹ φήσκει Stephanus; φήσι B; φησί Burnet.

THEAETETUS

soc. I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid ; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me : " Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought ? " I shall say " yes," I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

THEAET. It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

soc. " Do you go on and assert, then," he will say, " that we never could imagine that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of ? " I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

THEAET. Yes, and you will be right.

soc. " Then," he will say, " according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of ? " Come now, it is for you to answer.

THEAET. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

soc. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine

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πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἔνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἣ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἔνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῇται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον¹ ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῳς γὰρ οἶει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τι τότε² γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖν ἔνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθὼν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὣν αὐτὸς οἶδεν· ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ C τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῇ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὃ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζεται εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτι οὖν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλαγῇν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἂν τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα³ αἰρεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκратες.

D ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἑάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυρτεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

¹ μᾶλλον om. W.

² τότε W; ποτε BT.

³ πότερα W; ποτέραν BT.

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that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve ?

THEAET. No, by Zeus ; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

soc. You are right in supposing so ; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

THEAET. It seems so.

soc. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk ? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose ?

THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.

soc. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed ?

THEAET. What is it ?

ΣΩ. Ἐβελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὥς οὐκ εἰδῶσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; **Ε** ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ "γιγνώσκομεν" καὶ "οὐ γιγνώσκομεν," καὶ "ἐπιστάμεθα" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα," ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὐτῷ "ἀγνοεῖν" τε καὶ "συνιέναι," ὥς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχμόενος;

197 ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὧν γε ὃς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμεν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νῆ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

36. ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύω.

Β ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

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soc. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.

THEAET. And why is that shameless?

soc. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember.

soc. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with unclearness all along; for we have said over and over again "we know" and "we do not know" and "we have knowledge" and "we have no knowledge," as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms "be ignorant" and "understand," as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.

THEAET. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?

soc. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.

THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.

soc. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?

THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.

soc. They say it is having knowledge.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοῖνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἵπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε οἷός τ' ᾧ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν μοι ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτηθῆσθαι τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον εἰ¹ ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς ὢν μὴ φοροῖ,² ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτόν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι γε μὴν³ φαῖμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς γε.

C ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατόν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας, περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασάμενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού τινα φαῖμεν αὐτόν αὐτὰς αἰεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιή-
D σατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἦν ἂν αἰεὶ ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν

¹ εἰ vulg. ex emend. apogr. P; om. BTW.

² φοροῖ vulg.; φορῶν b; φορῶ B; φορῶ TW.

³ γε μὴν W; γε δὴ B; γε T; δέ γε vulg.

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THEAET. True.

soc. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

soc. Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

THEAET. I will if I can.

soc. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

THEAET. And rightly.

soc. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked —

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περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὖσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι πετομένας.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δῆ. ἀλλὰ τί τὸν τεύθεν;

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων φάναι χρή εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ἡύρηκέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

198 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὐθις ἀφιέναι, σκοπεῖ τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσῃ δ' ἐνθένδε¹ σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δῆ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτηθῆναι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

¹ ἐνθένδε] ἐντεῦθεν B.

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with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.

THEAET. Consider it done. What next?

soc. We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

THEAET. So be it.

soc. Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and even numbers.

THEAET. I do so.

soc. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσches τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικός γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμούς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

C ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἂν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἶδέναι. ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

D 37. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἔνεκα· ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὢν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ¹ ἡπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

E ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρή τοῖς

¹ μαθόντι καὶ W ; μαθόντι BT. ϣ

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THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

THEAET. To be sure.

soc. Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

THEAET. We shall.

soc. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

THEAET. That is true.

soc. This, then, was my question just now: How

ὀνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμή-
 σων ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμμα-
 τικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν
 ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀνα-
 γνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδοκότες αὐτῷ πάντα
 μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

199 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων
 οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστα-
 σθαι καὶ μαθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον
 μὲν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ
 ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἔκτῃται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν
 φάμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδεν
 μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῇ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ
 Β αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου
 οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ' ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων
 τινὰ πού ποτ' ¹ ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ'
 ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, τότε ² ἄρα τὰ ἑνδεκα
 δώδεκα ὥσθι εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἑνδεκα ἐπιστήμην
 ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον
 φάτταν ἀντὶ περισσεύουσας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γε ᾗ ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ,
 ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω
 δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῇ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς
 C πρόσθεν ἔδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίννε-
 σθαι; ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

¹ πού ποτ' W ; ἀπ' αὐτοῦ BT.

² τότε W ; ὅτε BT.

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should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

SOC. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

THEAET. But that too is absurd.

SOC. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions "know" and "learn" one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.

SOC. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ᾧ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ᾧ γὰρ κεκτῆμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευθεῖσιν ἵτινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγή ψευδῆς γενήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ;

D ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γινῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γινῶναι τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαι ποτέ τινα ποιήσῃ.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὀρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ῥαδίον γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὁ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ

THEAETETUS

THEAET. I will agree.

soc. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

THEAET. What disaster?

soc. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion. X

THEAET. How so?

soc. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

soc. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who

PLATO

200 ὥς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπισημοσύνην λαβὼν
 ψευδῇ μὲν, φήσ, δοξάσει. ἥ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴπου καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδῇ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῇ γε, καὶ ὥς εἰδὼς διακείσεται
 περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἴησεται τεθηρευκῶς ἔχειν,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπισημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ
 τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς
 Β ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· “ πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι,
 ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδὼς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιση-
 μοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἶεται τινα εἶναι
 ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν¹ εἰδὼς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε,
 δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδὼς,
 τὴν δ' οὐ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν,
 ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὐ μοι ἑρέιτε ὅτι τῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπισημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὐ ἐπιστήμαι,
 αἷς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστε-
 ς - ς ρεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ
 ἂν κεκτῆται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἔαν μὴ προχείρους
 ἔχη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθή-
 σεσθε εἰς ταῦτόν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον
 ποιοῦντες; ” τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀπο-
 κρινόμεθα;

¹ αὐτοῖν] αὐτὴν BT; om. W.

THEAETETUS

catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

THEAET. Certainly not.

soc. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, "Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῇ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφ-
D ἑντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὥς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

38. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστα, εἴηπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

E ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ
201 φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἰωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.

soc. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.

soc. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.

soc. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.

soc. What one?

THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.

soc. The man who was leading the way through the river,¹ Theaetetus, said: "The result itself will show;" and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

¹ A man who was leading the way through a river was asked if the water was deep. He replied *αὐτὸ δειξεί*, "the event itself will show" (i.e. you can find out by trying). The expression became proverbial.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὕτη;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἡ σὺ οἶε δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς Β μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις¹ δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι² μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν C λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἶπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτόν τῃν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς κατὰ³ δικαστήρια⁴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

¹ τούτοις] τούτους T.

² ἰδόντι] εἶδον τί B; εἶδόντι W.

³ κατὰ Jowett; καὶ mss.; om. Heindorf.

⁴ δικαστήρια] δικαστήριον T; om. Heindorf.

THEAETETUS

soc. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

THEAET. How so? What profession is it?

soc. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,¹ satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

soc. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

¹ The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a water-clock.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμεν, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, D τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὦν μὲν μὴ ἔστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις· τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα σύ τε καὶ γὰρ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μὲντ' ἂν ἐτέρου, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμ' ἂν.¹

39. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὅναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος· ἐγὼν E γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι· αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθ' ὥς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν· 202 ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεται, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο μόνον τις ἔρει· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτὸ" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνο" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἕκαστον" οὐδὲ τὸ "μόνον" οὐδὲ "τοῦτο" προσιοιστέον οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ρηθῆναι

¹ ἀκολουθήσαιμ' ἂν Schanz ; ἀκολουθησαίμην BT ; ἀκολουθήσαιμι al.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

soc. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

soc. Listen then, while I relate it to you—"a dream for a dream." I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this" or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be ex-

Β λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγενέαι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξαν δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθεῖ δόξαν τινὸς

Γ τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτην, δόξαν ἀληθεῖ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Δ ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγέγρασαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

THEAETETUS

pressed by reason ; they can only be named, for they have only a name ; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation ; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge ; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it ; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different ?

THEAET. That was it exactly.

soc. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge ?

THEAET. Precisely.

soc. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search ?

THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

soc. Probably this particular statement is so ; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion ? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

THEAET. What point ?

PLATO

ΣΩ. Ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὥς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος ἔγνωστόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δὴ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἶε ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

203 40. ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ὅρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως·

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτωςί· “ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σω;” τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

B ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως εἶπέ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων

THEAETETUS

soc. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.

THEAET. Is that not right?

soc. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.

THEAET. What examples?

soc. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables¹; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?

THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.

soc. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; "Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?" What would you reply?

THEAET. I should say "S and O."

soc. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.

THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless

¹ Στοιχείον and συλλαβή, originally general terms for element and combination, became the common words for letter and syllable.

ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώτ-
της· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνή οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ
τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων· ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ
λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ
τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὄντιν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν
περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα.

C ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον,
ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δῆ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγωμεν¹
τὰ ἀμφοτέρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ἢ ἡ δύο, τὰ
πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων
αὐτῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφοτέρᾳ
ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο
τι ὁ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γινώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον
εἰδὼς ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γινώ-
σκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ τις γινώσεται, προγινώσκειν

¹ λέγωμεν B; λέγομεν T et al.

THEAETETUS

letter,¹ a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing ; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters ; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

soc. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

THEAET. I think we have.

soc. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable ?

THEAET. Probably.

soc. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination ?

THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

soc. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not ?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How is that ? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both ?

THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

soc. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is

¹ The distinction here made is that which we make between vowels and consonants. The seven Greek vowels are α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω, called *φωνήεντα*.

τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνῶσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ῥακύνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνδρῶς μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

204 ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὥς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοσπόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἢ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἔν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτόν

Β καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχῶ μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

THEAETETUS

ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

THEAET. And very suddenly, too.

soc. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

soc. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

THEAET. No, we must not.

soc. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

THEAET. How so?

soc. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

soc. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?

THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

soc. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δῆ.¹

41. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὥς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ δῆ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὃ τι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ἓν, δύο, τρία, C τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δις τρία ἢ τρίς δύο ἢ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ² ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν ³ λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

D ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἓν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστι, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὡδὲ δῆ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλεθρον ταυτόν· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δῆ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ

¹ δέ γε δῆ BT; γε δῆ W.

² πάντα τὰ BT; πάντα W.

³ πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν Hermann; πάλιν|δ' οὐδέν BT; πᾶν δ' οὐδέν Burnet, after Campbell.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.

soc. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?

THEAET. Of the same.

soc. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And of the furlong likewise.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And the number of the army is the same

PLATO

στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μὴν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐ μέρη ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὠμολόγηται,¹ εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐστίν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὰ πάντα ὄν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἐστ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστίν ὅπερ ἐστίν ἢ τοῦ ὅλου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε.

205 ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐδ' ἂν μηδαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐδ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν μέρη ἦ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

¹ ὠμολόγηται T; ὁμολογεῖται B.

THEAETETUS

as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?

THEAET. No.

soc. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.¹

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

THEAET. That seems to be true.

soc. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

THEAET. Yes, of the all.

soc. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

soc. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

THEAET. Certainly.

¹ Cf. 204 B.

PLATO

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν Β μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταυτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ'; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἅττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρι' ἅττα αὐτῆς ¹ συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἵεναι.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγοούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἴη λόγος ἐξ ὧν τὰλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "εἶναι" περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ "τοῦτο," ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονοειδές τε ² καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.

¹ μόρι' ἅττα αὐτῆς W; μόρια ταύτης BT.

² τε W in ras. B; τι T.

THEAETETUS

soc. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

THEAET. It does.

soc. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters¹ of it?

THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

soc. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression "be" or "this," because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

THEAET. I remember.

soc. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

¹ The reader is reminded that the words *στοιχείον* and *συνλαβή* have the meanings "element" and "combination" as well as "letter" and "syllable."

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταῦτόν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐστὶν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἶ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεὶπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταῦτόν ἐφάνη.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἓν τε καὶ ἡμέρες, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβῇ, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσῃ αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν¹ καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τοῦναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

206 ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τοῦναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύννοισθα σαντῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἓν τε² τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταραττοὶ λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μὴν Β ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι

¹ γνωστόν W; ἄγνωστον pr. BT.

² τε W; om. BT.

THEAETETUS

THEAET. There is no other to be seen.

soc. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?

THEAET. Yes, unquestionably.

soc. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.

THEAET. I cannot dispute it.

soc. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.

THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.

soc. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?

THEAET. What experience?

soc. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.

THEAET. That is very true.

soc. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell

ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα
πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΟ. Ὃν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροὶ ἐσμεν στοιχεῖαν
καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι
καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος
ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνώσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ
κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως
ἐκαστον μᾶθημα, καὶ ἑάν τις φῇ συλλαβὴν μὲν
γνωστόν, ἄγνωστον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα
ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

C 42. ΣΟ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι
φανείεν ἀποδείξεις, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκει-
μενον μὴ ἐπιλαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε
καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσ-
γενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.

ΣΟ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν
σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἓν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δὴ;

D ΣΟ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διά-
νοιαν ἐμφανῇ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε
καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν
δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος
ρόήν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν¹ αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν
φαμέν.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάπτον
ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου

¹ γοῦν W; οὖν BT.

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which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

THEAET. Yes, that is all true.

soc. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

THEAET. No, we must not.

soc. Now what are we intended to understand by "rational explanation"? I think it means one of three things.

THEAET. What are they?

soc. The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

soc. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about

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αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως
 Ε ὅσοι τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου
 φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα
 χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ
 μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ
 νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τῇν
 207 ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρο-
 μένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
 “ ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης.” ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ
 ἂν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγα-
 πῶμεν ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἀμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν
 εἰπεῖν τροχοί, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία,¹ ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ
 σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
 Β συλλαβὴν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας
 καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικούς
 εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν
 τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον· τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι
 ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοι-
 χείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνειν
 τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.

¹ ὑπερτερία Kuhn; ὑπερτηρία Β; ὑπερτήρια Τ.

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anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

THEAET. True.

soc. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

THEAET. As for example, Socrates?

soc. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, "a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon."¹ Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say "wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke."

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

¹ *Works and Days*, 456 (454).

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων
C δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλα-
βόντα τοῦτο, λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ
δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστή-
μονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων
τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὦ ἐταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν
διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγον εἶναι,
τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτι
D ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνν ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντι-
ν οὖν ὅτουοῦν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ¹ μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ
δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ
αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων
μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
δρῶντας αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν
E ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ
εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβήν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ
πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

¹ τοτὲ] τότε W; ὅτε BT.

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THEAET. Yes, it was.

soc. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates?

soc. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question.

THEAET. Certainly I accept it.

soc. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus.

soc. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

soc. That is what I mean.

THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.

208 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ “Θεαί-
τητον” γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἰ οἷται¹ τε δεῖν
γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ “Θεόδωρον” ἐπι-
χειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ εἰ οἷται¹ τε δεῖν γράφειν
καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ’ ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν
πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ’ ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως
ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλ-
λαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν
αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον
ἔχων γράψῃ “Θεαίτητον” μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης,
ὅταν ἐξῆς γράψῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

Β ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν, ὀρθὰ δὲ
δοξάζων, ὥς φάμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης· τὴν
γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ
λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθῇ
δόξᾳ, ἣν οὕτω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

43. ΣΩ. Ὅναρ δῆ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν
οἰθηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον.
ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις

¹ οἷται] οἷεται ΒΤ.

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soc. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing "Theaetetus" thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write "Theodorus" thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

soc. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

THEAET. No, nothing.

soc. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

THEAET. True.

soc. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

THEAET. There is not much doubt about it.

soc. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted

*Trial +
error?*

C αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἓν γέ τι ἔφαμεν⁸ λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῳς ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἓν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἶδωλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημείον εἰπεῖν ὧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

D ΣΩ. Οἶον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὥς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψει· ἕως δ' ἂν κοινού τινος ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ,

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is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

soc. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

soc. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

soc. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things

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αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγωνὸς ἔσται, οὐ πρότερον ἢν δοξαστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε,¹ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνεται τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

209 ΣΩ. Φράσω, εἰς οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε² ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, εἰ μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν λόγον, γινώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἐρμηνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διανοούμεν, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὺ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινουν; θεὸς γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἦ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με

¹ παντάπασιν ἔγωγε W; παντάπασί γε ἐγὼ T.

² ἔγωγε W; ἐγὼ T.

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will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion. X

THEAET. That is what we affirm.

soc. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting.¹ While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

soc. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

THEAET. It was.

soc. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

THEAET. You must have been.

soc. For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought "That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth" and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any

¹ In which perspective is the main thing.

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λ Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἑμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἔμοι δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἔμοι ἐνσημνηναμένη κατάθῃται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω ἐξ ὧν εἰ σύ· ἢ ἐμέ,¹ καὶ ἐὰν αὖριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

Δ ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάννυ γελοία γίνεται ἢ ἐπίταξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν

¹ εἰ σύ· ἢ ἐμέ Wohlrab; εἰ σύ· ἢ με W (but ἡ added later); εἰ σὺ ἐμέ B; εἰσεῖ ἐμέ T.

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more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians,¹ as the saying is?

THEAET. Of course not.

soc. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

THEAET. Not at all.

soc. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.

soc. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

THEAET. How so?

soc. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this

¹ The Mysians were despised as especially effeminate and worthless.

PLATO

σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπή
 Ε πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ
 δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ
 γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα
 μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκο-
 τωμένῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰπέ δὴ ¹ τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι
 κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἥδὲ
 χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης
 λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν
 210 ἐστίν· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπι-
 στήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης
 διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν
 εἴη κατ' ἐκείνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὖθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν
 ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης
 εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθη-
 σις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ'
 Β ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμῃ
 ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

¹ εἰπέ δὴ T (and W in marg.); εἰ γε δὴ B; εἰ γε δὴ B²W.

THEAETETUS

plan the twirling of a scytale¹ or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

THEAET. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

soc. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then, it seems, if asked, "What is knowledge?" our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

THEAET. Apparently not.

¹ A *σκυτάλη* was a staff, especially a staff about which a strip of leather was rolled, on which dispatches were so written that when unrolled they were illegible until rolled again upon another staff of the same size and shape.

ΣΟ. Ἡ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἣ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαντῷ διὰ σέ εἴρηκα.

ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

44. ΣΟ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴαντε
 C γίγνη, βελτιόνων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, εἴαντε κενὸς ᾗς, ἥττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι καλοί.
 D Νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἣν με γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.

THEAETETUS

soc. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

THEAET. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

soc. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

THEAET. It does, decidedly.

soc. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are to-day and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus¹ has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

¹ Meletus was one of those who brought the suit which led to the condemnation and death of Socrates.

THE SOPHIST

INTRODUCTION TO *THE SOPHIST*

IN *The Sophist* Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates in accordance with the agreement made in the final paragraph of the *Theaetetus*. They bring with them an Eleatic Stranger, who presently agrees to undertake, with the aid of Theaetetus, the definition of the Philosopher, the Statesman, and the Sophist. Thereupon, after selecting the Sophist as the first of the three to be defined, he proceeds to illustrate his method by defining the angler, on the ground that the Sophist is a difficult subject and that practice on an easier and slighter matter is desirable. The method employed in defining first the angler and then the Sophist is that of comparison and division successively into two parts. This method was probably, at the time when this dialogue was written, something of a novelty, and is employed also in *The Statesman*, which is closely connected with *The Sophist* both in form and substance. It must be admitted that the process of dichotomy becomes very tedious, which may possibly be one of Plato's reasons for making the Stranger, not Socrates, the chief speaker in these two dialogues. The definition of the Sophist—the avowed purpose of the dialogue—is

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carried on in a satirical and polemic spirit which is abundantly evident even when it is no longer possible to name the particular persons against whom the attack is directed.

But all this occupies only the opening and concluding passages. It is interrupted by what is in form a long digression, but is really the most serious and important part of the whole. In this (236 D—264 B) the method of dichotomy is given up and abstract questions are treated in a quite different manner. The Sophist has been found to be a juggler and deceiver, and the question arises whether deception or falsehood does not involve the assumption of Not-Being, which was persistently opposed by Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers in general. Plato refutes the doctrine that Not-Being cannot exist by showing that it has a relative existence—that in each particular instance it denotes a difference or condition of being other than that in connexion with which it is said to exist. It is not mere negation—the opposite of Being—but becomes the positive notion of Difference. This is the most important doctrine promulgated in this dialogue.

Hereupon follows the discussion of the nature of Being, and the conclusion is reached that everything which possesses any power, either to produce a change or to be affected by a cause, has existence (247 D), *i.e.*, that power—whether active or passive—is Being.

The problem of predication—of the possibility of assertion—is solved by making the distinction between verbs and nouns and defining the sentence as a combination of those two. If that combination corresponds to reality, the assertion is true, if not, it

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is false. How far this is original with Plato is difficult to determine. Other subjects discussed in this dialogue are the theory of knowledge, the relation between reality and appearance, and that between the one and the many. The introduction of the five "forms" or categories—Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other—is an interesting feature which may be interpreted as marking a stage in the development of the theory of ideas. This dialogue is important in content, though not especially attractive in form.

The date of *The Sophist* cannot be earlier, and may be considerably later, than that of the *Theaetetus*.

There is an edition of *The Sophist and Politicus*, with English notes, by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1864).

ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ · ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

St. I.
p. 216

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΞΕΝΟΣ ΕΛΕΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

Ι. ΘΕΟ. Κατὰ τὴν χθὲς ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκομεν αὐτοὶ τε κοσμίως καὶ τόνδε τινα ξένον ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἑλέας, ἐταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα,¹ μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.

ΞΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλὰ τινα θεὸν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὀμήρου λόγον λέληθας; ὃς Β. φησιν ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅποσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοῦς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένιον οὐχ ἥκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόμενον ὑβρεῖς τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τάχ' οὖν ἂν καὶ σοὶ τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενός τε καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὢν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ

¹ Ζήνωνα ἐταίρων mss. ; ἐταίρων om. Upton.

THE SOPHIST

[OR ON BEING: LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

THEODORUS, SOCRATES, AN ELEAN STRANGER, THEAETETUS

THEO. According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence¹ and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous,¹ of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument—a kind of god of refutation.

THEO. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger's

¹ A modified quotation from *Odyssey*, ix. 271; xvii. 485-7.

PLATO

ξένου, ἀλλὰ μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἀνὴρ¹
 C οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν· πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ φίλε. τοῦτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ τι ῥᾶον, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, εἶναι διακρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ· πάνν γὰρ ἄνδρες² οὗτοι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόληας, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν πολιτικοὶ
 D φαντάζονται, τοτὲ δὲ σοφισταί, τοτὲ δ' ἔστιν οἷς δόξαν παράσχοιντο ἂν ὥς παντάπασιν ἔχοντες μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἂν πυνθανοίμην, εἰ φίλον αὐτῷ, τί ταῦθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ
 217 τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

ΘΕΟ. Τὰ ποῖα δῆ;

ΣΩ. Σοφιστὴν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορηθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διανοήθης;

ΣΩ. Τόδε· πότερον ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ δύο, ἢ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθ' ἐν ὄνομα γένος ἐκάστω προσ-
 ἦπτον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλ' οὐδεὶς, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελθεῖν αὐτά· ἢ πῶς, ὦ ξένε, λέγωμεν;

B ΞΕ. Οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τριῖ ἡγοῦντο·

¹ ἀνὴρ Bekker; ἀνὴρ BT.

² ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.

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character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes,¹ thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities,¹ beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

theo. What matters do you mean?

soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

theo. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

theo. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

str. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they

¹ Cf. *Od.* xvii. 485-7.

καθ' ἕκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ράδιον ἔργον.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ' ἔλθειν διερωτῶντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἅπερ πρὸς σέ νῦν, καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γέ φησιν ἱκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνημονεῖν.

Κ 2. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ξένε, ἡμῶν τήν γε πρώτην αἰτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ, τοσόνδε δ' ἡμῖν φράζε· πότερον εἰώθας ἡδίων αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι λέγων τοῦτο ὃ ἂν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουλευθῆς, ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων, οἷόν ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;

ΞΕ. Τῷ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως προσδιαλεγομένῳ ῥᾶον οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ καθ' αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Ἐξεστι τοίνυν τῶν παρόντων ὃν ἂν βουλευθῆς ἐκλέξασθαι· πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούουσιν αἰ σοὶ πράως· συμβούλῳ μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τινὰ αἰρήσει, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις σοὶ κατὰ νοῦν.

ΞΕ. ὦ Σώκρατες, αἰδῶς τίς μ' ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνειν λόγον συχνόν κατ' ἑμαυτόν,
Ε εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, οἷον¹ ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὐχ ὅσον ὧδε ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίζειν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναι τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου

¹ ὁν Ast; ὅσον BT.

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considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

THEO. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

soc. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favour we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

STR. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

soc. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

STR. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On

παμμήκους ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τοῖσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες, ἄξινόν τι καταφαίνεται μοι καὶ ἄγριον. ἐπεὶ
 218 Θεαίτητόν γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι παντάπασιν ἐξ ὧν αὐτός τε πρότερον διείλεγμα καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὦ ξέने, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσι κεχαρισμένος ἔσει;

ΞΕ. Κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον εἶναι, Θεαίτητε· πρὸς δὲ σέ ἤδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, γίνονται ἂν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τῷ μήκει πονῶν ἄχθῃ, μὴ ἐμέ αἰτιᾶσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἐταίρους.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὕτως οὐκ ἂν ερεῖν· ἂν δ' ἄρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιώτην καὶ συγγυμναστήν, ᾧ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ' ἐμοῦ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄηθες.

3. ΞΕ. Εὖ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδίᾳ βουλεύσει προΐόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ σοι συσκεπτέον ἀρχομένων πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι
 C λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ καὶ γὰρ τούτου πέρι τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐφ' ᾧ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτερος τάχ' ἂν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἔχοιμεν· δεῖ δὲ αἰεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φύλον ὃ νῦν ἐπινοοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων ῥᾶστον συλλαβεῖν τί
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the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favour to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

THEAET. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

STR. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

THEAET. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

STR. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and

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ποτ' ἔστιν, ὁ σοφιστής· ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων
δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκ-
ται πᾶσιν καὶ πάσαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς
D καὶ ῥάοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς
μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔγωγε καὶ νῦν
οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσθήρευτον ἡγη-
σαμένοις εἶναι τὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν
ἄλλῳ ῥάονι τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετᾶν, εἰ
μὴ σύ ποθεν εὐπετεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔχω.

ΞΕ. Βούλει δῆτα περὶ τινος τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες
πειραθῶμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;

E ΘΕΑΙ. Naί.

ΞΕ. Τί δῆτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὔγνωστον μὲν καὶ
σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττονα ἔχον τῶν
μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής· ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσί τε
γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος
ἐπάξιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

219 ΞΕ. Μέθοδον μὴν αὐτὸν ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ
ἀνεπιτήδειον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

4. ΞΕ. Φέρε δῆ, τῇδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καὶ
μοι λέγε· πότερον ὥς τεχνίτην αὐτὸν ἢ τινα ἄτεχ-
νον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστά γε ἄτεχνον.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν
εἴδη δύο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὅση περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν
σῶμα θεραπεία, τό τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ
B πλαστόν, ὃ δὴ σκεῦος ὠνομάκαμεν, ἥ τε μιμητική,

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everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practise them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

THEAET. I have not.

STR. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

THEAET. That would be good.

STR. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

THEAET. Certainly not one without an art.

STR. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

THEAET. How so?

STR. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or moulded (utensils we call

ξύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαιοτάτ' ἂν¹ ἐνὶ προσαγο-
ρεύοιτ' ἂν ὀνόματι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς καὶ τίνοι;

ΞΕ. Πᾶν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερόν τις ὄν ὕστερον
εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγῃ, τὸν μὲν ἄγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀγό-
μενον ποιεῖσθαι πού φαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Τὰ δέ γε νῦν δὴ ἂ² διήλθομεν ἅπαντα εἶχεν
εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶχε γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ποιητικὴν τοίνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι
προσείπωμεν.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος
ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τό τε χρηματιστικὸν
καὶ ἀγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ
μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα τὰ
μὲν χειροῦται λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι, τὰ δὲ τοῖς
χειρουμένοις οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἂν που διὰ
ταῦτα ξυνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ
λεχθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί· πρόποι γὰρ ἂν.

5. ΞΕ. Κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς ξυμπασῶν
D οὐσῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρᾳ τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικὴν,
ὦ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν κτητικῇ που δήλον.

ΞΕ. Κτητικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὐ δύο εἶδη; τὸ μὲν ἐκόν-
των πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὄν διὰ τε δωρεῶν
καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἧ

¹ δικαιοτάτ' ἂν BT; δικαιοτάτα W, Stobaeus.

² ἂ om. BTW.

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them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

THEAET. How so, and what is the name?

STR. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

THEAET. Yes, they do.

STR. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, that would be proper.

STR. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

THEAET. In acquisitive art, clearly.

STR. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of

κατ' ἔργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον ξύμπαν
χειρωτικὸν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἄρ' οὐ διχῇ τμητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὅλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας,¹

Ε τὸ δὲ κρυφαῖον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὴν δέ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ
τέμνειν διχῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε ὅπη.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀψύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ'
ἐμψύχου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν; εἴπερ ἔστον γε ἄμφω.

220 ΞΕ. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ
μὲν τῶν ἀψύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὄν² πλὴν κατ' ἓνια
τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἅττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα
βραχέα, χαίρειν εἶᾶσαι, τὸ δέ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζώων
οὔσαν θήραν, προσειπεῖν ζωοθηρικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστω.

ΞΕ. Ζωοθηρικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὐ διπλοῦν εἶδος ἂν λέ-
γοιτο ἐν δίκῃ, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἵδεσι
καὶ ὀνόμασι διηρημένον, πεζοθηρικόν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον
νευστικοῦ ζώου πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

Β ΞΕ. Νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηγνὸν φύλον ὀρώ-
μεν, τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῶν ἡ
θήρα λέγεται πού τις ὀρνιθευτική.

¹ θέντας Stobaeus; θέντες BT.

² ὄν Heindorf; εἶν BTW.

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acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

THEAET. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

STR. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

THEAET. In what way?

STR. By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

THEAET. Say how it can be done.

STR. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

THEAET. Certainly, if both exist.

STR. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλιευτική.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ ποῖα;

ΞΕ. Καθ' ἃ τὸ μὲν ἔρκεσιν αὐτόθεν¹ ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἐκάτερον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἔνεκα κωλύσεως
C εἴργῃ τι περιέχον, ἔρκος εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἔρκῃ χρὴ προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἐρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φήσομεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ
D γιγνόμενον ἕτερον μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δέ τινα θήραν ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν ἐνὶ λόγῳ νῦν χρεῶν· ἢ τί τις ἂν, Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. Τῆς τοίνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινόν, οἶμαι, πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε μεθημερινόν, ὥς ἐχόντων ἐν ἄκροις ἀγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριοδόντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν.

¹ αὐτόθεν al.; αὐτόθι BT.

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THEAET. It is.

STR. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

THEAET. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

STR. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

THEAET. Assuredly.

STR. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word—call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

STR. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

Β. Τοῦ τοίνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἄνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριόδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριωδοντία τις, οἶμαι, κέκληται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασὶ γοῦν τινές.

Β. Τὸ δέ γε λοιπὸν ἔστιν ἐν ἔτι μόνον ὥς εἰπεῖν εἶδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Β. Τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτης πληγῆς, ἀγκίστρω
 221 τε γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐχ ἢ τις ἂν τύχη
 τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἐκά-
 στοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄνω ῥάβδοις
 καὶ καλάμοις ἀνασπώμενον· οὐ τί φήσομεν, ὦ
 Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοῦνομα λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν, ὅπερ ἄρτι προῦθέμεθα δεῖν
 ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.

Β. 7. Β. Νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ¹
 τε καὶ γὰρ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοῦνομα,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον εἰλήφαμεν
 ἱκανῶς. Συμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἡμῖσι
 μέρος κτητικὸν ἦν, κτητικὸν δὲ χειρωτικόν, χειρω-
 τικὸν δὲ θηρευτικόν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικόν,
 ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικόν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ
 τὸ κάτωθεν τμήμα ὅλον ἀλιευτικόν, ἀλιευτικῆς δὲ
 πληκτικόν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικόν· τούτου
 δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγὴν ἀνασπασμένην,

¹ σύ Heindorf; οὐ σύ BT.

¹ Plato's etymology—ἀσπαλιευτικὴ from ἀνασπᾶσθαι—is hardly less absurd than that suggested in the translation.
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THEÆT. Yes, it is so called.

STR. Then of striking which belongs to barbhunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

THEÆT. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

STR. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

THEÆT. What is that?

STR. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards; being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theætetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

THEÆT. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

STR. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting; and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barbhunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle¹ has a name in the very

The words *at an angle* are inserted merely to give a reason in English for the words which follow them.

C ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθὲν τοῦνομα, ἢ
νῦν ἀσπαλιευτική ζητηθεῖσα ἐπὶ κλην γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἱκανῶς δε-
δήλωται.

8. ΞΕ. Φέρε δὴ, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα
καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὔρεῖν, ὃ τί ποτ'
ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γ' ἦν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον,
πότερον ἰδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι
τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τοῦτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὦ
D Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην· μανθάνω γὰρ ὃ λέγεις,
ὡς παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος¹ εἶναι τό γε ὄνομα τοῦτο
ἔχων.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς
ἔοικε, θετέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα ποτ' οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

ΞΕ. Ἄρ' ὦ πρὸς θεῶν ἡγνοήκαμεν τὰνδρὸς τὸν
ἄνδρα ὄντα ξυγγενῇ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα τοῦ;

ΞΕ. Τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Θηρευτὰ τινα καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος θήρας ἄτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον
εἵπομεν.

ΞΕ. Δίχα που νῦν δὴ² διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν
πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

¹ παντὸς δεῖ τοιοῦτος Winckelmann; πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτος B;
πάντως δεῖ τοιοῦτον T. ² νῦν δὴ T; νῦν B.

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likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

THEAET. That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

STR. Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

THEAET. By all means.

STR. Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

THEAET. Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

STR. But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

THEAET. Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

STR. Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

THEAET. Who is akin to whom?

STR. The angler to the sophist.

THEAET. How so?

STR. They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

THEAET. What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

STR. We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νεν-
στικά τῶν ἐνύδρων· τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἄσχιστον,
εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυειδὲς εἷη.

222 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Μέχρι μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς τε
καὶ ὁ ἀσπαλιευτὴς ἅμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης
πορεύεσθον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοίκατον γοῦν.

ΞΕ. Ἐκτρέπεσθον δέ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς,
ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλατταν πον καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας,
τὰν τούτοις ζῶα θηρευσόμενος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΞΕ. Ὁ δέ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἑτέρους
αὐτῶν τινας, πλούτου καὶ νεότητος ὅλον λειμῶνας
ἀφθόλους, τὰν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρυσόμενος.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω
τινὲ μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖον ἑκάτερον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων.

9. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἴτ' ἔστι τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων;

ΞΕ. Εἵπερ γέ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἡμερον ζῶον.
θὲς δὲ ὅπη χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἡμερον, εἴτε
ἄλλο μὲν ἡμερόν τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄγριον, εἴτε
ἡμερον μὲν λέγεις αὐτὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπων
δὲ μηδεμίαν ἡγεῖ θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερ' ἂν ἡγῇ
φίλον εἰρῆσθαί σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἡμᾶς τε ἡμερον, ὦ ξέने, ἡγοῦμαι
ζῶον, θήραν τε ἀνθρώπων εἶναι λέγω.

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THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

THEAET. I think they do.

STR. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

THEAET. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

STR. Yes, if man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

THEAET. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.

ΞΕ. Διττήν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί λέγοντες;

ΞΕ. Τὴν μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα βίαιον θῆραν ὀρισάμενοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.

ΞΕ. Τὴν δέ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ξύνολον, πιθανουργικὴν
D τίνα μίαν τέχνην προσειπόντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἰδίᾳ, τὸ δὲ δημοσίᾳ γιγνόμε-
νον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἶδος ἐκάτερον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῇ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνητικόν¹ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΞΕ. Τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὕτω προσέσχες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;

E ΞΕ. Ὅτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἔστω εἶδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τοῦ δέ γε μισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομι-
λοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασιν δι' ἡδονῆς τὸ
δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον
τροφήν ἑαυτῷ μόνον κολακικὴν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι,

¹ μισθαρνητικόν Heindorf; μισθαρνευτικόν BTW (so also below).

THE SOPHIST

STR. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

THEAET. How do we justify that assertion?

STR. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

THEAET. Excellent.

STR. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

THEAET. Correct.

STR. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

THEAET. Granted; each of them does form a class.

STR. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers' method of hunting.

THEAET. In what respect?

STR. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

THEAET. You are quite right.

STR. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mis-

223 πάντες φαῖμεν ἂν ἡ¹ ἡδυντικήν τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιούμενον, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττόμενον, ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐτέρῳ προσειπεῖν ἄξιον ὀνόματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τίνι δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δὴ· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστήν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηρρηκέναι. τοῦτ' οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσήκον ὄνομ' ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτόν.

Β ΙΟ. ΞΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν νῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, χειρωτικῆς,² θηρευτικῆς, ζωοθηρίας,³ χερσαίας, ἡμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ιδιοθηρίας, μισθαρνικῆς, νομισματοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστική.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν⁴. οὐ γάρ τι φαύλης μέτοχόν ἐστι τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον, ἀλλ' εὖ μάλα ποικίλης. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται, μὴ τοῦτο ὁ νῦν αὐτὸ ἡμεῖς φάμεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον εἶναι τι γένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ δὴ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἦν εἰδὸς που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν.

¹ ἡ Heindorf; ἡ om. MSS.

² χειρωτικῆς add. Aldina; κτητικῆς MSS.; secl. Schleiermacher.

³ ζωοθηρίας περὶ ζωοθηρίας MSS.; περὶ ζωοθηρίας secl. Schleiermacher.

⁴ ἴδωμεν W; εἰδῶμεν BT.

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taken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And what is that name? Try to tell.

THEAET. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

STR. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

THEAET. Most assuredly.

STR. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

THEAET. How so?

STR. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἶδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀγοραστικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰρήσθω.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμνεσθαι.

Δ ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαιρούμενοι, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἡμῖς μέρος ὄν, καπηλική¹ προσαγορεύεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλαττόμενον² ὠνὴ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορικὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

Ε ΞΕ. Τῆς δ' ἐμπορικῆς ἄρ' οὐκ ἠσθήμεθα ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σῶμα τρέφεται καὶ χρῆται,³ τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχὴ πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἴσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ τό γε ἕτερόν που ξυνίεμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

224 ΞΕ. Μουσικὴν τε τοίνυν ξυνάπασαν λέγωμεν,

¹ καπηλική bt; καὶ πηλική BT.

² διαλλαττόμενον] διαλαττομένων BT; διαλάττον W.

³ καὶ χρῆται Heindorf; κέχρηται BT.

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THEAET. Yes, it was.

STR. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

THEAET. So be it.

STR. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

THEAET. How so?

STR. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?

THEAET. What do you mean by that?

STR. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Take, therefore, the liberal arts¹ in general

¹ The word *μουσική*, here rendered "liberal arts," is much more inclusive than the English word "music," designating, as it does, nearly all education and culture except the purely physical. In the Athens of Socrates' day many, possibly most, of the teachers of music in this larger sense were foreigners, Greeks, of course, but not Athenians.

ἐκ πόλεως ἐκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἔνθεν μὲν ὠνηθεῖσάν, ἐτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πιπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικὴν καὶ θαυματοποικὴν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἥττον τῆς τῶν σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἔμπορον ὀρθῶς ἂν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Β ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταῦτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΙΙ. ΞΕ. Τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἀρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαιοτάτα λέγοιτ' ἂν, τὸ δὲ γελοῖον μὲν οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὅμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὐσαν πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τινι τῆς πράξεως ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἀνάγκη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ C μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρω, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τεχνοπωλικὸν μὴν τό γε περὶ τὰλλα ἂν ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τις ἂν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοῖ πλὴν τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. Ἰθι δὴ νῦν¹ συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὥς τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς,²

¹ ἰθι νῦν BT (δὴ above the line T); ἰθι δὴ W.

² μεταβλητικῆς] μεταβλητικὸν BT.

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that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

THEAET. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

STR. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a

Δ ἀγοραστικῆς, ἐμπορικῆς,¹ ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λό-
γους καὶ μαθήματα, ἀρετῆς πωλητικὸν δεύτερον
ἀνεφάνη σοφιστική.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Τρίτον δέ γ' οἶμαί σε, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ
καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὠνούμενος, τὰ δὲ
καὶ τεκταινόμενος αὐτὸς μαθήματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ
ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προϋτάξατο,
καλεῖν οὐδέν ἄλλο πλὴν ὅπερ νῦν δῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλω;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἄρα μεταβλητικόν, ἀγορα-
Ε στικόν, καπηλικόν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικόν, ἀμφοτέρως,
ὅτιπερ ἂν ᾗ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθηματοπωλικόν
γένος, αἰεὶ σὺ προσερεῖς, ὥς φαίνει, σοφιστικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολου-
θεῖν.

ΙΖ. ΞΕ. Ἔτι δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἴ τιτι τοιῷδε
προσέοικεν ἄρα τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος.

225 ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστικῆ τι μέρος ἡμῖν ἦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν
δίχα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καθ' ὅποια λέγε.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ
μαχητικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. Τῆς τοίνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι

¹ ἐμπορικῆς] ἐμπορικοῦ ΒΤ.

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second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one's own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

THEAET. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

STR. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

THEAET. Of what nature?

STR. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, we did.

STR. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

THEAET. Tell what the parts are.

STR. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to

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πρὸς σώματα γιγνομένῳ σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον
ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἶον βιαστικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τῷ δὲ λόγοις πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὦ Θεαί-
B τητε, ἄλλο εἶπη πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν¹;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον
διττόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Καθ' ὅσον μὲν γὰρ γίνεταί μήκεσί τε πρὸς
ἐναντία μήκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ² δίκαια καὶ
ἄδικα δημοσίᾳ, δικανικόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἰδίῳ αὖ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον
ἐρωτήσεσι πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μὴν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν
ἄλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ
C ξυμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκὴ δὲ καὶ ἀτέ-
χως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα³ θετέον μὲν
εἶδος, ἐπεὶ περ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ὁ λόγος,
ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτυχεν
οὔτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ· κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ
παντοδαπὰ διήρηται.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε ἔντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν
καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν,
ἄρ' οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὖ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

¹ ἀμφισβητητικόν Stephanus; ἀμφισβητικόν BTW.

² τὰ om. TW.

³ ταῦτα BT; τοῦτο al.

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that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

THEAET. No other.

STR. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

THEAET. How?

STR. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

THEAET. We are.

STR. And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

THEAET. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

STR. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

THEAET. Certainly.

D **ΞΕ.** Τοῦ μὴν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὃν τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασί γε.

ΞΕ. Τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῖνυν, ἣν ἐκάτερον δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτῶν, πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΞΕ. Δοκῶ μὴν τό γε ¹ δι' ἡδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελὲς τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀκούμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὐχ ἕτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.

E **ΞΕ.** Τούτου τοῖνυν τοῖναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί ² τις ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἕτερον οὐκ ἐξ-αμάρτοι πλὴν γε τὸν θαυμαστόν πάλιν ἐκείνον ἦκειν αὖ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν σοφιστήν;

226 **ΞΕ.** Οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐριστικῆς ὃν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς,³ τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

I3. **ΞΕ.** Ὅρας οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον οὐ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτὸν⁴;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρή.

¹ τό γε vulg. ; τόδε BT ; τὸ δε W. ² τί add. Heindorf.

³ ἀμφισβητητικῆς] ἀμφισβητικῆς BTW.

⁴ ληπτὸν W ; ληπτέον BT.

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STR. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

THEAET. Yes, we must do so.

STR. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

THEAET. Yes, that is about what it is called.

STR. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

THEAET. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!

STR. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

THEAET. Then we must catch him with both.

PLATO

ΞΕ. Χρὴ γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύνάμιν γε οὕτω
B ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἵχνος αὐτοῦ.
καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὀνομάτων καλοῦμεν
ἅττα που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πολλά· ἀτὰρ ποῖα δὴ τῶν πολλῶν
πυνθάνει;

ΞΕ. Τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ
διαττᾶν καὶ βράττειν καὶ διακρίνειν.¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ πρὸς γε τούτοις ἔτι ξαίνειν, κατάγειν,
κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα
ἐνόντα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον αὐτῶν πέρι βουλευθεὶς δηλῶσαι
C παραδείγματα προθεῖς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἥρου;

ΞΕ. Διαιρετικά που τὰ λεχθέντα εἴρηται ξύμ-
παντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα
μίαν οὔσαν ἐν ᾧασι τέχνην ἐνὸς ὀνόματος ἀξιώ-
σομεν αὐτήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα προσειπόντες;

ΞΕ. Διακριτικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

ΞΕ. Σκόπει δὴ ταύτης αὖ δύο ἂν πη δυνώμεθα
κατιδεῖν εἶδη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταχεῖαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις.

D ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσειςι
τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίονος ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ
δ' ὁμοιον ἀφ' ὁμοίου.

¹ διακρίνειν] many emendations have been suggested, none
entirely satisfactory, and all probably unnecessary.

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STR. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

THEÆT. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

STR. To such as these: we say “sift” and “strain” and “winnow” and “separate.”¹

THEÆT. Certainly.

STR. And besides these there are “card” and “comb” and “beat the web” and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

THEÆT. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

STR. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

THEÆT. Yes.

STR. Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

THEÆT. What shall we call it?

STR. The art of discrimination.

THEÆT. Very well.

STR. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

THEÆT. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

STR. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

¹ Apparently a term descriptive of some part of the process of weaving; cf. *Cratylus*, 338 B.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λεχθὲν φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. Τῆς μὲν τοίνυν ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον· τῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβαλλούσης ἔχω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε τί.

ΞΕ. Πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἐγὼ ξυννοῶ, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

Ε ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὖ διπλοῦν ὃν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Naί, κατὰ σχολήν γε ἴσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε καθορῶ νῦν.

Ι4. ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρσεων ἐνὶ περιλαβεῖν ὀνόματι προσήκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα καὶ τίνοι;

ΞΕ. Τὰ τε τῶν ζώων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς ἱατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα
227 καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τὰκτός,¹ εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὀνόματα ἔσχεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Παντάσας μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποισίας οὐδὲν ἤττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαῖ-

¹ περὶ τὰκτός] περιτακτός B; τὰ περὶ τὰ ἐκτός & T.

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THEAET. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

STR. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

THEAET. Yes, so it is.

STR. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

THEAET. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

STR. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

THEAET. What are they and what is the name?

STR. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper's art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller's art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

THEAET. Very.

STR. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It en-

Βρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἔνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ συγγενές καὶ τὸ μὴ συγγενές κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἤρου, τί προσερούμεν ὄνομα συμπάσας δυνάμεις, ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἐμψυχον εἴτε ἄψυχον εἰλήχασι¹ καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει, ποῖόν τι

Ο λεχθέν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει· μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ξυνδῆσαν, ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχειρήκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἰ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μαυθάνομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἶδη καθάρσεως, ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὄν.

ΞΕ. Πάντων κάλλιστα. καὶ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο

Ο ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος αὐτὸ λεχθέν διχῇ τέμνειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καθ' ὅποι' ἂν ὑφηγῇ πειράσομαί σοι συντέμνειν.

Ι5. ΞΕ. Πονηρίαν ἕτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λεγόμεν τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν καθαρμὸς ἦν τὸ λείπειν² μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἦ πού τι φλαῦρον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἄρα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν εὐρίσκωμεν

¹ εἰλήχασι W; εἰλήφασι BT.

² λείπειν Heindorf; λιπεῖν BT.

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deavours to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honours them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

THEAET. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

STR. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

THEAET. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

STR. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

THEAET. Yes, it was.

STR. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil

κακίας ἀφαίρεσίν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθελγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Δύο μὲν εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχὴν ῥητέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα;

228 ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἷον αἰσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔμαθον.

ΞΕ. Νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐν νόμικας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΞΕ. Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν¹;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' αἰσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν² γένος;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἡσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Συγγενῇ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὁρθῶς ἐροῦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

C ΞΕ. Τί δ'; ὅσ' αὖ³ κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπὸν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα⁴ τούτου τυγχάνειν

¹ διαφθορᾶς διαφορὰν Galen; διαφθορᾶς διαφθορὰν BT, Stobaeus.

² ἐνὸν Schleiermacher; ἐν δὲ Stobaeus; ἐν δὲ t; δὲ BT.

³ ὅσ' αὖ Cobet; ὅσα BT.

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from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

THEAET. Very properly.

STR. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

THEAET. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

STR. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

THEAET. No; I think it is nothing else.

STR. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

THEAET. Nothing else at all.

STR. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

THEAET. Yes, they are, decidedly.

STR. Yet they must all be naturally related.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

THEAET. Yes, quite right.

STR. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark

⁴ *πειρώμενα* T, Galen, Stobaeus; *πειρώμεθα* W; om. B.

καθ' ἐκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται¹ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνη,² πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τούναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἴσμεν ἀκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστὶν ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμω-
D μένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἀμετρον θετέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. Ἔστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε ἀγνοίαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὃ νῦν δὴ λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόησά σου, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ξύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσον ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντο-
δαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἰσχος θετέον.

¹ γίγνηται BT; γίνεται al.

² ἀποτυγχάνη T; ἀποτυγχάνει B et al.

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and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion?¹

THEAET. Evidently through disproportion.

STR. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

THEAET. Very much so.

STR. Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

THEAET. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

¹ The connexion between disproportion and missing the mark is not obvious. The explanation that a missile (*e.g.* an arrow) which is not evenly balanced will not fly straight, fails to take account of the words *πρὸς ἀλλήλα*. The idea seems rather to be that moving objects of various sizes, shapes, and rates of speed must interfere with each other.

16. Ή. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σώματί γε περὶ δύο παθήματα
τούτῳ δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνε τούτῳ;

229 Ή. Περὶ μὲν αἰσχος γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ νόσον
ιατρική.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεσθον.

Ή. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὕβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ
δειλίαν ἢ κολαστικὴ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ
πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκη¹;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὥς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρω-
πίνην δόξαν.

Ή. Τί δέ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μὲν ἄλλην
τινὰ ἢ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἶποι τις ἄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

Ή. Φέρε δὴ διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἄρα ἐν μόνον
B γένος φατέον εἶναι ἢ πλείω, δύο δέ τινα αὐτῆς
εἶναι μεγίστω, σκόπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπῶ.

Ή. Καί μοι δοκοῦμεν τῇδε ἂν πη τάχιστα εὐρεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

Ή. Τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἴ πη κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς²
τομὴν ἔχει τινά. διπλὴ γὰρ αὕτη γιγνομένη δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν,
ἐν ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἑκατέρῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν; καταφανές πῃ σοι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον;

C Ή. Ἀγνοίας γοῦν³ μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ
χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὅρῳ εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις
αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθμον μέρεσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖον δὴ;

Ή. Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δι' οὗ

¹ Δίκη Cobet; δίκη BT, Stobaeus.

² αὐτῆς W; αὐτῆς BT.

³ γοῦν W; δ' οὖν BT.

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STR. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

THEAET. What are they?

STR. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

THEAET. That is clear.

STR. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

THEAET. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

STR. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

THEAET. No, none.

STR. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

THEAET. I am thinking.

STR. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

THEAET. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

STR. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Thinking that one knows a thing when one

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κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοία σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοῦνομα προσρηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ἄρα μέρει τῷ τοῦτο ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ξένε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι' ἡμῶν κεκλήσθαι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἔτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀκεπτέον, εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.

I7. ΞΕ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πη σχίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί;

ΞΕ. Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἢ μὲν Ε τραχυτέρα τις ἔοικεν ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἕτερον αὐτῆς μόνον λειότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον λέγωμεν;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ὦ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς μάλιστ' ἐχρῶντό τε καὶ ἔτι πολλοὶ χρῶνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν
230 χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέως παραμυθούμενοι· τὸ δ' οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικῇν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε, εἴξασί¹ τινες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς

¹ εἴξασί BT, Stobaeus; ὡς εἴξασί vulg.

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does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

THEAET. True.

STR. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

THEAET. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

STR. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

THEAET. Yes, we must see about that.

STR. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

THEAET. On what principle?

STR. Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

THEAET. What shall we call each of these?

STR. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

THEAET. That is true.

STR. On the other hand, some appear to have con-

δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν ἐθέλῃν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὧν οἶοιτο περί δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῳς γε νομίζοντες.

B ΕΞ. Τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλω τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνι δῆ;

ΕΞ. Διερωτῶσιν ὧν ἂν οἴηται τίς τι περί λέγειν λέγων μηδέν· εἰθ' ἅτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥαδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταῦτόν τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς ¹ ἅμα περί τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐναντίας· οἱ δ' ὁρῶντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ
C αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν ² ἀπαλλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὦ παῖ φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἱατροὶ νενομίκασι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σῶμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διανοήθησαν ἐκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξῃ τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησι,
D πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίου δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνῃ καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι μόνον, πλείω δὲ μή.

¹ αὐταῖς] αὐταῖς BT.

² πασῶν Stobaeus; πασῶν τε BT.

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vinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

THEAET. They are quite right.

STR. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

ΘΕΑΙ. Βελτίστη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἔξεων αὕτη.

ΞΕ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὥς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐτονομιστέον, ἃν καὶ τυγχάνη βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὢν, Ε τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαιδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχροὺς γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΙΒ. ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτη χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ
231 τίνας φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Μὴ μείζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

ΞΕ. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας αἰεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακὴν· ὀλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὅμως δὲ ἔστωσαν· οὐ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἶομαι γενήσεσθαι
B τότε ὅποταν ἱκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὐν τό γε εἶκός.

ΞΕ. Ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτικῆς, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχὴν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτου δὲ διδασκαλικῆς, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανέντι μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλην ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστικῆς.

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THEAET. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

STR. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

STR. Well then, who are those who practise this art? I am afraid to say the sophists.

THEAET. Why so?

STR. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honour.

THEAET. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

STR. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

THEAET. No, probably not.

STR. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λεγέσθω μὲν· ἀπορῶ δὲ ἔγωγε ἤδη διὰ
C τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα
καὶ δισχυριζόμενον εἰπεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν.

ΞΕ. Εἰκότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοι κακεῖνον
ἡγείσθαι χρή νῦν ἤδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅπη ποτὲ ἔτι
διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὀρθὴ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ τὰς
ἀπάσας μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ
μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις.

ΙΘ. ΞΕ. Πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἶον ἐξαναπνεύσω-
μεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀνα-
D πανόμενοι, φέρε, ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται.
δοκῶ μὲν γάρ,¹ τὸ πρῶτον ἡρέθη νέων καὶ
πλουσιῶν ἔμμισθος θηρευτής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς
ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τρίτον δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κάπηλος
ἀνεφάνη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ
μαθήματα ἡμῖν ἦν.²

ΞΕ. Ὅρθως ἐμνημόνευσας. πέμπτον δ' ἐγὼ
πειράσομαι μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς
E περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην
ἀφωρισμένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὅμως
δ' ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίω
μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

¹ γάρ W; γὰρ ἂν BT.

² ἦν add. Heindorf.

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THEAET. Let us agree to all that ; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

STR. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument ; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler's grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigour.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge ?

THEAET. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

STR. Your memory is good ; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

THEAET. Yes, he was.

STR. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

THEAET. Very true.

232 **ΠΕ.** Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπινοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνεται, μᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὀνόματι προσ-
αγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τοῦτο ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑγιές,
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτὸ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὐ
δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ
μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν
ἀνθ' ἑνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει τοῦτο ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυ-
κέναι.

Β 20. **ΠΕ.** Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς γε αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ
δι' ἀργίαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτόν τι
τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἐν γὰρ τί μοι
μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνῦον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΠΕ. Ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΠΕ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδά-
σκαλον γίνεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΠΕ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, περὶ τίνος ἄρα καὶ φασὶν οἱ
τοιούτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικούς. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐξ
Α ἀρχῆς ἔστω τῇδε πῃ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θείων,
ὅς' ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀρ' ἱκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο
δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γοῦν¹ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

ΠΕ. Τί δ' ὅσα φανερά γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ
τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΠΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις,
ὁπόταν γενέσεώς τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων

¹ γοῦν W; οὖν BT.

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STR. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labours under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

THEAET. Something like that is very likely to be the case.

STR. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

THEAET. Which was it?

STR. I think we said he was a disputer.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

THEAET. That is their reputation, at any rate.

STR. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

THEAET. Those are included, of course.

STR. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in

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λέγηται τι, ξύνισμεν ὡς αὐτοί τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατοὺς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάσασί γε.

D ΉΕ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ ξυμπάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἄρ' οὐχ ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικούς¹;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχνουμένοις.

ΉΕ. Τὰ γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ Πρωταγόρεά μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης
E καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.

ΉΕ. Καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἐτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἱκανή τις δύναμις ἔοικ' εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γοῦν σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.

ΉΕ. Σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ παῖ, δυνατόν ἡγεῖ τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ἂν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὑξύτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον.

233 ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον, καὶ πρὸς τί μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γάρ πω κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΉΕ. Εἰ πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μακάριον μέντ' ἂν ἡμῶν, ὦ ξένε, ἦν τὸ γένος.

ΉΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ποτέ τις πρὸς γε τὸν ἐπιστάμενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ὢν δύναιτ' ἂν ὑγιές τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

¹ ἀμφισβητητικούς] ἀμφισβητικούς T.

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general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

THEAET. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

STR. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

THEAET. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

STR. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

THEAET. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

STR. For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

THEAET. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

STR. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

THEAET. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

STR. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Τί ποτ' οὖν ἂν εἴη τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαῦμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

Β ΞΕ. Καθ' ὃν τινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν, ὥς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὥς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὀρθῶς μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοί τε εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σὸν¹ δὴ τοῦτο, σχολῇ ποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἤθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητῆς γίγνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχολῇ μέντ' ἂν.

ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γ' ἐθέλουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

Γ ΞΕ. Δοκοῦσι γάρ, οἶμαι, πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἅπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Δρῶσι δέ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἅπαντα, φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ὄντες γε· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

Δ ΞΕ. Δοξαστικὴν ἄρα τινα περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστῆς ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφτανται.

¹ τὸ σὸν] τόσον BTW.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. He cannot at all.

STR. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

THEAET. Magical power in what respect?

STR. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you,¹ would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. But now people do care to do so?

THEAET. Very much.

STR. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And they do that about all things, do they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

THEAET. Of course it is impossible.

STR. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

¹ Cf. 232 D.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι.

ΞΕ. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερόν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τόδε. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Εἴ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ' ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μιᾷ τέχνῃ ξυνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς πάντα εἶπες;

ΞΕ. Τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σύ γ' ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ ξύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθά-
νεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Λέγω τοίνυν σέ καὶ ἐμέ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ δένδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Εἴ τις ἐμέ καὶ σέ καὶ τᾶλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσιν¹ φαίη.

234 ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ γεωργόν γε ἐρεῖς τινα· καὶ γὰρ ζώων αὐτὸν εἶπες ποιητήν.

ΞΕ. Φημί, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς² καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμπάντων· καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἕκαστα πάνυ μικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παιδιὰν λέγεις τινά.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἶδε καὶ

¹ ποιήσιν W; ποιησιν BT. ² καὶ γῆς W; om. BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

STR. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

THEAET. What sort of an example?

STR. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

THEAET. What is the question?

STR. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things—

THEAET. What do you mean by all things?

STR. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word "all."

THEAET. No, I do not.

STR. I mean you and me among the "all," and the other animals besides, and the trees.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

THEAET. What would he mean by "making"? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

STR. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

THEAET. This is some joke of yours.

STR. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small

ταῦτα ἕτερον ἂν διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μὴ οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως που.

B ΕΕ. Παιδιάς δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τι τεχνικώτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μιμητικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς· πάμπλου γὰρ εἴρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἐν πάντα ξυλλαβὼν καὶ σχεδὸν ποικιλώτατον.

22. ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν γ' ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατόν εἶναι μιᾷ τέχνῃ πάντα ποιεῖν γινώσκομέν που τοῦτο, ὅτι μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατός ἐσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παιδῶν, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύς, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτι περ ἂν βουληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὢν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργῳ.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ δῆ; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄρ' οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναι τινα ἄλλην τέχνην, ἢ αὐτὸ δυνατόν ὄν τυγχάνει ¹ τοὺς νέους καὶ ἔτι πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὥτων τοῖς λόγοις γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνη;

ΕΕ. Τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνου τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὖσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μετα-

¹ ἢ αὐτὸ δυνατόν ὄν τυγχάνει Burnet; ἢ (ἢ T) οὐ δυνατόν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει BT; ἢ ὃν δυνατόν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει Madvig.

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price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

THEAET. Surely we must.

STR. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

THEAET. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

STR. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

THEAET. Why should there not be such another art?

STR. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience¹ openly to lay hold on realities; they

¹ Apparently a reference to a proverbial expression. Cf. Hesiod, *Works*, 216 *ἐγνώ παθών*; Herodotus, i. 207 *τὰ παθήματα μαθήματα*.

βάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὥστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ ῥάδια, καὶ
 Ε πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων παραγενομένων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶδε ὄντι κρῖναι. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἔτι πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

ΞΕ. Τοιγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἶδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἄνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι
 235 λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστὶ τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διστάζομεν ἔτι μὴ περὶ ὧν περ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατόν εἶναι, περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ ξέने; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἤδη σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδείας μεταχόντων ἐστὶ τις εἰς.¹

ΞΕ. Γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετέον;

23. ΞΕ. Ἄγε δὴ, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἤδη τὸν
 Β θῆρα μηκέτ' ἀνεῖναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτόν περιελήφамεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστροικῶ τινι τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὥστε οὐκέτ'² ἐκφεύξεταί τοδε γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ³ ποῖον;

¹ τις εἰς Heusde; τις μερῶν εἰς BT (giving εἰς to the stranger); τις μερῶν εἰς W.

² οὐκέτ' W; οὐκ ἔτι B; ουκ T.

³ τὸ W; om. BT.

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will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

THEAET. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

STR. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

THEAET. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

STR. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

THEAET. Of course he must.

STR. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

THEAET. What next thing?

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἷς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάμοι τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΞΕ. Δέδοκται¹ τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαιρεῖν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάνας εἰς αὐτήν, ἔαν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθύς ὁ σοφιστὴς ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ
C λόγου, κάκείνῳ παραδόντας ἀποφῆναι τὴν ἄγραν· ἔαν δ' ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μιμητικῆς δύηται πῃ, ξυνακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας αἰετὴν τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοῖραν, ἕως περ ἂν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὗτος οὔτε ἄλλο γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπεύξεται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ' ἑκάσταν τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ποιητέον.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς
D διαιρέσεως ἔγωγέ μοι καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι δύο καθορᾶν εἶδη τῆς μιμητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητουμένην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ' ἡμῖν οὔσα τυγχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δ' ἄλλ' εἰπέ πρῶτον καὶ διέλεε ἡμῖν, τί νῦν δύο λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἔστι δ' αὕτη μάλιστα, ὅποταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα
E ἀποδιδούς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις,² τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ'; οὐ πάντες οἱ μιμούμενοί τι τοῦτ' ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν;

¹ δέδοκται] δέδεικται BT; δεδεικται W.

² ἐκάστοις Stobaeus, W; ἐκάσταις BT.

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STR. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

THEAET. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

STR. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

THEAET. You are right. That is what we must do.

STR. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

THEAET. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

STR. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colours to each part.

THEAET. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?

ΞΕ. Οὐκ οὖν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττου-
 σιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδίδοιεν τὴν τῶν
 καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἷσθ' ὅτι σμικρότερα
 236 μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω
 φαίνοιτ' ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν
 ὑφ' ἡμῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.¹

ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ
 δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὐσας συμμετρίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς
 δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.²

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκὸς γε ὄν,
 εἰκόνα καλεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

B ΞΕ. Καὶ τῆς γε μιμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος
 κλητέον, ὅπερ εἶπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κλητέον.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ
 καλοῦ θεᾶν εἰκέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἴ τις
 λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾶν, μὴδ' εἰκὸς ᾧ
 φησιν εἰκέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἄρ' οὐκ, ἐπεὶ περ
 φαίνεται μὲν, ἔοικε δὲ οὐ, φάντασμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν
 C τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ ξύμπασαν μιμητικὴν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ φάντασμα³ ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργα-
 ζομένην τέχνην ἄρ' οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ' ἂν
 προσαγορεύοιμεν;

¹ πάνυ μὲν οὖν T, Stobaeus; om. B.

² πάνυ μὲν οὖν BT; παντάπασί γε W.

³ φάντασμα W; φαντάσματα BT.

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STR. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

THEAET. It is to be so called.

STR. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavourable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be "fantastic art," would it not?

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε.

ΞΕ. Τούτω τοῖνυν τῷ δύο ἔλεγον εἶδη τῆς εἰδωλο-
ποικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Ὁ δέ γε καὶ τότε ἡμφεγνόουν, ἐν¹ ποτέρα²
τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσα-
D σθαι σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἀνὴρ³ καὶ
κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὖ καὶ
κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἶδος διερευνήσασθαι κατα-
πέφeyγεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὸ γινώσκων ξύμφης, ἥ σε
οἶον ρύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνεθισμένον συνεπε-
σπάσατο⁴ πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ξυμφῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί⁵ τοῦτο εἶρηκας;

24. ΞΕ. Ὅντως, ὦ μακάριε, ἐσμέν ἐν παντά-
E πασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ
τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἅττα,
ἀληθῇ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι μεστὰ ἀπορίας αἰεὶ
ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα
χρῆ ψευδῇ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο
φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογία μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντά-
237 πασιν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ
ὄν εἶναι· ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν.
Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῶν οὖσιν

¹ ἐν add. Bessarionis liber.

² ποτέρα B; πότερα TW.

³ ἀνὴρ Bekker; ἀνὴρ BT.

⁴ συνεπεσπάσατο W; νῦν ἐπεσπάσατο BT.

⁵ τί W; ὅτι BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. By all means.

STR. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

THEAET. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

STR. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

THEAET. Why?

STR. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to

PLATO

ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο,
πεζῇ τε ὥδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων·

οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ,¹ φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήμενος² εἶργε νόημα.

Β παρ' ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστα γε
δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτός³ ἂν δηλώσειε μέτρια
βασανισθεῖς. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα,
εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπη βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ
λόγον ἢ βέλτιστα διέξεις σκοπῶν αὐτός τε ἴθι
κάμῃ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ἄγε.

25. ΞΕ. Ἄλλὰ χρή δρᾶν ταῦτα. καὶ μοι λέγε·
τὸ μηδαμῶς ὃν τολμῶμέν που φθέγγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἔριδος ἔνεκα μηδὲ παιδιᾶς, ἀλλ'
C εἰ σπουδῇ⁴ δέοι συννοήσαντά τινα ἀποκρίνασθαι
τῶν ἀκροατῶν ποῖ χρή τοῦνομ' ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο τὸ
μὴ ὄν· τί⁵ δοκοῦμεν ἂν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτόν
τε καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυνθανομένῳ δεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὸν ἦρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἷω γε
ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' οὖν τοῦτό γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων
ἐπὶ τι⁶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ οἰστέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸ
τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἂν τις φέροι.

¹ τοῦτο δαμῇ Simplicius; τοῦτ' οὐδαμῇ BT.

² διζήμενος BTW (διζήσιος 258 D).

³ αὐτός W; οὗτος BT.

⁴ ἀλλ' εἰ σπουδῇ Bekker; ἀλλης ποῦ δὴ B; ἀλλή σπουδῇ T.

⁵ τί] ὅτι TW.

⁶ τι om. BT.

THE SOPHIST

the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse :

Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is ;
But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it's all the same to you.

THEAET. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued ; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

STR. Very well, then. Now tell me ; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being ?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question "To what is the designation 'not-being' to be applied ?" how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object ?

THEAET. That is a difficult question ; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

STR. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term "not-being" cannot be applied to any being.

THEAET. Of course not.

STR. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δῆ;

D ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν που φανερόν, ὥς καὶ τὸ
 “τὶ” τοῦτο ῥῆμα ἐπ’ ὄντι λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε·
 μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὥσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπρημω-
 μένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΞΕ. Ἄρα τῇδε σκοπῶν ξύμφης ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν τι
 λέγοντα ἐν γέ τι λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Ἐνὸς γὰρ δὴ τό γε “τὶ” φήσεις σημεῖον
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ “τινὲ” δυοῖν, τὸ δὲ “τινὲς” πολλῶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

E ΞΕ. Τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τι λέγοντα ἀναγκαιότατον,
 ὥς ἔοικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν
 τοιοῦτον λέγειν μὲν,¹ λέγειν μέντοι μηδέν, ἀλλ’
 οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὅς γ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ μὴ ὄν φθέγ-
 γεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

238 26. ΞΕ. Μήπω μέγ’ εἶπης· ἔτι γάρ, ὦ μα-
 κάριε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτά γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη
 καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕσα
 τυγχάνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκνήσης.

ΞΕ. Τῷ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένειτ’ ἂν τι τῶν
 ὄντων ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντι δέ τι² τῶν ὄντων ἄρα προσγίγνεσθαι
 φήσομεν δυνατόν εἶναι;

¹ μὲν τι BT; τι om. Schleiermacher.

² ὄντι δέ τι] ὄν δέ τι B; ὄντι δέ T.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. How could it?

STR. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word "something" of some being, for to speak of "something" in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And you will agree that "something" or "some" in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

THEAET. Quite necessarily.

STR. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say "not-being" does not speak at all?

THEAET. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

STR. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

THEAET. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

STR. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?

PLATO

- ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;
 ΞΕ. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ζύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.
 B ΘΕΑΙ. Εἵπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὥς ὄν.
 ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μήτε
 πλήθος μήτε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὄν προσφέρειν.
 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν ἂν ὀρθῶς γε, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἐπιχει-
 ροῖμεν, ὥς φησιν ὁ λόγος.
 ΞΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἡ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγγεται
 ἂν τις ἢ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ
 ὄντα ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε πῇ;
 ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἄρα οὐ πλήθος
 C ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;
 ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄν δέ, ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.
 ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιόν γε οὔτε ὀρθόν φάμεν
 ὄν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.
 ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.
 ΞΕ. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὥς οὔτε φθέγγασθαι δυνατόν
 ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ
 καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανόητόν τε καὶ ἄρρητον
 καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
 D ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγί-
 στην ἀπορίαν εἶναι αὐτοῦ περί;
 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ δὲ ¹ ἐτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἄλλην ἔχομεν;
 ΞΕ. Τί δέ, ² ὦ θαυμάσιε; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς

¹ τοῦ δὲ in marg. T; τόδε BT; τὸ δὲ W; τί δὲ in marg. al.;
 τὸ δὲ (τί δέ) . . . ἔχομεν attributed to the Stranger by
 Winckelmann and others.

² τί δέ B; τί δαί T; τίνα δὴ Winckelmann and others.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.

THEAET. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.

STR. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.

THEAET. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.

STR. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?

THEAET. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.

STR. When we say "things which are not," do we not attribute plurality to them?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And in saying "a thing which is not," do we not equally attribute the singular number?

THEAET. Obviously.

STR. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?

THEAET. Absolutely.

STR. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject?

THEAET. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?

STR. Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the

PLATO

λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστησι τὸ μὴ ὄν οὕτως, ὥστε, ὁπόταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρή τις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ περὶ ἐκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φής; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. Εἰ γὰρ μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἐνὸς οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὄν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἄρτι τε καὶ νῦν οὕτως ἐν αὐτὸ εἴρηκα· τὸ μὴ ὄν γὰρ φημί. ξυνίης τοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἄφθελκτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἶναι. ξυνέπει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Συνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος
239 ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνει.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὥς ἐνὶ διελεγόμην;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἄλογόν τε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄφθελκτόν ὥς γε πρὸς ἐν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Φαμέν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὥς ἐν μήτε ὥς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἐνὸς γὰρ εἶδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἂν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασί γε.

THE SOPHIST

very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

THEAET. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

STR. You must not look for more clearness in me ; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one ; for I say "that which is not." You understand surely?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then when I undertook to attach the verb "to be" to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

THEAET. Evidently.

STR. Well, then ; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

THEAET. Of course you did.

STR. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it "it" at all ; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

THEAET. Certainly.

B 27. ΞΕ. Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γ' ἔτι τί τις¹ ἂν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὖροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἔμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἰ² δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεψώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΞΕ. Ἴθι ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἅτε νέος ὢν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλήθος ἀριθμοῦ προστιθεὶς τῷ μὴ ὄντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθόν³ φθέγγασθαι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαυτὸ ὁρῶν πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροίην.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμέ χαίρειν ἐώμεν· ἕως δ' ἂν τινι δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυχχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἄπορον ὁ σοφιστὴς τόπον καταδέδυκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

D ΞΕ. Τοιγαροῦν εἴ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν τέχνην, ῥαδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἀποστρέψει⁴ τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιὸν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρή, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτῶμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδῶλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα πού τοιαυτ' ἔσθ' ἕτερα.

¹ ἐμέ γ' ἔτι τί τις] ἐμέ τε τι τίς B; ἐμέ γε ἔτι τις T; ἐμέ ἔτι τί τις W. ² εἰα Bessarion's copy; εἰ BT.

THE SOPHIST

STR. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

THEAET. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

STR. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

THEAET. That seems to be decidedly the case.

STR. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by "image," exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man's question.

THEAET. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

³ τὸ ὀρθὸν B; τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον T.

⁴ ἀποστρέψει corr. T; ἀποτρέψει BTW.

Ε 28. ΉΕ. Φανερός, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΉΕ. Δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὅμματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΉΕ. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδῶς ἔαν ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ πλάσμασι λέγῃς τι, καταγελάσεται σου τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λέγῃς αὐτῷ, 240 προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ὕδατα γιγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖον;

ΉΕ. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἠξίωσας ἐνὶ προσειπεῖν ὀνόματι φθελγόμενος εἰδωλον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς ἐν ὄν. λέγε οὖν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἄνδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆτα, ὦ ξέने, εἰδωλον ἂν φαῖμεν εἶναι πλὴν γε τὸ πρὸς ἀληθινὸν ἀφωμοιωμένον ἕτερον τοιοῦτον;

ΉΕ. Ἐτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ Β τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶπες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκὸς μὲν.

ΉΕ. Ἄρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὄντως ὄν λέγων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΉΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἀρ' ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΉΕ. Οὐκ ὄντως ¹ ὄν ² ἄρα λέγεις τὸ εἰκός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἐρεῖς.

¹ ὄντως W; ὄντων B; om. T.

² ὄν T; οὐκὸν B; οὐκ ὄν W.

THE SOPHIST

STR. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

THEAET. Why?

STR. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

THEAET. How so?

STR. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said "image" of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

THEAET. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?

STR. Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say "such"?

THEAET. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.

STR. And by the true you mean that which really is?

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And the not true is the opposite of the true?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι γε μὴν πως.¹

ΞΕ. Οὐκουν² ἀληθῶς γε, φῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν· πλήν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ὃν³ ἄρα⁴ ὄντως ἔστιν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

C ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὃν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.

ΞΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὁρᾷς γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἐπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἠνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὃν οὐχ ἐκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἶναί πως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρῳ καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῆ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις;

D ΞΕ. Ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναί τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδῇ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ' ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴπαιμεν;

ΞΕ. Ψευδὴς δ' αὖ δόξα ἔσται τάναντία τοῖς οὖσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάναντία.

ΞΕ. Λέγεις ἄρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῇ δόξαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

E ΞΕ. Πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν, ἢ πως εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;

¹ πως Hermann; πῶς; BT (the previous words being given to the stranger).

² οὐκουν W; οὐκοῦν T; οὐκὸν B.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. But it does exist, in a way.

STR. But not truly, you mean.

THEAET. No, except that it is really a likeness.

STR. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

THEAET. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.

STR. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

THEAET. Yes, I see that very well.

STR. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

THEAET. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

STR. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

THEAET. We shall say that. What else could we say?

STR. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

³ οὐκ δὲ] οὐκὸν B; οὐκ οὖν T.

⁴ ἀρα Badham; ἀρα οὐκ BT.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶναι πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἵπερ ψεύ-
σεται ποτέ τις τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

ΞΕ. Τί δ' ; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα
δοξάζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. Καὶ λόγος, οἶμαι, ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταῦτα ¹
241 νομισθῆσεται τά τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ
ὄντα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ² τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;

ΞΕ. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστὴς
οὐ φήσει. ἢ τίς μηχανὴ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὖ
φρονούντων, ὅταν ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἄλογα
καὶ ἀδιανόητα προδιωμολογημένα ³ ἢ τὰ πρὸ
τούτων ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
ἂ λέγει ⁴;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τάναντία
φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νῦν δὴ, ψευδῇ τολμήσαντας
εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστιν ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ
B γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις
ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νῦν δὴ πού τοῦτο
εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

29. ΞΕ. Ὅρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἀλλ' ὥρα ⁵
δὴ βουλευσασθαι ⁶ τί χρή δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι·
τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διε-
ρευνῶμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνῃ
τιθέντες, ὁρᾶς ὡς εὐποροὶ καὶ πολλοί.

¹ ταῦτα Stobaeus; ταῦτα ταῦτα B; ταῦτα T; ταῦτα ταῦτα W.

² ἄλλως W, Stobaeus; ἄλλος BT.

³ προδιωμολογημένα T; προσδιωμολογημένα B; ἀφθεγκτα . . .
ἀδιανόητα om. Madvig, Schanz, Burnet.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

STR. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And this too is falsehood?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

THEAET. In what other way could a statement be made false?

STR. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

- THEAET. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

STR. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

⁴ λέγει] λέγεις BT.

⁵ ὥρα] ὅρα BT.

⁶ βουλευσασθαι T; βουλευεσθαι B; om. Burnet.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Μικρὸν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν,
C οὐσῶν ὡς ἔπος εἶπεν ἀπεράντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν γ' ἄν,¹ ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶη τὸν
σοφιστὴν ἐλεῖν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶοι τ' ἐπιλαβέσθαι πη τάνδρός ἐσμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἐξεῖς οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες
ἀγαπήσεις ἕάν πη καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα
οὕτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἔξω;

D ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παραιτοῦμαί σε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Μή με οἶον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνε-
σθαί τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγ-
καῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ
βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὄν
αὐτὸ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις.

ΞΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον
δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῶ; τούτων γὰρ μήτε ἐλεγχθέντων
E μήτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτέ τις οἷός τε ἔσται
περὶ λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων
εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μιμημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων
αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτά εἰσι,
μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος
αὐτῷ λέγειν.

¹ γ' ἄν Burnet; γάρ BT; ἄρ' W; γὰρ ἄν al.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

THEAET. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

STR. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

THEAET. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

STR. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

THEAET. Of course I will.

STR. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

THEAET. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

STR. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—or about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

242 Ή. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἥ τὸ παράπαν ἑατέον, εἰ τοῦτό τις εἶργει δρᾶν ὄκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τοῦτό γε μηδὲν μηδαμῇ εἶρξῃ.

Ή. Τρίτον τοῖνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παραιτήσομαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

Ή. Εἰπόν που νῦν δὴ λέγων ὥς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἔλεγχον αἰεί τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰπες.

Ή. Φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μή ποτε διὰ ταῦτά σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξῃ παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν Β ἑμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθησόμεθα, εἴανπερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοῖνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἴης, θαρρῶν ἴθι τούτου γε ἔνεκα.

30. Ή. Φέρε δὴ, τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἂν ἄρξαιτο παρακινδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τήνδ', ὦ παῖ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡμῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίαν δὴ;

Ή. Τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι C πρῶτον, μή πη τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὦμεν¹ περὶ ταῦτα, ῥαδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὥς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε σαφέστερον ὃ λέγεις.

Ή. Εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἡμῖν διειλέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὅστις πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὤρμησε

¹ μὲν ὦμεν W; μένωμεν BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. And so we must take courage and attack our father's theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

THEAET. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

STR. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

THEAET. You have only to utter it.

STR. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

THEAET. Yes, so you did.

STR. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

THEAET. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

STR. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

THEAET. What way?

STR. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

THEAET. Express your meaning more clearly.

STR. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number

PLATO

τοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέισθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἅττα πη, τοτέ δὲ
D καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών, ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συν-οικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν¹ Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες δὲ καὶ Σικελαὶ τινες ὕστερον Μοῦσαι ξυνενόησαν²
E ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφοτέρα καὶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ὄν πολλά τε καὶ ἓν ἐστιν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλίαν συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ αἰεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἰ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἰ δὲ μαλακώτεραι τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτέ μὲν ἓν εἶναι φασὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ' Ἀφρο-
243 δίτης, τοτέ δὲ πολλά καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ διὰ νεϊκός³ τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τις ἢ μὴ τούτων εἴρηκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμελές. οὕτω μεγάλα κλεινοῖς καὶ παλαιοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· ἐκείνοι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες

¹ ἡμῖν al. Eusebius; ἡμῶν BTW.

² ξυνενόησαν T, Eusebius, Simplicius; ξυννενοήκασιν B.

THE SOPHIST

and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

THEÆT. How so?

STR. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage.¹ And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian² and later some Sicilian³ Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

THEÆT. What is that?

STR. That they paid too little attention and con-

¹ This refers apparently to Pherecydes and the early Ionians.

² Heracleitus and his followers.

³ Empedocles and his disciples.

PLATO

ὠλιγώρησαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτ' ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα,
B περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Ὅταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξῃται λέγων ὥς ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἢ ἐν ἡ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν αὖ ψυχρῷ συγκεραννύμενον, ἄλλοθί πη διακρίσεις καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθεῖς, τούτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεῶν ξυνίης ὃ τι λέγουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος, τοῦτό τε τὸ νῦν ἀπορούμενον ὁπότε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀκριβῶς ὦμην ξυνιέναι. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς ἵν' ἐσμέν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρῳ.

ΞΕ. Τάχα τοίνυν ἴσως οὐχ ἦττον κατὰ τὸ ὄν ταῦτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὁπότεν τις αὐτὸ φθέγξῃται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὐ, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΞΕ. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ταῦτὸν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

31. ΞΕ. Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ D μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθ', ἂν δόξῃ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρώτου νῦν σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὄν φῆς πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ' οἱ λέγοντες αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγούνται;

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sideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term "not-being," which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

THEAET. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term "being," and see what those who use it think it signifies?

PLATO

ΞΕ. Κατὰ πόδα ¹ γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὑπέλαβες.
λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτην δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον
ἡμᾶς, οἷον αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπνυθανομένους
ᾧδε· φέρε, ὅποσοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἢ τινε δύο
τοιούτῳ τὰ πάντ' εἶναι φατε, τί ποτε ἄρα τοῦτ' ἐπ'
Ε ἄμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἐκάτερον
εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον
τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ
δύο ἔτι καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθώμεν; οὐ γάρ που τοῖν γε
δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὃν ἀμφοτέρα ὁμοίως εἶναι
λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἔν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύο
εἵτην.²

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὃν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

244 ΞΕ. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο
λέγοιτ'³ ἂν σαφέστατα ἔν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατα εἵρηκας.

ΞΕ. Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡμεῖς ἠπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ
ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν
ὅποταν ὃν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν
ταῦτα πάλαι γιννώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν
ᾧόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον
τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν
τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν
Β τοῦναντίον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντές τε καὶ ἀξιούντες
παρὰ τε τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι πλείον
ἐνός λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὦ παῖ, τί πλημ-
μελήσομεν;

¹ πόδα T (emend.) W; πολλά B pr. T.

² εἵτην W; εἰ τὴν BT.

³ λέγοιτ'] λέγοιτο B; λέγετε T; λέγεται W.

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STR. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this "being" (or "are") of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two "being" you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases¹ they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

THEAET. True.

STR. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

THEAET. You are perfectly right.

STR. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say "being." For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

¹ "In both cases," i.e. whether you say that one only is or that both are, they would both be one, namely being.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦκιστά γε.

32. ΞΕ. Τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόντων ἄρ' οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθων.¹ ἐν πού φατε μόνον εἶναι; φαμέν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ὃν καλεῖτέ τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

C ΞΕ. Πότερον ὅπερ ἐν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἢ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὦ ξέने, ἀποκρισις;

ΞΕ. Δῆλον, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὅτιοῦν οὐ πάντων ῥᾶστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τό τε δύο ὀνόματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μὴδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἐν καταγέλαστόν που.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαί του²
D λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Τιθεῖς τε τοῦνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἕτερον δύο λέγει πού τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταυτόν γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοῦνομα,

¹ ἀποκρινέσθων Simplicius; ἀποκρινέσθωσαν BTW.

² του Hermann; τοῦ BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Not in the least.

STR. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one¹ what they mean when they say "being"?

THEAET. Of course we must.

STR. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Is it what you call "one," using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

THEAET. What is their next answer, Stranger?

STR. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

THEAET. Of course it is.

STR. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

THEAET. Why?

STR. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And further, if he asserts that the name is

¹ The Eleatic Zeno and his school.

ἢ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἰ δέ τις αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὀνόματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἐνὸς ὄνομα ὄν¹ καὶ τοῦ² ὀνόματος αὐτὸ³ ἐν ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ ὅλον ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος ἐνὸς ἢ ταῦτὸν φήσουσι τούτῳ;

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;

ΞΕ. Εἰ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης⁴ ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἢ τῇ,

τοιούτὸν γε ὄν τὸ ὄν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει,⁵
ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

245 ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτῃ δὴ πᾶν τε ὄν καὶ ὅλον ἐν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἀρ' οὐκ ἀδύνατον αὐτό γε τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

¹ ὄνομα ὄν Apelt; ἐν ὄν μόνον B; ὄν μόνον T.

² τοῦ BW; τοῦτο T.

³ αὐτὸ Schleiermacher; αὐτὸ BTW.

⁴ σφαίρης Simplicius; σφαῖρας BT.

⁵ ἔχει] ἔχειν al.

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the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

THEAET. True.

STR. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.¹

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

THEAET. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

STR. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,

On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,

then being, being such as he describes it, has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

THEAET. Why?

¹ In other words, "one," considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word "one" is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name with the thing.

ΞΕ. Ἀμερὲς δῆπου δεῖ παντελῶς τό γε ἀληθῶς
εἶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον εἰρῆσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

B ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν οὐ
συμφωνήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ.¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω.

ΞΕ. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὃν τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐ-
τως ἐν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλον, ἢ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν
ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὃν²;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὴν προβέβληκας αἵρεσιν.

ΞΕ. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθός τε γὰρ
τὸ ὃν ἐν εἶναι πως, οὐ ταῦτόν ὃν τῷ ἐνὶ φανεῖται³
καὶ πλεονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἐνὸς ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

C ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἴαν γε τὸ ὃν ἢ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ
πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου πάθος, ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον,
ἐνδεές τὸ ὃν ἑαυτοῦ ξυμβαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερό-
μενον οὐκ ὃν ἔσται τὸ ὃν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Καὶ ἐνός γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ
τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρὶς ἰδίαν ἐκατέρου φύσιν
εἰληφότος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

D ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντος δέ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταῦτά
τε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι
D μὴδ' ἂν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὃν.

¹ τῷ λόγῳ Simplicius (codd. EF); τῷ δλω λόγῳ B; τῷ
λόγῳ δλω T, Simpl. (cod. D).

² ὃν Schleiermacher; ὅλον BT.

³ φανεῖται Simplicius; φαίνεται BT.

THE SOPHIST

STR. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

STR. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

THEAET. I understand.

STR. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

THEAET. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

STR. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

THEAET. So it will.

STR. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Τὸ γενόμενον αἰὲ γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὥς οὔσαν δεῖ προσαγορεύειν τὸ ὅλον¹ ἐν τοῖς οὐσι μὴ τιθέντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὅποσονοῦν τι δεῖ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὅπόσον ἂν ᾗ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ² εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοίνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας Ἐκάστον εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὄν εἶτε δύο τινὲ εἶτε ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δηλοῖ σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν αἰὲ ρηθέντων πλάνην.

33. ΞΕ. Τοὺς μὲν τοίνυν διακριβολουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πάντας³ μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὁμῶς δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὐ θεατέον, ἵν' ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ
246 ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπωρότερον εἰπεῖν ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρή καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

¹ τὸ ὅλον Bekker; τὸ ἐν ᾗ τὸ ὅλον BT.

² αὐτὸ W, Simplicius; om. BT.

³ πάντας Eusebius; πάνην BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

THEAET. That certainly seems to be true.

STR. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

THEAET. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connexion with whatever has previously been said.

STR. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being¹; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

THEAET. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

STR. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

THEAET. How so?

¹ The Ionic philosophers, the Eleatics, Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Megarians, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Antisthenes all discussed the problem of being and not-being.

PLATO

ΞΕ. Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὺς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταῦτὸν σῶμα Β καὶ οὐσίαν ὀρίζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς τίς¹ φήσῃ² μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονούντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ δεινούς εἶρηκας ἄνδρας· ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.

ΞΕ. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ C διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰὲς ξυνέστηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Παρ' ἀμφοῖν τοίνυν τοῖν γενοῖν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;

ΞΕ. Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἵδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων

¹ τι al.; om. BT.

² φήσῃ B, Eusebius; φησι T.

THE SOPHIST

STR. Some of them¹ drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

THEAET. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

STR. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

THEAET. True.

STR. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

THEAET. How shall we get it?

STR. It is comparatively easy to get it from those

¹ The atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers), who taught that nothing exists except atoms and the void. Possibly there is a covert reference to Aristippus who was, like Plato, a pupil of Socrates.

ῥᾶον· ἡμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα
D πάντα ἐλκόντων βία χαλεπώτερον, ἴσως δὲ καὶ
σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' ὧδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ
αὐτῶν δρᾶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Μάλιστα μέν, εἴ πη δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελ-
τίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρεῖ,
λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς
ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολο-
γηθὲν παρὰ βελτιόνων που κυριώτερον ἢ τὸ παρὰ
χειρόνων· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ
τάληθες ζητοῦμεν.

E ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα.

34. ΞΕ. Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας
ἀποκρίνασθαί σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερ-
μήνευε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ΞΕ. Λεγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῶον εἶ φασιν εἶναί τι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἔμφυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τιθέντες τι τῶν ὄντων ψυχὴν;

247 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ
ἀδικὸν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ
ἄφρονα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσία τοι-

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who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

THEAET. What way?

STR. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

THEAET. I will do so.

STR. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

THEAET. Of course they do.

STR. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and

αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἐκάστην γίνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων
τὴν ἐναντίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμφασιν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τῳ¹ παραγίγνεσθαι
καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσουσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασὶ μὲν οὖν.

Β ΞΕ. Οὕσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ
τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ
ψυχῆς ἐν ἣ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ
ἀπτόν εἶναι φασὶ τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὁρατόν.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μὴν σῶμά τι λέγουσιν
ἴσχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα² ἀποκρίνονται
πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά
τι κεκτηῖσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον
ὧν ἡρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν
C ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα
δυσχυρίζεσθαι.

ΞΕ. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, βελτίους
γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες³. ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν
ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἳ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτό-
χθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουσι³ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς
χερσὶ ξυμπιέζειν εἰσὶν, ὥς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παρά-
παν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οἷα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἀνερωτῶμεν αὐτούς· εἰ γάρ
τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώ-

¹ τῳ] τῷ BT; τὸ W.

² ταῦτα] τὰ αὐτὰ W; ταῦτα BT.

³ ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.

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the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite ?

THEAET. Yes, they agree to this also.

STR. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

THEAET. Yes, they say that.

STR. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible ?

THEAET. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

STR. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body ?

THEAET. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

STR. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better ; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth¹ among them would not shrink from any such utterance ; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

THEAET. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

STR. Then let us question them further ; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no

¹ This refers to the story of Cadmus, who killed a dragon and then sowed its teeth, from which sprang fierce warriors to be his companions. Born of the dragon's teeth and of earth, they would naturally be of the earth, earthy.

Δματον, ἔφαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τούτοις ἄμα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφυῆς γεγονός, εἰς ὃ βλέποντες ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ' οὖν ἴσως ἂν ἀποροῖεν· εἰ δὴ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἄρ' ἐθέλοιεν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιόνδ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

ΞΕ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς ¹ τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὅτιον πεφυκός
Ε εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαν-
λοτάτου, καὶ εἰ μόνον εἰς ἅπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως
εἶναι· τίθεται γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἔστιν
οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ περ αὐτοί γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. Καλῶς· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὕστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τούτοις ἕτερον ἂν φανείη. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους
248 τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω ξυνομολογηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μένει.

35. **ΞΕ.** Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους ἴωμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σὺ δ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ΞΕ. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς που διελόμενοι λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;

¹ εἴτ' εἰς W; εἰ τις BT.

¹ i.e., between the process of coming into existence and existence itself. It is difficult to determine exactly who the idealists are whose doctrines are here discussed. Possibly
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matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

THEAET. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

STR. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

THEAET. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

STR. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

THEAET. It is settled.

STR. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

THEAET. I will.

STR. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?¹

Plato is restating or amending some of his own earlier beliefs.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὧ πάντων ἄριστοι, τί τοῦθ' ὑμᾶς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἄρ' οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ' ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Πάθημα ἢ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεώς τινος ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ξυνιόντων γιγνόμενον. τάχ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίν' οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;

C ΞΕ. Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ἰκανὸν ἔθεμεν ὅρον πού τῶν ὄντων, ὅταν τῷ παρῇ ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι;

D ΞΕ. Πρὸς ὃ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ' αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γινώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γινώσκεσθαι.

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THEAET. Yes, we do.

STR. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

THEAET. Yes, that is what we say.

STR. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

THEAET. What is that?

STR. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

THEAET. What is it, then, that they say?

STR. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

THEAET. What was it?

STR. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

THEAET. And is there not something in that?

STR. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ τὸ γινώσκεσθαι φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου· τὰναντία γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.¹

ΞΕ. Μανθάνω· τόδε γε,² ὡς τὸ γινώσκειν Εἴπερ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γινωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ συμβαίνειν πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον γινωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως, καθ' ὅσον γινώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ 249 φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὸς εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεινὸν μέντ' ἂν, ὦ ξέने, λόγον συγχωροῖμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωὴν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ' αὐτῷ λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τίν' ἂν ἕτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν

¹ δῆλον . . . λέγοιεν first attributed to Theaetetus by Heindorf.

² τόδε γε] τὸ δέ γε T; τὸ δὲ B.

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THEAET. They certainly assent to that.

STR. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

THEAET. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

STR. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

THEAET. Right.

STR. But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

THEAET. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

STR. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

THEAET. How can we?

STR. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

THEAET. But how else can it possess them?

STR. Then shall we say that it has mind and

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ἔχειν,¹ ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἔμφυχον ὄν
 ἐστάναι;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα ἔμοιγε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρη-
 τέον ὡς ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Ξυμβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκινήτων τε
 ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὐτὰ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα
 πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ
 ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ
 C αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἂν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Τί δ'; ἄνευ τούτων νοῦν καθορᾶς ὄντα ἢ
 γενόμενον ἂν καὶ ὁπουοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦκιστα.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τοῦτον παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον,
 ὅς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων
 ἰσχυρίζεται περὶ τίνος ὀπηοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τῷ δὴ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι
 πᾶσα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν
 ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἴδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστηκὸς
 D ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὐτὰ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων

¹ ἔχειν add. Schleiermacher.

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life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

THEAET. All those things seem to me absurd.

STR. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honour to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal

μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν, ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυναμφοτέρα λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

36. ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐπιεικῶς ἤδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Βαβαὶ μέντ' ἂν ἄρα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέψεως.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ' εἵρηκας;

ΞΕ. Ὡ μακάριε, οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμεν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείστη περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δέ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπη δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἔχοντες, οὐ πάνυ ξυνίημι.

ΞΕ. Σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον, εἰ ταῦτα νῦν ξυν-
250 ομολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθεῖμεν ἅπερ αὐτοὶ τότε ἠρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα; ὑπόμνησόν με.

ΞΕ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ πειράσομαί γε δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκείνους τότε, ἵνα ἅμα τι καὶ προῖωμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΞΕ. Εἰεν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

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motion; he must quote the children's prayer,¹ "all things immovable and in motion," and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

THEAET. What is this again? What do you mean?

STR. My dear fellow, don't you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

THEAET. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

STR. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.²

THEAET. What questions? Remind me.

STR. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

THEAET. That is right.

STR. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

THEAET. Of course.

¹ Nothing further seems to be known about this prayer. Stallbaum thought the reference was to a game in which the children said *ὅσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκίνημένα εἶη*, "may all unmoved things be moved."

² Cf. 242 D above.

- ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν εἶναι γε ὁμοίως φῆς ἀμφοτέρα αὐτὰ καὶ ἑκάτερον;
- B ΘΕΑΙ. Φημί γὰρ οὖν.
- ΞΕ. Ἄρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφοτέρα καὶ ἑκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῆς;
- ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.
- ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' ἐστάναι σημαίνει λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι;
- ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;
- ΞΕ. Τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθεῖς, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὴν καὶ ἀπιδὼν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπες ἀμφοτέρα;
- C ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύεσθαι τι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.
- ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ ξυναμφοτέρον τὸ ὄν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον δὴ τι τούτων.
- ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.
- ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.
- ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.
- ΞΕ. Ποῖ δὴ χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργές τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;
- ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖ γάρ;
- ΞΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἔτι ῥάδιον. εἰ γάρ τι μὴ κινεῖται, πῶς οὐχ ἔστηκεν; ἢ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὄν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἢ δυνατόν οὖν τοῦτο;

THE SOPHIST

STR. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

STR. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

THEAET. Of course not.

STR. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

THEAET. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

STR. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

THEAET. Apparently.

STR. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

THEAET. You are about right.

STR. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

THEAET. What indeed?

STR. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.

ΞΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν μνησθῆναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοῦνομα ἐφ' ὃ τί ποτε δεῖ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορία μέμνησαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορία
Ε περὶ τὸ ὄν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὦ ξέने, εἰ δυνατόν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορη-
μένον· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐξ ἴσου τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπο-
ρίας μετεिल्θήφατον, νῦν ἐλπίς ἤδη καθ' ἅπερ ἂν
αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον
ἀναφαίνεται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι· καὶ
251 ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον
ὀπηπερ ἂν οἰοί τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα
οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.

ΞΕ. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὄντινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς
ὀνόμασι ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.

37. ΞΕ. Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δὴ πού πόλλ' ἄττα
ἐπονομάζοντες, τὰ τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ
καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς,
Β ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον
αὐτὸν εἶναί φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα
ἄπειρα, καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως
ἐν ἑκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς
ὀνόμασι λέγομεν.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. No, nothing could be more impossible.

STR. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

THEAET. Of course I do.

STR. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

THEAET. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

STR. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.

THEAET. Good.

STR. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

THEAET. What, for instance? Please give an example.

STR. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Ὅθεν γε, οἶμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὥς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ που χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, C ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπονδακόσιν, ἐνίοτε πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθναμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνηυρηκέναί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἵνα τοίνυν πρὸς ἅπαντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾗ τοὺς πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅτιοῦν διαλεχθέντας, D ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἔμπροσθεν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὥς ἐν ἐρωτήσει λεχθησόμενα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ;

ΞΕ. Πότερον μήτε τὴν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενί, ἀλλ' ὥς ἄμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἀλλήλων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθῶμεν; ἢ πάντα εἰς ταῦτὸν ξυνάγωμεν ὥς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις; ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ μή; τούτων, ὦ 392

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. True.

STR. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.¹

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

THEAET. What are the arguments?

STR. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable [of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these

¹ Those are here satirized who deny the possibility of all except identical predication. Such were Antisthenes, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus. The two last are probably those referred to as old men whose learning came late in life.

Ε Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσαιμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν οὐ καθ' ἐν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφ' ἐκάστου τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω;¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις.²

ΞΕ. Καὶ τιθώμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγειν, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδέν. οὐκοῦν κινήσις τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξεται οὐσίας;

252 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν³;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔσται.

ΞΕ. Ταχὺ δὴ ταύτη γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἅμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούντων καὶ τῶν ὥς ἐν ἰσάντων καὶ ὅσοι κατ' εἶδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι φασιν αἰεὶ· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τό γε εἶναι προσάπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἔσθηκότ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Β ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσοι τοτὲ μὲν ξυντιθέασιν τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἴτε εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἁπειρα εἴτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἔαν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἔαν αἰεὶ,

¹ τί οὖν . . . ἐσκεψω; attributed to the Stranger by Badham.

² καλῶς λέγεις attributed to Theaetetus by Badham.

³ προσκοινωνοῦν W; προσκοινωνεῖν BT.

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alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

THEAET. I cannot answer these questions for them.

STR. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

THEAET. A good suggestion.

STR. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

THEAET. No.

STR. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

THEAET. It will not.

STR. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe “is” in motion, another that it “is” at rest.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interrup-

PLATO

κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἂν οὐδέν, εἴπερ μηδεμία
ἔστι ξύμμιξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Ἐτι τοίνυν ἂν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστό-
τατα μετίοιεν ¹ τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐὼντες κοινωνίᾳ
παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τῷ τε “εἶναι” που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται
χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ “χωρὶς” καὶ τῷ “τῶν ἄλλων” ²
καὶ τῷ “καθ’ αὐτό” καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν
ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγχόντων, ἀλλὰ
τὸ λεγόμενον οἰκοθεν τὸν πολέμιον καὶ ἐναντιω-
σόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποφθεγγόμενον ὥσπερ τὸν
ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες αἰεὶ πορεύονται.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ λέγεις ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀληθές.

ΞΕ. Τί δ’, ἂν πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐῷμεν δύναμιν
ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν οἷός τε καὶ γὰρ διαλύειν.

ΞΕ. Πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι κίνησίς τε ³ αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἴσταιτ’
ἂν καὶ στάσις αὖ πάλιν αὐτὴ κινεῖτο, εἴπερ ἐπιγι-
γνοίσθην ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοις.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγ-
καις ἀδύνατον, κίνησίν τε ἴστασθαι καὶ στάσιν
κινεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

¹ μετίοιεν] μετίοιμεν BTW.

² τῶν ἄλλων B; ἄλλων T.

³ τε] γε BTW.

THE SOPHIST

tion, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions "to be," "apart," "from the rest," "by itself," and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.¹

THEAET. That is a remarkably accurate illustration.

STR. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

THEAET. Even I can dispose of that assumption.

STR. How?

THEAET. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

STR. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then only the third possibility is left.

THEAET. Yes.

¹ Eurycles was a ventriloquist and soothsayer of the fifth century, cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1019.

Ε 38. ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμίγνυσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε δύο ἀδύνατον εὐρέθῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.¹

ΞΕ. Πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ' οὐ, 253 σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεπονθότ' ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεῖ που πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ ξυναρμόττει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὰ δέ γε φωνήεντα διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὥστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἀρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὅποια ὁποίοις δυνατὰ κοινω-
νεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεῖ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἱκανῶς αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέχνης.

ΞΕ. Ποίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τῆς γραμματικῆς.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων
B φθόγγους ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως; ὁ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραυν-
μένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γινώσκειν μουσικός,
ὁ δὲ μὴ ξυνιεῖς ἄμουσος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

¹ εὐρέθῃ. ναί Heindorf; εὐρεθῆναι BT; εὐρεθῆναι· ναί W.

THE SOPHIST

STR. And certainly one of these three must be true ; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet ; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others ? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art ?

THEAET. He has need of art.

STR. What art ?

THEAET. The art of grammar.

STR. And is not the same true in connexion with high and low sounds ? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical ?

THEAET. Yes.

ΞΕ. Καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνιῶν τοιαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἕτερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τί δ'; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταῦτα μίξεως ἔχειν ὡμολογήκαμεν, ἄρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; C καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ' ἅττ' αὐτ'¹ ἔστιν, ὥστε συμμίγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι' ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἷτια;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἴσως τῆς μεγίστης;

39. ΞΕ. Τίν' οὖν αὖ προσερούμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

D ΞΕ. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταυτὸν εἶδος ἕτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἕτερον ὃν ταυτὸν μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, φήσομεν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ιδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντη διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἐτέρας ἀλλήλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι' ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἐνὶ ξυνημμένην, καὶ

¹ συνέχοντ' ἅττ' αὐτ' Wagner; συνέχοντα ταῦτ' BTW.

THE SOPHIST

STR. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

THEAET. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

STR. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

THEAET. Yes, we shall.

STR. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many

Ε πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντα διωρισμένας· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ἢ τε κοινωνεῖν ἕκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλω δώσεις, ὥς ἐγῶμαι, πλὴν τῇ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλω δοίῃ τις;

ΞΕ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσομεν, ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν
254 μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἕτερον μὴν τρόπον ἢ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἢ τε τούτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβῇ προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΞΕ. Ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὖ τῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετῆς ὀφθῆναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν
B πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὄμματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφ-
ορῶντα ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἡμῖν ἦ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὥς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρὶν ἂν ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

THE SOPHIST

forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

THEAET. Certainly it is.

STR. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

THEAET. How could it be granted to anyone else?

STR. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him; he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

THEAET. How do they differ?

STR. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice,¹ and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

THEAET. It seems likely.

STR. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

THEAET. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

STR. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

¹ By practice, *i.e.*, by empirical knowledge as opposed to reason.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

40. Ή. Ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἡμῖν τῶν γενῶν ὁμο-
 λόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ
 τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλίγον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ
 C πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πᾶσι κεκοινωνηκέναι,
 τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ξυνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε
 σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ
 ταραττώμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν
 μεγίστων λεγομένων ἅττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποῖα
 ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ἔπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει
 δυνάμεως, ἵνα τό τε ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν εἰ μὴ πάσῃ
 σαφηνεῖα δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγου γε
 ἐνδεεῖς μὴδὲν γιννώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον ὁ
 τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ
 D παρεικάθῃ¹ τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ
 ὄν ἀθῶοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

Ή. Μέγιστα μὲν τῶν γενῶν, ἃ νῦν δὴ διημέμνεν,
 τό τε ὄν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε.

Ή. Καὶ μὲν τῷ γε δύο φαμέν αὐτοῖν ἀμίκτω
 πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

Ή. Τὸ δέ γε ὄν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν· ἔστὸν γὰρ
 ἄμφω πον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ή. Τρία δὴ γίνεταί ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὲν;

Ή. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἑτερόν
 ἔστιν, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτῷ ταυτόν.

¹ παρεικάθῃ Boeckh ; παρεικασθῇ BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. You are right.

STR. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

THEAET. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

STR. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

THEAET. Yes, by far.

STR. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

THEAET. Decidedly not.

STR. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then these prove to be three.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Τί ποτ' αὐτὸν οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τό τε ταῦτόν
καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτῷ,¹ τῶν μὲν
τριῶν ἄλλω, ξυμμιγνυμένῳ μὴν ἐκείνοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης
αἰεὶ, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ' οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὥς ὄντων
αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἣ τό τε ταῦτόν τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον
255 ὥς ἐκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς
αὐτούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὴν κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ'
ἕτερον οὔτε ταῦτόν ἐστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ὅτι περ ἂν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ
στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Κίνησις τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὐτὴ κινήθη-
σεται· περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα θάτερον ὅποτερον οὖν
γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὐτὸ θά-
τερον ἐπὶ τὸναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε
B μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ΞΕ. Μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταυτοῦ καὶ θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταῦτόν
ἢ θάτερον, μῆδ' αὐτὴν στάσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ὥς ἔν τι δια-
νοητέον ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΞΕ. Ἄλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν μῆδὲν διάφορον
σημαίνεται, κίνησιν αὐτὴν πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφοτέρα

¹ αὐτῷ] αὐτοῦ B; αὐτοῦ T.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But what do we mean by these words, "the same" and "other," which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say "the same" or "other"?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became "other" would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

THEAET. Exactly so.

STR. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

THEAET. No.

STR. But should we conceive of "being" and "the same" as one?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But if "being" and "the same" have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say

¹ i.e., sameness and difference can be predicated of both.

PLATO

εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταῦτόν ὥς
C ὄντα προσερούμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον.

ΞΕ. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ὄν ἐν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. Τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν εἶδεσι ¹ τὸ
ταῦτόν τιθώμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ θάτερον ἄρα ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον;
ἢ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν ὥς δύ' ἅττα ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει
διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ' ἄν.

— ΞΕ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν
αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ² αἰεὶ λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

D ΞΕ. Τὸ δ' ἕτερον αἰεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ
πάμπλου διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν
μετεῖχε τοῖν εἶδοῖν ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἦν ἂν ποτέ τι καὶ
τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς
ἡμῖν, ὅτιπερ ἂν ἕτερον ᾗ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἐτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν
E τοῖς εἶδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν
εἶναι διεληλυθυῖαν· ἐν ἑκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι

¹ εἶδεσι BT; εἶδεσιν εἶδος W.

² ἄλλα TW; ἄλληλα B.

THE SOPHIST

that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

THEAET. But surely that is impossible.

STR. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

THEAET. Pretty nearly.

STR. So we shall consider "the same" a fourth class in addition to the other three?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then shall we call "the other" a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and "being" as two names for one class?

THEAET. May be.

STR. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

THEAET. The facts are as you say.

STR. Then we must place the nature of "the other" as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason

τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

41. ΞΕ. Ὡς δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ' ἑν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὥς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἕτερον στάσεως. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐ στάσις ἄρ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

256 ΞΕ. Ἔστι δέ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. Αὐθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἕτερον ταύτου ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. Οὐ ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γ' ἦν ταῦτόν διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτὸ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταῦτόν τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταῦτόν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἴπωμεν αὐτὴν ταῦτόν καὶ μὴ ταῦτόν, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν μὲν ταῦτόν, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν Β ταύτου πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν,¹ ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταῦτόν, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτὴν θατέρου, δι' ἣν ἀποχωριζομένη ταύτου γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκείνο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὥστε ὀρθῶς αὐτὴ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταῦτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ πῃ μετελάμβανεν αὐτὴ

¹ λέγομεν W; λέγωμεν BT.

THE SOPHIST

of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

THEAET. How?

STR. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

THEAET. We do.

STR. Then it is not rest.

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

THEAET. Yes, it exists.

STR. Now motion again is other than the same.

THEAET. You're about right.

STR. Therefore it is not the same.

THEAET. No, it is not.

STR. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. Then even if absolute motion partook in

κίνησις στάσεως, οὐδὲν ἂν ἄτοπον ἦν στάσιμον αὐτὴν προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατά γε, εἶπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μή.

C ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τὴν τούτου πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὥς ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Λέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν· ἡ κίνησις ἐστὶν ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, καθάπερ ταυτοῦ τε ἦν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΞΕ. Οὐχ ἕτερον ἄρ' ἐστὶ πη καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν νῦν δὴ λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἄρ' αὖ¹ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἕτερον αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ
D ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προϋθέμεθα σκοπεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νῦν δὴ φανέντος.

ΞΕ. Ἀδεῶς ἄρα τὴν κίνησιν ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδεέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστὶ καὶ ὄν, ἐπεὶπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. κατὰ πάντα
E γὰρ ἢ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ

¹ αὐ Heindorf; οὐ BT.

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any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

THEAET. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

STR. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.¹

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

THEAET. Inevitably.

STR. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

THEAET. True.

STR. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

THEAET. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

STR. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

THEAET. Yes, most fearlessly.

STR. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and

¹ See 251 E ff.

ὄντος ἑκαστον οὐκ ὄν ποιεῖ, καὶ ξύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΞΕ. Περὶ ἑκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅμοιον.

257 ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερον εἶναι λεκτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄν ἄρ' ἡμῖν, ὅσαπέρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνα γὰρ οὐκ ὄν ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀπέραντα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τᾶλλα οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δυσχεραντέον, ἐπεὶ περ ἔχει κοινωνίαν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τῶν γενῶν φύσις. εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα μὴ συγχωρεῖ, πείσας ἡμῶν τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὕτω πειθέτω τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δικαιότατα εἴρηκας.

B ΞΕ. Ἰδωμεν¹ δὴ καὶ τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὥς ὅμοιον, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

¹ ἰδωμεν W; εἰδῶμεν B; εἰδωμεν T.

¹ Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that every thing in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.

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therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

THEAET. Yes, I suppose so.

STR. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.¹

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

STR. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

THEAET. That is not far from the truth.

STR. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.²

THEAET. That is very fair.

STR. Then here is a point to consider.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

THEAET. What do you mean?

² i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguments respecting the participation of ideas in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.

PLATO

ΞΕ. Οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγῃται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τί μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα C τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ αὐτ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

42. ΞΕ. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Μία μὲν ἐστὶ πού καὶ ἐκείνη,¹ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἀφορισθὲν ἐπω- D νυμίαν ἴσχει τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν· διὸ πολλὰ τέχνηαι τ' εἰς² λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μιᾶς οὔσης ταῦτόν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάχ' ἂν· ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ³ λέγωμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἔστι τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν.

ΞΕ. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

¹ ἐκείνη W; ἐκείνη BT. ² τέ εἰσι W; τεῖσι T; τισιν B.

³ ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ W; ἀλλό πη T; ἀλλο πῇ B.

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STR. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

THEAET. No, of course not.

STR. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle "not"¹ indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

THEAET. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

STR. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

THEAET. There is.

STR. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

¹ The two particles *οὐ* and *μή* in Greek.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγγόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἑτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ΞΕ. Ἴθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους¹ ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτὸ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν οὕτω ξυμβέβηκεν εἶναι² τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Ὅντος δὴ πρὸς ὃν³ ἀντίθεσις, ὥς ἔοικ', εἶναί τις⁴ συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ἥττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

258 ΞΕ. Ὅμοίως ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅμοίως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δίκαιῳ κατὰ ταῦτα θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ ταύτη λέξομεν, ἐπεὶ περ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὕσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὕσης ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἥττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Β ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντι-

¹ ἑνὸς γένους T; γένους B.

² ξυμβέβηκεν εἶναι Stephanus; ξυμβεβηκέναι BT.

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THEAET. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

STR. Now, then, tell me something more.

THEAET. What?

STR. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

THEAET. No less truly.

STR. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no

³ δν D; δν BT.

⁴ τis Apelt; τi BT.

κειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἦττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. Τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὃ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐζητοῦμεν, αὐτό ἐστὶ τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. Πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα¹ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλόν,² οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν ἦν τε καὶ ἐστὶ μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἐν; ἢ τινα ἔτι πρὸς αὐτό, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστίαν ἔχομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

43. ΞΕ. Οἷσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Πλείον ἢ 'κεῖνος ἀπέειπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

D ΞΕ. "Ὅτι ὁ μὲν πού φησιν,

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ,³ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα,⁴ ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' οδοῦ διζήσιος⁵ εἶργε νόημα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

¹ μὴ μέγα add. Boeckh.

² μὴ καλόν add. Boeckh.

³ τοῦτο δαμῆ Simplicius; τοῦτ' οὐδαμῆ BT.

⁴ ἔόντα Aristot.; ὄντα BT.

⁵ διζήσιος BT (cf. 237 A).

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less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. Then what shall we call this?

THEAET. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

STR. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

THEAET. None whatever.

STR. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because he says somewhere¹:

Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is ;
Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation.

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

¹ Parmenides, 52 f., ed. Mullach.

ΞΕ. Ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον ὥς ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην
Ε ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον¹ μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὥς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξέने, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς εἶπη τις ὅτι τὸναντίον τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὥς ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίου τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάσαι λέγομεν, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ, λόγον
259 ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον· ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὥς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἢ μέχριπερ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκείνῳ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμίγνυται τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ γένη καὶ τό τε ὄν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διεληλυθότα τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκείνῳ γε οὐ μετέσχευεν ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν.
B τὸ δὲ ὄν αὐθιγότερον μετεληφὸς ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἂν εἴη γενῶν, ἕτερον δ' ἐκείνων ἀπάντων ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὄν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὐ μύρια ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω καὶ ξύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

¹ ἕκαστον Simplicius; ἐκάστου BT.

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STR. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is ; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

THEAET. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

STR. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

THEAET. True.

ΞΕ. Καὶ ταύταις δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπὶ στεί τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων· εἴτε ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανεσθῆκώς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὥς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὔρεῖν, ἐκείνο δ' ἤδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὥς δυνατὰ¹ τοῖς λεγομένοις οἶόν τ' εἶναι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τέ τις ἕτερον ὃν πη ταῦτόν εἶναι φῇ καὶ ὅταν ταῦτόν ὃν D ἕτερον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ' ἐκείνο ὃ φησι τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πη καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὁμοῖον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τὰναντία αἰεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενῆς ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

44. ΞΕ. Καὶ γάρ, ὦγαθέ, τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελές E καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δῆ;

ΞΕ. Τελεωτάτῃ πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὴν

¹ δυνατὰ BTW; δυνατώτατα Schanz; ἀνήνυτα Badham; δυνατὸν μάλιστα Campbell; δέον αὐτὰ? Apelt; δυνατὰ is certainly wrong. Possibly οὐκ ὄντα or οὐκ ἄξια (the interpretation adopted in the translation).

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STR. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

THEAET. Exactly so.

STR. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

THEAET. Why so?

STR. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse.

ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονε
ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

260 ΉΕ. Σκόπει τοίνυν ὥς ἐν καιρῷ νῦν δὴ τοῖς
τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἑα
ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ μίγνυσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πρὸς δὴ τί;

ΉΕ. Πρὸς τὸ τὸν ¹ λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἔν τι
γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν
μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν, ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ
παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτ'
ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μὴδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν,
οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἰοί τ' ἦμεν. ἀφηρέθημεν
B δ' ἂν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μῖξιν
μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς τοῦτό γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὃ τι νῦν
διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.

ΉΕ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως τῇδ' ἐπόμενος ῥᾶστ' ἂν μάθοις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΉΕ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὄν ἡμῖν ἔν τι τῶν ἄλλων
γένος ὄν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΉΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξη τε
καὶ λόγῳ μίγνυται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

¹ τὸν W; om. BT.

¹ The denial, that is to say, of all interrelations of ideas
leads to purely negative results. Examples of this are the
exclusive antithesis of being and not-being and the mutual
exclusion of rest and motion. The difficulty is solved at
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For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.¹

THEAET. True.

STR. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

THEAET. What was our object?

STR. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

THEAET. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

STR. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

THEAET. What line?

STR. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

THEAET. Why?

once when we recognize that positive and negative are necessarily interwoven in the nature of things, that the negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only different from it.

PLATO

ΞΕ. Μὴ μιγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγ-
C καῖον ἀληθῇ πάντ' εἶναι, μιγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε
ψευδῆς γίνεται καὶ λόγος· τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα
δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν
διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Ὅντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκό-
νων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τὸν δέ γε ¹ σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που
D τῷ τόπῳ καταπεφευγέειν μὲν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέ-
ναι τὸ παράπαν μὴδ' εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ὄν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαι τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ
οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὄν μετέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ
ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι·
τάχα δ' ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ
ὄντος, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν
οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποικὴν καὶ φαν-
E ταστικὴν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχουτ' ἂν
πάλιν ὥς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ δόξα καὶ
λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ
παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς
κοινωνίας. διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν
καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἵνα

¹ δέ γε W; δὲ BT.

¹ The English word "fancy," though etymologically identical with the Greek *φαντασία*, has lost the close con-
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STR. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

THEAET. So it is.

STR. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

THEAET. Yes, so it was.

STR. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy,¹ in order that when they are made clear we may perceive

nexion with “seeming” (*φαλσεσθαι*) which the Greek retains. The Greek word is therefore more comprehensive than the English, denoting that which appears to be, whether as the result of imagination or of sensation. Cf. 235 D ff.

φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι
261 κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὃν ἀποδεί-
ξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ¹
ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες
ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε, ² ὦ ξέने, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι
τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθή-
ρευτον εἶη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων
γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον
ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἐκείνον
ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν ὥς οὐκ
B ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ προβέ-
βληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὥς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον
καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως
ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτ' ἄλλο μετ' ἐκείνο· καὶ πέρας, ὡς
ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

ΞΕ. Θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν
τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν αἰεὶ προϊέναι. τί γὰρ ὁ
γ' ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν
ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοῦπισθεν ἀπ-
C ωσθεῖς; σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγό-
μενον, ὃ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτε ἔλοι πόλιν. νῦν δ'
ἐπεὶ, ὦγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι
μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἡρημένον ἂν εἶη, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
ἤδη ῥάω καὶ σμικρότερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

45. ΞΕ. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ
ἐρρήθη νῦν δὴ, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπο-
λογισώμεθα ³ πότερον αὐτῶν ἀπτεται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἢ

¹ αὐτὸ W; αὐτὸν BT.

² γε TW; δέ γε B.

³ ἀπολογισώμεθα Heindorf; ἀπολογησώμεθα BT.

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that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

THEÆT. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences,¹ and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line; and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

STR. No one should be discouraged, Theætetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

THEÆT. Good.

STR. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches

¹ Perhaps a sort of pun is intended, for πρόβλημα was already beginning to have the meaning of "problem."

παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔστιν ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα
 ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

D ΞΕ. Φέρε δὴ, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν
 γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν
 ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα. φαίνεται γάρ πη ταύτη
 τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπ-
 ακουστέον;

ΞΕ. Εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις ξυναρμόττει¹ εἴτε
 μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ
 δ' οὐ.

ΞΕ. Τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς
 E λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι ξυναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ
 συνεχείᾳ μηδέν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμωστῇ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;

ΞΕ. Ὅπερ ᾤηθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν.
 ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν πού τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
 δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

262 ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰπέ ἐκάτερον.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὃν δῆλωμα ῥήμά
 που λέγομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

¹ ξυναρμόττει W ; ξυναρμόττειν BT.

¹ The science of language, in all its branches, was young in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were necessarily used in a technical sense. So here *ὄνομα* and *ῥήμα* are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the 482

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them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters ; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

THEAET. What do we need to understand about names ?

STR. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

THEAET. Evidently the last ; some will and some will not.

STR. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

THEAET. How so, and what do you mean by that ?

STR. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented ; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

THEAET. How so ?

STR. One called nouns, the other verbs.¹

THEAET. Define each of them.

STR. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

THEAET. Yes.

sense of "verb" and "noun," though Plato elsewhere employs them with their ordinary meanings. Similarly the distinction between vowels and consonants (*Theaetetus*, 203 ; cf. *The Sophist*, 253) was at least relatively new, as was that between the active and the passive voice. How important Plato's part was in the development of linguistic study can no longer be accurately determined.

PLATO

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς ¹ ἐκείνα πράττουσι
σημεῖον τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς
λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων
χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔμαθον.

B ΞΕ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἕτερόν τι βλέπων ἄρτι
ξυνωμολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν,
ὅτι συνεχῶς ὧδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Οἶον “βαδίζει,” “τρέχει,” “καθεύδει,”
καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, καὶ
πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ' εἶπη, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον
ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγεται “λέων,”
“ἔλαφος,” “ἵππος,” ὅσα τε ὀνόματα τῶν τὰς
πράξεις αὐτῶν πραττόντων ὀνομάσθη, καὶ κατὰ
C ταύτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδεὶς πῶς ξυνέστη λόγος·
οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὔτ' ἐκείνως πράξιν οὐδ'
ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ
φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα
κεράσῃ· τότε δ' ἡρμოსέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο
εὐθύς ἢ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ
πρῶτός τε καὶ ² σμικρότατος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ἄρ' ὧδε λέγεις;

ΞΕ. “Ὅταν εἶπη τις· “ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει,”
λόγον εἶναι φῆς τοῦτον ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

¹ αὐτοῖς τοῖς B, Stobaeus; αὐτοῖς T.

² τε καὶ W, Stobaeus; εἰ καὶ T; καὶ B.

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STR. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

THEAET. I do not understand that.

STR. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

STR. For instance, "walks," "runs," "sleeps" and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

THEAET. No, of course not.

STR. And again, when "lion," "stag," "horse," and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

THEAET. What do you mean by that?

STR. When one says "a man learns," you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

THEAET. Yes.

ΞΕ. Δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἵπομεν,¹ καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

46. ΞΕ. Οὕτω δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα² τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἤρμωσσε, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτῶν σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἀρμόττει, τὰ δὲ Ε ἀρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἔτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ἦ, τινὸς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ δέ τινος ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ γοῦν.

ΞΕ. Λέξω τοίνυν σοι λόγον συνθεῖς πρᾶγμα πράξει δι' ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δ' ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ, σύ μοι φράζειν.

263 ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος κάθηται. μὴν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.

ΞΕ. Σὸν ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.

¹ εἵπομεν Stobaeus; εἵπομεν BT.

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STR. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

THEAET. That was right.

STR. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now there is another little point.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

THEAET. True.

STR. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Now let us pay attention to each other.

THEAET. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

STR. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

THEAET. I will, to the best of my ability.

STR. "Theaetetus sits." It isn't a long sentence, is it?

THEAET. No, it is fairly short.

STR. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

THEAET. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

² *πράγματα* BTW; *γράμματα*, letters, Bury (*cf.* 253).

PLATO

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ ὁδ' αὖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖος;

ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτον οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἄλλως εἴποι πλήν ἐμὸν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΞΕ. Ποιὸν δέ γέ τινά φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τούτων δὴ ποιὸν τινα ἐκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν μὲν ψευδῇ που, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῇ.

ΞΕ. Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστι περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδῆς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.

ΞΕ. Ὅντων¹ δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

C ΞΕ. Ὅν ὕστερον δὴ λόγον εἶρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν, ἐξ ὧν ὠρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἔστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἓνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ ξυνωμολογήσαμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἐπειτα δέ γε τινός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.

¹ ὄντων Cornarius ; ὄντως BT.

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STR. And how about this sentence ?

THEAET. What one ?

STR. "Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies."

THEAET. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

STR. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences ?

THEAET. One is false, I suppose, the other true.

STR. The true one states facts as they are about you.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

THEAET. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

STR. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are ; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

THEAET. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

STR. And secondly it has a subject.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And if you are not the subject, there is none.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΞΕ. Μηδενὸς δὲ ¹ ὧν οὐδ' ἂν λόγος εἴη τὸ παρά-
παν· ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦν λόγον
ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα.

D ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα ² μέντοι
θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντά-
πασιν ἔοικεν ³ ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἔκ τε ῥημάτων
γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς
γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

47. ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ; διάνοιά τε καὶ δόξα καὶ
φαντασία, μὴ οὐκ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ γένη
ψευδῇ τε καὶ ἀληθῇ πάνθ' ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς
ἐγγίγνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ὡδ' εἴσει ῥᾶον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτά, ⁴ τί
E ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δίδου μόνον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταυτόν· πλὴν
ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ
φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη,
διάνοια;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος
ἰὼν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῇ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἴσμεν ὄν—

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

¹ δὲ emend. apogr. Parisinum 1811; γε BT;] δὲ or δέ γε
Heindorf.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

THEAET. Yes, very truly.

STR. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

THEAET. How is it plain?

STR. You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures and the several differences between them.

THEAET. Give me an opportunity.

STR. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

THEAET. True.

STR. And in speech we know there is just—

THEAET. What?

STR. Affirmation and negation.

² λεγόμενα add. Badham.

³ εοικεν W; ὡς εοικεν BT.

⁴ αὐτά W, Stobaeus; om. BT.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσμεν.

264 ΉΕ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλήν δόξης ἔχεις ὃ τι προσείπης αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΉΕ. Τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτό ¹ ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐ πάθος, ἄρ' οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλήν φαντασίαν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΉΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεούτης, B “φαίνεται” δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῇ τε αὐτῶν ἓνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΉΕ. Κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ἠύρέθη ψευδὴς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἢ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἢν ἐφοβήθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ζητοῦντες αὐτό;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατανοῶ.

48. ΉΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ' εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυ- C μῶμεν. ἐπεὶδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατ' εἶδη διαιρέσεων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίων δῆ;

ΉΕ. Διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἶδη δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικὴν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΉΕ. Καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἵπομεν ὡς ἀποροῦμεν εἰς ὁποτέραν θήσομεν.

¹ αὐτὸ Stobaeus; αὐτὴν BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, we know that.

STR. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

THEAET. No.

STR. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say "it seems" is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

¹ See 235 n ff.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἔτι μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὥς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἶδωλον οὔτε φάντασμα εἶη τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεύδος εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δ' οὔσα δόξα ψευδής, ἐγχαρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγχαρεῖ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἦν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πάλιν τοίνυν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ ἔκ προτεθέν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦπὶ δεξιὰ αἰ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἕως ἂν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λιπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα 265 μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιρούμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἵδεσιν ἐφαντάζεθ' ἡμῖν;

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. You are right.

STR. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

THEAET. True.

STR. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

THEAET. Yes, it is possible.

STR. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

THEAET. Right.

STR. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

¹ See 219.

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Νῦν δέ γ' ἐπειδὴ μιμητικὴ περιεῖληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα B διαιρετέον πρώτην. ἡ γάρ που μίμησις ποιήσεις τίς ἐστίν, εἰδῶλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἐκάστων· ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ποιητικῆς δὲ πρώτον δύο ἔστω μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν θεῖον, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπινον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕπω μεμάθηκα.

49. ΞΕ. Ποιητικὴν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἣτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μεμνήμεθα.

C ΞΕ. Ζῶα δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ριζῶν φύεται καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἡ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι χρώμενοι—

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

ΞΕ. Τῷ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τίνος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυοῦσης, ἡ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἴσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὲν¹ βλέπων εἰς σέ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἶεσθαί σε κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

ΞΕ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε

¹ μὲν b; μὴ BT.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. The divine and the human.

THEAET. I don't yet understand.

STR. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

THEAET. Yes, we remember.

STR. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God's workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

THEAET. What belief?

STR. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

THEAET. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

STR. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you

ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως
δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς
ἀναγκαίως ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ
δέ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν
Ε παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὕτη¹ πρόσσεισιν ἐφ' ἧς νῦν
ἔλκεσθαι φήσ, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ
γίγνεται ἂν· ἀλλὰ θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα
ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων
ξυνιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνῃ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν
λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ θεῖον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΞΕ. Τέμνε δὴ δυοῖν οὖσαις δίχα ἐκατέραν αὐθις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

266 ΞΕ. Ὅλον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν
ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὖ κατὰ μῆκος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τετμήσθω.

ΞΕ. Τέτταρα μὲν αὐτῆς οὕτω τὰ πάντα μέρη
γίνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο
δ' αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεῖα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τὰ δὲ γ' ὥς ἑτέρως αὖ διηρημένα, μέρος μὲν
ἐν ἀφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τὸ δ'
ὑπολοίπῳ σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἂν λεγοίσθην εἰδωλο-
ποικῶ· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ
διχῇ διαιρεῖται.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε ὅπη² ἐκατέρα αὐθις.

50. ΞΕ. Ἡμεῖς μὲν που καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ ἐξ
ᾧ τὰ πεφυκότες ἐστί, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων
ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργα-
σμένα ἕκαστα· ἢ πῶς;

¹ αὕτη W ; αὕτη B ; αὕτη T. ² ὅπη inferior mss.; ὅποι B¹.

THE SOPHIST

were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion ; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go ; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

THEAET. How ?

STR. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before ; now divide it lengthwise.

THEAET. Assume that it is done.

STR. In that way we now get four parts in all ; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making ; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

THEAET. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

STR. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not ?

PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΞΕ. Τούτων δέ γε ἐκάστων εἶδωλα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονία καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα;

ΞΕ. Τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις καὶ ὅσα μεθ' ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφῇ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ' ἀν φῶς οἰκεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεῖα εἰς ἐν ξυνελθὼν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰωθυίας ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἶδος ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα θείας ἔργα ποιήσεως, αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἶδωλον ἐκάστω.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δέ τιν' ἑτέραν, οἷον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινον ἐγρηγορόσιν ἀπειργασμένην;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο διττὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐ ποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, αὐτουργικῇ,¹ τὸ δὲ εἶδωλον εἰδωλοποιικῇ.²

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιητικῆς εἶδη· θείαν³ μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην⁴ κατὰ θάτερον τμήμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

¹ αὐτουργικῇ Heindorf; αὐτουργική BT.

² εἰδωλοποιικῇ Heindorf; εἰδωλοποιική BT.

³ θείαν Heindorf; θεία B; θεία T.

⁴ ἀνθρωπίνην Heindorf; ἀνθρωπίνη B; ἀνθρωπίνη T.

¹ This was the current explanation of reflection. Mirrors and smooth objects were supposed to contain a luminous principle which met on the smooth surface with the light

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.¹

THEAET. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

STR. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

THEAET. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

coming from the object reflected. So in the act of vision the fire within the eye united with the external fire (*Timaeus*, 46 A). The words τῆς ἐμπροσθεν . . . ἐναντίαν ἀποθῆναι refer to the transposition of right and left in the reflection (cf. *Theaetetus*, 193 c).

51. Ή. Τῆς τοίνυν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶ-
μεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικόν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἔμε-
λεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄντως ὃν ψεῦδος καὶ
τῶν ὄντων ἔν τι φανείη πεφυκός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

Ή. Οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κατ-
αριθμήσομεν αὐτῷ¹ νῦν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶδη
δύο;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

267 Ή. Τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὐθις διορίζωμεν
δίχα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

Ή. Τὸ μὲν δι' ὀργάνων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ
παρέχοντος ἑαυτὸν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιούντος τὸ
φάντασμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς;

Ή. Ὅταν, οἶμαι, τὸ σὸν σχῆμά τις τῷ ἑαυτοῦ
χρῶμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἢ φωνὴν φωνῇ
φαίνεσθαι ποιῇ, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φανταστικῆς
μάλιστα κέκληταί που.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ή. Μιμητικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὐτῆς προσειπόντες
ἀπονειμώμεθα². τὸ δ' ἄλλο πᾶν ἀφῶμεν μαλακι-
B σθέντες καὶ παρέντες ἐτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἓν
καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοῦναι τιν' αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.

Ή. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι διπλοῦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
ἄξιον ἡγεῖσθαι· δι' αὐτὸ δέ, σκόπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε.

Ή. Τῶν μιμουμένων οἱ μὲν εἰδότες ὁ μιμοῦνται

¹ αὐτῷ] αὐτῷ BT.

² ἀπονειμώμεθα W; ἀπονειμώμεθα BT.

THE SOPHIST

STR. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

THEAET. Yes, there were.

STR. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

THEAET. How?

STR. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

THEAET. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

STR. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

THEAET. Please do.

STR. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such

τοῦτο πράττουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐκ εἰδότες. καίτοι τίνα μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδεμίαν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδόντων ἦν μίμημα; τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γινώσκων ἄν τις μιμήσαιοτο.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης ξυλλήβδην ἀρετῆς; ἄρ' οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν, δοξάζοντες δέ πη, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσι πολλοὶ τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσι τοῦτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοί.

ΞΕ. Μῶν οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς ὄντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τοῦναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πᾶν.

ΞΕ. Μιμητὴν δὴ τοῦτόν γε ἕτερον ἐκείνου
D λεκτέον οἶμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γινώσκοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

52. ΞΕ. Πόθεν οὖν ὄνομα ἑκατέρῳ τις αὐτῶν λήψεται πρέπον; ἢ δῆλον δὴ χαλεπὸν ὄν, διότι τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ' εἶδη διαιρέσεως παλαιά τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀργία¹ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν, ὥστε μὴδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαι· καθὸ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν. ὁμῶς δέ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρῆσθαι, διαγνώσεως ἕνεκα τὴν μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικὴν

¹ ἀργία Madvig; αἰρία BT.

THE SOPHIST

knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

THEAET. None.

STR. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

THEAET. Yes, there are very many such people.

STR. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

THEAET. Quite the opposite.

STR. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is

Ἐπροσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικῆς
τινα μίμησιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

ΞΕ. Θατέρῳ τοίνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μιμουμένοις δῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Τὸν δοξομιμητὴν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὥσπερ
σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγῆς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ' ἔχων τινα
ἔστιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σκοπώμεν.

268 ΞΕ. Ἐχει τοίνυν καὶ μάλα συχνήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
εὐήθης αὐτῶν ἔστιν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ
δοξάζει· τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις κυλίνδῃσιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ φόβον,
ὥς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὥς εἰδὼς
ἐσχημάτισται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἑκατέρου γένους ὡς
εἴρηκας.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἀπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, τὸν
δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

ΞΕ. Τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ γένος ἐν ἡ δύο φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρα σύ.

B ΞΕ. Σκοπῶ· καὶ μοι διττῷ καταφαίνεσθόν
τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς
πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ
τε καὶ βραχείσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδια-
λεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα.

THE SOPHIST

based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. We must therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

THEAET. Let us do so.

STR. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

THEAET. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

STR. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

THEAET. That is reasonable, at any rate.

STR. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

THEAET. That is your affair.

STR. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes. I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

THEAET. You are quite right.

ΞΕ. Τίνα οὖν ἀποφαινόμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότῃρα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δημολογικόν.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ τὸν ἕτερον ἐροῦμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ¹ μὲν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἔθεμεν· μιμητὴς δ' ὢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἤδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσεῖπεν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκείνον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν, τοῦνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ ² δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστήν· εἶναι, τὰ ληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

¹ τὸ Stephanus ; τὸν BT.

² τὸ Schleiermacher ; τὸν BT.

THE SOPHIST

STR. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

THEAET. Popular orator.

STR. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

THEAET. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

STR. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

THEAET. Yes, he certainly will.

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